[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7D886TVRQ9EM2MNE8MBRCP5":3,"skill-same:01M7D886TVRQ9EM2MNE8MBRCP5":134},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":77,"commitSha":78,"skillDirectory":79,"forksCount":80,"repositoryHtmlUrl":81,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":82,"ownerBlogUrl":83,"ownerDescription":84,"updatedAt":85,"install":86,"resources":99},"01M7D886TVRQ9EM2MNE8MBRCP5","detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr",null,"Detect OS credential dumping (MITRE T1003) targeting LSASS memory, the SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials by correlating EDR telemetry, Sysmon process-access events, and Windows security event logs. Use when hunting for Mimikatz-style credential theft, triaging an EDR alert on LSASS access, or scoping an incident after suspected credential dumping.","SaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use","SaiVatsal","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F242597752?v=4","01M7D5YM1T4VXW9203M0GFAHZ1","SaiVatsalPolimera","01M7D5YM2D61ST39XVR2V7B7ZJ",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr\ndescription: Detect OS credential dumping (MITRE T1003) targeting LSASS memory, the SAM\n  database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials by correlating EDR telemetry, Sysmon process-access\n  events, and Windows security event logs. Use when hunting for Mimikatz-style credential\n  theft, triaging an EDR alert on LSASS access, or scoping an incident after suspected\n  credential dumping.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- credential-dumping\n- lsass\n- mitre-t1003\n- edr\n- mimikatz\n- ntds\n- sam-database\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Token Binding\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Restore Access\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1003.001\n- T1003.002\n- T1003.003\n- T1003.006\nmitre_f3:\n  version: '1.1'\n  tactics:\n  - reconnaissance\n  - positioning\n  - initial-access\n  techniques:\n  - id: T1555\n    name: Credentials from Password Stores\n    tactic: reconnaissance\n    source: attack\n  - id: T1555.003\n    name: 'Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers'\n    tactic: reconnaissance\n    source: attack\n  - id: T1539\n    name: Steal Web Session Cookie\n    tactic: positioning\n    source: attack\n  - id: F1006\n    name: Account Takeover\n    tactic: initial-access\n    source: f3\n  - id: F1006.002\n    name: 'Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential'\n    tactic: initial-access\n    source: f3\n---\n\n# Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment\n- After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges\n- When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads\n- During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise\n- When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters\n- Windows Security Event ID 4656\u002F4663 (Object Access Auditing)\n- LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)\n- Registry auditing for SAM hive access\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor LSASS Process Access**: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.\n2. **Detect Credential Dumping Tools**: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.\n3. **Monitor NTDS.dit Access**: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.\n4. **Track SAM\u002FSECURITY\u002FSYSTEM Hive Access**: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.\n5. **Detect DCSync Activity**: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).\n6. **Correlate with Lateral Movement**: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.\n7. **Assess Impact**: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |\n| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |\n| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |\n| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |\n| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |\n| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |\n| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |\n| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)lsass\\.exe$\")\n| where GrantedAccess IN (\"0x1FFFFF\", \"0x1F3FFF\", \"0x143A\", \"0x1F0FFF\", \"0x0040\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1410\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)comsvcs\\.dll.*MiniDump\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)ntdsutil.*\\\"ac i ntds\\\".*ifm\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)reg\\s+save\\s+hklm\\\\\\\\(sam|security|system)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)vssadmin.*create\\s+shadow\")\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType in (\"LsassAccess\", \"CredentialDumpingActivity\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping\n```yaml\ntitle: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: process_access\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith: '\\lsass.exe'\n        GrantedAccess|contains:\n            - '0x1FFFFF'\n            - '0x1F3FFF'\n            - '0x143A'\n            - '0x0040'\n    filter:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.001\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.\n2. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.\n3. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.\n4. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.\n5. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.\n6. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nDumping Method: [LSASS_Access\u002FNTDS\u002FSAM\u002FDCSync]\nSource Process: [Tool or process used]\nTarget: [LSASS\u002FNTDS.dit\u002FSAM\u002FSECURITY]\nAccess Rights: [Granted access mask]\nUser Context: [Account performing the dump]\nATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nCredentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]\n```\n","# Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment\n- After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges\n- When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads\n- During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise\n- When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters\n- Windows Security Event ID 4656\u002F4663 (Object Access Auditing)\n- LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)\n- Registry auditing for SAM hive access\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor LSASS Process Access**: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.\n2. **Detect Credential Dumping Tools**: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.\n3. **Monitor NTDS.dit Access**: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.\n4. **Track SAM\u002FSECURITY\u002FSYSTEM Hive Access**: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.\n5. **Detect DCSync Activity**: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).\n6. **Correlate with Lateral Movement**: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.