[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFDPVX2P92NWFY6GG5X9TS":3,"skill-same:01M7DFDPVX2P92NWFY6GG5X9TS":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFDPVX2P92NWFY6GG5X9TS","oracle-manipulation",null,"Hunt single-block oracle manipulation — spot-price AMM oracles, manipulable TWAP, dependent calculations, missing staleness checks.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Foracle-manipulation\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: oracle-manipulation\ndescription: Hunt single-block oracle manipulation — spot-price AMM oracles, manipulable TWAP, dependent calculations, missing staleness checks.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: smart-contracts\n  when_to_use: \"oracle manipulation twap price bypass\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1565.001\n    - T1190\n---\n\n# Oracle Manipulation Playbook\n\nDeFi protocols that read a price from an on-chain source are\nvulnerable when the source can be moved within a single transaction\nor block. Classic vectors:\n\n1. **Spot-price AMM oracle** — `reserve1 \u002F reserve0` of a Uniswap V2 pool. Anyone with enough capital (or a flash loan) can push the price for one block.\n2. **Manipulable TWAP** — short window TWAP, or TWAP over a low-liquidity pool.\n3. **Single Chainlink feed without staleness check** — feed returns 0 \u002F stale → uses 0 in math.\n4. **Custom oracle reading from manipulable storage** — e.g., a \"fair-price\" oracle that reads `totalSupply()` of an LP token alongside reserves.\n5. **L2 sequencer offline** — L2 oracles need a \"is sequencer up?\" check or attacker can exploit when sequencer downs and feeds freeze.\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Locate price-reading code\n```bash\n# Common patterns\ngrep -rn 'getReserves\\|getAmountsOut\\|getPriceFromSqrtPriceX96\\|latestAnswer\\|latestRoundData' src\u002F\n\n# Custom oracle reads\ngrep -rn 'IPriceOracle\\|getPrice\\|consult' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. Trace each price use\nFor each call:\n- Is the price read from a Uniswap V2 \u002F Sushi \u002F Camelot pool's reserves?\n  → spot price = manipulable\n- Is the price read from a Uniswap V3 pool's `slot0.sqrtPriceX96`?\n  → manipulable\n- Is it a Uniswap V3 TWAP via `OracleLibrary.consult`?\n  → check the secondsAgo window (>= 1800s = 30 min is the safe minimum)\n- Is it a Chainlink `latestRoundData()` call?\n  → check: is `updatedAt` validated? Is `answeredInRound >= roundId`? Is `answer > 0`? Are L2 sequencer feeds checked?\n\n### 3. Validate staleness handling\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F MISSING — vulnerable\n(, int256 price, , , ) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\n\n\u002F\u002F GOOD — explicit staleness + sequencer\n(uint80 roundId, int256 price, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\nrequire(price > 0, \"ORACLE_NEGATIVE\");\nrequire(updatedAt > block.timestamp - MAX_DELAY, \"ORACLE_STALE\");\nrequire(answeredInRound >= roundId, \"ORACLE_OLD_ROUND\");\n\u002F\u002F On L2: also check sequencer uptime feed (L2 SequencerUptimeFeed)\n```\n\n### 4. Trace the price's use\nThe bug isn't oracle-reading — it's oracle-trusting. Find where the\nprice drives a state change:\n- Liquidation thresholds\n- Collateral valuation\n- Borrow limits\n- Swap output amounts (slippage check)\n- LP token pricing for vaults\n\n## PoC via Foundry\n\n### Flash-loan price push (Uniswap V2 reserves)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Pseudo:\ncontract Test_oracle is Test {\n    function test_manipulate() public {\n        \u002F\u002F 1. Flash-loan WETH from Aave \u002F Balancer \u002F Uniswap V3\n        \u002F\u002F 2. Swap WETH → token in target pool, draining one side\n        \u002F\u002F 3. Reserves now skewed → spot price way off\n        \u002F\u002F 4. Call vulnerable protocol's price-dependent function\n        \u002F\u002F    (e.g., borrow USDC against overvalued collateral)\n        \u002F\u002F 5. Reverse the swap, repay flash loan\n        \u002F\u002F 6. Profit = whatever was extracted in step 4\n        assertGt(USDC.balanceOf(attacker), 0, \"should profit\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\nRaptix helper:\n```\nfoundry_oracle_test(target=\"LendingPool\", price_feed=\"UniV2Pair\",\n                    token0=\"WETH\", token1=\"TARGETTOKEN\", target_path=\"src\u002FLendingPool.sol\")\n```\n\n### Chainlink stale check missing\n```solidity\nfunction test_stale_price() public {\n    \u002F\u002F mock the feed to return updatedAt that's 24h old\n    vm.mockCall(\n        address(priceFeed),\n        abi.encodeWithSignature(\"latestRoundData()\"),\n        abi.encode(uint80(1), int256(STALE_PRICE), uint256(0), block.timestamp - 86400, uint80(1))\n    );\n\n    \u002F\u002F call function — should revert if staleness checked, should proceed if not\n    target.priceDependentFunction();\n    \u002F\u002F