[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7D7PPSVZ7DX1475RZTHTPJH":3,"skill-same:01M7D7PPSVZ7DX1475RZTHTPJH":112},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":55,"commitSha":56,"skillDirectory":57,"forksCount":58,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":60,"ownerBlogUrl":61,"ownerDescription":62,"updatedAt":63,"install":64,"resources":77},"01M7D7PPSVZ7DX1475RZTHTPJH","detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse",null,"Detect Azure service principal abuse in Microsoft Entra ID using KQL detection queries (Sentinel\u002FSplunk) against Azure AD Audit and Sign-in Logs, covering added credentials, privileged role assignment, admin consent bypass, and service principal enumeration. Use when investigating suspected privilege escalation or persistence via service principals, or building threat-hunting queries for Entra ID identity abuse.","SaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use","SaiVatsal","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F242597752?v=4","01M7D5YM1T4VXW9203M0GFAHZ1","SaiVatsalPolimera","01M7D5YM2D61ST39XVR2V7B7ZJ",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-azure-service-principal-abuse\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills-main\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-azure-service-principal-abuse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse\ndescription: Detect Azure service principal abuse in Microsoft Entra ID using KQL detection\n  queries (Sentinel\u002FSplunk) against Azure AD Audit and Sign-in Logs, covering added\n  credentials, privileged role assignment, admin consent bypass, and service principal\n  enumeration. Use when investigating suspected privilege escalation or persistence\n  via service principals, or building threat-hunting queries for Entra ID identity\n  abuse.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- azure\n- entra-id\n- service-principal\n- privilege-escalation\n- credential-abuse\n- detection\n- splunk\n- sentinel\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Token Binding\n- Restore Access\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Reissue Credential\n- Network Isolation\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- GV.SC-06\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078.004\n- T1098.001\n- T1528\n- T1550.001\n- T1098.003\n---\n\n# Detecting Azure Service Principal Abuse\n\n## Overview\n\nAzure service principals are identity objects used by applications, services, and automation tools to access Azure resources. Attackers exploit service principals for privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistent access. Key abuse patterns include: adding credentials to existing principals, assigning privileged roles, bypassing admin consent, and enumerating service principals for attack paths. Application ownership grants the ability to manage credentials and configure permissions, creating hidden privilege escalation paths.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure service principal abuse\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Azure subscription with Microsoft Entra ID P2 license\n- Access to Azure AD Audit Logs and Sign-in Logs\n- Microsoft Sentinel or Splunk for SIEM-based detection\n- Microsoft Graph API permissions for investigation\n- Global Reader or Security Reader role minimum\n\n## Key Abuse Patterns\n\n### 1. New Credentials Added to Service Principal\n\nAttackers add new client secrets or certificates to gain persistent access:\n\n**Detection Query (KQL - Sentinel):**\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName has \"Add service principal credentials\"\n    or OperationName has \"Update application - Certificates and secrets management\"\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend TargetSPId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)\n| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, OperationName, TargetSP, TargetSPId\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n**Detection Query (SPL - Splunk):**\n```spl\nindex=azure sourcetype=\"azure:aad:audit\"\noperationName=\"Add service principal credentials\"\n    OR operationName=\"Update application*Certificates and secrets*\"\n| stats count by initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName, targetResources{}.displayName, _time\n| sort -_time\n```\n\n### 2. Privileged Role Assignment to Service Principal\n\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName == \"Add member to role\"\n| extend RoleName = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)\n| where RoleName has_any (\"Global Administrator\", \"Application Administrator\",\n    \"Privileged Role Administrator\", \"Cloud Application Administrator\")\n| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, TargetSP, RoleName, OperationName\n```\n\n### 3. Service Principal Enumeration Detection\n\n```kql\nMicrosoftGraphActivityLogs\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| where RequestUri has \"\u002FservicePrincipals\"\n| summarize RequestCount = count() by UserAgent, IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)\n| where RequestCount > 10\n| sort by RequestCount desc\n```\n\n### 4. Admin Consent Bypass\n\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName == \"Consent to application\"\n| extend ConsentType = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[4].newValue)\n| where ConsentType has \"AllPrincipals\"\n| extend AppName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, AppName, ConsentType\n```\n\n### 5. OAuth App Permissions Escalation\n\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName == \"Add app role assignment to service principal\"\n| extend AppRoleValue = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)\n| where