[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7D9JE5JS6ZGFB2PF97XHD2W":3,"skill-same:01M7D9JE5JS6ZGFB2PF97XHD2W":78},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":56,"commitSha":57,"skillDirectory":58,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":60,"ownerBlogUrl":61,"ownerDescription":62,"updatedAt":63,"install":64,"resources":77},"01M7D9JE5JS6ZGFB2PF97XHD2W","Security Threat Modeling",null,"Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations to produce actionable AppSec-grade threat models.","GrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai","GrupoANDevelopment-m","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F257455179?v=4","01M7D69X2N2KEVN0SJF6WGM6SH","Antônio  Ndombe","01M7D69X3P5JTT8H8S904N3888",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fqa\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: \"Security Threat Modeling\"\ndescription: \"Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations to produce actionable AppSec-grade threat models.\"\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: openai\nlicense: MIT\ntags: [threat-model, security, appsec, trust-boundaries, abuse-paths]\ntestingTypes: [security]\nframeworks: []\nlanguages: [python, typescript, javascript, go, java]\ndomains: [web, api, backend, infrastructure]\nagents: [claude-code, cursor, github-copilot, windsurf, codex, aider, continue, cline, zed, bolt]\n---\n\n# Security Threat Modeling\n\nDeliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model specific to the repository, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritize realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Scope and Extract the System Model\n\n- Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo\n- Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints\n- Separate runtime behavior from CI\u002Fbuild\u002Fdev tooling and from tests\u002Fexamples\n- Map in-scope locations and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly\n- Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence\n\n### 2. Derive Boundaries, Assets, and Entry Points\n\n- Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components\n- Note protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting at each boundary\n- List assets that drive risk: data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs\n- Identify entry points: endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers, job triggers, admin tooling\n\n### 3. Calibrate Attacker Capabilities\n\n- Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage\n- List assets that drive risk: credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability\n- Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity\n\n### 4. Enumerate Threats as Abuse Paths\n\n- Map attacker goals to assets and boundaries\n- Focus on: exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service\n- Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets\n- Keep the number of threats small but high quality\n\n### 5. Prioritize with Explicit Reasoning\n\n- Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low\u002Fmedium\u002Fhigh) with short justifications\n- Set overall priority (critical\u002Fhigh\u002Fmedium\u002Flow) using likelihood x impact\n- State which assumptions most influence the ranking\n\n### 6. Validate with the User\n\n- Summarize key assumptions that affect threat ranking or scope\n- Ask 1-3 targeted questions to resolve missing context\n- Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report\n\n### 7. Recommend Mitigations\n\n- Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations\n- Tie mitigations to concrete locations and control types\n- Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice\n\n### 8. Quality Check\n\n- Confirm all entrypoints are covered\n- Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats\n- Confirm runtime vs CI\u002Fdev separation\n- Write the final Markdown to `\u003Crepo-name>-threat-model.md`\n\n## Risk Prioritization Guidance\n\n- **High:** Pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key\u002Ftoken theft, sandbox escape\n- **Medium:** Targeted DoS, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass, log poisoning\n- **Low:** Low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, unlikely preconditions\n","# Security Threat Modeling\n\nDeliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model specific to the repository, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritize realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Scope and Extract the System Model\n\n- Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo\n- Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints\n- Separate runtime behavior from CI\u002Fbuild\u002Fdev tooling and from tests\u002Fexamples\n- Map in-scope locations and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly\n- Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence\n\n### 2. Derive Boundaries, Assets, and Entry Points\n\n- Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components\n- Note protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting at each boundary\n- List assets that drive risk: data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs\n- Identify entry points: endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers, job triggers, admin tooling\n\n### 3. Calibrate Attacker Capabilities\n\n- Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage\n- List assets that drive risk: credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability\n- Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity\n\n### 4. Enumerate Threats as Abuse Paths\n\n- Map attacker goals to assets and boundaries\n- Focus on: exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service\n- Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets\n- Keep the number of threats small but high quality\n\n### 5. Prioritize with Explicit Reasoning\n\n- Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low\u002Fmedium\u002Fhigh) with short justifications\n- Set overall priority (critical\u002Fhigh\u002Fmedium\u002Flow) using likelihood x impact\n- State which assumptions most influence the ranking\n\n### 6. Validate with the User\n\n- Summarize key assumptions that affect threat ranking or scope\n- Ask 1-3 targeted questions to resolve missing context\n- Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report\n\n### 7. Recommend Mitigations\n\n- Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations\n- Tie mitigations to concrete locations and control types\n- Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice\n\n### 8. Quality Check\n\n- Confirm all entrypoints are covered\n- Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats\n- Confirm runtime vs CI\u002Fdev separation\n- Write the final Markdown to `\u003Crepo-name>-threat-model.md`\n\n## Risk Prioritization Guidance\n\n- **High:** Pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key\u002Ftoken