[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DEPSBJFPP7XYFFEEN5WSVJ":3,"skill-same:01M7DEPSBJFPP7XYFFEEN5WSVJ":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":33,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":34,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7DEPSBJFPP7XYFFEEN5WSVJ","apt34-oilrig",null,"Adversary-emulation profile for APT34 \u002F OilRig (G0049), an Iranian state-sponsored espionage group, mapping its ATT&CK TTPs to Raptix tooling for authorized red-team emulation.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fapt34-oilrig\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: apt34-oilrig\ndescription: \"Adversary-emulation profile for APT34 \u002F OilRig (G0049), an Iranian state-sponsored espionage group, mapping its ATT&CK TTPs to Raptix tooling for authorized red-team emulation.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: adversary-emulation\n  when_to_use: \"APT34, OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, Cobalt Gypsy, Evasive Serpens, Iranian APT, MOIS, Middle East espionage, DNS tunneling, BONDUPDATER, POWRUNER, SideTwist, STEALHOOK, Outlook Home Page persistence, Exchange exfiltration, password filter DLL, emulate Iranian threat actor\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, apt34, oilrig, iran, espionage, g0049, dns-tunneling, middle-east, mitre-attack, red-team\n  mitre_attack: T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003, T1204.001, T1204.002, T1133, T1078, T1078.002, T1190, T1195, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1047, T1203, T1218.001, T1053.005, T1543.003, T1505.003, T1137.004, T1556.002, T1133, T1068, T1543.003, T1112, T1140, T1070.004, T1027.005, T1027.013, T1036, T1036.005, T1553.002, T1588.003, T1497.001, T1686.003, T1003.001, T1003.004, T1003.005, T1555, T1555.003, T1555.004, T1552.001, T1110, T1056.001, T1115, T1087.001, T1087.002, T1082, T1016, T1049, T1033, T1007, T1057, T1518, T1069.001, T1069.002, T1201, T1120, T1012, T1046, T1021.001, T1021.004, T1572, T1219, T1005, T1119, T1074.001, T1113, T1217, T1025, T1071.001, T1071.004, T1132.001, T1008, T1573.002, T1105, T1048.003, T1585.003, T1583.001, T1584.004, T1586.002, T1587.001, T1588.002, T1608.001\n---\n\n# APT34 (OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nAPT34 — tracked as OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, Cobalt Gypsy \u002F COBALT GYPSY, IRN2, Evasive Serpens, EUROPIUM, ITG13, and TA452 (MITRE ATT&CK **G0049**) — is a suspected Iranian state-sponsored cyber-espionage group operational since at least 2014. It conducts long-running, reconnaissance-heavy intrusions against Middle Eastern and international organizations, favoring spearphishing for initial access, heavy use of PowerShell\u002FVBScript backdoors, custom DNS-tunneling C2, supply-chain and trust-relationship abuse, and patient credential harvesting. The group continually re-tools (BONDUPDATER → SideTwist → cloud\u002FExchange-based C2) and is notable for living-off-the-land tradecraft, password-filter-DLL credential capture, and exfiltrating data through victim-owned Microsoft Exchange servers to blend with legitimate mail flow.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n- **Suspected sponsor:** Iran. FireEye\u002FMandiant assesses APT34 \"works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.\" Multiple vendors (Trend Micro, Microsoft, CrowdStrike) link the cluster to Iranian intelligence services.\n- **Motivation:** Strategic **cyber espionage** — long-term reconnaissance and credential\u002Fdata theft to advance Iranian geopolitical interests in the region. Primary intent is intelligence collection, not financial gain. (A separate but related Iranian destructive operation, ZeroCleare wiper (S1151), is associated with the same cluster, indicating latent destructive capability.)\n- **Confidence:** High that the activity is Iranian state-aligned espionage; the precise sponsoring agency varies by vendor naming. Attribution of any single intrusion should be treated as suspected unless backed by collected infrastructure\u002Ftooling overlap.\n\n## Targeting\n- **Sectors:** Financial\u002Fbanking, government, energy\u002Foil & gas, chemical, telecommunications, critical infrastructure, and aviation\u002Ftransport.\n- **Regions:** Primarily the Middle East — Gulf Cooperation Council states (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain), plus Israel; with international reach into the U.S. and other regions via supply-chain and trust-relationship pivots.\n- **Victim profile:** Government ministries and state-aligned enterprises in strategic sectors; the group frequently compromises one organization (e.g., HR\u002Fjob portals, telecoms) and abuses that trust to reach higher-value government targets.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n- **2014–2016 — Emergence (Helminth):** Social-engineering attacks delivering the Helminth backdoor (S0170) via macro-enabled Excel spreadsheets against Middle Eastern banks; FireEye began tracking the cluster as APT34. (Source: MITRE G0049; LevelBlue\u002FTrustwave APT34 profile.)