[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DEX53FCNN4DF36A8D7N1MW":3,"skill-same:01M7DEX53FCNN4DF36A8D7N1MW":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DEX53FCNN4DF36A8D7N1MW","scattered-spider",null,"Adversary-emulation profile for Scattered Spider (UNC3944\u002FOcto Tempest), a financially motivated social-engineering-led intrusion group, mapped to ATT&CK G1015 and Raptix tooling.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fscattered-spider\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: scattered-spider\ndescription: \"Adversary-emulation profile for Scattered Spider (UNC3944\u002FOcto Tempest), a financially motivated social-engineering-led intrusion group, mapped to ATT&CK G1015 and Raptix tooling.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: adversary-emulation\n  when_to_use: \"scattered spider, unc3944, octo tempest, muddled libra, star fraud, 0ktapus, storm-0875, scatter swine, help desk social engineering, sim swap, mfa fatigue, mfa bypass, vishing, smishing, okta phishing, entra id federation abuse, esxi ransomware, dragonforce, blackcat alphv, ransomhub, qilin, the com emulation, identity attack, rmm abuse\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, scattered-spider, unc3944, octo-tempest, g1015, social-engineering, identity-attacks, ransomware, cloud, mfa-bypass, sim-swapping, e-crime, mitre-attack\n  mitre_attack: T1589, T1589.001, T1598, T1598.001, T1598.003, T1598.004, T1583.001, T1585.001, T1588.001, T1588.002, T1102, T1451, T1566.004, T1660, T1190, T1133, T1078, T1078.004, T1621, T1199, T1204, T1059.001, T1059.004, T1047, T1219.002, T1098, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1098.005, T1136, T1543.002, T1547.005, T1556.006, T1556.009, T1484.002, T1068, T1548.002, T1553.002, T1564.008, T1070.008, T1562, T1685, T1027, T1134, T1003, T1003.003, T1003.006, T1555.005, T1539, T1552.001, T1552.004, T1684.001, T1087, T1087.002, T1087.003, T1087.004, T1069.002, T1069.003, T1018, T1046, T1082, T1016, T1083, T1580, T1538, T1213.002, T1213.003, T1213.005, T1021.001, T1021.004, T1021.007, T1572, T1090, T1578.002, T1530, T1114, T1114.003, T1074, T1041, T1567.002, T1486, T1490, T1657, T1006, T1217\n---\n\n# Scattered Spider (UNC3944, Octo Tempest, Muddled Libra, Star Fraud) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nScattered Spider (MITRE ATT&CK **G1015**) is a financially motivated, predominantly native English-speaking cybercriminal collective active since at least 2022 and widely linked to the loosely affiliated \"The Com\" social network. The group is exceptional not for novel malware but for **aggressive, high-tempo social engineering of human identity processes**: it phones and SMS-phishes help desks and employees, impersonates IT staff, bypasses MFA (push bombing, SIM swapping, attacker-registered tokens), and rapidly pivots into cloud identity (Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, AWS, Azure) and virtualization (VMware ESXi\u002FvCenter) before staging data theft and ransomware. It began with the 2022 \"0ktapus\" Okta-credential phishing wave, escalated to the high-profile 2023 MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment intrusions, and through 2024–2025 operated as an affiliate of multiple ransomware-as-a-service brands (BlackCat\u002FALPHV, RansomHub, Qilin, DragonForce), hitting retail, insurance, and aviation. This profile teaches Raptix to emulate G1015's signature identity-centric TTPs inside an authorized engagement and helps the blue cell anticipate detection.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Sponsor \u002F nation:** Non-state, criminal. Members are assessed to be primarily young, native English speakers based in the US and UK, affiliated with the broader \"The Com\" cybercrime community. **Not** a nation-state actor; multiple arrests and a 2025 US extradition have been reported (per Krebs on Security \u002F Infosecurity Magazine).\n- **Motivation:** Primarily **financial** — credential theft, SIM-swap fraud \u002F crypto theft, data extortion, and ransomware (`T1657` Financial Theft). There is no credible espionage, destructive-only, or influence mandate; destruction (encryption) is in service of extortion.\n- **Confidence:** High confidence the cluster tracked as Scattered Spider = UNC3944 (Mandiant\u002FGoogle) = Octo Tempest \u002F Storm-0875 (Microsoft) = Muddled Libra (Palo Alto Unit 42) = Roasted 0ktapus = Scatter Swine = Star Fraud. Note these vendor clusters overlap but are not byte-for-byte identical; treat as a fluid affiliate community rather than a fixed roster.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** Initially telecom, BPO\u002Foutsourcing, and CRM\u002FSaaS providers (for SIM-swap and downstream access); from 2023 expanded to hospitality & gaming (casinos), retail, technology\u002FMSP, manufacturing, and **financial services \u002F insurance**; in mid-2025, **aviation**.\n- **Regions:** Primarily English-speaking targets — United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia — with reporting of expansion toward Singapore and India.\n- **Victim profile:** Large enterprises with **large outsourced or tiered IT help desks**, heavy reliance on SSO\u002FMFA (Okta, Microsoft Entra ID), significant cloud\u002FSaaS footprint, and VMware-virtualized data centers. The human help desk and identity-recovery workflow is the deliberately chosen weak point.