[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFD3X0HA2QGQF74ZMT4T3Y":3,"skill-same:01M7DFD3X0HA2QGQF74ZMT4T3Y":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFD3X0HA2QGQF74ZMT4T3Y","flash-loan",null,"Flash-loan exploit patterns — callback reentrancy, oracle amplification, governance attacks, unauthenticated callback handlers.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fflash-loan\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: flash-loan\ndescription: Flash-loan exploit patterns — callback reentrancy, oracle amplification, governance attacks, unauthenticated callback handlers.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: smart-contracts\n  when_to_use: \"flash loan aave dydx balancer composition\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1190\n    - T1565.001\n---\n\n# Flash Loan Attack Playbook\n\nFlash loans give the attacker uncollateralized capital for a single\ntransaction. They're not vulnerabilities themselves — they're a force\nmultiplier for existing bugs. Sources: Aave, Balancer, Uniswap V2\u002FV3,\nMaker, dYdX (deprecated).\n\n## Common attack patterns\n\n### 1. Oracle amplification (most common)\nUse loan to push a price, then trigger price-dependent action.\n**Cross-reference**: see `oracle-manipulation\u002FSKILL.md`.\n\n### 2. Unauthenticated callback handler\n```solidity\nfunction executeOperation(\n    address[] calldata assets,\n    uint256[] calldata amounts,\n    uint256[] calldata premiums,\n    address initiator,                     \u002F\u002F ← UNVALIDATED in many contracts\n    bytes calldata params\n) external returns (bool) {\n    \u002F\u002F Anyone can call this with fake `initiator`\n    \u002F\u002F and have the contract do whatever the params say\n}\n```\n**Bug**: `initiator` and `msg.sender == pool` checks are missing.\n**Attack**: call `executeOperation` directly with no actual loan, malicious `params` → contract does the operation anyway.\n\n### 3. Governance attack via flash loan\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable governance:\nfunction propose() external {\n    require(getVotes(msg.sender) > THRESHOLD);\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n}\nfunction getVotes(address user) public view returns (uint256) {\n    return token.balanceOf(user);  \u002F\u002F ← reads SPOT balance, not snapshot\n}\n```\n**Attack**: flash-loan governance tokens, propose malicious change (e.g., upgrade contract to drain), vote with the loaned tokens, execute, repay loan. **MakerDAO** had this pattern; mitigated by checkpoint-based voting.\n\n### 4. Liquidity manipulation\nPool that uses `totalSupply()` or `balanceOf(pool)` for share math:\n```solidity\nfunction deposit(uint256 amt) external {\n    uint256 shares = (amt * totalSupply()) \u002F underlying.balanceOf(address(this));\n    _mint(msg.sender, shares);\n    underlying.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amt);\n}\n```\nAttacker:\n1. Flash-loan and deposit (becomes 99% of pool)\n2. Donate underlying to inflate `underlying.balanceOf` artificially\n3. Next depositor's shares = `amt * totalSupply \u002F inflatedBalance` ≈ 0\n4. Withdraw → drain\nThis is the **ERC4626 inflation attack** (also covered in `reentrancy\u002F` overlap).\n\n### 5. Liquidation arbitrage gone wrong\nA liquidator that uses flash loans to repay debt before claiming\ncollateral — usually benign. The bug: liquidation health check happens\n*before* the seizure, but the seizure happens via callback into a\nmanipulable function. Reentrancy + oracle dependent.\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Locate flash-loan integrations\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'executeOperation\\|flashLoan\\|onFlashLoan\\|flashCallback\\|aaveFlashLoan' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. For each handler\nCheck:\n- `msg.sender == known_pool` (whitelist callback origin)\n- `initiator == address(this)` (only respond to your own loans)\n- ReentrancyGuard on the public function that *takes* the loan\n- The fee is correctly accounted (`amounts[i] + premiums[i]` is repaid)\n\n### 3. For each price-reading function\nSee `oracle-manipulation\u002FSKILL.md`.