[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFE5CVKDVB08Q9M1GAR4T5":3,"skill-same:01M7DFE5CVKDVB08Q9M1GAR4T5":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFE5CVKDVB08Q9M1GAR4T5","upgradeable-proxy",null,"Proxy upgrade patterns and their bugs — uninitialized implementation, storage slot collisions, selector clashes, unprotected upgrade auth.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fupgradeable-proxy\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: upgradeable-proxy\ndescription: Proxy upgrade patterns and their bugs — uninitialized implementation, storage slot collisions, selector clashes, unprotected upgrade auth.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: smart-contracts\n  when_to_use: \"upgradeable proxy uups eip-1967 storage collision\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1190\n    - T1574\n---\n\n# Upgradeable Proxy Playbook\n\nProxies separate storage (proxy) from logic (implementation). The\nproxy `delegatecall`s into the implementation, executing logic in the\nproxy's storage context. Three common patterns:\n\n1. **Transparent Proxy** (OZ TransparentUpgradeableProxy)\n2. **UUPS** (OZ UUPSUpgradeable, OZ 4.1+)\n3. **Diamond \u002F EIP-2535** (multi-facet, much more complex)\n\nEach has distinct bug classes.\n\n## Audit checklist\n\n### 1. Uninitialized implementation\nImplementations should be initialized at deployment to prevent\nthird-party initialization:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable — anyone can call initialize() on the implementation\n\u002F\u002F directly (not via proxy) and become its owner\ncontract VulnImpl {\n    function initialize(address owner_) external {\n        owner = owner_;\n    }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Safe — disable initializers on impl deployment\ncontract SafeImpl is Initializable {\n    constructor() { _disableInitializers(); }\n\n    function initialize(address owner_) external initializer {\n        owner = owner_;\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Attack**: attacker calls `initialize` on the impl contract → becomes\n\"owner\" of the impl. While this doesn't immediately drain the proxy,\nit CAN matter if `_authorizeUpgrade` reads impl-side state, or if\nselfdestruct is exposed and impl auth is on owner. Past incident:\n**Parity multisig 2017** — $280M frozen.\n\n```bash\n# Find unprotected impl\ngrep -rn 'initialize\\|_disableInitializers' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. Storage slot collisions\nProxy and impl share storage. New impl versions must lay storage\nidentical to old:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F V1\ncontract LogicV1 {\n    address public owner;     \u002F\u002F slot 0\n    uint256 public total;     \u002F\u002F slot 1\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F V2 — BUG: inserted new var at top\ncontract LogicV2 {\n    uint256 public newVar;    \u002F\u002F slot 0 — overwrites owner!\n    address public owner;     \u002F\u002F slot 1\n    uint256 public total;     \u002F\u002F slot 2\n}\n```\n\nAfter upgrade, `owner` is read from where `total` was; arbitrary value.\n\n**Check**:\n- New vars only appended at the end\n- Inheritance order unchanged\n- OZ `__gap` reserved slots used in upgradeable libs\n\n```bash\n# OZ provides a tool\nslither-check-upgradeability V1.sol V2.sol --proxy-name MyProxy\n```\n\n### 3. Function selector collisions (Transparent Proxy specifically)\nTransparent proxy: if caller is admin → proxy admin functions; else →\ndelegatecall to impl. If impl has function with selector matching a\nproxy admin selector → admin sees impl, user sees impl, admin can never\ncall admin functions. Or worse, ABI-trickery.\n\n**Common collisions**:\n- `upgradeTo(address)`: selector `0x3659cfe6` — what if impl defines a `transferOwnership(address)` that hashes to the same selector?\n\nSlither auto-detects:\n```bash\nslither --print human-summary src\u002F | grep -i selector\n```\n\n### 4. `_authorizeUpgrade` empty \u002F wrong\nUUPS pattern: implementation contains the upgrade authorization. Default\nOZ `_authorizeUpgrade` is `internal virtual {}` — empty body that\n**reverts**, but the function itself is empty. Devs override it:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — empty body, no actual auth check\nfunction _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal override {}\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE\nfunction _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal override onlyOwner {}\n```\n\n**Attack**: anyone calls `upgradeTo(maliciousImpl)` → all storage now\ncontrolled by malicious code.