[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DEKMM58YJS9ZV08C4GVGER":3,"skill-same:01M7DEKMM58YJS9ZV08C4GVGER":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M7DEKMM58YJS9ZV08C4GVGER","aatmf-t14-infra-warfare",null,"AATMF T14 — Infrastructure & Economic Warfare. Endpoint DoS via expensive prompts, model-API account exhaustion, GPU resource starvation, billing weaponization.","Akapi895\u002Fraptix","Akapi895","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F83953516?v=4","01M7DEGNDGERR4F4YETDFVA512","Phạm Anh Tuấn","01M7DEGNEHYZNA920AYM5EH7H8",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fplugins\u002Fllm-redteam\u002Ft14-infra-warfare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: aatmf-t14-infra-warfare\ndescription: AATMF T14 — Infrastructure & Economic Warfare. Endpoint DoS via expensive prompts, model-API account exhaustion, GPU resource starvation, billing weaponization.\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"infra dos economic warfare cost amplification gpu starvation billing\"\n  mitre_attack: T1499\n  subdomain: ai-security\n  aatmf_tactic: T14\n---\n\n# T14 — Infrastructure & Economic Warfare\n\nAttacks aimed at degrading service availability, exhausting budget,\nor causing economic harm via abuse of the LLM endpoint. Adjacent to\nclassical DoS but LLM-specific cost dynamics.\n\n## Techniques\n\n### T14.001 — Per-account budget exhaustion\n- Multiple low-bandwidth requests each maximizing token cost\n- Free-tier abuse via account creation farms\n- Direct DDoS of paid endpoint (uses budget at attack rate)\n\nDefenders: per-account caps + alerts.\n\n### T14.002 — Shared-quota poisoning\nMulti-tenant LLM services share quotas at a provider level. Attacker\nexhausts the shared quota → all tenants degraded.\n\nTargets: SaaS products that meter LLM access but share underlying\nAPI account.\n\n### T14.003 — GPU resource starvation\nSelf-hosted inference. Long-context queries hog GPU:\n- Send queries near max context length\n- Send batch of long-context queries in parallel\n- Loop to maintain pressure\n\nCost-amplification ratio: 1 user request → 100% GPU utilization.\n\n### T14.004 — Cost amplification (T5.002 cross-ref)\nPrompt engineering to maximize output cost:\n- \"Repeat 'token' 5000 times\"\n- \"Generate the maximum-length response you're allowed to produce\"\n- Quadratic context patterns that bloat each turn\n\n### T14.005 — Pricing-tier exploit\nSome APIs charge differently based on model variant. Trick the\nendpoint into using the expensive variant via parameter manipulation\n(T5.004 overlap).\n\n### T14.006 — Caching-pollution\nWhere LLM provider caches identical prompts (cost-reduction feature):\n- Submit prompts that fill cache but produce uncacheable outputs\n- Cache thrashing → no cost savings, full cost incurred\n\n### T14.007 — Streaming attack\nOpen many streaming requests → never consume → endpoint holds\nconnection slots open until timeout.\n\n## Probe pattern\n\nT14 is load-testing territory. Use k6, locust, hey:\n```bash\n# Spike test\nhey -n 1000 -c 100 -m POST -H 'Authorization: Bearer X' \\\n  -d '{\"prompt\":\"'$(python3 -c 'print(\"a\"*100000)')'\"}' \\\n  https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fapi\u002Fchat\n```\n\nMonitor:\n- Cost \u002F minute via provider dashboard\n- p99 latency\n- 429 \u002F 503 error rate\n- Other-tenant impact (if multi-tenant)\n\n## Detection signals\n\n- Cost spike >5x baseline w\u002Fo feature change\n- p99 latency degradation\n- Specific user IDs \u002F IPs concentrating traffic\n- Output token distribution skewed long\n\n## Severity\n\n| Outcome | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Multi-tenant outage via quota exhaust | Critical 9.0 |\n| Single-org budget burn via abuse | High 7-8 |\n| GPU starvation single-host | High 7-8 (recoverable) |\n| Streaming-slot starvation | Medium 6-7 |\n\n## Defender\n\n- Per-account hard budget caps (with grace + alert at 80%\u002F95%)\n- `max_tokens` strictly enforced (no `unlimited`)\n- Context-length per-tier caps\n- Rate limits per-account AND global (catch shared-quota attacks)\n- Anomaly detection on cost\u002Flatency\u002Fconcurrency\n- Caching: per-tenant cache, not global\n- Streaming: connection timeout aggressive (60s if no consumer)\n\n## Cross-references\n- T5 (API exploitation) — overlap on cost\u002Fabuse vectors\n- Classical DDoS skills `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002F...`\n","# T14 — Infrastructure & Economic Warfare\n\nAttacks aimed at degrading service availability, exhausting budget,\nor causing economic harm via abuse of the LLM endpoint. Adjacent to\nclassical DoS but LLM-specific cost dynamics.