[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7DAY86TJ0MJQZ904TZWQYVR":3,"skill-same:01M7DAY86TJ0MJQZ904TZWQYVR":60},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":30,"updatedAt":31,"install":32,"resources":45},"01M7DAY86TJ0MJQZ904TZWQYVR","malware-analysis",null,"alicewe1\u002Falice_skill","alicewe1","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F102134151?v=4","01M7D9STCM8HAESM958JP0989K","Alice_we","01M7D9STDR22MTD9FTTWPAZNV8",64,"GPL-3.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F_modules\u002Fmalware-analysis\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"﻿---\nx-alice-class: pentest\n---\n# Malware Analysis\n\n> YARA \u002F Sigma \u002F 沙箱 \u002F IOC 提取 \u002F 反反分析\n> 静态 + 动态 + 行为三合一\n\n## 适用场景\n\n- 恶意软件样本分析（PE\u002FELF\u002FMach-O\u002FAPK\u002F脚本）\n- YARA 规则编写与验证\n- Sigma 行为检测规则生成\n- 沙箱自动化分析编排\n- IOC 提取与威胁情报\n- 反分析技术检测与绕过\n\n## 六阶段分析流程\n\n### Phase 1: 初步分诊\n\n```bash\n# 快速静态检测\nfile sample.exe                      # 文件类型\nstrings sample.exe | grep -i \"http\\|cmd\\|powershell\\|base64\"  # 快速 IOCs\nrabin2 -zz sample.exe                # 字符串提取 + 交叉引用\nfloss sample.exe                     # 去混淆字符串提取（FireEye）\n\n# PE 头部分析\npecheck sample.exe                   # PE 结构验证\npescan sample.exe                    # 异常检测（节表、入口点）\ndiec sample.exe                      # Detect It Easy（壳\u002F编译器识别）\n\n# Hash 查询\nsha256sum sample.exe\n# → VirusTotal \u002F MalwareBazaar \u002F Triage 查询\n```\n\n### Phase 2: 静态分析\n\n```text\n反汇编\u002F反编译：\n□ IDA Pro \u002F Ghidra: 深度反编译\n□ radare2: CLI 快速分析\n□ x64dbg: Windows GUI 调试器\n\n重点分析区域：\n□ 入口点（Entry Point）→ 初始化逻辑\n□ 导入表 → API 用途推断（CreateRemoteThread=注入, CryptEncrypt=勒索）\n□ 资源段 → 嵌入 Payload（.rsrc 节）\n□ 字符串表 → URL\u002FC2\u002F文件路径\u002FBase64 blob\n□ TLS 回调 → 调试器启动前执行\n```\n\n### Phase 3: 沙箱动态分析\n\n```text\n自动化沙箱：\n□ Joe Sandbox \u002F ANY.RUN \u002F Triage: 商业沙箱\n□ CAPE Sandbox: 开源 + YARA 集成（推荐）\n□ ASD Azul: 开源恶意软件分析平台（2026 新发布）\n□ Cuckoo Sandbox: 经典开源（逐步被 CAPE 取代）\n\n监控重点：\n□ 进程创建: CreateProcess \u002F ShellExecute\n□ 文件操作: WriteFile → 勒索? DeleteFile → Wiper?\n□ 注册表: Run\u002FRunOnce 持久化\n□ 网络: HTTP\u002FDNS → C2 通信\n□ 内存: VirtualAllocEx → 进程注入\n□ 服务: CreateService → 持久化\n```\n\n### Phase 4: YARA 规则编写\n\n```yara\n\u002F\u002F 规则结构\nrule MalwareFamily_Example {\n    meta:\n        description = \"检测 Example 恶意软件家族\"\n        author = \"分析者\"\n        date = \"2026-05\"\n        severity = \"high\"\n        hash = \"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e\"\n        mitre_id = \"T1055\"  \u002F\u002F Process Injection\n\n    strings:\n        \u002F\u002F 字符串匹配\n        $str1 = \"C2_SERVER_URL\" ascii wide\n        $str2 = \"payload.dat\" ascii\n\n        \u002F\u002F 十六进制匹配\n        $hex1 = { 8B 45 ?? 50 FF 15 [4] 85 C0 }\n        \u002F\u002F 操作码序列: mov eax, [ebp-?]; push eax; call [import]; test eax, eax\n\n        \u002F\u002F 正则匹配\n        $re1 = \u002Fhttps?:\\\u002F\\\u002F[a-z0-9.