[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7CSKCDDWTP8SJ6V6DC70Q4C":3,"skill-same:01M7CSKCDDWTP8SJ6V6DC70Q4C":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":30,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":32,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":34,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M7CSKCDDWTP8SJ6V6DC70Q4C","desktop-and-local-ipc-security",null,"Use when the diff adds or changes a loopback HTTP or WebSocket server, a bind address, a Unix socket, named pipe, XPC or D-Bus service, an Electron or Tauri main-process handler, a custom URL scheme or file association, a privileged helper or updater, or code that spawns tools inside directories a user or download supplied","makifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper","makifbaysal","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F25031940?v=4","01M7CRG3ZCSYZSSEVDMW3DEYC8","Mehmet Akif Baysal","01M7CRG401FJ8YAXH5ER730XYV",122,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fsecurity-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fdesktop-and-local-ipc-security\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: desktop-and-local-ipc-security\ncategory: security\ndescription: Use when the diff adds or changes a loopback HTTP or WebSocket server, a bind address, a Unix socket, named pipe, XPC or D-Bus service, an Electron or Tauri main-process handler, a custom URL scheme or file association, a privileged helper or updater, or code that spawns tools inside directories a user or download supplied\ntech_stack: Desktop & local IPC\nsource: cloudflare\u002Fsecurity-audit-skill (MIT) desktop, mobile and local-IPC attack classes, adapted to diff review; own wording; Electron security checklist and platform IPC documentation cited, not reproduced\n---\n# Desktop and Local IPC Security\n\n## Overview\n\nA desktop app's attackers are not \"the internet\" in general. They are a web page open in the user's browser (which can send requests to `127.0.0.1`), another app or OS user on the same machine, a document or archive the user opened, a link the user clicked, and remote content loaded into a webview. Each reaches the app through a different door: a loopback port, a socket, a URL scheme, an IPC channel, a file.\n\n**Core principle:** name the attacker's starting position, then show the check that stops it at that door. A process name, a path, a port number or a claimed sender field is not authentication — an OS peer credential, a code-signature check, or an unguessable per-launch token is.\n\n## 1. Loopback HTTP and WebSocket Servers\n\nAny web page can send requests to `http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:\u003Cport>`. \"Simple\" requests — a form `POST`, `text\u002Fplain` bodies, `GET` with side effects — need no CORS preflight and still execute; DNS rebinding lets a page on `attacker.example` read responses once its name resolves to `127.0.0.1`; a WebSocket upgrade carries no CORS check at all.\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F ❌ a local API that runs agent tasks, open to every page in every browser on the machine\nmux.HandleFunc(\"\u002Fapi\u002Frun\", runHandler)\nhttp.ListenAndServe(\"127.0.0.1:\"+port, mux)\n\n\u002F\u002F ✅ a per-launch random token in a header (pages cannot read or guess it, and it is never a cookie),\n\u002F\u002F    plus a Host check that defeats DNS rebinding for the routes that need no token\nfunc guard(next http.Handler, token string, port string) http.Handler {\n\tallowed := map[string]bool{\"127.0.0.1:\" + port: true, \"localhost:\" + port: true}\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif !allowed[r.Host] { http.Error(w, \"bad host\", http.StatusForbidden); return }\n\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")), []byte(\"Bearer \"+token)) != 1 {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized); return\n\t\t}\n\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n}\n```\n\nFindings: a new local route outside the token middleware that changes state or returns private data; authentication by cookie on a loopback API (CSRF from any page); CORS on the local server reflecting any origin; a WebSocket endpoint that skips the token or the `Origin` check; the token placed in a URL query string that lands in logs or browser history.\n\n## 2. Bind Address\n\n`\":8080\"`, `\"0.0.0.0\"` and `\"[::]\"` listen on every interface — the LAN, a café Wi-Fi, a VPN. A local-only service must bind `127.0.0.1` (or `::1`). Go's `http.ListenAndServe(\":\"+port, …)`, Node's `server.listen(port)` with no host and Python's `host=\"0.0.0.0\"` all expose it.