\n\n```bash\ngrep -rn '_authorizeUpgrade' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 5. `delegatecall` to attacker-controlled address\nIf the impl contains a function that performs `delegatecall(arbitrary_address)`,\nattackers can pass their own contract → execute arbitrary code in\nproxy storage context, including selfdestruct.\n\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'delegatecall' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 6. Constructor logic in upgradeable contracts\nConstructors run on the implementation only — proxy storage is\nuntouched. Storage initialization must happen in `initialize()`. If\ncritical state is set in the constructor, the proxy will read zero\nvalues:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — admin set in constructor, proxy reads 0x0\ncontract Impl {\n    address public admin;\n    constructor() { admin = msg.sender; }  \u002F\u002F sets admin on IMPL only\n}\n```\n\n### 7. Diamond \u002F EIP-2535 specific bugs\n- **Facet selector collisions** — two facets define same selector\n- **Diamond storage** position not unique → cross-facet storage corruption\n- **`diamondCut` access control** — must be gated, often forgotten\n\n```bash\n# Inspect facet selectors\nslither . --print function-summary | grep -A1 'Facet'\n```\n\n### 8. Storage gap for inheritance\nOZ upgradeable libs use `uint256[N] private __gap;` to reserve slots\nfor future vars. Custom contracts inheriting them MUST preserve this:\n\n```solidity\ncontract MyToken is ERC20Upgradeable {\n    uint256 public myVar1;\n    uint256 public myVar2;\n    uint256[48] private __gap;  \u002F\u002F reserve 48 slots for future\n}\n```\n\nWithout `__gap`, future versions can't add fields without colliding\nwith parent contracts that also added fields.\n\n## PoC template (Foundry)\n```solidity\nfunction test_unauth_upgrade() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    address malicious = address(new MaliciousImpl());\n\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n    proxy.upgradeTo(malicious);  \u002F\u002F _authorizeUpgrade is empty\n\n    \u002F\u002F Now any call to proxy executes malicious code\n    proxy.balanceOf(attacker);  \u002F\u002F returns whatever malicious wants\n}\n\nfunction test_impl_init() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    address impl = address(proxy.implementation());\n\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n    IImpl(impl).initialize(attacker);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Attacker is \"owner\" of impl\n    \u002F\u002F Whether that matters depends on impl logic\n    assertEq(IImpl(impl).owner(), attacker);\n}\n\nfunction test_storage_collision() public {\n    \u002F\u002F Set state in V1\n    proxy.setOwner(address(this));\n    assertEq(proxy.owner(), address(this));\n\n    \u002F\u002F Upgrade to V2 which inserted a new var at slot 0\n    proxy.upgradeTo(address(new LogicV2()));\n\n    \u002F\u002F owner now reads from where total was — likely garbage\n    assertNotEq(proxy.owner(), address(this));\n}\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- Empty `_authorizeUpgrade`: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0 (Critical)\n- Uninitialized impl + selfdestruct path: 10.0\n- Storage collision discovered post-deployment: 9.0 (already-deployed bug, can't fix in place)\n- Selector collision: 8.0 (DoS or value manipulation)\n- Diamond facet collision: 8.0\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F UUPS template\ncontract MyContract is UUPSUpgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable {\n    constructor() { _disableInitializers(); }\n\n    function initialize(address owner_) external initializer {\n        __Ownable_init(owner_);\n        __UUPSUpgradeable_init();\n    }\n\n    function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override onlyOwner {}\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Storage layout discipline\ncontract MyToken is ERC20Upgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable {\n    \u002F\u002F V1 fields\n    uint256 public param1;\n    address public param2;\n\n    \u002F\u002F Reserved gap — DECREMENT this when adding fields\n    uint256[48] private __gap;\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Verify upgrade safety in CI\nforge test --match-contract Test_Upgrade\n# Plus run `slither-check-upgradeability V1 V2` in CI gate\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Parity multisig (Jul + Nov 2017): $30M stolen, $280M frozen — both proxy\u002Fimpl bugs\n- Audius (Jul 2022): $6M — unauth initializer on governance proxy\n- dForce (Apr 2020): $25M — proxy upgrade w\u002F broken token logic (ERC777 reentrancy via upgrade)\n- KILT Protocol (Mar 2022): bricked w\u002F storage collision after a botched upgrade\n- Compound (Sep 2021): $80M; not a proxy bug but a governance-deployed bug — upgrade triggered the issue\n- Beanstalk (Apr 2022): governance + flash-loan + immediate upgrade execution = drain\n- Curve (Jul 2023): $61M; Vyper compiler reentrancy in a proxy-deployed contract\n","# Upgradeable Proxy Playbook\n\nProxies separate storage (proxy) from logic (implementation). The\nproxy `delegatecall`s into the implementation, executing logic in the\nproxy's storage context. Three common patterns:\n\n1. **Transparent Proxy** (OZ TransparentUpgradeableProxy)\n2. **UUPS** (OZ UUPSUpgradeable, OZ 4.1+)\n3. **Diamond \u002F EIP-2535** (multi-facet, much more complex)\n\nEach has distinct bug classes.