-]+\\\u002F[a-z]{3,8}\\.php\u002F ascii\n\n    condition:\n        \u002F\u002F 组合条件\n        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and     \u002F\u002F MZ 头\n        filesize \u003C 500KB and\n        (2 of ($str*) or $hex1)\n}\n```\n\n### Phase 5: Sigma 规则生成\n\n```yaml\n# 行为检测规则\ntitle: Suspicious Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread\nid: 5a3d2c1b-1234-5678-9abc-def012345678\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: 检测使用 CreateRemoteThread 的进程注入行为\nauthor: 分析者\ndate: 2026\u002F05\u002F25\ntags:\n    - attack.t1055          # Process Injection\n    - attack.t1055.001      # DLL Injection\nlogsource:\n    category: process_creation\n    product: windows\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        Image|endswith: '\\powershell.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - 'CreateRemoteThread'\n            - 'VirtualAllocEx'\n            - 'WriteProcessMemory'\n    condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n    - 合法的调试工具\nlevel: high\n```\n\n### Phase 6: IOC 提取与情报\n\n```text\nIOC 类型分类：\n□ 网络 IOC:\n  - IP: C2 地址（注意时效性）\n  - Domain: DGA 算法生成的域名（rsnkfda.com, xpqmje.net）\n  - URL: Payload 托管地址\n  - User-Agent: 自定义 UA 字符串\n\n□ 主机 IOC:\n  - 文件路径: %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\*.dat\n  - 注册表: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\\n  - Mutex: Global\\{GUID} 互斥体名称\n  - 服务名: 伪装成系统服务的名称\n\n□ 行为 IOC:\n  - MITRE ATT&CK 技术 ID (T1055, T1003, T1571...)\n  - Sigma 规则 → SIEM 集成\n  - YARA 规则 → 端点检测\n\n□ 静态 IOC:\n  - 编译时间戳（可伪造）\n  - PDB 路径（含开发者信息）\n  - 节名异常（非标准 .text\u002F.data）\n  - 导入表异常组合（如勒索软件 CryptEncrypt + DeleteShadowCopies）\n```\n\n## 反分析技术速查\n\n| 技术 | 检测方法 | YARA 特征 |\n|------|---------|----------|\n| 虚拟机检测 | WMI Win32_BIOS\u002FVideoController\u002FProcessor | `Win32_` 字符串 + 特定厂商名 |\n| 沙箱检测 | 磁盘 \u003C 60GB, RAM \u003C 2GB, 单核 CPU | GlobalMemoryStatusEx 调用模式 |\n| 调试器检测 | IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent | PEB.BeingDebugged 偏移访问 |\n| 定时逃逸 | Sleep(300000) 后执行恶意行为 | NtDelayExecution 长参数 |\n| 地理位置检测 | 检查键盘布局\u002F时区 → 排除 CIS 国家 | GetKeyboardLayoutList 调用 |\n| 父进程检测 | explorer.exe vs cmd.exe | 进程名字符串比较 |\n| API 直接 syscall | 绕过 EDR hook | syscall 指令 + SSN 解析 |\n\n## 多 Agent 自动化分析 (SentinelHive 架构)\n\n```text\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                  Hive Director                    │\n│          (Claude Opus 编排 + 仲裁)                │\n└──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬───────┘\n       │      │      │      │      │\n   ┌───┘  ┌───┘  ┌───┘  ┌───┘  ┌───┘\n   ▼      ▼      ▼      ▼      ▼      ▼\nTriage  RE    Behav  Intel  Detect Remed\n 快速   反编译  行为   威胁   规则   修复\n 分诊   静态   动态   情报   YARA  方案\n                          Sigma\n```\n\n## 工具链\n\n| 工具 | 用途 | 获取 |\n|------|------|------|\n| Ghidra \u002F IDA Pro | 深度反编译 | ghidra-sre.org |\n| CAPE Sandbox | 开源恶意软件沙箱 | GitHub: kevoreilly\u002FCAPEv2 |\n| ASD Azul | 大规模自动化分析 | GitHub: ASD |\n| YARA | 模式匹配规则引擎 | `pip install yara-python` |\n| Sigma | SIEM 行为检测规则 | GitHub: SigmaHQ\u002Fsigma |\n| FLOSS | 去混淆字符串提取 | `pip install flare-floss` |\n| Detect It Easy | 壳\u002F编译器检测 | GitHub: horsicq\u002FDetect-It-Easy |\n| pe-sieve | 进程内存扫描 | GitHub: hasherezade\u002Fpe-sieve |\n| VirusTotal API | 多引擎扫描 | virustotal.com |\n| MalwareBazaar | 恶意软件样本库 | bazaar.abuse.ch |\n\n## 参考\n\n- `references\u002Fyara-sigma-rules.md` — YARA + Sigma 编写方法论\n- `references\u002Fsandbox-orchestration.md` — 沙箱编排与自动化\n- `references\u002Fanti-analysis-techniques.md` — 94 种反分析技术检测\n","# Malware Analysis\n\n> YARA \u002F Sigma \u002F 沙箱 \u002F IOC 提取 \u002F 反反分析\n> 静态 + 动态 + 行为三合一\n\n## 适用场景\n\n- 恶意软件样本分析（PE\u002FELF\u002FMach-O\u002FAPK\u002F脚本）\n- YARA 规则编写与验证\n- Sigma 行为检测规则生成\n- 沙箱自动化分析编排\n- IOC 提取与威胁情报\n- 反分析技术检测与绕过\n\n## 六阶段分析流程\n\n### Phase 1: 初步分诊\n\n```bash\n# 快速静态检测\nfile sample.exe                      # 文件类型\nstrings sample.exe | grep -i \"http\\|cmd\\|powershell\\|base64\"  # 快速 IOCs\nrabin2 -zz sample.exe                # 字符串提取 + 交叉引用\nfloss sample.exe                     # 去混淆字符串提取（FireEye）\n\n# PE 头部分析\npecheck sample.exe                   # PE 结构验证\npescan sample.exe                    # 异常检测（节表、入口点）\ndiec sample.exe                      # Detect It Easy（壳\u002F编译器识别）\n\n# Hash 查询\nsha256sum sample.exe\n# → VirusTotal \u002F MalwareBazaar \u002F Triage 查询\n```\n\n### Phase 2: 静态分析\n\n```text\n反汇编\u002F反编译：\n□ IDA Pro \u002F Ghidra: 深度反编译\n□ radare2: CLI 快速分析\n□ x64dbg: Windows GUI 调试器\n\n重点分析区域：\n□ 入口点（Entry Point）→ 初始化逻辑\n□ 导入表 → API 用途推断（CreateRemoteThread=注入, CryptEncrypt=勒索）\n□ 资源段 → 嵌入 Payload（.rsrc 节）\n□ 字符串表 → URL\u002FC2\u002F文件路径\u002FBase64 blob\n□ TLS 回调 → 调试器启动前执行\n```\n\n### Phase 3: 沙箱动态分析\n\n```text\n自动化沙箱：\n□ Joe Sandbox \u002F ANY.RUN \u002F Triage: 商业沙箱\n□ CAPE Sandbox: 开源 + YARA 集成（推荐）\n□ ASD Azul: 开源恶意软件分析平台（2026 新发布）\n□ Cuckoo Sandbox: 经典开源（逐步被 CAPE 取代）\n\n监控重点：\n□ 进程创建: CreateProcess \u002F ShellExecute\n□ 文件操作: WriteFile → 勒索? DeleteFile → Wiper?\n□ 注册表: Run\u002FRunOnce 持久化\n□ 网络: HTTP\u002FDNS → C2 通信\n□ 内存: VirtualAllocEx → 进程注入\n□ 服务: CreateService → 持久化\n```\n\n### Phase 4: YARA 规则编写\n\n```yara\n\u002F\u002F 规则结构\nrule MalwareFamily_Example {\n    meta:\n        description = \"检测 Example 恶意软件家族\"\n        author = \"分析者\"\n        date = \"2026-05\"\n        severity = \"high\"\n        hash = \"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e\"\n        mitre_id = \"T1055\"  \u002F\u002F Process Injection\n\n    strings:\n        \u002F\u002F 字符串匹配\n        $str1 = \"C2_SERVER_URL\" ascii wide\n        $str2 = \"payload.dat\" ascii\n\n        \u002F\u002F 十六进制匹配\n        $hex1 = { 8B 45 ?? 50 FF 15 [4] 85 C0 }\n        \u002F\u002F 操作码序列: mov eax, [ebp-?]; push eax; call [import]; test eax, eax\n\n        \u002F\u002F 正则匹配\n        $re1 = \u002Fhttps?:\\\u002F\\\u002F[a-z0-9.-]+\\\u002F[a-z]{3,8}\\.php\u002F ascii\n\n    condition:\n        \u002F\u002F 组合条件\n        uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and     \u002F\u002F MZ 头\n        filesize \u003C 500KB and\n        (2 of ($str*) or $hex1)\n}\n```\n\n### Phase 5: Sigma 规则生成\n\n```yaml\n# 行为检测规则\ntitle: Suspicious Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread\nid: 5a3d2c1b-1234-5678-9abc-def012345678\nstatus: experimental\ndescription: 检测使用 CreateRemoteThread 的进程注入行为\nauthor: 分析者\ndate: 2026\u002F05\u002F25\ntags:\n    - attack.t1055          # Process Injection\n    - attack.t1055.001      # DLL Injection\nlogsource:\n    category: process_creation\n    product: windows\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        Image|endswith: '\\powershell.