\n\n### 4. For each share-mint \u002F share-burn function\nCheck `ERC4626` virtual-shares mitigation:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F OpenZeppelin ERC4626 v4.7+\nfunction _convertToShares(uint256 assets, MathUpgradeable.Rounding rounding) internal view virtual override returns (uint256) {\n    return _initialConvertToShares(assets, rounding);  \u002F\u002F adds 10**18 to total supply for share calc\n}\n```\nIf using legacy ERC4626 or custom vault math, write a Foundry test that:\n1. Attacker deposits 1 wei → gets 1 share\n2. Attacker direct-transfers 1e18 underlying to vault\n3. Victim deposits 1e18 → gets 0 shares (rounding)\n4. Attacker withdraws 1 share → gets 100% of pool\n\n```\nfoundry_inflation_test(vault_address=\"...\", underlying=\"...\", target_path=\"src\u002FVault.sol\")\n```\n\n## Severity calibration\n\n| Pattern | Severity if confirmed |\n|---|---|\n| Unauth callback handler → arbitrary execution | Critical 10.0 |\n| Flash-loan oracle manipulation drains protocol | Critical 9-10 |\n| Governance attack possible | Critical 9-10 (if exec results in fund loss) |\n| ERC4626 inflation attack on live vault | Critical 9 |\n| Liquidation reentrancy via callback | High 8 |\n| Theoretical (low liquidity, manipulation cost > attack profit) | Medium-Low |\n\n## PoC template (Foundry)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.0;\n\nimport \"forge-std\u002FTest.sol\";\nimport \"@aave-v3\u002Finterfaces\u002FIPool.sol\";\n\ncontract Test_FlashAttack is Test {\n    IPool constant AAVE = IPool(0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2);\n    address constant TARGET = 0x...;\n    address constant ATTACKER = address(0xBEEF);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.createSelectFork(\"https:\u002F\u002Feth-mainnet...\u002F\u003Cblock>\");\n    }\n\n    function test_drain() public {\n        vm.startPrank(ATTACKER);\n        uint256 beforeBal = WETH.balanceOf(ATTACKER);\n\n        \u002F\u002F Request 10000 WETH flash loan\n        address[] memory assets = new address[](1);\n        assets[0] = address(WETH);\n        uint256[] memory amts = new uint256[](1);\n        amts[0] = 10000 ether;\n        uint256[] memory modes = new uint256[](1);  \u002F\u002F 0 = repay full\n\n        AAVE.flashLoan(address(this), assets, amts, modes, address(this), \"\", 0);\n\n        uint256 afterBal = WETH.balanceOf(ATTACKER);\n        assertGt(afterBal, beforeBal + 100 ether, \"should profit\");\n    }\n\n    function executeOperation(\n        address[] calldata assets,\n        uint256[] calldata amts,\n        uint256[] calldata premiums,\n        address initiator,\n        bytes calldata\n    ) external returns (bool) {\n        \u002F\u002F 1. Use loaned funds to manipulate TARGET\n        \u002F\u002F 2. Profit\n        \u002F\u002F 3. Repay\n        IERC20(assets[0]).approve(address(AAVE), amts[0] + premiums[0]);\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## OPSEC (operational, not blue team — this is on-chain)\nFlash-loan attacks leave a single transaction trail visible to:\n- Mempool watchers \u002F Flashbots inspectors\n- MEV bots that may front-run if not using private mempool\n- Risk dashboards (DefiLlama, Forta, Cyfrin)\n\nFor audit-PoC purposes (not live exploit) just use a forked anvil.\n\n## Defender remediation\n1. **Snapshot-based governance** — vote based on historical balance, not spot\n2. **TWAP oracles only** — never spot price for trust-critical decisions\n3. **Validate flash callback origin** — `require(msg.sender == knownPool && initiator == address(this))`\n4. **ERC4626 OpenZeppelin v4.7+** — virtual shares mitigation\n5. **Initial deposit by deployer** — seed the vault with 10**18 underlying before opening, makes inflation impractical\n\n## Known exemplars\n- bZx 1 (Feb 2020): $350k flash-loan oracle attack\n- bZx 2 (Feb 2020): $645k Synthetix sUSD attack\n- Beanstalk (Apr 2022): $182M flash-loan governance attack\n- Euler (Mar 2023): $197M; donateToReserves bug + flash loan\n- Mango (Oct 2022): $114M oracle + flash loan\n- Cream (Oct 2021): $130M via yUSD oracle\n- KyberSwap (Nov 2023): $48.5M via concentrated-liquidity edge case + flash loan\n","# Flash Loan Attack Playbook\n\nFlash loans give the attacker uncollateralized capital for a single\ntransaction. They're not vulnerabilities themselves — they're a force\nmultiplier for existing bugs. Sources: Aave, Balancer, Uniswap V2\u002FV3,\nMaker, dYdX (deprecated).