\n- **December 2017 — CVE-2017-11882 government campaign:** Within a week of Microsoft's Nov-2017 patch, APT34 spearphished a Middle East government org with a malicious .rtf exploiting CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) to deploy **POWRUNER** (S0184) and **BONDUPDATER** (S0360), the latter using a custom DGA for DNS-based C2. (Source: FireEye\u002FMandiant, 2017-12-07.)\n- **Mid-2018 onward — Outlook Home Page persistence (CVE-2017-11774):** APT34 (alongside APT33) abused the Outlook Home Page feature for code execution and persistence after obtaining valid credentials. (Source: FireEye\u002FMandiant; U.S. Cyber Command advisory; Dark Reading.)\n- **April 2019 — Tool\u002Fsource leak:** A leak via the \"Lab Dookhtegan\" Telegram channel exposed OilRig webshells, DNS-tunneling tooling, and victim data, confirming TTPs and infrastructure. (Source: BankInfoSecurity.)\n- **October 2024 — Earth Simnavaz Gulf campaign:** Trend Micro reported APT34\u002FEarth Simnavaz targeting UAE\u002FGulf government and critical-infrastructure orgs: initial access via a webshell on a vulnerable web server, privilege escalation with **CVE-2024-30088** (Windows Kernel), a registered **password filter DLL** to capture plaintext credentials, the **STEALHOOK** backdoor exfiltrating data as attachments through the victim's own **Microsoft Exchange** server, and **ngrok** for tunneling\u002Flateral movement to the Domain Controller. (Source: Trend Micro; Industrial Cyber; Dark Reading.)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n*(Every technique below is grounded in the MITRE ATT&CK G0049 entry unless otherwise noted.)*\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1566.001 \u002F T1566.002 \u002F T1566.003** — Spearphishing via attachment (macro-enabled Excel\u002FWord, .rtf), via link, and via service (LinkedIn personas\u002Ffake job sites).\n- **T1190** — Exploitation of public-facing web servers to drop webshells (Earth Simnavaz initial access; complements T1505.003).\n- **T1133** — External remote services: persistence\u002Faccess via VPN, Citrix, and OWA.\n- **T1195** — Supply-chain \u002F trust-relationship compromise: leveraging one breached org to reach government targets.\n- **T1078 \u002F T1078.002** — Valid (incl. domain) accounts using harvested credentials.\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F .003 \u002F .005** — PowerShell, Windows Command Shell (batch), and VBScript macros for code execution.\n- **T1047** — WMI for execution.\n- **T1203** — Exploitation for client execution (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2024-30088).\n- **T1218.001** — Compiled HTML (.chm) payloads to load malware.\n- **T1204.001 \u002F .002** — User execution of malicious links and macro-enabled documents.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1053.005** — Scheduled tasks executing VBScript.\n- **T1543.003** — Windows services created on remote Domain Controllers.\n- **T1505.003** — Webshells (e.g., SEASHARPEE S0185, RGDoor S0258) for durable network access.\n- **T1137.004** — Outlook Home Page abuse (CVE-2017-11774) for persistence.\n- **T1556.002** — Password Filter DLL registered both for credential capture and as a persistence\u002Fdelivery mechanism.\n- **T1133** — Re-entry via VPN\u002FCitrix\u002FOWA.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- **T1068** — Exploitation for privilege escalation via Windows Kernel CVE-2024-30088.\n- **T1543.003** — Service creation for elevated execution.\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- **T1140** — Decode base64 with certutil\u002FPowerShell.\n- **T1070.004** — Delete payload files post-execution.\n- **T1027.005 \u002F .013** — Modify samples to evade AV; base64-encrypted\u002Fencoded files.\n- **T1036 \u002F T1036.005** — Masquerading (e.g., `.doc`-extension executables; Plink renamed `\\ProgramData\\Adobe.exe`).\n- **T1553.002 \u002F T1588.003** — Code signing with stolen certificates (and acquiring those certs).\n- **T1497.001** — Sandbox evasion via mouse-presence\u002Fsystem checks.\n- **T1112** — Modify registry via reg.exe.\n- **T1686.003** — Disable\u002Fmodify Windows firewall for remote access.\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1003.001 \u002F .004 \u002F .005** — LSASS (Mimikatz S0002), LSA Secrets and cached domain creds (LaZagne S0349).\n- **T1555 \u002F .003 \u002F .004** — Password stores; browser creds (LaZagne, PICKPOCKET); Windows Credential Manager (VALUEVAULT).\n- **T1552.001** — Credentials in files via LaZagne.\n- **T1556.002** — Password Filter DLL to capture plaintext credentials at logon\u002Fchange.\n- **T1110** — Brute force \u002F password spraying.\n- **T1056.001** — Keylogging (KEYPUNCH, LONGWATCH).\n- **T1115** — Clipboard capture via infostealers.\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.001 \u002F .002** — Local\u002Fdomain account enumeration (`net user`, net commands).\n- **T1082 \u002F T1016 \u002F T1049 \u002F T1033 \u002F T1007** — System info (`systeminfo`, `hostname`), network config (`ipconfig \u002Fall`), connections (`netstat -an`), user (`whoami`), services (`sc query`).\n- **T1057 \u002F T1518** — Process listing (`tasklist`); installed software (incl. Chrome).\n- **T1069.001 \u002F .002** — Local and domain permission-group enumeration.\n- **T1201** — Password policy discovery (`net accounts`).