AppRoleValue has_any (\"RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory\",\n    \"Application.ReadWrite.All\", \"AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All\",\n    \"Directory.ReadWrite.All\", \"Mail.ReadWrite\")\n| extend TargetApp = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| project TimeGenerated, TargetApp, AppRoleValue, CorrelationId\n```\n\n## Investigation Procedures\n\n### Step 1: Identify compromised service principal\n\n```powershell\n# List service principals with recently added credentials\nConnect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Application.Read.All\"\n\n$suspiciousSPs = Get-MgServicePrincipal -All | ForEach-Object {\n    $sp = $_\n    $creds = Get-MgServicePrincipalPasswordCredential -ServicePrincipalId $sp.Id\n    $recentCreds = $creds | Where-Object { $_.StartDateTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }\n    if ($recentCreds) {\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            DisplayName = $sp.DisplayName\n            AppId = $sp.AppId\n            ObjectId = $sp.Id\n            NewCredsCount = $recentCreds.Count\n            LatestCredAdded = ($recentCreds | Sort-Object StartDateTime -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).StartDateTime\n        }\n    }\n}\n$suspiciousSPs | Sort-Object LatestCredAdded -Descending\n```\n\n### Step 2: Review service principal role assignments\n\n```powershell\n# Check role assignments for a specific service principal\n$spId = \"\u003Cservice-principal-object-id>\"\nGet-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId $spId | ForEach-Object {\n    $resource = Get-MgServicePrincipal -ServicePrincipalId $_.ResourceId\n    [PSCustomObject]@{\n        AppRoleId = $_.AppRoleId\n        ResourceDisplayName = $resource.DisplayName\n        CreatedDateTime = $_.CreatedDateTime\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Check application ownership\n\n```powershell\n# List owners of all applications (ownership = credential control)\nGet-MgApplication -All | ForEach-Object {\n    $app = $_\n    $owners = Get-MgApplicationOwner -ApplicationId $app.Id\n    foreach ($owner in $owners) {\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            AppName = $app.DisplayName\n            AppId = $app.AppId\n            OwnerUPN = $owner.AdditionalProperties.userPrincipalName\n            OwnerType = $owner.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type'\n        }\n    }\n} | Where-Object { $_.OwnerUPN -ne $null }\n```\n\n### Step 4: Review sign-in activity\n\n```kql\nAADServicePrincipalSignInLogs\n| where ServicePrincipalId == \"\u003Ctarget-sp-id>\"\n| project TimeGenerated, ServicePrincipalName, IPAddress, Location,\n    ResourceDisplayName, Status.errorCode\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n## Preventive Controls\n\n### Restrict application registration\n\n```powershell\n# Disable user ability to register applications\nUpdate-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{\n    AllowedToCreateApps = $false\n}\n```\n\n### Configure app consent policies\n\n```powershell\n# Require admin approval for all app consent requests\nNew-MgPolicyPermissionGrantPolicy -Id \"admin-only-consent\" `\n    -DisplayName \"Admin Only Consent\" `\n    -Description \"Only admins can consent to applications\"\n```\n\n### Monitor with Microsoft Sentinel Analytics Rules\n\nCreate analytics rules for:\n- New service principal credential additions\n- Privileged role assignments to service principals\n- Bulk service principal enumeration\n- Admin consent grants to unknown applications\n- Service principal sign-ins from unusual locations\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Description |\n|-----------|-----|-------------|\n| Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | T1098.001 | Adding credentials to service principal |\n| Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | T1078.004 | Using compromised service principal |\n| Account Discovery: Cloud Account | T1087.004 | Enumerating service principals |\n| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | OAuth token theft via service principal |\n\n## References\n\n- Splunk Detection: Azure AD Service Principal Abuse\n- Semperis: Service Principal Ownership Abuse in Entra ID\n- MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix\n- Microsoft: Securing service principals in Entra ID\n","# Detecting Azure Service Principal Abuse\n\n## Overview\n\nAzure service principals are identity objects used by applications, services, and automation tools to access Azure resources. Attackers exploit service principals for privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistent access. Key abuse patterns include: adding credentials to existing principals, assigning privileged roles, bypassing admin consent, and enumerating service principals for attack paths. Application ownership grants the ability to manage credentials and configure permissions, creating hidden privilege escalation paths.