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **Aug 2022 — \"0ktapus\" \u002F Roasted 0ktapus:** SMS smishing campaign harvesting Okta credentials and OTPs via ~169 lookalike domains; ~130 organizations compromised, including downstream intrusions at Twilio, Cloudflare (blocked), Mailchimp, DoorDash, and LastPass. (Group-IB, \"Roasting 0ktapus.\")\n- **Sep 2023 — MGM Resorts & Caesars Entertainment:** Help-desk vishing (an employee impersonation reportedly seeded from LinkedIn) granted access; MGM suffered major operational disruption, Caesars reportedly paid a ransom. BlackCat\u002FALPHV ransomware was associated. (Reuters\u002FCyberScoop reporting; CISA AA23-320A.)\n- **Nov 16, 2023 — CISA\u002FFBI Joint Advisory AA23-320A** first published, codifying the group's TTPs. (CISA.)\n- **2024 — RaaS affiliate shift:** Following ALPHV's collapse, the group operated with RansomHub and Qilin affiliates.\n- **Apr–May 2025 — UK retail wave:** Marks & Spencer (initial access reportedly Feb 2025), Co-op, and Harrods; M&S disruption estimated in the hundreds of millions of GBP, with **DragonForce** ransomware deployed against ESXi. UK arrests of four suspects followed. (The Hacker News; Mandiant\u002FGoogle.)\n- **Jun 2025 — US insurance sector:** Reported intrusions including Philadelphia Insurance Companies and Erie Insurance. (Push Security; Claranet.)\n- **Late Jun–Jul 2025 — Aviation:** FBI warned of expansion to airlines; incidents reported at Hawaiian Airlines, WestJet, and Qantas (third-party contact-center platform). (CSO Online.)\n- **Jul 29, 2025 — AA23-320A updated** by FBI\u002FCISA + international partners (RCMP, ASD's ACSC, AFP, CCCS, NCSC-UK) with TTPs current to June 2025 and confirmation of DragonForce deployment. (IC3\u002FCISA.)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Resource Development\n- `T1583.001` Acquire Infrastructure: Domains — registers lookalike\u002FSSO-spoofing domains (e.g. `victim-helpdesk[.]com`, `victim-sso[.]com`).\n- `T1585.001` Establish Accounts: Social Media — builds fake personas; uses LinkedIn for target profiling.\n- `T1588.001` \u002F `T1588.002` Obtain Capabilities (Malware\u002FTools) — acquires info-stealers, RATs, ransomware, and offensive tools (RustScan, LinPEAS, aws_consoler, rsocx, Level RMM).\n- `T1102` Web Service — stages\u002Fdownloads tooling from file.io, GitHub, paste.ee.\n\n### Initial Access\n- `T1598.004` \u002F `T1566.004` Spearphishing Voice (vishing) — calls help desks\u002Femployees impersonating IT to trigger password and MFA resets; signature technique.\n- `T1660` \u002F `T1598.003` Phishing (mobile \u002F spearphishing link) — SMS smishing to credential-harvesting portals mimicking SSO.\n- `T1598.001` Spearphishing Service — Telegram\u002FTeams messages impersonating IT personnel.\n- `T1451` SIM-Card Swap — social-engineers carriers to port victim numbers and intercept SMS OTPs.\n- `T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application — opportunistic (e.g., CVE-2021-35464 in ForgeRock OpenAM).\n- `T1133` External Remote Services — abuses VPNs, Citrix, and remote-access tooling for entry.\n- `T1078` \u002F `T1078.004` Valid Accounts (incl. Cloud) — logs in with socially-engineered credentials; compromised Entra ID\u002FAzure accounts.\n- `T1199` Trusted Relationship — pivots through MSPs, BPOs, and third-party contact-center platforms.\n- `T1621` MFA Request Generation — push-bombing \u002F MFA-fatigue until a victim approves.\n\n### Execution\n- `T1204` User Execution — directs impersonated victims to install RMM agents.\n- `T1219.002` Remote Desktop Software — deploys TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, ConnectWise, ngrok-based access.\n- `T1059.001` PowerShell — e.g., `Get-ADUser` and recon scripting.\n- `T1059.004` Unix Shell — installs Teleport and tooling on Linux\u002FESXi.\n- `T1047` Windows Management Instrumentation — via Impacket for remote execution\u002Flateral movement.\n\n### Persistence\n- `T1098.005` Device Registration — registers attacker MFA devices\u002Fendpoints for durable access through VPN.\n- `T1136` Create Account — creates new identities in the victim tenant\u002Fdomain.\n- `T1098` \u002F `T1098.001` \u002F `T1098.003` Account Manipulation — adds accounts to privileged groups (e.g., ESX Admins), adds cloud credentials, assigns admin roles.\n- `T1556.006` Modify Authentication Process: MFA — registers own MFA tokens post-compromise.\n- `T1484.002` Domain Trust Modification — adds a rogue federated IdP to the SSO tenant for backdoor authentication.\n- `T1543.002` \u002F `T1547.005` Systemd Service \u002F SSP — Teleport persistence on Linux; Mimikatz SSP.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- `T1556.009` Conditional Access Policies — adds trusted locations \u002F weakens CA to bypass MFA for controlled accounts.\n- `T1068` Exploitation for Privilege Escalation — has deployed a malicious kernel driver (BYOVD via CVE-2015-2291).\n- `T1548.002` Bypass UAC — via tooling (BlackCat, WarzoneRAT).\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- `T1685` Disable or Modify Tools \u002F `T1562` Impair Defenses — uninstalls\u002Fdisables EDR and security agents.\n- `T1564.008` Email Hiding Rules \u002F `T1070.008` Clear Mailbox Data — auto-deletes vendor security alert emails; deletes traces of its own account activity.