\n- **T1120 \u002F T1012** — Peripheral (mouse) discovery; registry queries (Terminal Server Client keys).\n- **T1046** — Network service discovery (SoftPerfect Network Scanner, GOLDIRONY).\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.001** — RDP (often through tunneling).\n- **T1021.004** — SSH via PuTTY.\n- **T1572** — Protocol tunneling with Plink.\n- **T1219** — ngrok used as remote-access\u002Ftunneling RMM to reach the DC (Earth Simnavaz).\n- PsExec (S0029) for remote execution.\n\n### Collection\n- **T1005 \u002F T1119 \u002F T1074.001** — Local data collection, automated collection, local staging in `%TEMP%`.\n- **T1113** — Screen capture (CANDYKING).\n- **T1217 \u002F T1025** — Browser data dumpers (MKG, CDumper, EDumper); USB capture via Wireshark `usbcapcmd`.\n- **T1056.001 \u002F T1115** — Keylogging and clipboard data (also credential access).\n\n### Command and Control\n- **T1071.001** — HTTP web-protocol C2.\n- **T1071.004** — DNS-tunneling C2 (signature TTP; BONDUPDATER DGA, requestbin.net).\n- **T1132.001** — Base64 standard encoding of C2 data.\n- **T1008** — Fallback channels (ISMAgent falls back to DNS when HTTP unavailable).\n- **T1573.002** — Asymmetric encrypted channels (PowerExchange\u002Ftunneling utilities).\n- **T1105** — Ingress tool transfer.\n\n### Exfiltration\n- **T1048.003** — Exfiltration over alternative protocol via the victim's own Microsoft Exchange server (STEALHOOK emails data as attachments) and FTP.\n\n### Impact\n- No routine destructive impact in espionage operations, but the cluster is associated with the **ZeroCleare** (S1151) wiper, demonstrating latent destructive capability — relevant for blue-cell worst-case planning.\n\n### Resource Development (pre-intrusion)\n- **T1583.001 \u002F T1584.004 \u002F T1586.002** — Acquire domains (fake VPN\u002Fjob sites), compromise infrastructure (hijacked Israeli HR\u002Fjob portals as C2), compromise email accounts for phishing.\n- **T1585.003** — Establish M365 cloud accounts for C2.\n- **T1587.001 \u002F T1588.002 \u002F T1608.001** — Develop malware (Solar, Mango); obtain tools (Plink, Mimikatz); host malware on fake targeting sites.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n**Custom:** BONDUPDATER (S0360, DGA DNS downloader), POWRUNER (S0184, PowerShell backdoor), Helminth (S0170, VBScript\u002FPowerShell + EXE), ISMInjector (S0189), QUADAGENT (S0269), OopsIE (S0264), SideTwist (S0610), RDAT (S0495, DNS\u002Femail-steganography C2), RGDoor (S0258, IIS backdoor), SEASHARPEE (S0185, webshell), PowerExchange (S1173, Exchange-based C2), Solar \u002F Mango (S1166 \u002F S1169), SampleCheck5000 (S1168), ODAgent (S1170), OilCheck (S1171), OilBooster (S1172), ZeroCleare (S1151, wiper). Named (non-MITRE-software) tooling from reporting: STEALHOOK, VALUEVAULT, PICKPOCKET, KEYPUNCH, LONGWATCH, CANDYKING, GOLDIRONY, MKG\u002FCDumper\u002FEDumper.\n**Public \u002F dual-use:** Mimikatz (S0002), LaZagne (S0349), PsExec (S0029), ngrok (S0508), certutil (S0160), Net (S0039), Reg (S0075), Tasklist (S0057), Systeminfo (S0096), netstat (S0104), ipconfig (S0100), ftp (S0095), Plink\u002FPuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, Wireshark (`usbcapcmd`).\n\n## Emulation guidance (Raptix)\n**AUTHORIZED USE ONLY — execute these techniques exclusively within the documented scope, rules of engagement, and target list of a signed engagement; never against systems you are not explicitly authorized to test.**\n\nMap APT34's signature behaviors to Raptix capabilities to reproduce the actor's tradecraft for blue-cell exercise:\n- **Initial access (T1566.x \u002F T1204.x):** Use the phishing\u002Fsocial-engineering skill to craft macro-enabled Office or .rtf lures and LinkedIn-style personas (mirroring T1566.003). For web-facing entry (T1190\u002FT1505.003), use the web-exploitation\u002Fbash tooling to drop an authorized webshell on an in-scope test server.\n- **Execution (T1059.001\u002F.003\u002F.005, T1047, T1218.001):** Drive PowerShell, cmd, VBScript, WMI, and .chm-loader payloads via the bash\u002Fcommand-execution and defense-evasion skills. Stage a custom-DGA \"BONDUPDATER-style\" beacon to emulate the actor's loader behavior.\n- **C2 (T1071.004 DNS tunneling, T1071.001 HTTP, T1008 fallback, T1573.002):** Configure your **C2\u002FSliver** profile for DNS-over-HTTP fallback to replicate APT34's hallmark DNS-tunneling and HTTP-with-DNS-failover beaconing. Use base64 encoding (T1132.001) on C2 traffic to match the actor.\n- **Persistence (T1053.005, T1543.003, T1505.003, T1137.004, T1556.002):** Via the persistence\u002FAD skills, plant scheduled tasks, create services on a (lab) DC, deploy a webshell, and — where the engagement explicitly authorizes endpoint persistence — emulate Outlook Home Page abuse and a benign password-filter-DLL to demonstrate the credential-capture vector.\n- **Privilege escalation (T1068):** Use the local-privesc tooling to emulate kernel-exploit escalation in a patched-vs-unpatched lab; do not weaponize live CVEs outside scope.\n- **Credential access (T1003.x, T1555.x, T1556.002, T1110, T1056.001):** Run Mimikatz\u002FLaZagne-equivalent modules from the credential-access skill for LSASS\u002FLSA\u002Fbrowser\u002FCredential-Manager dumping; emulate password-spray (T1110) and a keylogger to mirror APT34 harvesting.