\n\n## Common attack patterns\n\n### 1. Oracle amplification (most common)\nUse loan to push a price, then trigger price-dependent action.\n**Cross-reference**: see `oracle-manipulation\u002FSKILL.md`.\n\n### 2. Unauthenticated callback handler\n```solidity\nfunction executeOperation(\n    address[] calldata assets,\n    uint256[] calldata amounts,\n    uint256[] calldata premiums,\n    address initiator,                     \u002F\u002F ← UNVALIDATED in many contracts\n    bytes calldata params\n) external returns (bool) {\n    \u002F\u002F Anyone can call this with fake `initiator`\n    \u002F\u002F and have the contract do whatever the params say\n}\n```\n**Bug**: `initiator` and `msg.sender == pool` checks are missing.\n**Attack**: call `executeOperation` directly with no actual loan, malicious `params` → contract does the operation anyway.\n\n### 3. Governance attack via flash loan\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable governance:\nfunction propose() external {\n    require(getVotes(msg.sender) > THRESHOLD);\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n}\nfunction getVotes(address user) public view returns (uint256) {\n    return token.balanceOf(user);  \u002F\u002F ← reads SPOT balance, not snapshot\n}\n```\n**Attack**: flash-loan governance tokens, propose malicious change (e.g., upgrade contract to drain), vote with the loaned tokens, execute, repay loan. **MakerDAO** had this pattern; mitigated by checkpoint-based voting.\n\n### 4. Liquidity manipulation\nPool that uses `totalSupply()` or `balanceOf(pool)` for share math:\n```solidity\nfunction deposit(uint256 amt) external {\n    uint256 shares = (amt * totalSupply()) \u002F underlying.balanceOf(address(this));\n    _mint(msg.sender, shares);\n    underlying.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amt);\n}\n```\nAttacker:\n1. Flash-loan and deposit (becomes 99% of pool)\n2. Donate underlying to inflate `underlying.balanceOf` artificially\n3. Next depositor's shares = `amt * totalSupply \u002F inflatedBalance` ≈ 0\n4. Withdraw → drain\nThis is the **ERC4626 inflation attack** (also covered in `reentrancy\u002F` overlap).\n\n### 5. Liquidation arbitrage gone wrong\nA liquidator that uses flash loans to repay debt before claiming\ncollateral — usually benign. The bug: liquidation health check happens\n*before* the seizure, but the seizure happens via callback into a\nmanipulable function. Reentrancy + oracle dependent.\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Locate flash-loan integrations\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'executeOperation\\|flashLoan\\|onFlashLoan\\|flashCallback\\|aaveFlashLoan' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. For each handler\nCheck:\n- `msg.sender == known_pool` (whitelist callback origin)\n- `initiator == address(this)` (only respond to your own loans)\n- ReentrancyGuard on the public function that *takes* the loan\n- The fee is correctly accounted (`amounts[i] + premiums[i]` is repaid)\n\n### 3. For each price-reading function\nSee `oracle-manipulation\u002FSKILL.md`.\n\n### 4. For each share-mint \u002F share-burn function\nCheck `ERC4626` virtual-shares mitigation:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F OpenZeppelin ERC4626 v4.7+\nfunction _convertToShares(uint256 assets, MathUpgradeable.Rounding rounding) internal view virtual override returns (uint256) {\n    return _initialConvertToShares(assets, rounding);  \u002F\u002F adds 10**18 to total supply for share calc\n}\n```\nIf using legacy ERC4626 or custom vault math, write a Foundry test that:\n1. Attacker deposits 1 wei → gets 1 share\n2. Attacker direct-transfers 1e18 underlying to vault\n3. Victim deposits 1e18 → gets 0 shares (rounding)\n4. Attacker withdraws 1 share → gets 100% of pool\n\n```\nfoundry_inflation_test(vault_address=\"...