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure service principal abuse\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Azure subscription with Microsoft Entra ID P2 license\n- Access to Azure AD Audit Logs and Sign-in Logs\n- Microsoft Sentinel or Splunk for SIEM-based detection\n- Microsoft Graph API permissions for investigation\n- Global Reader or Security Reader role minimum\n\n## Key Abuse Patterns\n\n### 1. New Credentials Added to Service Principal\n\nAttackers add new client secrets or certificates to gain persistent access:\n\n**Detection Query (KQL - Sentinel):**\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName has \"Add service principal credentials\"\n    or OperationName has \"Update application - Certificates and secrets management\"\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend TargetSPId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)\n| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, OperationName, TargetSP, TargetSPId\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n**Detection Query (SPL - Splunk):**\n```spl\nindex=azure sourcetype=\"azure:aad:audit\"\noperationName=\"Add service principal credentials\"\n    OR operationName=\"Update application*Certificates and secrets*\"\n| stats count by initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName, targetResources{}.displayName, _time\n| sort -_time\n```\n\n### 2. Privileged Role Assignment to Service Principal\n\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName == \"Add member to role\"\n| extend RoleName = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)\n| where RoleName has_any (\"Global Administrator\", \"Application Administrator\",\n    \"Privileged Role Administrator\", \"Cloud Application Administrator\")\n| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, TargetSP, RoleName, OperationName\n```\n\n### 3. Service Principal Enumeration Detection\n\n```kql\nMicrosoftGraphActivityLogs\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| where RequestUri has \"\u002FservicePrincipals\"\n| summarize RequestCount = count() by UserAgent, IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)\n| where RequestCount > 10\n| sort by RequestCount desc\n```\n\n### 4. Admin Consent Bypass\n\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName == \"Consent to application\"\n| extend ConsentType = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[4].newValue)\n| where ConsentType has \"AllPrincipals\"\n| extend AppName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, AppName, ConsentType\n```\n\n### 5. OAuth App Permissions Escalation\n\n```kql\nAuditLogs\n| where OperationName == \"Add app role assignment to service principal\"\n| extend AppRoleValue = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)\n| where AppRoleValue has_any (\"RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory\",\n    \"Application.ReadWrite.All\", \"AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All\",\n    \"Directory.ReadWrite.All\", \"Mail.ReadWrite\")\n| extend TargetApp = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| project TimeGenerated, TargetApp, AppRoleValue, CorrelationId\n```\n\n## Investigation Procedures\n\n### Step 1: Identify compromised service principal\n\n```powershell\n# List service principals with recently added credentials\nConnect-MgGraph -Scopes \"Application.Read.All\"\n\n$suspiciousSPs = Get-MgServicePrincipal -All | ForEach-Object {\n    $sp = $_\n    $creds = Get-MgServicePrincipalPasswordCredential -ServicePrincipalId $sp.Id\n    $recentCreds = $creds | Where-Object { $_.StartDateTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }\n    if ($recentCreds) {\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            DisplayName = $sp.DisplayName\n            AppId = $sp.AppId\n            ObjectId = $sp.Id\n            NewCredsCount = $recentCreds.Count\n            LatestCredAdded = ($recentCreds | Sort-Object StartDateTime -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).StartDateTime\n        }\n    }\n}\n$suspiciousSPs | Sort-Object LatestCredAdded -Descending\n```\n\n### Step 2: Review service principal role assignments\n\n```powershell\n# Check role assignments for a specific service principal\n$spId = \"\u003Cservice-principal-object-id>\"\nGet-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId $spId | ForEach-Object {\n    $resource = Get-MgServicePrincipal -ServicePrincipalId $_.ResourceId\n    [PSCustomObject]@{\n        AppRoleId = $_.AppRoleId\n        ResourceDisplayName = $resource.DisplayName\n        CreatedDateTime = $_.CreatedDateTime\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Check application ownership\n\n```powershell\n# List owners of all applications (ownership = credential control)\nGet-MgApplication -All | ForEach-Object {\n    $app = $_\n    $owners = Get-MgApplicationOwner -ApplicationId $app.Id\n    foreach ($owner in $owners) {\n        [PSCustomObject]@{\n            AppName = $app.DisplayName\n            AppId = $app.AppId\n            OwnerUPN = $owner.AdditionalProperties.userPrincipalName\n            OwnerType = $owner.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type'\n        }\n    }\n} | Where-Object { $_.OwnerUPN -ne $null }\n```\n\n### Step 4: Review sign-in activity\n\n```kql\nAADServicePrincipalSignInLogs\n| where ServicePrincipalId == \"\u003Ctarget-sp-id>\"\n| project TimeGenerated, ServicePrincipalName, IPAddress, Location,\n    ResourceDisplayName, Status.errorCode\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n## Preventive Controls\n\n### Restrict application registration\n\n```powershell\n# Disable user ability to register applications\nUpdate-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{\n    AllowedToCreateApps = $false\n}\n```\n\n### Configure app consent policies\n\n```powershell\n# Require admin approval for all app consent requests\nNew-MgPolicyPermissionGrantPolicy -Id \"admin-only-consent\" `\n    -DisplayName \"Admin Only Consent\" `\n    -Description \"Only admins can consent to applications\"\n```\n\n### Monitor with Microsoft Sentinel Analytics Rules\n\nCreate analytics rules for:\n- New service principal credential additions\n- Privileged role assignments to service principals\n- Bulk service principal enumeration\n- Admin consent grants to unknown applications\n- Service principal sign-ins from unusual locations\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Description |\n|-----------|-----|-------------|\n| Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | T1098.001 | Adding credentials to service