[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFD9RRHJP64XG0DM553T1R":3,"skill-same:01M7DFD9RRHJP64XG0DM553T1R":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFD9RRHJP64XG0DM553T1R","contracts-governance-attack",null,"DAO governance attack — flash-loan-backed vote manipulation, delegation hijack, quorum dilution, proposal-spam DoS, time-lock bypass via emergency multisig, snapshot vs. on-chain vote desync, Compound\u002FAave\u002FUniswap-style GovernorBravo abuse.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fgovernance-attack\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: contracts-governance-attack\ndescription: \"DAO governance attack — flash-loan-backed vote manipulation, delegation hijack, quorum dilution, proposal-spam DoS, time-lock bypass via emergency multisig, snapshot vs. on-chain vote desync, Compound\u002FAave\u002FUniswap-style GovernorBravo abuse.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"dao governance vote proposal governorbravo compound aave uniswap snapshot timelock multisig delegation flash loan quorum\"\n  subdomain: contracts\n  tags: defi, dao, governance, flash-loan\n  mitre_attack: T1565.001, T1190\n---\n\n# DAO Governance Attack\n\nDAOs delegate real financial control — treasury, upgrade authority,\nparameter changes — to a token-weighted vote. Every mechanism that\nturns \"tokens\" into \"a passed proposal\" (vote counting, delegation,\nquorum, time-locks, off-chain signaling) is a separate attack surface.\n\n## Attack classes\n\n### 1. Flash-loan-backed vote\nDAOs that grant voting power = current token balance (not snapshot of past balance) are vulnerable:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Attack: borrow governance token, vote, return loan, all in one tx\nfunction attack() external {\n    \u002F\u002F 1. Flash-borrow gov tokens\n    IFlashLoan(aave).flashLoan(address(this), govToken, 1_000_000e18, \"\");\n}\nfunction executeOperation(...) external {\n    \u002F\u002F 2. Vote on the malicious proposal\n    governor.castVote(proposalId, 1);   \u002F\u002F 1 = for\n    \u002F\u002F 3. Repay loan + premium (automatic by flash-loan callback)\n}\n```\n\nThis is what happened to Beanstalk (April 2022, $182M loss) — attacker flash-borrowed Beanstalk gov tokens, voted to drain the treasury, repaid the loan. Same block.\n\n**Defense check:** Does `getVotes(address, blockNumber)` reference a past snapshot? If yes (Compound's GovernorBravo pattern, OZ Governor with `ERC20Votes` + `getPastVotes`), flash-loan vote doesn't work.\n\n### 2. Delegation hijack\nERC20Votes lets users delegate. If a contract holds gov tokens and delegates to itself, controlling that contract = controlling the votes.\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F If the target DAO has a contract holding tokens that delegates to itself,\n\u002F\u002F and that contract is upgradeable\u002Fhas an admin function:\nupgradeableContract.upgradeAndCall(newImpl, abi.encodeWithSelector(redelegate.selector, attacker));\n\u002F\u002F Now attacker controls those votes.\n```\n\n### 3. Quorum dilution attack\nIf quorum = % of total supply (not % of currently-active voters), an attacker can mint or stake extra tokens to push quorum out of reach:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Some DAOs base quorum on totalSupply()\n\u002F\u002F Attacker mints a bunch of tokens to themselves (via legit minting if they're holder)\n\u002F\u002F Quorum requirement now too high for real voters to meet → all proposals fail\n```\n\n### 4. Proposal spam DoS\nGovernorBravo has a proposalThreshold. If low, attacker spams proposals to:\n- Burn proposers' gas\n- Confuse the UI\n- Push real proposals out of the active window\n\n### 5. Time-lock bypass via emergency multisig\nMost DAOs have a \"Security Council\" or \"Emergency Multisig\" that can execute without time-lock for emergencies. If signers can be socially engineered, phished, or are compromised: instant treasury drain.\n\nCheck: `timelock.executor()` — if it's a multisig and you can compromise N-of-M signers, the time-lock is illusory.