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - 'CreateRemoteThread'\n            - 'VirtualAllocEx'\n            - 'WriteProcessMemory'\n    condition: selection\nfalsepositives:\n    - 合法的调试工具\nlevel: high\n```\n\n### Phase 6: IOC 提取与情报\n\n```text\nIOC 类型分类：\n□ 网络 IOC:\n  - IP: C2 地址（注意时效性）\n  - Domain: DGA 算法生成的域名（rsnkfda.com, xpqmje.net）\n  - URL: Payload 托管地址\n  - User-Agent: 自定义 UA 字符串\n\n□ 主机 IOC:\n  - 文件路径: %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\*.dat\n  - 注册表: HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\\n  - Mutex: Global\\{GUID} 互斥体名称\n  - 服务名: 伪装成系统服务的名称\n\n□ 行为 IOC:\n  - MITRE ATT&CK 技术 ID (T1055, T1003, T1571...)\n  - Sigma 规则 → SIEM 集成\n  - YARA 规则 → 端点检测\n\n□ 静态 IOC:\n  - 编译时间戳（可伪造）\n  - PDB 路径（含开发者信息）\n  - 节名异常（非标准 .text\u002F.data）\n  - 导入表异常组合（如勒索软件 CryptEncrypt + DeleteShadowCopies）\n```\n\n## 反分析技术速查\n\n| 技术 | 检测方法 | YARA 特征 |\n|------|---------|----------|\n| 虚拟机检测 | WMI Win32_BIOS\u002FVideoController\u002FProcessor | `Win32_` 字符串 + 特定厂商名 |\n| 沙箱检测 | 磁盘 \u003C 60GB, RAM \u003C 2GB, 单核 CPU | GlobalMemoryStatusEx 调用模式 |\n| 调试器检测 | IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent | PEB.BeingDebugged 偏移访问 |\n| 定时逃逸 | Sleep(300000) 后执行恶意行为 | NtDelayExecution 长参数 |\n| 地理位置检测 | 检查键盘布局\u002F时区 → 排除 CIS 国家 | GetKeyboardLayoutList 调用 |\n| 父进程检测 | explorer.exe vs cmd.exe | 进程名字符串比较 |\n| API 直接 syscall | 绕过 EDR hook | syscall 指令 + SSN 解析 |\n\n## 多 Agent 自动化分析 (SentinelHive 架构)\n\n```text\n┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│                  Hive Director                    │\n│          (Claude Opus 编排 + 仲裁)                │\n└──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬───────┘\n       │      │      │      │      │\n   ┌───┘  ┌───┘  ┌───┘  ┌───┘  ┌───┘\n   ▼      ▼      ▼      ▼      ▼      ▼\nTriage  RE    Behav  Intel  Detect Remed\n 快速   反编译  行为   威胁   规则   修复\n 分诊   静态   动态   情报   YARA  方案\n                          Sigma\n```\n\n## 工具链\n\n| 工具 | 用途 | 获取 |\n|------|------|------|\n| Ghidra \u002F IDA Pro | 深度反编译 | ghidra-sre.org |\n| CAPE Sandbox | 开源恶意软件沙箱 | GitHub: kevoreilly\u002FCAPEv2 |\n| ASD Azul | 大规模自动化分析 | GitHub: ASD |\n| YARA | 模式匹配规则引擎 | `pip install yara-python` |\n| Sigma | SIEM 行为检测规则 | GitHub: SigmaHQ\u002Fsigma |\n| FLOSS | 去混淆字符串提取 | `pip install flare-floss` |\n| Detect It Easy | 壳\u002F编译器检测 | GitHub: horsicq\u002FDetect-It-Easy |\n| pe-sieve | 进程内存扫描 | GitHub: hasherezade\u002Fpe-sieve |\n| VirusTotal API | 多引擎扫描 | virustotal.com |\n| MalwareBazaar | 恶意软件样本库 | bazaar.abuse.ch |\n\n## 参考\n\n- `references\u002Fyara-sigma-rules.md` — YARA + Sigma 编写方法论\n- `references\u002Fsandbox-orchestration.md` — 沙箱编排与自动化\n- `references\u002Fanti-analysis-techniques.md` — 94 种反分析技术检测\n",{"x-alice-class":23},"pentest","main","19a54ac988e9929160334271f5c1924ddd9b227e","_modules\u002Fmalware-analysis",19,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1","写一些自己用得上的工具，能自动化就绝不手动 · 自动化 \u002F 工程效率 \u002F Agent 技能生态 · 保持好奇，持续构建","2026-09-30 00:41:20",{"source":7,"skillName":5,"commands":33,"prompt":43,"zipAvailable":44},[34,37,40],{"tool":35,"command":36},"npx","npx skills add alicewe1\u002Falice_skill --skill malware-analysis",{"tool":38,"command":39},"bunx","bunx skills add alicewe1\u002Falice_skill --skill malware-analysis",{"tool":41,"command":42},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add alicewe1\u002Falice_skill --skill malware-analysis","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F_modules\u002Fmalware-analysis\u002FSKILL.md",true,[46,52,56],{"path":47,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":50,"sourceHtmlUrl":51},"references\u002Fanti-analysis-techniques.