\n- **Discovery (T1087\u002FT1082\u002FT1016\u002FT1049\u002FT1069\u002FT1201\u002FT1046):** Execute the LOLBin recon sequence (`whoami`, `net user`\u002F`net group`, `ipconfig \u002Fall`, `netstat -an`, `net accounts`, `sc query`) via bash and run an authorized network scan to mirror the actor's footprint.\n- **Lateral movement (T1021.001\u002F.004, T1572, T1219):** Use the lateral-movement skill with RDP\u002FSSH plus Plink\u002Fngrok-style tunneling to traverse to a lab DC, replicating the Earth Simnavaz path.\n- **Collection & exfiltration (T1113\u002FT1074.001\u002FT1048.003):** Stage data in `%TEMP%`, capture screenshots, then emulate exfiltration through an in-scope Exchange\u002Fmail path (STEALHOOK pattern) or DNS tunnel to validate DLP\u002Fegress detections.\n- **Cloud (T1585.003):** Where the engagement includes M365\u002FAzure, use the cloud skill to stand up an authorized cloud-mail C2 account mirroring the actor's M365 abuse.\n\nSequence the emulation as the actor does: phish → execute loader → DNS\u002FHTTP C2 → recon → credential harvest → escalate → lateral to DC → stage → exfil via mail\u002FDNS — so the blue cell can validate detection at each hop.\n\n## Detection & defense\n- **Phishing\u002Fmacros (T1566, T1204, T1218.001):** Block macros from the internet, disable Equation Editor, strip\u002F sandbox .rtf and .chm attachments; user-reporting + attachment detonation.\n- **DNS-tunneling C2 (T1071.004, T1008):** Monitor for high-volume\u002Flong\u002Fencoded TXT\u002FA queries, DGA-like subdomains, and unusual resolver patterns; baseline DNS egress and alert on anomalous query length\u002Fentropy. This is the highest-signal detection for APT34.\n- **Outlook Home Page persistence (T1137.004):** Audit\u002Fdisable the Outlook Home Page registry keys; ensure the CVE-2017-11774 patch is applied and not rolled back; alert on creation of `Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Outlook\\WebView` URL values.\n- **Password Filter DLL (T1556.002):** Monitor `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages` for new entries and unexpected DLLs loaded into LSASS.\n- **Credential dumping (T1003.x):** Enable LSASS protection (RunAsPPL\u002FCredential Guard), alert on suspicious LSASS access and on LaZagne\u002FMimikatz behavior.\n- **Exchange exfiltration (T1048.003):** Alert on programmatic mail sends with attachments from server\u002Fservice contexts, anomalous EWS\u002FExchange transport activity, and outbound mail to unfamiliar external addresses.\n- **Tunneling\u002FRMM (T1572, T1219, T1021):** Detect ngrok\u002FPlink\u002FPuTTY binaries and renamed copies (e.g., `Adobe.exe` in `ProgramData` — T1036.005), monitor for unexpected RDP\u002FSSH tunnels, and restrict outbound to known RMM domains.\n- **Webshells (T1505.003):** File-integrity monitoring on web roots, alert on web-server processes spawning cmd\u002FPowerShell.\n- **Exploitation\u002Fpatching (T1203, T1068):** Prioritize patching CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11774, and CVE-2024-30088; restrict kernel-exploit prerequisites.\n- **Living-off-the-land recon (T1059.001, certutil decode T1140):** Enable PowerShell script-block\u002Fmodule logging and alert on `certutil -decode`, base64 blobs, and the clustered LOLBin recon sequence.\n- **Identity (T1078, T1110, T1133):** Enforce MFA on VPN\u002FCitrix\u002FOWA\u002FM365, monitor for password spraying and impossible-travel logons.\n\n## Sources\n- MITRE ATT&CK — OilRig (G0049): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0049\u002F\n- FireEye\u002FMandiant — \"New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34 … Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit\" (2017-12-07): https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Ftargeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34\u002F\n- Mandiant\u002FFireEye — \"Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774)\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fbreaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks\u002F\n- Trend Micro — \"Earth Simnavaz (aka APT34) Levies Advanced Cyberattacks Against Middle East\" (2024-10): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.trendmicro.com\u002Fen_us\u002Fresearch\u002F24\u002Fj\u002Fearth-simnavaz-cyberattacks.html\n- Industrial Cyber — Trend Micro Earth Simnavaz Exchange backdoor coverage: https:\u002F\u002Findustrialcyber.co\u002Fransomware\u002Ftrend-micro-reveals-earth-simnavaz-apt-targets-gulf-organizations-using-microsoft-exchange-server-backdoor\u002F\n- Dark Reading — \"Iran's APT34 Abuses MS Exchange to Spy on Gulf Gov'ts\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.darkreading.com\u002Fcyberattacks-data-breaches\u002Firan-apt34-ms-exchange-spy-gulf-govts\n- Dark Reading — \"Attackers Continue to Exploit Outlook Home Page Flaw\" (CVE-2017-11774): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.darkreading.com\u002Fvulnerabilities-threats\u002Fattackers-continue-to-exploit-outlook-home-page-flaw\n- BankInfoSecurity — \"Leak Exposes OilRig APT Group's Tools\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bankinfosecurity.com\u002Fleak-exposes-oilrig-apt-groups-tools-a-12397\n","# APT34 (OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nAPT34 — tracked as OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, Cobalt Gypsy \u002F COBALT GYPSY, IRN2, Evasive Serpens, EUROPIUM, ITG13, and TA452 (MITRE ATT&CK **G0049**) — is a suspected Iranian state-sponsored cyber-espionage group operational since at least 2014. It conducts long-running, reconnaissance-heavy intrusions against Middle Eastern and international organizations, favoring spearphishing for initial access, heavy use of PowerShell\u002FVBScript backdoors, custom DNS-tunneling C2, supply-chain and trust-relationship abuse, and patient credential harvesting. The group continually re-tools (BONDUPDATER → SideTwist → cloud\u002FExchange-based C2) and is notable for living-off-the-land tradecraft, password-filter-DLL credential capture, and exfiltrating data through victim-owned Microsoft Exchange servers to blend with legitimate mail flow.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n- **Suspected sponsor:** Iran. FireEye\u002FMandiant assesses APT34 \"works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.\" Multiple vendors (Trend Micro, Microsoft, CrowdStrike) link the cluster to Iranian intelligence services.\n- **Motivation:** Strategic **cyber espionage** — long-term reconnaissance and credential\u002Fdata theft to advance Iranian geopolitical interests in the region. Primary intent is intelligence collection, not financial gain. (A separate but related Iranian destructive operation, ZeroCleare wiper (S1151), is associated with the same cluster, indicating latent destructive capability.)\n- **Confidence:** High that the activity is Iranian state-aligned espionage; the precise sponsoring agency varies by vendor naming. Attribution of any single intrusion should be treated as suspected unless backed by collected infrastructure\u002Ftooling overlap.\n\n## Targeting\n- **Sectors:** Financial\u002Fbanking, government, energy\u002Foil & gas, chemical, telecommunications, critical infrastructure, and aviation\u002Ftransport.\n- **Regions:** Primarily the Middle East — Gulf Cooperation Council states (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain), plus Israel; with international reach into the U.S. and other regions via supply-chain and trust-relationship pivots.\n- **Victim profile:** Government ministries and state-aligned enterprises in strategic sectors; the group frequently compromises one organization (e.g., HR\u002Fjob portals, telecoms) and abuses that trust to reach higher-value government targets.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n- **2014–2016 — Emergence (Helminth):** Social-engineering attacks delivering the Helminth backdoor (S0170) via macro-enabled Excel spreadsheets against Middle Eastern banks; FireEye began tracking the cluster as APT34. (Source: MITRE G0049; LevelBlue\u002FTrustwave APT34 profile.)\n- **December 2017 — CVE-2017-11882 government campaign:** Within a week of Microsoft's Nov-2017 patch, APT34 spearphished a Middle East government org with a malicious .rtf exploiting CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) to deploy **POWRUNER** (S0184) and **BONDUPDATER** (S0360), the latter using a custom DGA for DNS-based C2. (Source: FireEye\u002FMandiant, 2017-12-07.)\n- **Mid-2018 onward — Outlook Home Page persistence (CVE-2017-11774):** APT34 (alongside APT33) abused the Outlook Home Page feature for code execution and persistence after obtaining valid credentials. (Source: FireEye\u002FMandiant; U.S. Cyber Command advisory; Dark Reading.)\n- **April 2019 — Tool\u002Fsource leak:** A leak via the \"Lab Dookhtegan\" Telegram channel exposed OilRig webshells, DNS-tunneling tooling, and victim data, confirming TTPs and infrastructure. (Source: BankInfoSecurity.)\n- **October 2024 — Earth Simnavaz Gulf campaign:** Trend Micro reported APT34\u002FEarth Simnavaz targeting UAE\u002FGulf government and critical-infrastructure orgs: initial access via a webshell on a vulnerable web server, privilege escalation with **CVE-2024-30088** (Windows Kernel), a registered **password filter DLL** to capture plaintext credentials, the **STEALHOOK** backdoor exfiltrating data as attachments through the victim's own **Microsoft Exchange** server, and **ngrok** for tunneling\u002Flateral movement to the Domain Controller. (Source: Trend Micro; Industrial Cyber; Dark Reading.)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n*(Every technique below is grounded in the MITRE ATT&CK G0049 entry unless otherwise noted.)*\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1566.001 \u002F T1566.002 \u002F T1566.003** — Spearphishing via attachment (macro-enabled Excel\u002FWord, .rtf), via link, and via service (LinkedIn personas\u002Ffake job sites).\n- **T1190** — Exploitation of public-facing web servers to drop webshells (Earth Simnavaz initial access; complements T1505.003).\n- **T1133** — External remote services: persistence\u002Faccess via VPN, Citrix, and OWA.\n- **T1195** — Supply-chain \u002F trust-relationship compromise: leveraging one breached org to reach government targets.\n- **T1078 \u002F T1078.002** — Valid (incl. domain) accounts using harvested credentials.