[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7D88E5VDXCNKZRYAXC3VSWC":3,"skill-same:01M7D88E5VDXCNKZRYAXC3VSWC":109},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":52,"commitSha":53,"skillDirectory":54,"forksCount":55,"repositoryHtmlUrl":56,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":57,"ownerBlogUrl":58,"ownerDescription":59,"updatedAt":60,"install":61,"resources":74},"01M7D88E5VDXCNKZRYAXC3VSWC","detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",null,"Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25 for cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loads. Use when hunting defense-evasion activity that hides code inside legitimate processes, investigating an EDR alert on suspicious cross-process access, or validating Sysmon coverage for injection detection.","SaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use","SaiVatsal","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F242597752?v=4","01M7D5YM1T4VXW9203M0GFAHZ1","SaiVatsalPolimera","01M7D5YM2D61ST39XVR2V7B7ZJ",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\ndescription: Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process\n  hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25 for\n  cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loads. Use\n  when hunting defense-evasion activity that hides code inside legitimate processes, investigating\n  an EDR alert on suspicious cross-process access, or validating Sysmon coverage for injection\n  detection.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- process-injection\n- sysmon\n- mitre-t1055\n- defense-evasion\n- dll-injection\n- process-hollowing\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Content Format Conversion\n- File Content Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1055.001\n- T1055.002\n- T1055.003\n- T1055.012\n---\n\n# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes\n- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation\n- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants\n- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25\n- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection\n- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters\n- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection\n- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+\n- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.\n2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.\n3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.\n4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).\n5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.\n6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).\n7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |\n| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |\n| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |\n| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |\n| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |\n| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |\n| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |\n| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |\n| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |\n| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |\n| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |\n| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed\u002Finjected code |\n| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=8\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\\.exe$\"), \"high_value_target\", \"normal_target\")\n| where suspicious=\"high_value_target\"\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where match(GrantedAccess, \"(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)\")\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType == \"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (\"csrss.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"services.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"svchost.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"winlogon.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection\n```yaml\ntitle: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: create_remote_thread\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith:\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n            - '\\explorer.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\winlogon.exe'\n    filter_legitimate:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\services.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1055\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.\n2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.\n3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.\n4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.\n5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSource Process: [Injecting process path]\nSource PID: [Process ID]\nTarget Process: [Target process path]\nTarget PID: [Process ID]\nInjection Type: [DLL\u002FShellcode\u002FHollowing\u002FAPC]\nSysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]\nAccess Mask: [Granted access value]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]\n```\n","# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes\n- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation\n- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants\n- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25\n- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection\n- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters\n- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection\n- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+\n- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.\n2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.\n3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.\n4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).\n5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.\n6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).\n7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |\n| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |\n| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |\n| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |\n| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |\n| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |\n| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |\n| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |\n| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |\n| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |\n| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |\n| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed\u002Finjected code |\n| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=8\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\\.exe$\"), \"high_value_target\", \"normal_target\")\n| where suspicious=\"high_value_target\"\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where match(GrantedAccess, \"(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)\")\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType == \"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (\"csrss.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"services.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"svchost.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"winlogon.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection\n```yaml\ntitle: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: create_remote_thread\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith:\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n            - '\\explorer.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\winlogon.exe'\n    filter_legitimate:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\services.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1055\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.\n2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.\n3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.\n4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.\n5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSource Process: [Injecting process path]\nSource PID: [Process ID]\nTarget Process: [Target process path]\nTarget PID: [Process ID]\nInjection Type: [DLL\u002FShellcode\u002FHollowing\u002FAPC]\nSysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]\nAccess Mask: [Granted access value]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":41,"d3fend_techniques":46},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"threat-hunting","process-injection","sysmon","mitre-t1055","defense-evasion","dll-injection","process-hollowing","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[42,43,44,45],"T1055.001","T1055.002","T1055.003","T1055.012",[47,48,49,50,51],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis","main","8a3b3de73262a4c4db64523949360f3c599c2fb1","Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal","https:\u002F\u002Fsaivatsal.github.io\u002FPortfolio\u002F","The Longer It Takes The Stronger It Becomes ","2026-09-21 22:45:58",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":62,"prompt":72,"zipAvailable":73},[63,66,69],{"tool":64,"command":65},"npx","npx skills add SaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",{"tool":67,"command":68},"bunx","bunx skills add SaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",{"tool":70,"command":71},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add SaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FSKILL.md",true,[75,81,85,91,95,99,105],{"path":76,"resourceType":77,"resourceTypeDesc":78,"sizeBytes":79,"sourceHtmlUrl":80},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",978,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":82,"resourceType":82,"resourceTypeDesc":83,"sizeBytes":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":86,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2750,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":92,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":93,"sourceHtmlUrl":94},"references\u002Fstandards.md",3243,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":96,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3109,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":100,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":103,"sourceHtmlUrl":104},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5480,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":106,"resourceType":101,"resourceTypeDesc":102,"sizeBytes":107,"sourceHtmlUrl":108},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",6023,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[110,118,126,135,142,149],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":114,"sourceHtmlUrl":115,"categories":116,"keywords":117,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJZP6E6KMBQV4CZSDPZEZ8","webapp-testing","Toolkit for interacting with and testing local web applications using Playwright. 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Use when building user interfaces, implementing design systems, creating responsive layouts, adding accessible components (dialogs, dropdowns, forms, tables), customizing themes and colors, implementing dark mode, generating visual designs and posters, or establishing consistent styling patterns across applications.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fui-styling\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fui-styling\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":136,"name":137,"nameZh":6,"description":138,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":130,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":139,"categories":140,"keywords":141,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJR902059VEQP23PVM2WA0","design","Comprehensive design skill: brand identity, design tokens, UI styling, logo generation (55 styles, Gemini AI), corporate identity program (50 deliverables, CIP mockups), HTML presentations (Chart.js), banner design (22 styles, social\u002Fads\u002Fweb\u002Fprint), icon design (15 styles, SVG, Gemini 3.1 Pro), social photos (HTML→screenshot, multi-platform). Actions: design logo, create CIP, generate mockups, build slides, design banner, generate icon, create social photos, social media images, brand identity, design system. Platforms: Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Pinterest, TikTok, Threads, Google Ads.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":143,"name":144,"nameZh":6,"description":145,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":130,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":146,"categories":147,"keywords":148,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJR56QF5N6XYTCPCFHFMNP","design-system","Token architecture, component specifications, and slide generation. Three-layer tokens (primitive→semantic→component), CSS variables, spacing\u002Ftypography scales, component specs, strategic slide creation. Use for design tokens, systematic design, brand-compliant presentations.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign-system\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":150,"name":151,"nameZh":6,"description":152,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":130,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":153,"categories":154,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJQXB6M0SFF7NX8J5N01AH","banner-design","Design banners for social media, ads, website heroes, creative assets, and print. Multiple art direction options with AI-generated visuals. Actions: design, create, generate banner. Platforms: Facebook, Twitter\u002FX, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Google Display, website hero, print. Styles: minimalist, gradient, bold typography, photo-based, illustrated, geometric, retro, glassmorphism, 3D, neon, duotone, editorial, collage. Uses ui-ux-pro-max, frontend-design, ai-artist, ai-multimodal skills.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fbanner-design\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]