security-review
Use in code_review when the diff touches input handling, auth, queries, files, outbound requests, secrets, dependencies or LLM calls, and in analysis for any new endpoint or data flow
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-15
- Stars
- ★ 122
- Forks
- 18
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- security-review
- source
- getsentry/skills find-bugs (Apache-2.0), anthropics/claude-plugins-official (Apache-2.0), github/awesome-copilot se-security-reviewer (MIT), adapted; OWASP category names linked only
- category
- quality
- description
- Use in code_review when the diff touches input handling, auth, queries, files, outbound requests, secrets, dependencies or LLM calls, and in analysis for any new endpoint or data flow
03 SKILL.md 正文
Security Review
Overview
Security is not a separate pass over the whole repo — it is one more lens on the diff (code_review) or the design (analysis) you are already reading. Report only what is reachable by an attacker; a theoretical issue with no path to it is noise that trains people to skip your findings.
1. Risk Tier First
- High — auth, payments, admin actions, file upload, outbound URL fetch, anything that calls an LLM with tool access. Run the full checklist below.
- Medium — user data, external API calls. Run Injection, Authorization, Exceptional Conditions, Secrets.
- Low — pure UI, utilities, pure config/copy. Run Secrets and Supply Chain only.
2. Map the Attack Surface (of the diff, not the repo)
List, from the diff: every new input (params, headers, body, path segment, uploaded file, webhook payload, LLM output used downstream), every new or changed query, every auth/authorization check, every outbound call, every secret touched.
3. Report Only Attacker-Reachable Findings
Trace the value to its source with grep_code/expand_symbol_context before flagging it. Not attacker-controlled: config values, environment variables, constants, server-set values, test fixtures. Not a finding: framework auto-escaping doing its job (React {x}, an ORM's parameterized query) — that is the control working, not a gap.
4. Checks
Authorization per new route — does it carry the same middleware as its neighbours, and does the query filter by owner/tenant (IDOR)?
- ❌
func (h *Handler) GetInvoice(w, r) { id := r.PathValue("id"); inv, _ := h.repo.Get(ctx, id); json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(inv) }— any authenticated user reads any invoice by guessing an id. - ✅
inv, err := h.repo.Get(ctx, id); if inv.OrgID != authctx.OrgID(ctx) { return ErrForbidden }— the query result is checked against the caller's scope before it is returned.
Injection sinks — string-built SQL, exec.Command("sh","-c",…) / child_process.exec, template |safe, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, v-html.
- ❌
db.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE title = '%s'", title)) - ✅
db.Exec("SELECT * FROM tasks WHERE title = $1", title)
Path traversal, SSRF, open redirect — a path or URL built from user input without an allowlist or a resolved-path check.
- ❌
http.ServeFile(w, r, filepath.Join(baseDir, r.URL.Query().Get("file")))—../../etc/passwdescapesbaseDir. - ✅ resolve the joined path with
filepath.Clean/EvalSymlinksand reject anything outsidebaseDir.
Secrets — in code, logs, error bodies, or argv (this repo's own rule: secrets never go on argv; a child process gets them via env, not a command-line flag).
- ❌
exec.Command("curl", "-H", "Authorization: Bearer "+token, url) - ✅ pass the token through an env var the child reads, never a flag.
Crypto — math/rand/Math.random used for a token or session id; MD5/SHA1 for a password hash.
CSRF / CORS — a cookie-authenticated state change with no CSRF check; Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * alongside credentialed requests.
Supply chain — a new dependency: pinned in the lockfile, maintained, license-compatible, not a typo-squat of a popular name, and actually in scope (an out-of-scope list that forbids unrequested dependency changes still applies).
Exceptional conditions — an error swallowed into a 200/success response; auth that fails open (an unreachable check defaults to "allowed" instead of "denied").
- ❌
if err != nil { log.Error(err) }then falls through and returns 200 anyway. - ✅ the error is propagated and mapped to the right status code.
LLM-specific (any diff that calls a model or exposes a tool to one) — model output used directly as a shell command, a SQL fragment, or a URL; a tool callable on untrusted content (e.g. a webhook body) with no confirmation step. See OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, LLM01 Prompt Injection.
5. Severity
- Critical — exploitable without authentication, an auth bypass, an injection sink reachable by input, or a leaked secret.
- Critical when it reaches data, Important otherwise — exploitable only with conditions (IDOR on a specific id, stored XSS, SSRF to an internal service).
- Minor — defence-in-depth gaps (a check that is redundant with one already upstream).
6. Before the Verdict
State to yourself, not in the comment: which areas you could not verify and why (e.g. "didn't trace the mobile client's handling of this field — out of this diff's repo"). An unverifiable area is not a finding; it's a boundary of the review.
References (names and links only — OWASP content is CC BY-SA, not reproduced)
OWASP Top 10:2025: A01 Broken Access Control · A03 Software Supply Chain Failures · A04 Cryptographic Failures · A05 Injection · A06 Insecure Design · A07 Authentication Failures · A08 Software/Data Integrity Failures · A09 Security Logging and Alerting Failures · A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions. OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications: LLM01 Prompt Injection.
Common Mistakes
- Flagging a value from
os.Getenvor a hardcoded constant as attacker-controlled. - Flagging React's
{value}interpolation or an ORM's parameter binding as an injection risk — that is the escaping working. - A Critical for a low-tier diff (pure copy/UI change) that has no reachable input at all.
- Running the full checklist on a low-risk diff instead of just Secrets and Supply Chain.
Red Flags
- A finding with no traced source for the "attacker-controlled" claim.
- A new outbound call (
fetch_url-equivalent,http.Client) with no mention of where the URL comes from. - A new dependency with no lockfile entry checked.
- "Might be exploitable" with no file:line and no input trace — rewrite it with both, or drop it.
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