\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F .003 \u002F .005** — PowerShell, Windows Command Shell (batch), and VBScript macros for code execution.\n- **T1047** — WMI for execution.\n- **T1203** — Exploitation for client execution (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2024-30088).\n- **T1218.001** — Compiled HTML (.chm) payloads to load malware.\n- **T1204.001 \u002F .002** — User execution of malicious links and macro-enabled documents.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1053.005** — Scheduled tasks executing VBScript.\n- **T1543.003** — Windows services created on remote Domain Controllers.\n- **T1505.003** — Webshells (e.g., SEASHARPEE S0185, RGDoor S0258) for durable network access.\n- **T1137.004** — Outlook Home Page abuse (CVE-2017-11774) for persistence.\n- **T1556.002** — Password Filter DLL registered both for credential capture and as a persistence\u002Fdelivery mechanism.\n- **T1133** — Re-entry via VPN\u002FCitrix\u002FOWA.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- **T1068** — Exploitation for privilege escalation via Windows Kernel CVE-2024-30088.\n- **T1543.003** — Service creation for elevated execution.\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- **T1140** — Decode base64 with certutil\u002FPowerShell.\n- **T1070.004** — Delete payload files post-execution.\n- **T1027.005 \u002F .013** — Modify samples to evade AV; base64-encrypted\u002Fencoded files.\n- **T1036 \u002F T1036.005** — Masquerading (e.g., `.doc`-extension executables; Plink renamed `\\ProgramData\\Adobe.exe`).\n- **T1553.002 \u002F T1588.003** — Code signing with stolen certificates (and acquiring those certs).\n- **T1497.001** — Sandbox evasion via mouse-presence\u002Fsystem checks.\n- **T1112** — Modify registry via reg.exe.\n- **T1686.003** — Disable\u002Fmodify Windows firewall for remote access.\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1003.001 \u002F .004 \u002F .005** — LSASS (Mimikatz S0002), LSA Secrets and cached domain creds (LaZagne S0349).\n- **T1555 \u002F .003 \u002F .004** — Password stores; browser creds (LaZagne, PICKPOCKET); Windows Credential Manager (VALUEVAULT).\n- **T1552.001** — Credentials in files via LaZagne.\n- **T1556.002** — Password Filter DLL to capture plaintext credentials at logon\u002Fchange.\n- **T1110** — Brute force \u002F password spraying.\n- **T1056.001** — Keylogging (KEYPUNCH, LONGWATCH).\n- **T1115** — Clipboard capture via infostealers.\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.001 \u002F .002** — Local\u002Fdomain account enumeration (`net user`, net commands).\n- **T1082 \u002F T1016 \u002F T1049 \u002F T1033 \u002F T1007** — System info (`systeminfo`, `hostname`), network config (`ipconfig \u002Fall`), connections (`netstat -an`), user (`whoami`), services (`sc query`).\n- **T1057 \u002F T1518** — Process listing (`tasklist`); installed software (incl. Chrome).\n- **T1069.001 \u002F .002** — Local and domain permission-group enumeration.\n- **T1201** — Password policy discovery (`net accounts`).\n- **T1120 \u002F T1012** — Peripheral (mouse) discovery; registry queries (Terminal Server Client keys).\n- **T1046** — Network service discovery (SoftPerfect Network Scanner, GOLDIRONY).\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.001** — RDP (often through tunneling).\n- **T1021.004** — SSH via PuTTY.\n- **T1572** — Protocol tunneling with Plink.\n- **T1219** — ngrok used as remote-access\u002Ftunneling RMM to reach the DC (Earth Simnavaz).\n- PsExec (S0029) for remote execution.\n\n### Collection\n- **T1005 \u002F T1119 \u002F T1074.001** — Local data collection, automated collection, local staging in `%TEMP%`.\n- **T1113** — Screen capture (CANDYKING).\n- **T1217 \u002F T1025** — Browser data dumpers (MKG, CDumper, EDumper); USB capture via Wireshark `usbcapcmd`.\n- **T1056.001 \u002F T1115** — Keylogging and clipboard data (also credential access).\n\n### Command and Control\n- **T1071.001** — HTTP web-protocol C2.\n- **T1071.004** — DNS-tunneling C2 (signature TTP; BONDUPDATER DGA, requestbin.net).\n- **T1132.001** — Base64 standard encoding of C2 data.\n- **T1008** — Fallback channels (ISMAgent falls back to DNS when HTTP unavailable).\n- **T1573.002** — Asymmetric encrypted channels (PowerExchange\u002Ftunneling utilities).\n- **T1105** — Ingress tool transfer.\n\n### Exfiltration\n- **T1048.003** — Exfiltration over alternative protocol via the victim's own Microsoft Exchange server (STEALHOOK emails data as attachments) and FTP.\n\n### Impact\n- No routine destructive impact in espionage operations, but the cluster is associated with the **ZeroCleare** (S1151) wiper, demonstrating latent destructive capability — relevant for blue-cell worst-case planning.\n\n### Resource Development (pre-intrusion)\n- **T1583.001 \u002F T1584.004 \u002F T1586.002** — Acquire domains (fake VPN\u002Fjob sites), compromise infrastructure (hijacked Israeli HR\u002Fjob portals as C2), compromise email accounts for phishing.\n- **T1585.003** — Establish M365 cloud accounts for C2.\n- **T1587.001 \u002F T1588.002 \u002F T1608.001** — Develop malware (Solar, Mango); obtain tools (Plink, Mimikatz); host malware on fake targeting sites.