theft, sandbox escape\n- **Medium:** Targeted DoS, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass, log poisoning\n- **Low:** Low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, unlikely preconditions\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"agents":30,"author":41,"domains":42,"license":15,"version":47,"languages":48,"frameworks":54,"description":7,"testingTypes":55},[25,26,27,28,29],"threat-model","security","appsec","trust-boundaries","abuse-paths",[31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40],"claude-code","cursor","github-copilot","windsurf","codex","aider","continue","cline","zed","bolt","openai",[43,44,45,46],"web","api","backend","infrastructure","1.0.0",[49,50,51,52,53],"python","typescript","javascript","go","java",[],[26],"main","eac438ea9216a7cb8a570cab803eb01eeafc6793","skills\u002Fqa\u002Fsecurity-threat-model","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m","https:\u002F\u002Fid-preview--d5bef06d-6c9e-4563-a3d4-a855b9d61610.lovable.app\u002F","Eu sou Antonio B. B. Ndombe \r\nEu sou um Pesquisador e desenvolvedor de sistema autonomia cognitivos, fundador de sistemas ODCs ( organismos digital conscientes)","2026-11-04 06:53:39",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":65,"prompt":75,"zipAvailable":76},[66,69,72],{"tool":67,"command":68},"npx","npx skills add GrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai --skill \"Security Threat Modeling\"",{"tool":70,"command":71},"bunx","bunx skills add GrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai --skill \"Security Threat Modeling\"",{"tool":73,"command":74},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add GrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai --skill \"Security Threat Modeling\"","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fqa\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[79,87,94,101,108,115],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":83,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DASC6FSCJP49JZBSK0NY1Z","nemoclaw-user-reference","Describes the NemoClaw integration layer and blueprint architecture and how they orchestrate compatible agent sandboxes. Use when looking up architecture, agent integration, plugin structure, or blueprint design. Trigger keywords - nemoclaw architecture, nemoclaw agent architecture, nemoclaw plugin blueprint structure, nemoclaw vs openshell, which cli, nemoclaw cli, openshell cli, sandbox commands, nemoclaw cli commands, nemoclaw command reference, nemoclaw network policy, sandbox egress control operator approval, nemoclaw troubleshooting, nemoclaw debug sandbox issues.","Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fupstream\u002Fnemoclaw\u002Fskills\u002Fnemoclaw-user-reference\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":83,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DAS5S79VK33XFGVAM2TFWF","nemoclaw-user-overview","Explains how OpenClaw, OpenShell, and NemoClaw form the ecosystem, NemoClaw's position in the stack, what NemoClaw adds beyond the community sandbox, and when to prefer NemoClaw versus integrating OpenShell and OpenClaw directly. Use when users ask about the relationship between OpenClaw, OpenShell, and NemoClaw, or when to use NemoClaw versus OpenShell. Trigger keywords - nemoclaw ecosystem, openclaw openshell, nemoclaw vs openshell, sandboxed openclaw, how nemoclaw works, nemoclaw sandbox lifecycle blueprint, nemoclaw overview, openclaw always-on assistants, nvidia openshell, nvidia nemotron, nemoclaw release notes, nemoclaw changelog.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fupstream\u002Fnemoclaw\u002Fskills\u002Fnemoclaw-user-overview\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":83,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DAS0PQEMET5MNGZ1ABSZVS","nemoclaw-user-monitor-sandbox","Inspects sandbox health, traces agent behavior, and diagnoses problems. Use when monitoring a running sandbox, debugging agent issues, or checking sandbox logs. Trigger keywords - monitor nemoclaw sandbox, debug nemoclaw agent issues.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fupstream\u002Fnemoclaw\u002Fskills\u002Fnemoclaw-user-monitor-sandbox\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":83,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DARQYGF7E9A69VH6S3CGN9","nemoclaw-user-manage-sandboxes","Explains operational tasks after the quickstart: listing sandboxes, status and health checks, logs, diagnostics, port forwards, multiple sandboxes, credential reset, rebuilds, network presets, upgrades, and uninstall. Trigger keywords - manage nemoclaw sandboxes, nemoclaw status, nemoclaw list, nemoclaw dashboard port, nemoclaw rebuild, nemoclaw upgrade sandboxes, nemoclaw uninstall, sandbox mutability, sandbox runtime configuration, sandbox rebuild, nemoclaw backup, nemoclaw restore, workspace backup, openshell sandbox download upload, nemoclaw messaging channels, nemoclaw telegram, nemoclaw discord, nemoclaw slack, nemoclaw wechat, nemoclaw whatsapp, openshell channel messaging, nemoclaw workspace files, soul.md, user.md, identity.md, agents.md, sandbox persistence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fupstream\u002Fnemoclaw\u002Fskills\u002Fnemoclaw-user-manage-sandboxes\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":83,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DARH8BRTG51TRCAB7YWDJ4","nemoclaw-user-manage-policy","Adds, removes, or modifies allowed endpoints in the sandbox policy. Use when customizing network policy, changing egress rules, or configuring sandbox endpoint access. Trigger keywords - customize nemoclaw network policy, sandbox egress policy configuration, nemoclaw integration policy examples, post-install policy setup, openshell approval workflow, policy preset, nemoclaw approve network requests, sandbox egress approval tui.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fupstream\u002Fnemoclaw\u002Fskills\u002Fnemoclaw-user-manage-policy\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":83,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":19},"01M7DARAT62M2VR37590VCZ5NS","nemoclaw-user-get-started","Installs NemoClaw, launches a sandbox, and runs the first agent prompt. Use when onboarding, installing, or launching a NemoClaw sandbox for the first time. Trigger keywords - nemoclaw quickstart, install nemoclaw openclaw sandbox, nemohermes quickstart, hermes agent nemoclaw, run hermes openshell sandbox, nemoclaw prerequisites, nemoclaw supported platforms, nemoclaw hardware software, nemoclaw windows wsl2 setup, nemoclaw install windows docker desktop.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGrupoANDevelopment-m\u002Falberto-ai\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fupstream\u002Fnemoclaw\u002Fskills\u002Fnemoclaw-user-get-started\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]