\n- `T1553.002` Code Signing — abuses self-signed and stolen certificates (e.g., NVIDIA, Global Software LLC).\n- `T1027` Obfuscated Files \u002F `T1134` Access Token Manipulation — malware-delivered obfuscation and token abuse.\n\n### Credential Access\n- `T1003` \u002F `T1003.003` \u002F `T1003.006` OS Credential Dumping (Mimikatz, LaZagne), NTDS extraction via shadow copies, and DCSync.\n- `T1555.005` Password Managers — hunts HashiCorp Vault and PAM solutions.\n- `T1539` Steal Web Session Cookie \u002F `T1217` Browser Information — harvests cookies and browser data (Raccoon Stealer).\n- `T1552.001` \u002F `T1552.004` Credentials in Files \u002F Private Keys — searches credential docs; exfiltrates code-signing certs.\n- `T1684.001` Impersonation — impersonates IT help desk to reset passwords\u002FMFA.\n- `T1589` \u002F `T1589.001` Gather Victim Identity Info \u002F Credentials — leverages prior-breach data to pass identity-verification challenges.\n\n### Discovery\n- `T1087.002\u002F.003\u002F.004` Account Discovery (Domain\u002FEmail\u002FCloud) — enumerates AD, Entra ID groups and members.\n- `T1069.002` \u002F `T1069.003` Permission Groups Discovery — ADExplorer\u002FADRecon.ps1 for domain groups; Azure AD group membership.\n- `T1018` Remote System Discovery — maps vCenter\u002FESXi infrastructure.\n- `T1046` Network Service Discovery — RustScan port scanning.\n- `T1082` \u002F `T1016` \u002F `T1083` System\u002FNetwork\u002FFile Discovery — OS fingerprinting, `ping`\u002F`nltest`, hunting MFA docs, network diagrams, and credentials.\n- `T1580` \u002F `T1538` Cloud Infrastructure Discovery — enumerates AWS S3 and Systems Manager Inventory.\n- `T1213.002\u002F.003\u002F.005` Data from Information Repositories — SharePoint (VPN\u002FMFA enrollment info), internal GitHub repos, Slack\u002FTeams.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- `T1021.001` RDP, `T1021.004` SSH (incl. vCenter), `T1021.007` Cloud Services (EC2\u002FAzure).\n- `T1572` Protocol Tunneling — Teleport.sh, Chisel, ngrok, Pinggy, MobaXterm SSH tunnels.\n- `T1090` Proxy — proxy networks and rsocx reverse proxy to blend in.\n\n### Collection\n- `T1530` Data from Cloud Storage — OneDrive and cloud resources.\n- `T1114` \u002F `T1114.003` Email Collection \u002F Forwarding Rule — searches Exchange for incident-response emails and forwards\u002Fredirects security alerts.\n- `T1074` Data Staged — consolidates stolen data into a central store.\n\n### Command & Control\n- RMM tools (`T1219.002`) and tunnelers (`T1572`) double as resilient C2. ngrok (S0508) and Tor (S0183) appear in operations.\n- `T1578.002` Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure — spins up attacker EC2\u002FAzure VMs as staging\u002FC2.\n\n### Exfiltration\n- `T1041` Exfiltration Over C2 Channel — via Teleport.\n- `T1567.002` Exfiltration to Cloud Storage — MEGA, AWS S3; abuse of cloud DB platforms (e.g., Snowflake tenants). Rclone (S1040) used for cloud transfer.\n\n### Impact\n- `T1486` Data Encrypted for Impact — BlackCat\u002FALPHV and later DragonForce ransomware, notably against VMware ESXi.\n- `T1490` Inhibit System Recovery — stops Volume Shadow Copy service.\n- `T1006` Direct Volume Access — shadow-copies DC disks to grab NTDS.dit.\n- `T1657` Financial Theft — double-extortion: data theft + encryption with leak-site threats.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n- **Ransomware (RaaS affiliate, not owned):** BlackCat\u002FALPHV (S1068), DragonForce, RansomHub, Qilin — deployed especially against ESXi.\n- **Credential tooling (public):** Mimikatz (S0002), LaZagne (S0349), Impacket (S0357), Raccoon Stealer (S1148).\n- **Remote access \u002F RMM (legitimate, abused):** TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, ConnectWise ScreenConnect (S0591), Level RMM, Splashtop, Pulseway.\n- **Tunneling \u002F C2:** ngrok (S0508), Chisel, Teleport.sh, Pinggy, rsocx, MobaXterm, Tor (S0183).\n- **Recon \u002F cloud:** RustScan, ADExplorer, ADRecon.ps1, SharpHound, LinPEAS, aws_consoler.\n- **Exfil:** Rclone (S1040), MEGA client.\n- **RATs \u002F drivers:** WarzoneRAT (S0670); BYOVD kernel driver (CVE-2015-2291).\n- Hallmark: minimal custom malware — the group weaponizes **legitimate admin\u002FRMM software and identity systems**, making it hard to catch with signature-based detection.\n\n## Emulation guidance (Raptix)\n\n**Authorized use only:** Execute the below exclusively within the documented rules of engagement and approved scope for this engagement; never SIM-swap real subscribers, social-engineer real third-party carriers\u002Fhelp desks outside scope, or deploy real ransomware against production data.\n\n- **Initial access via identity, not exploits.** Lead with `defense-evasion`\u002Fsocial-engineering playbooks emulating help-desk vishing and SSO smishing (`T1598.004`, `T1660`). Use the phishing\u002Fportal-cloning capability to stand up an in-scope lookalike SSO page (`T1583.001`) and harvest test credentials\u002FOTPs. Emulate MFA fatigue (`T1621`) and attacker-MFA-device registration (`T1098.005`, `T1556.006`) against authorized test identities rather than performing a real SIM swap (`T1451` — emulate the OTP-interception outcome with a provisioned test number).\n- **Cloud\u002Fidentity pivot.