If we reach here w\u002Fo revert → bug\n}\n```\n\n## Severity calibration\n\n| Manipulation surface | Typical impact | Severity |\n|---|---|---|\n| Spot-price oracle drives liquidation | Drain LPs via fake liquidations | Critical |\n| Spot-price drives borrow limit | Borrow more than collateral worth | Critical |\n| TWAP \u003C 30 min | Still manipulable on low-liquidity pairs | High |\n| TWAP 30 min+ on high-liquidity ETH-USDC | Hard to exploit profitably | Medium-Low |\n| Missing staleness check, but feed updates often | Edge-case impact during outages | Medium |\n| L2 sequencer not checked | Exploitable during sequencer downtime | High (timing-dependent) |\n\n## CVSS\n- Spot-oracle + flash-loan available + drains protocol: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0 (Crit)\n- 30-min TWAP on illiquid pair: 7-8 (High)\n- Missing staleness + Chainlink usually fresh: 5-6 (Medium)\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Use Chainlink properly, not spot-price\nfunction getPrice() internal view returns (uint256) {\n    (uint80 roundId, int256 answer, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound)\n        = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\n    require(answer > 0, \"neg price\");\n    require(updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, \"stale\");\n    require(answeredInRound >= roundId, \"old round\");\n    \u002F\u002F L2 only:\n    (, int256 sequencerStatus, , uint256 sequencerStart, ) = sequencerFeed.latestRoundData();\n    require(sequencerStatus == 0, \"sequencer down\");\n    require(block.timestamp - sequencerStart > 1 hours, \"grace period\");\n    return uint256(answer);\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Where Chainlink unavailable: use 30+ min Uniswap V3 TWAP w\u002F deep-liquidity pool\nfunction getTwap(uint32 secondsAgo) internal view returns (uint160 sqrtPriceX96) {\n    (int24 arithmeticMeanTick, ) = OracleLibrary.consult(pool, secondsAgo);\n    return TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(arithmeticMeanTick);\n}\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- bZx Feb 2020: $645k via Synthetix sUSD spot-price oracle\n- Harvest Finance Oct 2020: $24M via Curve pool spot price\n- Cream Oct 2021: $130M via Yearn share-price manipulation\n- Mango Markets Oct 2022: $114M via MNGO spot price on AMM\n- Avraham Eisenberg's pattern, exactly: deposit small collateral, manipulate oracle, borrow against inflated value\n- Inverse Finance Apr 2022: $15M via INV\u002FETH spot price\n- Beanstalk Apr 2022: $182M via governance + flash-loan oracle (different but related)\n","# Oracle Manipulation Playbook\n\nDeFi protocols that read a price from an on-chain source are\nvulnerable when the source can be moved within a single transaction\nor block. Classic vectors:\n\n1. **Spot-price AMM oracle** — `reserve1 \u002F reserve0` of a Uniswap V2 pool. Anyone with enough capital (or a flash loan) can push the price for one block.\n2. **Manipulable TWAP** — short window TWAP, or TWAP over a low-liquidity pool.\n3. **Single Chainlink feed without staleness check** — feed returns 0 \u002F stale → uses 0 in math.\n4. **Custom oracle reading from manipulable storage** — e.g., a \"fair-price\" oracle that reads `totalSupply()` of an LP token alongside reserves.\n5. **L2 sequencer offline** — L2 oracles need a \"is sequencer up?\" check or attacker can exploit when sequencer downs and feeds freeze.\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Locate price-reading code\n```bash\n# Common patterns\ngrep -rn 'getReserves\\|getAmountsOut\\|getPriceFromSqrtPriceX96\\|latestAnswer\\|latestRoundData' src\u002F\n\n# Custom oracle reads\ngrep -rn 'IPriceOracle\\|getPrice\\|consult' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. Trace each price use\nFor each call:\n- Is the price read from a Uniswap V2 \u002F Sushi \u002F Camelot pool's reserves?\n  → spot price = manipulable\n- Is the price read from a Uniswap V3 pool's `slot0.sqrtPriceX96`?\n  → manipulable\n- Is it a Uniswap V3 TWAP via `OracleLibrary.consult`?\n  → check the secondsAgo window (>= 1800s = 30 min is the safe minimum)\n- Is it a Chainlink `latestRoundData()` call?\n  → check: is `updatedAt` validated? Is `answeredInRound >= roundId`? Is `answer > 0`? Are L2 sequencer feeds checked?