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",5387,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F_modules\u002Fmalware-analysis\u002Freferences\u002Fanti-analysis-techniques.md",{"path":53,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"references\u002Fsandbox-orchestration.md",5239,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F_modules\u002Fmalware-analysis\u002Freferences\u002Fsandbox-orchestration.md",{"path":57,"resourceType":48,"resourceTypeDesc":49,"sizeBytes":58,"sourceHtmlUrl":59},"references\u002Fyara-sigma-rules.md",6464,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F_modules\u002Fmalware-analysis\u002Freferences\u002Fyara-sigma-rules.md",[61,68,75,82,89,96],{"skillNo":62,"name":63,"nameZh":6,"description":64,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":65,"categories":66,"keywords":67,"publishedAt":18},"01M7DBMD9P6R27SWQCW5HYVWG0","alice","Alice 六类技能总路由。用户输入 Alice 或要求查看 Alice 技能菜单时，严格输出固定菜单；输入攻\u002F防模式、六类入口或直接描述任务时，按类别→领域→模块渐进路由。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Faliceskill\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":69,"name":70,"nameZh":6,"description":71,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":18},"01M7DBM8X5M7YXPYBVFMWF8HRC","alice-reverse","逆向分析渐进路由（二进制 \u002F 移动端 \u002F 协议 \u002F 取证 \u002F 保护机制 \u002F 运行时观测）。触发词：二进制\u002F移动端\u002F反编译\u002FFrida\u002FIDA\u002FGhidra\u002FPE\u002FELF\u002FAPK\u002F协议\u002F取证；先选领域索引，再按任务匹配度与评分选模块，禁止一次读取全部领域。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Falice-reverse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":79,"categories":80,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":18},"01M7DBM630E2YKQP29194TT7HC","alice-pentest","web安全渐进路由（Web \u002F API \u002F 资产发现 \u002F 漏洞验证 \u002F 云与网络安全）。触发词：Web\u002FAPI\u002F资产发现\u002F端口\u002F漏洞验证\u002F云与网络安全；先选领域索引，再按任务匹配度与评分选模块，禁止一次读取全部领域。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Falice-pentest\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":18},"01M7DBM20M2VDYV5D3MYDGBTQX","alice-game","游戏攻防渐进路由（游戏客户端 \u002F 内存 \u002F 图形 \u002F 反作弊 \u002F 安全研究）。触发词：游戏客户端\u002F内存\u002F图形\u002F偏移\u002F反作弊\u002F模拟器\u002F覆盖层；先选领域索引，再按任务匹配度与评分选模块，禁止一次读取全部领域。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Falice-game\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":18},"01M7DBKXVEKB8931MZG23VACFN","alice-crack","卡密授权渐进路由（卡密 \u002F 激活 \u002F 授权验证 \u002F 许可证管理 \u002F 本地授权分析）。触发词：卡密\u002F激活\u002F授权验证\u002Flicense\u002F机器码\u002F试用状态；先选领域索引，再按任务匹配度与评分选模块，禁止一次读取全部领域。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Falice-crack\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":18},"01M7DBKTMT90MGV2WP8K73TMQD","alice-assist","技能指令渐进路由（技能路由 \u002F 评分 \u002F 吸收 \u002F 迁移 \u002F 自动化 \u002F 文档与平台集成）。触发词：技能创建\u002F吸收\u002F评分\u002F迁移\u002F自动化\u002F文档\u002F平台指令；先选领域索引，再按任务匹配度与评分选模块，禁止一次读取全部领域。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Falicewe1\u002Falice_skill\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Falice-assist\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]