** Use the **cloud skills** (Azure\u002FEntra + AWS) to emulate G1015's identity tradecraft: enumerate Entra ID\u002FAWS accounts and groups (`T1087.004`, `T1069.003`, `T1580`, `T1538`), add cloud credentials\u002Froles (`T1098.001`, `T1098.003`), weaken Conditional Access \u002F add trusted locations (`T1556.009`), and add a rogue federation trust (`T1484.002`) — all against the engagement's lab\u002Ftest tenant.\n- **AD operations.** Drive the **AD skills**: ADExplorer\u002FSharpHound-style enumeration (`T1069.002`, `T1087.002`), DCSync and NTDS via shadow copy (`T1003.006`, `T1003.003`, `T1006`), Mimikatz\u002FLaZagne dumping (`T1003`). Use **bash\u002FPowerShell** for `Get-ADUser`, `nltest`, and `ping` recon (`T1059.001`, `T1016`).\n- **Lateral movement & C2.** Use the **lateral-movement** skill for RDP\u002FSSH\u002FWMI (`T1021.001`, `T1021.004`, `T1047`) and the **c2\u002FSliver** capability plus **protocol tunneling** (ngrok\u002FChisel-style, `T1572`, `T1090`) to mirror RMM-and-tunnel C2 (`T1219.002`). Deploy an approved RMM agent to a test host to replicate the signature `T1204`→`T1219.002` chain.\n- **Virtualization target.** Where the lab includes VMware, emulate vCenter\u002FESXi enumeration and SSH access (`T1018`, `T1021.004`) and group manipulation (`T1098`) — stop short of encryption; instead validate that backup\u002Fimmutability controls would have blocked `T1486`\u002F`T1490`.\n- **Collection & exfil simulation.** Stage benign canary data (`T1074`) and exfiltrate to an in-scope cloud bucket via Rclone-style transfer (`T1567.002`) to test DLP\u002Fegress controls; emulate inbox-rule evasion (`T1564.008`, `T1114.003`) on a test mailbox.\n- **Impact (simulated):** For ransomware emulation, use a benign\u002Finert payload or a detonation-safe simulator against test ESXi\u002Fhosts to exercise EDR-disable (`T1685`), shadow-copy deletion (`T1490`), and encryption (`T1486`) detections — never real ransomware on production.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Identity verification at the help desk:** require strong, out-of-band, on-camera or in-person verification before any password\u002FMFA reset; never rely on DOB\u002Flast-4-SSN; temporarily disable self-service MFA resets during active threats. Directly counters `T1598.004`\u002F`T1684.001`.\n- **Phishing-resistant MFA:** remove SMS\u002Fvoice\u002Femail factors; deploy FIDO2\u002Fnumber-matching; restrict MFA registration to trusted IPs\u002Fcompliant devices; alert on the same MFA method registered across multiple users (counters `T1621`, `T1451`, `T1556.006`, `T1098.005`).\n- **Entra ID \u002F SSO monitoring:** alert on changes to Conditional Access Policies, Trusted Named Locations, and federation\u002Fdomain config; verify all federated domains (counters `T1556.009`, `T1484.002`).\n- **Detect lookalike domains & smishing portals:** continuous brand\u002Ftyposquat domain monitoring; user training to reject MFA push-bombing and report IT-impersonation SMS\u002FTeams messages (counters `T1583.001`, `T1660`, `T1598.001`).\n- **RMM control:** allow-list approved remote-access software; alert on TeamViewer\u002FAnyDesk\u002FScreenConnect\u002Fngrok install or execution and outbound to tunneling services (counters `T1219.002`, `T1572`).\n- **Teams\u002Fcollaboration detection:** alert on external-tenant chats with display names containing \"help\"\u002F\"helpdesk\" (Mandiant-provided KQL\u002FSecOps rules).\n- **Recon tooling:** alert on ADRecon, ADExplorer, SharpHound, RustScan execution; lock down docs containing VPN\u002FMFA-enrollment\u002Fnetwork-diagram info (counters discovery cluster).\n- **Identity store segregation & Tier-0:** decouple AD from cloud\u002Fvirtualization\u002Fbackup identity; local, vault-excluded, MFA-enforced root accounts for ESXi\u002FvCenter; enable ESXi lockdown mode; immutable, network-isolated backups (counters `T1486`, `T1490`, `T1003.x`).\n- **Egress restriction & session monitoring:** restrict outbound from DCs\u002FTSI servers; block Tor exit nodes and VPS ranges; alert on impossible-travel, proxy\u002FVPN logins, and token replay (counters C2\u002Fexfil cluster).\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — Scattered Spider (G1015): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG1015\u002F\n- Mandiant \u002F Google Cloud — \"Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Func3944-proactive-hardening-recommendations\n- CISA\u002FFBI Joint Advisory AA23-320A — Scattered Spider: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa23-320a\n- CISA alert — \"CISA and Partners Release Updated Advisory on Scattered Spider Group\" (July 29, 2025): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Falerts\u002F2025\u002F07\u002F29\u002Fcisa-and-partners-release-updated-advisory-scattered-spider-group\n- IC3 PDF of AA23-320A (July 29, 2025): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ic3.gov\u002FCSA\u002F2025\u002F250729.pdf\n- Group-IB — \"Roasting 0ktapus: The phishing campaign going after Okta identity credentials\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.group-ib.com\u002Fblog\u002F0ktapus\u002F\n- The Hacker News — \"Scattered Spider Behind Cyberattacks on M&S and Co-op\": https:\u002F\u002Fthehackernews.com\u002F2025\u002F06\u002Fscattered-spider-behind-cyberattacks-on.html\n- CSO Online — \"Scattered Spider shifts focus to airlines\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.csoonline.com\u002Farticle\u002F4014787\u002Fscattered-spider-shifts-focus-to-airlines-as-strikes-hit-hawaiian-westjet-and-now-qantas.html\n- Krebs on Security — \"Alleged 'Scattered Spider' Member Extradited to U.S.