\n7. **Assess Impact**: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |\n| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |\n| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |\n| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |\n| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |\n| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |\n| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |\n| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)lsass\\.exe$\")\n| where GrantedAccess IN (\"0x1FFFFF\", \"0x1F3FFF\", \"0x143A\", \"0x1F0FFF\", \"0x0040\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1410\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)comsvcs\\.dll.*MiniDump\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)ntdsutil.*\\\"ac i ntds\\\".*ifm\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)reg\\s+save\\s+hklm\\\\\\\\(sam|security|system)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)vssadmin.*create\\s+shadow\")\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType in (\"LsassAccess\", \"CredentialDumpingActivity\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping\n```yaml\ntitle: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: process_access\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith: '\\lsass.exe'\n        GrantedAccess|contains:\n            - '0x1FFFFF'\n            - '0x1F3FFF'\n            - '0x143A'\n            - '0x0040'\n    filter:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.001\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.\n2. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.\n3. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.\n4. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.\n5. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.\n6. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nDumping Method: [LSASS_Access\u002FNTDS\u002FSAM\u002FDCSync]\nSource Process: [Tool or process used]\nTarget: [LSASS\u002FNTDS.dit\u002FSAM\u002FSECURITY]\nAccess Rights: [Granted access mask]\nUser Context: [Account performing the dump]\nATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nCredentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"mitre_f3":37,"nist_csf":61,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":66,"d3fend_techniques":71},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"threat-hunting","credential-dumping","lsass","mitre-t1003","edr","mimikatz","ntds","sam-database","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",{"tactics":38,"version":42,"techniques":43},[39,40,41],"reconnaissance","positioning","initial-access","1.1",[44,48,51,54,58],{"id":45,"name":46,"source":47,"tactic":39},"T1555","Credentials from Password Stores","attack",{"id":49,"name":50,"source":47,"tactic":39},"T1555.003","Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers",{"id":52,"name":53,"source":47,"tactic":40},"T1539","Steal Web Session 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for interacting with and testing local web applications using Playwright. Supports verifying frontend functionality, debugging UI behavior, capturing browser screenshots, and viewing browser logs.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fwebapp-testing\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fwebapp-testing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":144,"name":145,"nameZh":6,"description":146,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":147,"sourceHtmlUrl":148,"categories":149,"keywords":150,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJZFTS5TS06K2TV3MDTE67","web-artifacts-builder","Suite of tools for creating elaborate, multi-component claude.ai HTML artifacts using modern frontend web technologies (React, Tailwind CSS, shadcn\u002Fui). Use for complex artifacts requiring state management, routing, or shadcn\u002Fui components - not for simple single-file HTML\u002FJSX artifacts.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fweb-artifacts-builder\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fweb-artifacts-builder\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":152,"name":153,"nameZh":6,"description":154,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":155,"licenseFileUrl":156,"sourceHtmlUrl":157,"categories":158,"keywords":159,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJRK4SRQ908F2TJM6EZ7EV","ui-styling","Create beautiful, accessible user interfaces with shadcn\u002Fui components (built on Radix UI + Tailwind), Tailwind CSS utility-first styling, and canvas-based visual designs. Use when building user interfaces, implementing design systems, creating responsive layouts, adding accessible components (dialogs, dropdowns, forms, tables), customizing themes and colors, implementing dark mode, generating visual designs and posters, or establishing consistent styling patterns across applications.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fui-styling\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fui-styling\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":161,"name":162,"nameZh":6,"description":163,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":155,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":164,"categories":165,"keywords":166,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJR902059VEQP23PVM2WA0","design","Comprehensive design skill: brand identity, design tokens, UI styling, logo generation (55 styles, Gemini AI), corporate identity program (50 deliverables, CIP mockups), HTML presentations (Chart.js), banner design (22 styles, social\u002Fads\u002Fweb\u002Fprint), icon design (15 styles, SVG, Gemini 3.1 Pro), social photos (HTML→screenshot, multi-platform). Actions: design logo, create CIP, generate mockups, build slides, design banner, generate icon, create social photos, social media images, brand identity, design system. Platforms: Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Pinterest, TikTok, Threads, Google Ads.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":168,"name":169,"nameZh":6,"description":170,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":155,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":171,"categories":172,"keywords":173,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJR56QF5N6XYTCPCFHFMNP","design-system","Token architecture, component specifications, and slide generation. Three-layer tokens (primitive→semantic→component), CSS variables, spacing\u002Ftypography scales, component specs, strategic slide creation. Use for design tokens, systematic design, brand-compliant presentations.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign-system\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":175,"name":176,"nameZh":6,"description":177,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":155,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":178,"categories":179,"keywords":180,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJQXB6M0SFF7NX8J5N01AH","banner-design","Design banners for social media, ads, website heroes, creative assets, and print. Multiple art direction options with AI-generated visuals. Actions: design, create, generate banner. Platforms: Facebook, Twitter\u002FX, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Google Display, website hero, print. Styles: minimalist, gradient, bold typography, photo-based, illustrated, geometric, retro, glassmorphism, 3D, neon, duotone, editorial, collage. Uses ui-ux-pro-max, frontend-design, ai-artist, ai-multimodal skills.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fbanner-design\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]