principal |\n| Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | T1078.004 | Using compromised service principal |\n| Account Discovery: Cloud Account | T1087.004 | Enumerating service principals |\n| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | OAuth token theft via service principal |\n\n## References\n\n- Splunk Detection: Azure AD Service Principal Abuse\n- Semperis: Service Principal Ownership Abuse in Entra ID\n- MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix\n- Microsoft: Securing service principals in Entra ID\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":42,"description":7,"mitre_attack":43,"d3fend_techniques":49},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"azure","entra-id","service-principal","privilege-escalation","credential-abuse","detection","splunk","sentinel","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[38,39,40,41],"PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01","cloud-security",[44,45,46,47,48],"T1078.004","T1098.001","T1528","T1550.001","T1098.003",[50,51,52,53,54],"Token Binding","Restore Access","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Reissue 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Supports verifying frontend functionality, debugging UI behavior, capturing browser screenshots, and viewing browser logs.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fwebapp-testing\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fwebapp-testing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":122,"name":123,"nameZh":6,"description":124,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":125,"sourceHtmlUrl":126,"categories":127,"keywords":128,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJZFTS5TS06K2TV3MDTE67","web-artifacts-builder","Suite of tools for creating elaborate, multi-component claude.ai HTML artifacts using modern frontend web technologies (React, Tailwind CSS, shadcn\u002Fui). Use for complex artifacts requiring state management, routing, or shadcn\u002Fui components - not for simple single-file HTML\u002FJSX artifacts.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fweb-artifacts-builder\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fweb-artifacts-builder\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":133,"licenseFileUrl":134,"sourceHtmlUrl":135,"categories":136,"keywords":137,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJRK4SRQ908F2TJM6EZ7EV","ui-styling","Create beautiful, accessible user interfaces with shadcn\u002Fui components (built on Radix UI + Tailwind), Tailwind CSS utility-first styling, and canvas-based visual designs. Use when building user interfaces, implementing design systems, creating responsive layouts, adding accessible components (dialogs, dropdowns, forms, tables), customizing themes and colors, implementing dark mode, generating visual designs and posters, or establishing consistent styling patterns across applications.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fui-styling\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fui-styling\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":139,"name":140,"nameZh":6,"description":141,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":133,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":142,"categories":143,"keywords":144,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJR902059VEQP23PVM2WA0","design","Comprehensive design skill: brand identity, design tokens, UI styling, logo generation (55 styles, Gemini AI), corporate identity program (50 deliverables, CIP mockups), HTML presentations (Chart.js), banner design (22 styles, social\u002Fads\u002Fweb\u002Fprint), icon design (15 styles, SVG, Gemini 3.1 Pro), social photos (HTML→screenshot, multi-platform). Actions: design logo, create CIP, generate mockups, build slides, design banner, generate icon, create social photos, social media images, brand identity, design system. Platforms: Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Pinterest, TikTok, Threads, Google Ads.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":146,"name":147,"nameZh":6,"description":148,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":133,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":149,"categories":150,"keywords":151,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJR56QF5N6XYTCPCFHFMNP","design-system","Token architecture, component specifications, and slide generation. Three-layer tokens (primitive→semantic→component), CSS variables, spacing\u002Ftypography scales, component specs, strategic slide creation. Use for design tokens, systematic design, brand-compliant presentations.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign-system\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":153,"name":154,"nameZh":6,"description":155,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":133,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":156,"categories":157,"keywords":158,"publishedAt":20},"01M7DJQXB6M0SFF7NX8J5N01AH","banner-design","Design banners for social media, ads, website heroes, creative assets, and print. Multiple art direction options with AI-generated visuals. Actions: design, create, generate banner. Platforms: Facebook, Twitter\u002FX, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, Google Display, website hero, print. Styles: minimalist, gradient, bold typography, photo-based, illustrated, geometric, retro, glassmorphism, 3D, neon, duotone, editorial, collage. Uses ui-ux-pro-max, frontend-design, ai-artist, ai-multimodal skills.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSaiVatsal\u002FSkills-I-Use\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max-skill-main\u002Fcli\u002Fassets\u002Fskills\u002Fbanner-design\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]