\": https:\u002F\u002Fkrebsonsecurity.com\u002F2025\u002F04\u002Falleged-scattered-spider-member-extradited-to-u-s\u002F\n","# Scattered Spider (UNC3944, Octo Tempest, Muddled Libra, Star Fraud) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nScattered Spider (MITRE ATT&CK **G1015**) is a financially motivated, predominantly native English-speaking cybercriminal collective active since at least 2022 and widely linked to the loosely affiliated \"The Com\" social network. The group is exceptional not for novel malware but for **aggressive, high-tempo social engineering of human identity processes**: it phones and SMS-phishes help desks and employees, impersonates IT staff, bypasses MFA (push bombing, SIM swapping, attacker-registered tokens), and rapidly pivots into cloud identity (Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, AWS, Azure) and virtualization (VMware ESXi\u002FvCenter) before staging data theft and ransomware. It began with the 2022 \"0ktapus\" Okta-credential phishing wave, escalated to the high-profile 2023 MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment intrusions, and through 2024–2025 operated as an affiliate of multiple ransomware-as-a-service brands (BlackCat\u002FALPHV, RansomHub, Qilin, DragonForce), hitting retail, insurance, and aviation. This profile teaches Raptix to emulate G1015's signature identity-centric TTPs inside an authorized engagement and helps the blue cell anticipate detection.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Sponsor \u002F nation:** Non-state, criminal. Members are assessed to be primarily young, native English speakers based in the US and UK, affiliated with the broader \"The Com\" cybercrime community. **Not** a nation-state actor; multiple arrests and a 2025 US extradition have been reported (per Krebs on Security \u002F Infosecurity Magazine).\n- **Motivation:** Primarily **financial** — credential theft, SIM-swap fraud \u002F crypto theft, data extortion, and ransomware (`T1657` Financial Theft). There is no credible espionage, destructive-only, or influence mandate; destruction (encryption) is in service of extortion.\n- **Confidence:** High confidence the cluster tracked as Scattered Spider = UNC3944 (Mandiant\u002FGoogle) = Octo Tempest \u002F Storm-0875 (Microsoft) = Muddled Libra (Palo Alto Unit 42) = Roasted 0ktapus = Scatter Swine = Star Fraud. Note these vendor clusters overlap but are not byte-for-byte identical; treat as a fluid affiliate community rather than a fixed roster.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** Initially telecom, BPO\u002Foutsourcing, and CRM\u002FSaaS providers (for SIM-swap and downstream access); from 2023 expanded to hospitality & gaming (casinos), retail, technology\u002FMSP, manufacturing, and **financial services \u002F insurance**; in mid-2025, **aviation**.\n- **Regions:** Primarily English-speaking targets — United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia — with reporting of expansion toward Singapore and India.\n- **Victim profile:** Large enterprises with **large outsourced or tiered IT help desks**, heavy reliance on SSO\u002FMFA (Okta, Microsoft Entra ID), significant cloud\u002FSaaS footprint, and VMware-virtualized data centers. The human help desk and identity-recovery workflow is the deliberately chosen weak point.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **Aug 2022 — \"0ktapus\" \u002F Roasted 0ktapus:** SMS smishing campaign harvesting Okta credentials and OTPs via ~169 lookalike domains; ~130 organizations compromised, including downstream intrusions at Twilio, Cloudflare (blocked), Mailchimp, DoorDash, and LastPass. (Group-IB, \"Roasting 0ktapus.\")\n- **Sep 2023 — MGM Resorts & Caesars Entertainment:** Help-desk vishing (an employee impersonation reportedly seeded from LinkedIn) granted access; MGM suffered major operational disruption, Caesars reportedly paid a ransom. BlackCat\u002FALPHV ransomware was associated. (Reuters\u002FCyberScoop reporting; CISA AA23-320A.)\n- **Nov 16, 2023 — CISA\u002FFBI Joint Advisory AA23-320A** first published, codifying the group's TTPs. (CISA.)\n- **2024 — RaaS affiliate shift:** Following ALPHV's collapse, the group operated with RansomHub and Qilin affiliates.\n- **Apr–May 2025 — UK retail wave:** Marks & Spencer (initial access reportedly Feb 2025), Co-op, and Harrods; M&S disruption estimated in the hundreds of millions of GBP, with **DragonForce** ransomware deployed against ESXi. UK arrests of four suspects followed. (The Hacker News; Mandiant\u002FGoogle.)\n- **Jun 2025 — US insurance sector:** Reported intrusions including Philadelphia Insurance Companies and Erie Insurance. (Push Security; Claranet.)\n- **Late Jun–Jul 2025 — Aviation:** FBI warned of expansion to airlines; incidents reported at Hawaiian Airlines, WestJet, and Qantas (third-party contact-center platform). (CSO Online.)\n- **Jul 29, 2025 — AA23-320A updated** by FBI\u002FCISA + international partners (RCMP, ASD's ACSC, AFP, CCCS, NCSC-UK) with TTPs current to June 2025 and confirmation of DragonForce deployment. (IC3\u002FCISA.)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Resource Development\n- `T1583.001` Acquire Infrastructure: Domains — registers lookalike\u002FSSO-spoofing domains (e.g. `victim-helpdesk[.]com`, `victim-sso[.]com`).