\n\n### 6. Snapshot vs. on-chain desync\nOff-chain Snapshot.org votes use signed messages. If the DAO trusts Snapshot results and executes via a relayer:\n- Forge votes by sniping pending signed messages\n- Bribe voters off-chain (cheaper than on-chain)\n- Replay signed messages on a fork\n\n### 7. Proposal-script slippage\nGovernorBravo proposals execute calldata. If the proposal description and the actual calldata don't match, voters approve one thing while approving another:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Description: \"Allocate 1000 USDC to grants\"\n\u002F\u002F Actual calldata: transfer(attacker, 1_000_000e6)\n\u002F\u002F Voters who don't decode calldata get rugged.\n```\n\n## Recon\n\n```bash\n# Identify the governance contract\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $TIMELOCK \"getMinDelay()(uint256)\"\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $GOVERNOR \"votingPeriod()(uint256)\"\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $GOVERNOR \"proposalThreshold()(uint256)\"\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $GOVERNOR \"quorum(uint256)(uint256)\" $BLOCK\n\n# Compound\u002FAave\u002FUniswap-style: Get GovernorBravo state\nforge inspect GovernorBravoDelegate storage-layout\n\n# List active proposals\ncast logs --rpc-url $RPC --address $GOVERNOR \\\n  --from-block latest:-1000 \\\n  \"ProposalCreated(uint256,address,address[],uint256[],string[],bytes[],uint256,uint256,string)\"\n```\n\n## Defender's checklist (the audit you're trying to defeat)\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| `getVotes` uses past-block snapshot | Can't flash-loan-vote — find delegation-hijack instead |\n| Two-step time-lock (queue + execute) | Can't bypass without compromised emergency multisig |\n| `proposalThreshold > 0` | Can't spam — but might still be cheap |\n| Off-chain vote (Snapshot) → on-chain by N-of-M multisig | Replace at the multisig layer |\n\n## Tooling\n\n```bash\n# Tally, Boardroom — DAO dashboards (find target governance contracts)\n# Forge \u002F Foundry — simulate the attack on a fork\nforge test --fork-url $RPC --match-test test_governance_drain\n# Tenderly — live transaction simulation against fork\n```\n\n## References\n\n- \"Beanstalk Governance Attack\" post-mortems (Beanstalk Farms, April 2022)\n- Compound GovernorBravo audit reports (OpenZeppelin)\n- \"Slippage in Governance Proposals\" — Trail of Bits research\n- Devcon Bogota talks on governance security\n","# DAO Governance Attack\n\nDAOs delegate real financial control — treasury, upgrade authority,\nparameter changes — to a token-weighted vote. Every mechanism that\nturns \"tokens\" into \"a passed proposal\" (vote counting, delegation,\nquorum, time-locks, off-chain signaling) is a separate attack surface.\n\n## Attack classes\n\n### 1. Flash-loan-backed vote\nDAOs that grant voting power = current token balance (not snapshot of past balance) are vulnerable:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Attack: borrow governance token, vote, return loan, all in one tx\nfunction attack() external {\n    \u002F\u002F 1. Flash-borrow gov tokens\n    IFlashLoan(aave).flashLoan(address(this), govToken, 1_000_000e18, \"\");\n}\nfunction executeOperation(...) external {\n    \u002F\u002F 2. Vote on the malicious proposal\n    governor.castVote(proposalId, 1);   \u002F\u002F 1 = for\n    \u002F\u002F 3. Repay loan + premium (automatic by flash-loan callback)\n}\n```\n\nThis is what happened to Beanstalk (April 2022, $182M loss) — attacker flash-borrowed Beanstalk gov tokens, voted to drain the treasury, repaid the loan. Same block.\n\n**Defense check:** Does `getVotes(address, blockNumber)` reference a past snapshot? If yes (Compound's GovernorBravo pattern, OZ Governor with `ERC20Votes` + `getPastVotes`), flash-loan vote doesn't work.\n\n### 2. Delegation hijack\nERC20Votes lets users delegate. If a contract holds gov tokens and delegates to itself, controlling that contract = controlling the votes.\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F If the target DAO has a contract holding tokens that delegates to itself,\n\u002F\u002F and that contract is upgradeable\u002Fhas an admin function:\nupgradeableContract.upgradeAndCall(newImpl, abi.encodeWithSelector(redelegate.selector, attacker));\n\u002F\u002F Now attacker controls those votes.