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n**Custom:** BONDUPDATER (S0360, DGA DNS downloader), POWRUNER (S0184, PowerShell backdoor), Helminth (S0170, VBScript\u002FPowerShell + EXE), ISMInjector (S0189), QUADAGENT (S0269), OopsIE (S0264), SideTwist (S0610), RDAT (S0495, DNS\u002Femail-steganography C2), RGDoor (S0258, IIS backdoor), SEASHARPEE (S0185, webshell), PowerExchange (S1173, Exchange-based C2), Solar \u002F Mango (S1166 \u002F S1169), SampleCheck5000 (S1168), ODAgent (S1170), OilCheck (S1171), OilBooster (S1172), ZeroCleare (S1151, wiper). Named (non-MITRE-software) tooling from reporting: STEALHOOK, VALUEVAULT, PICKPOCKET, KEYPUNCH, LONGWATCH, CANDYKING, GOLDIRONY, MKG\u002FCDumper\u002FEDumper.\n**Public \u002F dual-use:** Mimikatz (S0002), LaZagne (S0349), PsExec (S0029), ngrok (S0508), certutil (S0160), Net (S0039), Reg (S0075), Tasklist (S0057), Systeminfo (S0096), netstat (S0104), ipconfig (S0100), ftp (S0095), Plink\u002FPuTTY, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, Wireshark (`usbcapcmd`).\n\n## Emulation guidance (Raptix)\n**AUTHORIZED USE ONLY — execute these techniques exclusively within the documented scope, rules of engagement, and target list of a signed engagement; never against systems you are not explicitly authorized to test.**\n\nMap APT34's signature behaviors to Raptix capabilities to reproduce the actor's tradecraft for blue-cell exercise:\n- **Initial access (T1566.x \u002F T1204.x):** Use the phishing\u002Fsocial-engineering skill to craft macro-enabled Office or .rtf lures and LinkedIn-style personas (mirroring T1566.003). For web-facing entry (T1190\u002FT1505.003), use the web-exploitation\u002Fbash tooling to drop an authorized webshell on an in-scope test server.\n- **Execution (T1059.001\u002F.003\u002F.005, T1047, T1218.001):** Drive PowerShell, cmd, VBScript, WMI, and .chm-loader payloads via the bash\u002Fcommand-execution and defense-evasion skills. Stage a custom-DGA \"BONDUPDATER-style\" beacon to emulate the actor's loader behavior.\n- **C2 (T1071.004 DNS tunneling, T1071.001 HTTP, T1008 fallback, T1573.002):** Configure your **C2\u002FSliver** profile for DNS-over-HTTP fallback to replicate APT34's hallmark DNS-tunneling and HTTP-with-DNS-failover beaconing. Use base64 encoding (T1132.001) on C2 traffic to match the actor.\n- **Persistence (T1053.005, T1543.003, T1505.003, T1137.004, T1556.002):** Via the persistence\u002FAD skills, plant scheduled tasks, create services on a (lab) DC, deploy a webshell, and — where the engagement explicitly authorizes endpoint persistence — emulate Outlook Home Page abuse and a benign password-filter-DLL to demonstrate the credential-capture vector.\n- **Privilege escalation (T1068):** Use the local-privesc tooling to emulate kernel-exploit escalation in a patched-vs-unpatched lab; do not weaponize live CVEs outside scope.\n- **Credential access (T1003.x, T1555.x, T1556.002, T1110, T1056.001):** Run Mimikatz\u002FLaZagne-equivalent modules from the credential-access skill for LSASS\u002FLSA\u002Fbrowser\u002FCredential-Manager dumping; emulate password-spray (T1110) and a keylogger to mirror APT34 harvesting.\n- **Discovery (T1087\u002FT1082\u002FT1016\u002FT1049\u002FT1069\u002FT1201\u002FT1046):** Execute the LOLBin recon sequence (`whoami`, `net user`\u002F`net group`, `ipconfig \u002Fall`, `netstat -an`, `net accounts`, `sc query`) via bash and run an authorized network scan to mirror the actor's footprint.\n- **Lateral movement (T1021.001\u002F.004, T1572, T1219):** Use the lateral-movement skill with RDP\u002FSSH plus Plink\u002Fngrok-style tunneling to traverse to a lab DC, replicating the Earth Simnavaz path.\n- **Collection & exfiltration (T1113\u002FT1074.001\u002FT1048.003):** Stage data in `%TEMP%`, capture screenshots, then emulate exfiltration through an in-scope Exchange\u002Fmail path (STEALHOOK pattern) or DNS tunnel to validate DLP\u002Fegress detections.\n- **Cloud (T1585.003):** Where the engagement includes M365\u002FAzure, use the cloud skill to stand up an authorized cloud-mail C2 account mirroring the actor's M365 abuse.\n\nSequence the emulation as the actor does: phish → execute loader → DNS\u002FHTTP C2 → recon → credential harvest → escalate → lateral to DC → stage → exfil via mail\u002FDNS — so the blue cell can validate detection at each hop.\n\n## Detection & defense\n- **Phishing\u002Fmacros (T1566, T1204, T1218.001):** Block macros from the internet, disable Equation Editor, strip\u002F sandbox .rtf and .chm attachments; user-reporting + attachment detonation.\n- **DNS-tunneling C2 (T1071.004, T1008):** Monitor for high-volume\u002Flong\u002Fencoded TXT\u002FA queries, DGA-like subdomains, and unusual resolver patterns; baseline DNS egress and alert on anomalous query length\u002Fentropy. This is the highest-signal detection for APT34.\n- **Outlook Home Page persistence (T1137.004):** Audit\u002Fdisable the Outlook Home Page registry keys; ensure the CVE-2017-11774 patch is applied and not rolled back; alert on creation of `Software\\Microsoft\\Office\\*\\Outlook\\WebView` URL values.\n- **Password Filter DLL (T1556.002):** Monitor `HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages` for new entries and unexpected DLLs loaded into LSASS.