\n- `T1585.001` Establish Accounts: Social Media — builds fake personas; uses LinkedIn for target profiling.\n- `T1588.001` \u002F `T1588.002` Obtain Capabilities (Malware\u002FTools) — acquires info-stealers, RATs, ransomware, and offensive tools (RustScan, LinPEAS, aws_consoler, rsocx, Level RMM).\n- `T1102` Web Service — stages\u002Fdownloads tooling from file.io, GitHub, paste.ee.\n\n### Initial Access\n- `T1598.004` \u002F `T1566.004` Spearphishing Voice (vishing) — calls help desks\u002Femployees impersonating IT to trigger password and MFA resets; signature technique.\n- `T1660` \u002F `T1598.003` Phishing (mobile \u002F spearphishing link) — SMS smishing to credential-harvesting portals mimicking SSO.\n- `T1598.001` Spearphishing Service — Telegram\u002FTeams messages impersonating IT personnel.\n- `T1451` SIM-Card Swap — social-engineers carriers to port victim numbers and intercept SMS OTPs.\n- `T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application — opportunistic (e.g., CVE-2021-35464 in ForgeRock OpenAM).\n- `T1133` External Remote Services — abuses VPNs, Citrix, and remote-access tooling for entry.\n- `T1078` \u002F `T1078.004` Valid Accounts (incl. Cloud) — logs in with socially-engineered credentials; compromised Entra ID\u002FAzure accounts.\n- `T1199` Trusted Relationship — pivots through MSPs, BPOs, and third-party contact-center platforms.\n- `T1621` MFA Request Generation — push-bombing \u002F MFA-fatigue until a victim approves.\n\n### Execution\n- `T1204` User Execution — directs impersonated victims to install RMM agents.\n- `T1219.002` Remote Desktop Software — deploys TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, ConnectWise, ngrok-based access.\n- `T1059.001` PowerShell — e.g., `Get-ADUser` and recon scripting.\n- `T1059.004` Unix Shell — installs Teleport and tooling on Linux\u002FESXi.\n- `T1047` Windows Management Instrumentation — via Impacket for remote execution\u002Flateral movement.\n\n### Persistence\n- `T1098.005` Device Registration — registers attacker MFA devices\u002Fendpoints for durable access through VPN.\n- `T1136` Create Account — creates new identities in the victim tenant\u002Fdomain.\n- `T1098` \u002F `T1098.001` \u002F `T1098.003` Account Manipulation — adds accounts to privileged groups (e.g., ESX Admins), adds cloud credentials, assigns admin roles.\n- `T1556.006` Modify Authentication Process: MFA — registers own MFA tokens post-compromise.\n- `T1484.002` Domain Trust Modification — adds a rogue federated IdP to the SSO tenant for backdoor authentication.\n- `T1543.002` \u002F `T1547.005` Systemd Service \u002F SSP — Teleport persistence on Linux; Mimikatz SSP.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- `T1556.009` Conditional Access Policies — adds trusted locations \u002F weakens CA to bypass MFA for controlled accounts.\n- `T1068` Exploitation for Privilege Escalation — has deployed a malicious kernel driver (BYOVD via CVE-2015-2291).\n- `T1548.002` Bypass UAC — via tooling (BlackCat, WarzoneRAT).\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- `T1685` Disable or Modify Tools \u002F `T1562` Impair Defenses — uninstalls\u002Fdisables EDR and security agents.\n- `T1564.008` Email Hiding Rules \u002F `T1070.008` Clear Mailbox Data — auto-deletes vendor security alert emails; deletes traces of its own account activity.\n- `T1553.002` Code Signing — abuses self-signed and stolen certificates (e.g., NVIDIA, Global Software LLC).\n- `T1027` Obfuscated Files \u002F `T1134` Access Token Manipulation — malware-delivered obfuscation and token abuse.\n\n### Credential Access\n- `T1003` \u002F `T1003.003` \u002F `T1003.006` OS Credential Dumping (Mimikatz, LaZagne), NTDS extraction via shadow copies, and DCSync.\n- `T1555.005` Password Managers — hunts HashiCorp Vault and PAM solutions.\n- `T1539` Steal Web Session Cookie \u002F `T1217` Browser Information — harvests cookies and browser data (Raccoon Stealer).\n- `T1552.001` \u002F `T1552.004` Credentials in Files \u002F Private Keys — searches credential docs; exfiltrates code-signing certs.\n- `T1684.001` Impersonation — impersonates IT help desk to reset passwords\u002FMFA.\n- `T1589` \u002F `T1589.001` Gather Victim Identity Info \u002F Credentials — leverages prior-breach data to pass identity-verification challenges.\n\n### Discovery\n- `T1087.002\u002F.003\u002F.004` Account Discovery (Domain\u002FEmail\u002FCloud) — enumerates AD, Entra ID groups and members.\n- `T1069.002` \u002F `T1069.003` Permission Groups Discovery — ADExplorer\u002FADRecon.ps1 for domain groups; Azure AD group membership.\n- `T1018` Remote System Discovery — maps vCenter\u002FESXi infrastructure.\n- `T1046` Network Service Discovery — RustScan port scanning.\n- `T1082` \u002F `T1016` \u002F `T1083` System\u002FNetwork\u002FFile Discovery — OS fingerprinting, `ping`\u002F`nltest`, hunting MFA docs, network diagrams, and credentials.\n- `T1580` \u002F `T1538` Cloud Infrastructure Discovery — enumerates AWS S3 and Systems Manager Inventory.\n- `T1213.002\u002F.003\u002F.005` Data from Information Repositories — SharePoint (VPN\u002FMFA enrollment info), internal GitHub repos, Slack\u002FTeams.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- `T1021.001` RDP, `T1021.004` SSH (incl. vCenter), `T1021.007` Cloud Services (EC2\u002FAzure).\n- `T1572` Protocol Tunneling — Teleport.sh, Chisel, ngrok, Pinggy, MobaXterm SSH tunnels.