\n\n## Audit checklist\n\n### 1. Uninitialized implementation\nImplementations should be initialized at deployment to prevent\nthird-party initialization:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable — anyone can call initialize() on the implementation\n\u002F\u002F directly (not via proxy) and become its owner\ncontract VulnImpl {\n    function initialize(address owner_) external {\n        owner = owner_;\n    }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Safe — disable initializers on impl deployment\ncontract SafeImpl is Initializable {\n    constructor() { _disableInitializers(); }\n\n    function initialize(address owner_) external initializer {\n        owner = owner_;\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Attack**: attacker calls `initialize` on the impl contract → becomes\n\"owner\" of the impl. While this doesn't immediately drain the proxy,\nit CAN matter if `_authorizeUpgrade` reads impl-side state, or if\nselfdestruct is exposed and impl auth is on owner. Past incident:\n**Parity multisig 2017** — $280M frozen.\n\n```bash\n# Find unprotected impl\ngrep -rn 'initialize\\|_disableInitializers' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. Storage slot collisions\nProxy and impl share storage. New impl versions must lay storage\nidentical to old:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F V1\ncontract LogicV1 {\n    address public owner;     \u002F\u002F slot 0\n    uint256 public total;     \u002F\u002F slot 1\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F V2 — BUG: inserted new var at top\ncontract LogicV2 {\n    uint256 public newVar;    \u002F\u002F slot 0 — overwrites owner!\n    address public owner;     \u002F\u002F slot 1\n    uint256 public total;     \u002F\u002F slot 2\n}\n```\n\nAfter upgrade, `owner` is read from where `total` was; arbitrary value.\n\n**Check**:\n- New vars only appended at the end\n- Inheritance order unchanged\n- OZ `__gap` reserved slots used in upgradeable libs\n\n```bash\n# OZ provides a tool\nslither-check-upgradeability V1.sol V2.sol --proxy-name MyProxy\n```\n\n### 3. Function selector collisions (Transparent Proxy specifically)\nTransparent proxy: if caller is admin → proxy admin functions; else →\ndelegatecall to impl. If impl has function with selector matching a\nproxy admin selector → admin sees impl, user sees impl, admin can never\ncall admin functions. Or worse, ABI-trickery.\n\n**Common collisions**:\n- `upgradeTo(address)`: selector `0x3659cfe6` — what if impl defines a `transferOwnership(address)` that hashes to the same selector?\n\nSlither auto-detects:\n```bash\nslither --print human-summary src\u002F | grep -i selector\n```\n\n### 4. `_authorizeUpgrade` empty \u002F wrong\nUUPS pattern: implementation contains the upgrade authorization. Default\nOZ `_authorizeUpgrade` is `internal virtual {}` — empty body that\n**reverts**, but the function itself is empty. Devs override it:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — empty body, no actual auth check\nfunction _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal override {}\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE\nfunction _authorizeUpgrade(address newImplementation) internal override onlyOwner {}\n```\n\n**Attack**: anyone calls `upgradeTo(maliciousImpl)` → all storage now\ncontrolled by malicious code.\n\n```bash\ngrep -rn '_authorizeUpgrade' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 5. `delegatecall` to attacker-controlled address\nIf the impl contains a function that performs `delegatecall(arbitrary_address)`,\nattackers can pass their own contract → execute arbitrary code in\nproxy storage context, including selfdestruct.