\n- **Credential dumping (T1003.x):** Enable LSASS protection (RunAsPPL\u002FCredential Guard), alert on suspicious LSASS access and on LaZagne\u002FMimikatz behavior.\n- **Exchange exfiltration (T1048.003):** Alert on programmatic mail sends with attachments from server\u002Fservice contexts, anomalous EWS\u002FExchange transport activity, and outbound mail to unfamiliar external addresses.\n- **Tunneling\u002FRMM (T1572, T1219, T1021):** Detect ngrok\u002FPlink\u002FPuTTY binaries and renamed copies (e.g., `Adobe.exe` in `ProgramData` — T1036.005), monitor for unexpected RDP\u002FSSH tunnels, and restrict outbound to known RMM domains.\n- **Webshells (T1505.003):** File-integrity monitoring on web roots, alert on web-server processes spawning cmd\u002FPowerShell.\n- **Exploitation\u002Fpatching (T1203, T1068):** Prioritize patching CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11774, and CVE-2024-30088; restrict kernel-exploit prerequisites.\n- **Living-off-the-land recon (T1059.001, certutil decode T1140):** Enable PowerShell script-block\u002Fmodule logging and alert on `certutil -decode`, base64 blobs, and the clustered LOLBin recon sequence.\n- **Identity (T1078, T1110, T1133):** Enforce MFA on VPN\u002FCitrix\u002FOWA\u002FM365, monitor for password spraying and impossible-travel logons.\n\n## Sources\n- MITRE ATT&CK — OilRig (G0049): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0049\u002F\n- FireEye\u002FMandiant — \"New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34 … Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit\" (2017-12-07): https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Ftargeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34\u002F\n- Mandiant\u002FFireEye — \"Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774)\": https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fbreaking-the-rules-tough-outlook-for-home-page-attacks\u002F\n- Trend Micro — \"Earth Simnavaz (aka APT34) Levies Advanced Cyberattacks Against Middle East\" (2024-10): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.trendmicro.com\u002Fen_us\u002Fresearch\u002F24\u002Fj\u002Fearth-simnavaz-cyberattacks.html\n- Industrial Cyber — Trend Micro Earth Simnavaz Exchange backdoor coverage: https:\u002F\u002Findustrialcyber.co\u002Fransomware\u002Ftrend-micro-reveals-earth-simnavaz-apt-targets-gulf-organizations-using-microsoft-exchange-server-backdoor\u002F\n- Dark Reading — \"Iran's APT34 Abuses MS Exchange to Spy on Gulf Gov'ts\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.darkreading.com\u002Fcyberattacks-data-breaches\u002Firan-apt34-ms-exchange-spy-gulf-govts\n- Dark Reading — \"Attackers Continue to Exploit Outlook Home Page Flaw\" (CVE-2017-11774): https:\u002F\u002Fwww.darkreading.com\u002Fvulnerabilities-threats\u002Fattackers-continue-to-exploit-outlook-home-page-flaw\n- BankInfoSecurity — \"Leak Exposes OilRig APT Group's Tools\": https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bankinfosecurity.com\u002Fleak-exposes-oilrig-apt-groups-tools-a-12397\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, apt34, oilrig, iran, espionage, g0049, dns-tunneling, middle-east, mitre-attack, red-team","adversary-emulation","APT34, OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Earth Simnavaz, Crambus, Cobalt Gypsy, Evasive Serpens, Iranian APT, MOIS, Middle East espionage, DNS tunneling, BONDUPDATER, POWRUNER, SideTwist, STEALHOOK, Outlook Home Page persistence, Exchange exfiltration, password filter DLL, emulate Iranian threat actor","T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003, T1204.001, T1204.002, T1133, T1078, T1078.002, T1190, T1195, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1047, T1203, T1218.001, T1053.005, T1543.003, T1505.003, T1137.004, T1556.002, T1133, T1068, T1543.003, T1112, T1140, T1070.004, T1027.005, T1027.013, T1036, T1036.005, T1553.002, T1588.003, T1497.001, T1686.003, T1003.001, T1003.004, T1003.005, T1555, T1555.003, T1555.004, T1552.001, T1110, T1056.001, T1115, T1087.001, T1087.002, T1082, T1016, T1049, T1033, T1007, T1057, T1518, T1069.001, T1069.002, T1201, T1120, T1012, T1046, T1021.001, T1021.004, T1572, T1219, T1005, T1119, T1074.001, T1113, T1217, T1025, T1071.001, T1071.004, T1132.001, T1008, T1573.002, T1105, T1048.003, T1585.003, T1583.001, T1584.004, T1586.002, T1587.001, T1588.002, T1608.001","Bash Read Write","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fapt34-oilrig","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill apt34-oilrig",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill apt34-oilrig",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill apt34-oilrig","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fapt34-oilrig\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,58,65,72,79,86],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":55,"categories":56,"keywords":57,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":59,"name":60,"nameZh":6,"description":61,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":62,"categories":63,"keywords":64,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":66,"name":67,"nameZh":6,"description":68,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]