\n\n### 3. Validate staleness handling\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F MISSING — vulnerable\n(, int256 price, , , ) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\n\n\u002F\u002F GOOD — explicit staleness + sequencer\n(uint80 roundId, int256 price, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\nrequire(price > 0, \"ORACLE_NEGATIVE\");\nrequire(updatedAt > block.timestamp - MAX_DELAY, \"ORACLE_STALE\");\nrequire(answeredInRound >= roundId, \"ORACLE_OLD_ROUND\");\n\u002F\u002F On L2: also check sequencer uptime feed (L2 SequencerUptimeFeed)\n```\n\n### 4. Trace the price's use\nThe bug isn't oracle-reading — it's oracle-trusting. Find where the\nprice drives a state change:\n- Liquidation thresholds\n- Collateral valuation\n- Borrow limits\n- Swap output amounts (slippage check)\n- LP token pricing for vaults\n\n## PoC via Foundry\n\n### Flash-loan price push (Uniswap V2 reserves)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Pseudo:\ncontract Test_oracle is Test {\n    function test_manipulate() public {\n        \u002F\u002F 1. Flash-loan WETH from Aave \u002F Balancer \u002F Uniswap V3\n        \u002F\u002F 2. Swap WETH → token in target pool, draining one side\n        \u002F\u002F 3. Reserves now skewed → spot price way off\n        \u002F\u002F 4. Call vulnerable protocol's price-dependent function\n        \u002F\u002F    (e.g., borrow USDC against overvalued collateral)\n        \u002F\u002F 5. Reverse the swap, repay flash loan\n        \u002F\u002F 6. Profit = whatever was extracted in step 4\n        assertGt(USDC.balanceOf(attacker), 0, \"should profit\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\nRaptix helper:\n```\nfoundry_oracle_test(target=\"LendingPool\", price_feed=\"UniV2Pair\",\n                    token0=\"WETH\", token1=\"TARGETTOKEN\", target_path=\"src\u002FLendingPool.sol\")\n```\n\n### Chainlink stale check missing\n```solidity\nfunction test_stale_price() public {\n    \u002F\u002F mock the feed to return updatedAt that's 24h old\n    vm.mockCall(\n        address(priceFeed),\n        abi.encodeWithSignature(\"latestRoundData()\"),\n        abi.encode(uint80(1), int256(STALE_PRICE), uint256(0), block.timestamp - 86400, uint80(1))\n    );\n\n    \u002F\u002F call function — should revert if staleness checked, should proceed if not\n    target.priceDependentFunction();\n    \u002F\u002F If we reach here w\u002Fo revert → bug\n}\n```\n\n## Severity calibration\n\n| Manipulation surface | Typical impact | Severity |\n|---|---|---|\n| Spot-price oracle drives liquidation | Drain LPs via fake liquidations | Critical |\n| Spot-price drives borrow limit | Borrow more than collateral worth | Critical |\n| TWAP \u003C 30 min | Still manipulable on low-liquidity pairs | High |\n| TWAP 30 min+ on high-liquidity ETH-USDC | Hard to exploit profitably | Medium-Low |\n| Missing staleness check, but feed updates often | Edge-case impact during outages | Medium |\n| L2 sequencer not checked | Exploitable during sequencer downtime | High (timing-dependent) |\n\n## CVSS\n- Spot-oracle + flash-loan available + drains protocol: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0 (Crit)\n- 30-min TWAP on illiquid pair: 7-8 (High)\n- Missing staleness + Chainlink usually fresh: 5-6 (Medium)\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Use Chainlink properly, not spot-price\nfunction getPrice() internal view returns (uint256) {\n    (uint80 roundId, int256 answer, , uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound)\n        = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\n    require(answer > 0, \"neg price\");\n    require(updatedAt > block.timestamp - 1 hours, \"stale\");\n    require(answeredInRound >= roundId, \"old round\");\n    \u002F\u002F L2 only:\n    (, int256 sequencerStatus, , uint256 sequencerStart, ) = sequencerFeed.latestRoundData();\n    require(sequencerStatus == 0, \"sequencer down\");\n    require(block.timestamp - sequencerStart > 1 hours, \"grace period\");\n    return uint256(answer);\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Where Chainlink unavailable: use 30+ min Uniswap V3 TWAP w\u002F deep-liquidity pool\nfunction getTwap(uint32 secondsAgo) internal view returns (uint160 sqrtPriceX96) {\n    (int24 arithmeticMeanTick, ) = OracleLibrary.consult(pool, secondsAgo);\n    return TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(arithmeticMeanTick);\n}\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- bZx Feb 2020: $645k via Synthetix sUSD spot-price oracle\n- Harvest Finance Oct 2020: $24M via Curve pool spot price\n- Cream Oct 2021: $130M via Yearn share-price manipulation\n- Mango Markets Oct 2022: $114M via MNGO spot price on AMM\n- Avraham Eisenberg's pattern, exactly: deposit small collateral, manipulate oracle, borrow against inflated value\n- Inverse Finance Apr 2022: $15M via INV\u002FETH spot price\n- Beanstalk Apr 2022: $182M via governance + flash-loan oracle (different but related)\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"smart-contracts","oracle manipulation twap price bypass",[28,29],"T1565.001","T1190","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Foracle-manipulation","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill oracle-manipulation",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill oracle-manipulation",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill oracle-manipulation","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Foracle-manipulation\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]