\n\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'delegatecall' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 6. Constructor logic in upgradeable contracts\nConstructors run on the implementation only — proxy storage is\nuntouched. Storage initialization must happen in `initialize()`. If\ncritical state is set in the constructor, the proxy will read zero\nvalues:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — admin set in constructor, proxy reads 0x0\ncontract Impl {\n    address public admin;\n    constructor() { admin = msg.sender; }  \u002F\u002F sets admin on IMPL only\n}\n```\n\n### 7. Diamond \u002F EIP-2535 specific bugs\n- **Facet selector collisions** — two facets define same selector\n- **Diamond storage** position not unique → cross-facet storage corruption\n- **`diamondCut` access control** — must be gated, often forgotten\n\n```bash\n# Inspect facet selectors\nslither . --print function-summary | grep -A1 'Facet'\n```\n\n### 8. Storage gap for inheritance\nOZ upgradeable libs use `uint256[N] private __gap;` to reserve slots\nfor future vars. Custom contracts inheriting them MUST preserve this:\n\n```solidity\ncontract MyToken is ERC20Upgradeable {\n    uint256 public myVar1;\n    uint256 public myVar2;\n    uint256[48] private __gap;  \u002F\u002F reserve 48 slots for future\n}\n```\n\nWithout `__gap`, future versions can't add fields without colliding\nwith parent contracts that also added fields.\n\n## PoC template (Foundry)\n```solidity\nfunction test_unauth_upgrade() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    address malicious = address(new MaliciousImpl());\n\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n    proxy.upgradeTo(malicious);  \u002F\u002F _authorizeUpgrade is empty\n\n    \u002F\u002F Now any call to proxy executes malicious code\n    proxy.balanceOf(attacker);  \u002F\u002F returns whatever malicious wants\n}\n\nfunction test_impl_init() public {\n    address attacker = address(0xBEEF);\n    address impl = address(proxy.implementation());\n\n    vm.prank(attacker);\n    IImpl(impl).initialize(attacker);\n\n    \u002F\u002F Attacker is \"owner\" of impl\n    \u002F\u002F Whether that matters depends on impl logic\n    assertEq(IImpl(impl).owner(), attacker);\n}\n\nfunction test_storage_collision() public {\n    \u002F\u002F Set state in V1\n    proxy.setOwner(address(this));\n    assertEq(proxy.owner(), address(this));\n\n    \u002F\u002F Upgrade to V2 which inserted a new var at slot 0\n    proxy.upgradeTo(address(new LogicV2()));\n\n    \u002F\u002F owner now reads from where total was — likely garbage\n    assertNotEq(proxy.owner(), address(this));\n}\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- Empty `_authorizeUpgrade`: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0 (Critical)\n- Uninitialized impl + selfdestruct path: 10.0\n- Storage collision discovered post-deployment: 9.0 (already-deployed bug, can't fix in place)\n- Selector collision: 8.0 (DoS or value manipulation)\n- Diamond facet collision: 8.0\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F UUPS template\ncontract MyContract is UUPSUpgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable {\n    constructor() { _disableInitializers(); }\n\n    function initialize(address owner_) external initializer {\n        __Ownable_init(owner_);\n        __UUPSUpgradeable_init();\n    }\n\n    function _authorizeUpgrade(address) internal override onlyOwner {}\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Storage layout discipline\ncontract MyToken is ERC20Upgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable {\n    \u002F\u002F V1 fields\n    uint256 public param1;\n    address public param2;\n\n    \u002F\u002F Reserved gap — DECREMENT this when adding fields\n    uint256[48] private __gap;\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Verify upgrade safety in CI\nforge test --match-contract Test_Upgrade\n# Plus run `slither-check-upgradeability V1 V2` in CI gate\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Parity multisig (Jul + Nov 2017): $30M stolen, $280M frozen — both proxy\u002Fimpl bugs\n- Audius (Jul 2022): $6M — unauth initializer on governance proxy\n- dForce (Apr 2020): $25M — proxy upgrade w\u002F broken token logic (ERC777 reentrancy via upgrade)\n- KILT Protocol (Mar 2022): bricked w\u002F storage collision after a botched upgrade\n- Compound (Sep 2021): $80M; not a proxy bug but a governance-deployed bug — upgrade triggered the issue\n- Beanstalk (Apr 2022): governance + flash-loan + immediate upgrade execution = drain\n- Curve (Jul 2023): $61M; Vyper compiler reentrancy in a proxy-deployed contract\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"smart-contracts","upgradeable proxy uups eip-1967 storage collision",[28,29],"T1190","T1574","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fupgradeable-proxy","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill upgradeable-proxy",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill upgradeable-proxy",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill upgradeable-proxy","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fupgradeable-proxy\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]