\n- `T1090` Proxy — proxy networks and rsocx reverse proxy to blend in.\n\n### Collection\n- `T1530` Data from Cloud Storage — OneDrive and cloud resources.\n- `T1114` \u002F `T1114.003` Email Collection \u002F Forwarding Rule — searches Exchange for incident-response emails and forwards\u002Fredirects security alerts.\n- `T1074` Data Staged — consolidates stolen data into a central store.\n\n### Command & Control\n- RMM tools (`T1219.002`) and tunnelers (`T1572`) double as resilient C2. ngrok (S0508) and Tor (S0183) appear in operations.\n- `T1578.002` Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure — spins up attacker EC2\u002FAzure VMs as staging\u002FC2.\n\n### Exfiltration\n- `T1041` Exfiltration Over C2 Channel — via Teleport.\n- `T1567.002` Exfiltration to Cloud Storage — MEGA, AWS S3; abuse of cloud DB platforms (e.g., Snowflake tenants). Rclone (S1040) used for cloud transfer.\n\n### Impact\n- `T1486` Data Encrypted for Impact — BlackCat\u002FALPHV and later DragonForce ransomware, notably against VMware ESXi.\n- `T1490` Inhibit System Recovery — stops Volume Shadow Copy service.\n- `T1006` Direct Volume Access — shadow-copies DC disks to grab NTDS.dit.\n- `T1657` Financial Theft — double-extortion: data theft + encryption with leak-site threats.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n- **Ransomware (RaaS affiliate, not owned):** BlackCat\u002FALPHV (S1068), DragonForce, RansomHub, Qilin — deployed especially against ESXi.\n- **Credential tooling (public):** Mimikatz (S0002), LaZagne (S0349), Impacket (S0357), Raccoon Stealer (S1148).\n- **Remote access \u002F RMM (legitimate, abused):** TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, ConnectWise ScreenConnect (S0591), Level RMM, Splashtop, Pulseway.\n- **Tunneling \u002F C2:** ngrok (S0508), Chisel, Teleport.sh, Pinggy, rsocx, MobaXterm, Tor (S0183).\n- **Recon \u002F cloud:** RustScan, ADExplorer, ADRecon.ps1, SharpHound, LinPEAS, aws_consoler.\n- **Exfil:** Rclone (S1040), MEGA client.\n- **RATs \u002F drivers:** WarzoneRAT (S0670); BYOVD kernel driver (CVE-2015-2291).\n- Hallmark: minimal custom malware — the group weaponizes **legitimate admin\u002FRMM software and identity systems**, making it hard to catch with signature-based detection.\n\n## Emulation guidance (Raptix)\n\n**Authorized use only:** Execute the below exclusively within the documented rules of engagement and approved scope for this engagement; never SIM-swap real subscribers, social-engineer real third-party carriers\u002Fhelp desks outside scope, or deploy real ransomware against production data.\n\n- **Initial access via identity, not exploits.** Lead with `defense-evasion`\u002Fsocial-engineering playbooks emulating help-desk vishing and SSO smishing (`T1598.004`, `T1660`). Use the phishing\u002Fportal-cloning capability to stand up an in-scope lookalike SSO page (`T1583.001`) and harvest test credentials\u002FOTPs. Emulate MFA fatigue (`T1621`) and attacker-MFA-device registration (`T1098.005`, `T1556.006`) against authorized test identities rather than performing a real SIM swap (`T1451` — emulate the OTP-interception outcome with a provisioned test number).\n- **Cloud\u002Fidentity pivot.** Use the **cloud skills** (Azure\u002FEntra + AWS) to emulate G1015's identity tradecraft: enumerate Entra ID\u002FAWS accounts and groups (`T1087.004`, `T1069.003`, `T1580`, `T1538`), add cloud credentials\u002Froles (`T1098.001`, `T1098.003`), weaken Conditional Access \u002F add trusted locations (`T1556.009`), and add a rogue federation trust (`T1484.002`) — all against the engagement's lab\u002Ftest tenant.\n- **AD operations.** Drive the **AD skills**: ADExplorer\u002FSharpHound-style enumeration (`T1069.002`, `T1087.002`), DCSync and NTDS via shadow copy (`T1003.006`, `T1003.003`, `T1006`), Mimikatz\u002FLaZagne dumping (`T1003`). Use **bash\u002FPowerShell** for `Get-ADUser`, `nltest`, and `ping` recon (`T1059.001`, `T1016`).\n- **Lateral movement & C2.** Use the **lateral-movement** skill for RDP\u002FSSH\u002FWMI (`T1021.001`, `T1021.004`, `T1047`) and the **c2\u002FSliver** capability plus **protocol tunneling** (ngrok\u002FChisel-style, `T1572`, `T1090`) to mirror RMM-and-tunnel C2 (`T1219.002`). Deploy an approved RMM agent to a test host to replicate the signature `T1204`→`T1219.002` chain.\n- **Virtualization target.** Where the lab includes VMware, emulate vCenter\u002FESXi enumeration and SSH access (`T1018`, `T1021.004`) and group manipulation (`T1098`) — stop short of encryption; instead validate that backup\u002Fimmutability controls would have blocked `T1486`\u002F`T1490`.\n- **Collection & exfil simulation.** Stage benign canary data (`T1074`) and exfiltrate to an in-scope cloud bucket via Rclone-style transfer (`T1567.002`) to test DLP\u002Fegress controls; emulate inbox-rule evasion (`T1564.008`, `T1114.003`) on a test mailbox.\n- **Impact (simulated):** For ransomware emulation, use a benign\u002Finert payload or a detonation-safe simulator against test ESXi\u002Fhosts to exercise EDR-disable (`T1685`), shadow-copy deletion (`T1490`), and encryption (`T1486`) detections — never real ransomware on production.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Identity verification at the help desk:** require strong, out-of-band, on-camera or in-person verification before any password\u002FMFA reset; never rely on DOB\u002Flast-4-SSN; temporarily disable self-service MFA resets during active threats. Directly counters `T1598.004`\u002F`T1684.001`.