\n```\n\n### 3. Quorum dilution attack\nIf quorum = % of total supply (not % of currently-active voters), an attacker can mint or stake extra tokens to push quorum out of reach:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Some DAOs base quorum on totalSupply()\n\u002F\u002F Attacker mints a bunch of tokens to themselves (via legit minting if they're holder)\n\u002F\u002F Quorum requirement now too high for real voters to meet → all proposals fail\n```\n\n### 4. Proposal spam DoS\nGovernorBravo has a proposalThreshold. If low, attacker spams proposals to:\n- Burn proposers' gas\n- Confuse the UI\n- Push real proposals out of the active window\n\n### 5. Time-lock bypass via emergency multisig\nMost DAOs have a \"Security Council\" or \"Emergency Multisig\" that can execute without time-lock for emergencies. If signers can be socially engineered, phished, or are compromised: instant treasury drain.\n\nCheck: `timelock.executor()` — if it's a multisig and you can compromise N-of-M signers, the time-lock is illusory.\n\n### 6. Snapshot vs. on-chain desync\nOff-chain Snapshot.org votes use signed messages. If the DAO trusts Snapshot results and executes via a relayer:\n- Forge votes by sniping pending signed messages\n- Bribe voters off-chain (cheaper than on-chain)\n- Replay signed messages on a fork\n\n### 7. Proposal-script slippage\nGovernorBravo proposals execute calldata. If the proposal description and the actual calldata don't match, voters approve one thing while approving another:\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Description: \"Allocate 1000 USDC to grants\"\n\u002F\u002F Actual calldata: transfer(attacker, 1_000_000e6)\n\u002F\u002F Voters who don't decode calldata get rugged.\n```\n\n## Recon\n\n```bash\n# Identify the governance contract\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $TIMELOCK \"getMinDelay()(uint256)\"\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $GOVERNOR \"votingPeriod()(uint256)\"\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $GOVERNOR \"proposalThreshold()(uint256)\"\ncast call --rpc-url $RPC $GOVERNOR \"quorum(uint256)(uint256)\" $BLOCK\n\n# Compound\u002FAave\u002FUniswap-style: Get GovernorBravo state\nforge inspect GovernorBravoDelegate storage-layout\n\n# List active proposals\ncast logs --rpc-url $RPC --address $GOVERNOR \\\n  --from-block latest:-1000 \\\n  \"ProposalCreated(uint256,address,address[],uint256[],string[],bytes[],uint256,uint256,string)\"\n```\n\n## Defender's checklist (the audit you're trying to defeat)\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| `getVotes` uses past-block snapshot | Can't flash-loan-vote — find delegation-hijack instead |\n| Two-step time-lock (queue + execute) | Can't bypass without compromised emergency multisig |\n| `proposalThreshold > 0` | Can't spam — but might still be cheap |\n| Off-chain vote (Snapshot) → on-chain by N-of-M multisig | Replace at the multisig layer |\n\n## Tooling\n\n```bash\n# Tally, Boardroom — DAO dashboards (find target governance contracts)\n# Forge \u002F Foundry — simulate the attack on a fork\nforge test --fork-url $RPC --match-test test_governance_drain\n# Tenderly — live transaction simulation against fork\n```\n\n## References\n\n- \"Beanstalk Governance Attack\" post-mortems (Beanstalk Farms, April 2022)\n- Compound GovernorBravo audit reports (OpenZeppelin)\n- \"Slippage in Governance Proposals\" — Trail of Bits research\n- Devcon Bogota talks on governance security\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"defi, dao, governance, flash-loan","contracts","dao governance vote proposal governorbravo compound aave uniswap snapshot timelock multisig delegation flash loan quorum","T1565.001, T1190","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fgovernance-attack","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill contracts-governance-attack",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill contracts-governance-attack",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix 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The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]