\n\n## Techniques\n\n### T14.001 — Per-account budget exhaustion\n- Multiple low-bandwidth requests each maximizing token cost\n- Free-tier abuse via account creation farms\n- Direct DDoS of paid endpoint (uses budget at attack rate)\n\nDefenders: per-account caps + alerts.\n\n### T14.002 — Shared-quota poisoning\nMulti-tenant LLM services share quotas at a provider level. Attacker\nexhausts the shared quota → all tenants degraded.\n\nTargets: SaaS products that meter LLM access but share underlying\nAPI account.\n\n### T14.003 — GPU resource starvation\nSelf-hosted inference. Long-context queries hog GPU:\n- Send queries near max context length\n- Send batch of long-context queries in parallel\n- Loop to maintain pressure\n\nCost-amplification ratio: 1 user request → 100% GPU utilization.\n\n### T14.004 — Cost amplification (T5.002 cross-ref)\nPrompt engineering to maximize output cost:\n- \"Repeat 'token' 5000 times\"\n- \"Generate the maximum-length response you're allowed to produce\"\n- Quadratic context patterns that bloat each turn\n\n### T14.005 — Pricing-tier exploit\nSome APIs charge differently based on model variant. Trick the\nendpoint into using the expensive variant via parameter manipulation\n(T5.004 overlap).\n\n### T14.006 — Caching-pollution\nWhere LLM provider caches identical prompts (cost-reduction feature):\n- Submit prompts that fill cache but produce uncacheable outputs\n- Cache thrashing → no cost savings, full cost incurred\n\n### T14.007 — Streaming attack\nOpen many streaming requests → never consume → endpoint holds\nconnection slots open until timeout.\n\n## Probe pattern\n\nT14 is load-testing territory. Use k6, locust, hey:\n```bash\n# Spike test\nhey -n 1000 -c 100 -m POST -H 'Authorization: Bearer X' \\\n  -d '{\"prompt\":\"'$(python3 -c 'print(\"a\"*100000)')'\"}' \\\n  https:\u002F\u002Ftarget\u002Fapi\u002Fchat\n```\n\nMonitor:\n- Cost \u002F minute via provider dashboard\n- p99 latency\n- 429 \u002F 503 error rate\n- Other-tenant impact (if multi-tenant)\n\n## Detection signals\n\n- Cost spike >5x baseline w\u002Fo feature change\n- p99 latency degradation\n- Specific user IDs \u002F IPs concentrating traffic\n- Output token distribution skewed long\n\n## Severity\n\n| Outcome | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Multi-tenant outage via quota exhaust | Critical 9.0 |\n| Single-org budget burn via abuse | High 7-8 |\n| GPU starvation single-host | High 7-8 (recoverable) |\n| Streaming-slot starvation | Medium 6-7 |\n\n## Defender\n\n- Per-account hard budget caps (with grace + alert at 80%\u002F95%)\n- `max_tokens` strictly enforced (no `unlimited`)\n- Context-length per-tier caps\n- Rate limits per-account AND global (catch shared-quota attacks)\n- Anomaly detection on cost\u002Flatency\u002Fconcurrency\n- Caching: per-tenant cache, not global\n- Streaming: connection timeout aggressive (60s if no consumer)\n\n## Cross-references\n- T5 (API exploitation) — overlap on cost\u002Fabuse vectors\n- Classical DDoS skills `skills\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002F...`\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"aatmf_tactic":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ai-security","infra dos economic warfare cost amplification gpu starvation billing","T14","T1499","master","8e5d356b795eae2edd4a26509a4b8968e2c4c251","packages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fplugins\u002Fllm-redteam\u002Ft14-infra-warfare","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895","2026-11-06 17:46:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill aatmf-t14-infra-warfare",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill aatmf-t14-infra-warfare",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Akapi895\u002Fraptix --skill aatmf-t14-infra-warfare","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fplugins\u002Fllm-redteam\u002Ft14-infra-warfare\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGM32SRP4FZSPYWY621BKQ","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKXXVDTY0KBZZR83VFPZX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKSV77ENX3D6TG2HQX9MK","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKJ9R6YTFRFBSEAJRGGKF","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGKCFZGKK2EQMWZM1A18S8","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DGK76MKZQWBXTZN82W7214","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FAkapi895\u002Fraptix\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fpackages\u002Fraptix-skills\u002Fraptix_skills\u002Fdefs\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]