\n- **Phishing-resistant MFA:** remove SMS\u002Fvoice\u002Femail factors; deploy FIDO2\u002Fnumber-matching; restrict MFA registration to trusted IPs\u002Fcompliant devices; alert on the same MFA method registered across multiple users (counters `T1621`, `T1451`, `T1556.006`, `T1098.005`).\n- **Entra ID \u002F SSO monitoring:** alert on changes to Conditional Access Policies, Trusted Named Locations, and federation\u002Fdomain config; verify all federated domains (counters `T1556.009`, `T1484.002`).\n- **Detect lookalike domains & smishing portals:** continuous brand\u002Ftyposquat domain monitoring; user training to reject MFA push-bombing and report IT-impersonation SMS\u002FTeams messages (counters `T1583.001`, `T1660`, `T1598.001`).\n- **RMM control:** allow-list approved remote-access software; alert on TeamViewer\u002FAnyDesk\u002FScreenConnect\u002Fngrok install or execution and outbound to tunneling services (counters `T1219.002`, `T1572`).\n- **Teams\u002Fcollaboration detection:** alert on external-tenant chats with display names containing \"help\"\u002F\"helpdesk\" (Mandiant-provided KQL\u002FSecOps rules).\n- **Recon tooling:** alert on ADRecon, ADExplorer, SharpHound, RustScan execution; lock down docs containing VPN\u002FMFA-enrollment\u002Fnetwork-diagram info (counters discovery cluster).\n- **Identity store segregation & Tier-0:** decouple AD from cloud\u002Fvirtualization\u002Fbackup identity; local, vault-excluded, MFA-enforced root accounts for ESXi\u002FvCenter; enable ESXi lockdown mode; immutable, network-isolated backups (counters `T1486`, `T1490`, `T1003.x`).\n- **Egress restriction & session monitoring:** restrict outbound from DCs\u002FTSI servers; block Tor exit nodes and VPS ranges; alert on impossible-travel, proxy\u002FVPN logins, and token replay (counters C2\u002Fexfil cluster).\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — Scattered Spider (G1015): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG1015\u002F\n- Mandiant \u002F Google Cloud — \"Defending Against UNC3944: Cybercrime Hardening Guidance from the Frontlines\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Func3944-proactive-hardening-recommendations\n- CISA\u002FFBI Joint Advisory AA23-320A — Scattered Spider: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa23-320a\n- CISA alert — \"CISA and Partners Release Updated Advisory on Scattered Spider Group\" (July 29, 2025): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Falerts\u002F2025\u002F07\u002F29\u002Fcisa-and-partners-release-updated-advisory-scattered-spider-group\n- IC3 PDF of AA23-320A (July 29, 2025): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ic3.gov\u002FCSA\u002F2025\u002F250729.pdf\n- Group-IB — \"Roasting 0ktapus: The phishing campaign going after Okta identity credentials\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.group-ib.com\u002Fblog\u002F0ktapus\u002F\n- The Hacker News — \"Scattered Spider Behind Cyberattacks on M&S and Co-op\": https:\u002F\u002Fthehackernews.com\u002F2025\u002F06\u002Fscattered-spider-behind-cyberattacks-on.html\n- CSO Online — \"Scattered Spider shifts focus to airlines\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.csoonline.com\u002Farticle\u002F4014787\u002Fscattered-spider-shifts-focus-to-airlines-as-strikes-hit-hawaiian-westjet-and-now-qantas.html\n- Krebs on Security — \"Alleged 'Scattered Spider' Member Extradited to U.S.\": https:\u002F\u002Fkrebsonsecurity.com\u002F2025\u002F04\u002Falleged-scattered-spider-member-extradited-to-u-s\u002F\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, scattered-spider, unc3944, octo-tempest, g1015, social-engineering, identity-attacks, ransomware, cloud, mfa-bypass, sim-swapping, e-crime, mitre-attack","adversary-emulation","scattered spider, unc3944, octo tempest, muddled libra, star fraud, 0ktapus, storm-0875, scatter swine, help desk social engineering, sim swap, mfa fatigue, mfa bypass, vishing, smishing, okta phishing, entra id federation abuse, esxi ransomware, dragonforce, blackcat alphv, ransomhub, qilin, the com emulation, identity attack, rmm abuse","T1589, T1589.001, T1598, T1598.001, T1598.003, T1598.004, T1583.001, T1585.001, T1588.001, T1588.002, T1102, T1451, T1566.004, T1660, T1190, T1133, T1078, T1078.004, T1621, T1199, T1204, T1059.001, T1059.004, T1047, T1219.002, T1098, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1098.005, T1136, T1543.002, T1547.005, T1556.006, T1556.009, T1484.002, T1068, T1548.002, T1553.002, T1564.008, T1070.008, T1562, T1685, T1027, T1134, T1003, T1003.003, T1003.006, T1555.005, T1539, T1552.001, T1552.004, T1684.001, T1087, T1087.002, T1087.003, T1087.004, T1069.002, T1069.003, T1018, T1046, T1082, T1016, T1083, T1580, T1538, T1213.002, T1213.003, T1213.005, T1021.001, T1021.004, T1021.007, T1572, T1090, T1578.002, T1530, T1114, T1114.003, T1074, T1041, T1567.002, T1486, T1490, T1657, T1006, T1217","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fscattered-spider","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill scattered-spider",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill scattered-spider",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill scattered-spider","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fscattered-spider\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]