\", underlying=\"...\", target_path=\"src\u002FVault.sol\")\n```\n\n## Severity calibration\n\n| Pattern | Severity if confirmed |\n|---|---|\n| Unauth callback handler → arbitrary execution | Critical 10.0 |\n| Flash-loan oracle manipulation drains protocol | Critical 9-10 |\n| Governance attack possible | Critical 9-10 (if exec results in fund loss) |\n| ERC4626 inflation attack on live vault | Critical 9 |\n| Liquidation reentrancy via callback | High 8 |\n| Theoretical (low liquidity, manipulation cost > attack profit) | Medium-Low |\n\n## PoC template (Foundry)\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.0;\n\nimport \"forge-std\u002FTest.sol\";\nimport \"@aave-v3\u002Finterfaces\u002FIPool.sol\";\n\ncontract Test_FlashAttack is Test {\n    IPool constant AAVE = IPool(0x87870Bca3F3fD6335C3F4ce8392D69350B4fA4E2);\n    address constant TARGET = 0x...;\n    address constant ATTACKER = address(0xBEEF);\n\n    function setUp() public {\n        vm.createSelectFork(\"https:\u002F\u002Feth-mainnet...\u002F\u003Cblock>\");\n    }\n\n    function test_drain() public {\n        vm.startPrank(ATTACKER);\n        uint256 beforeBal = WETH.balanceOf(ATTACKER);\n\n        \u002F\u002F Request 10000 WETH flash loan\n        address[] memory assets = new address[](1);\n        assets[0] = address(WETH);\n        uint256[] memory amts = new uint256[](1);\n        amts[0] = 10000 ether;\n        uint256[] memory modes = new uint256[](1);  \u002F\u002F 0 = repay full\n\n        AAVE.flashLoan(address(this), assets, amts, modes, address(this), \"\", 0);\n\n        uint256 afterBal = WETH.balanceOf(ATTACKER);\n        assertGt(afterBal, beforeBal + 100 ether, \"should profit\");\n    }\n\n    function executeOperation(\n        address[] calldata assets,\n        uint256[] calldata amts,\n        uint256[] calldata premiums,\n        address initiator,\n        bytes calldata\n    ) external returns (bool) {\n        \u002F\u002F 1. Use loaned funds to manipulate TARGET\n        \u002F\u002F 2. Profit\n        \u002F\u002F 3. Repay\n        IERC20(assets[0]).approve(address(AAVE), amts[0] + premiums[0]);\n        return true;\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## OPSEC (operational, not blue team — this is on-chain)\nFlash-loan attacks leave a single transaction trail visible to:\n- Mempool watchers \u002F Flashbots inspectors\n- MEV bots that may front-run if not using private mempool\n- Risk dashboards (DefiLlama, Forta, Cyfrin)\n\nFor audit-PoC purposes (not live exploit) just use a forked anvil.\n\n## Defender remediation\n1. **Snapshot-based governance** — vote based on historical balance, not spot\n2. **TWAP oracles only** — never spot price for trust-critical decisions\n3. **Validate flash callback origin** — `require(msg.sender == knownPool && initiator == address(this))`\n4. **ERC4626 OpenZeppelin v4.7+** — virtual shares mitigation\n5. **Initial deposit by deployer** — seed the vault with 10**18 underlying before opening, makes inflation impractical\n\n## Known exemplars\n- bZx 1 (Feb 2020): $350k flash-loan oracle attack\n- bZx 2 (Feb 2020): $645k Synthetix sUSD attack\n- Beanstalk (Apr 2022): $182M flash-loan governance attack\n- Euler (Mar 2023): $197M; donateToReserves bug + flash loan\n- Mango (Oct 2022): $114M oracle + flash loan\n- Cream (Oct 2021): $130M via yUSD oracle\n- KyberSwap (Nov 2023): $48.5M via concentrated-liquidity edge case + flash loan\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"smart-contracts","flash loan aave dydx balancer composition",[28,29],"T1190","T1565.001","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fflash-loan","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill flash-loan",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill flash-loan",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill flash-loan","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fflash-loan\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]