\n\n## 3. Unix Sockets, Named Pipes, XPC, D-Bus\n\n- **Unix sockets:** created in a world-writable directory (`\u002Ftmp`) with a predictable name, or with mode `0777`\u002Fa permissive umask — another OS user connects or pre-creates the path. Check `SO_PEERCRED`\u002F`getpeereid` when the service acts for a specific user.\n- **Windows named pipes:** the default DACL, a missing `PIPE_REJECT_REMOTE_CLIENTS`, or a pipe name another process can create first (squatting).\n- **macOS XPC and helpers:** the client verified by PID (reusable) instead of its audit token and code-signing requirement.\n- **D-Bus:** a method on the system bus with no polkit action or a policy that allows any user.\n- **Claimed identity:** the channel belongs to one app or user but a request field names another — bind every method to the peer credential, not the field.\n\n## 4. Electron and Tauri Main Process\n\nRenderer-side settings are in web-frontend-security §7; the main process is where privilege lives.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F ❌ any frame — including remote content or an injected iframe — can ask the main process to run a command\nipcMain.handle(\"run\", (_e, cmd: string, args: string[]) => execFile(cmd, args));\n\n\u002F\u002F ✅ check the sender's origin on every call, and expose an operation, not a primitive\nipcMain.handle(\"open-project\", (e, id: string) => {\n  if (new URL(e.senderFrame.url).origin !== \"app:\u002F\u002Ftasktrooper\") throw new Error(\"forbidden\");\n  return projects.open(validateId(id));\n});\n```\n\nAlso: `shell.openExternal(url)` without a scheme allowlist (`file:`, `smb:`, custom schemes launch other programs); missing `setWindowOpenHandler` and `will-navigate` handlers, so a link navigates the privileged window to remote content; a custom protocol handler (`protocol.handle`) that serves files by joining a path from the URL (path-traversal-and-file-handling); Tauri commands with broad `fs`\u002F`shell` scopes reachable from remote content.\n\n## 5. URL Schemes, File Associations and argv\n\nA custom scheme (`tasktrooper:\u002F\u002F`), a file association or a share target can be fired by any web page, email or file. Treat everything it carries as untrusted:\n\n- an action triggered without user confirmation or session binding (import a project, connect an account, run a task, change a setting);\n- an auth callback through the scheme accepted without the pending `state` and PKCE verifier of a flow this app started;\n- argv from `second-instance` or `open-url` passed on to a child process or parsed for switches — a URL can carry `--flag`-shaped text; put `--` before operands and parse the URL, not the argv string.\n\n## 6. Privileged Helpers, Updaters and Installers\n\n- A helper running as root\u002FSYSTEM that takes a path, command or setting from an unprivileged caller and acts without its own per-operation check.\n- A path the helper reads or executes that a lower-privileged user can write (an update staging directory, a log directory, a plugin folder) — or that it checks, then reopens (TOCTOU, path-traversal-and-file-handling §2).\n- An updater that does not verify the signature, accepts a downgrade, or fetches over plain HTTP (supply-chain-and-dependency-review §7).\n\n## 7. Spawning Tools in Supplied Directories\n\nA directory the user did not author — an extracted archive, a downloaded workspace, a cloned third-party repo — carries configuration that tools execute: `.git\u002Fconfig` (`core.fsmonitor`, `core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`), `.npmrc`, `.envrc`, `Makefile`, `.vscode\u002Ftasks.json`, a `pyproject.toml` build backend. Code that runs `git status`, `npm`, `make` or a language server inside such a directory without isolation runs the directory's code. Also: resolving a bare program name through a `PATH` that includes the working directory.\n\n## 8. Local Secrets and Device Lifecycle\n\n- A token file or local database readable by other OS users (`0644` in a shared location, a world-readable temp file).\n- Secrets passed on argv (visible in `ps` to every local user) — pass them by environment or file descriptor.\n- Cached data, notifications or webview storage that survive sign-out and appear under the next account.\n\n## Not Findings\n\n- The same OS user reading their own files, config or keychain items — the attacker is the victim.\n- Malware already running as the user — it already has the user's authority.\n- A loopback route that needs the token, or a health check that returns nothing private.\n\n## Severity Guide\n\nAny web page reaching command execution, file read or account actions through a loopback server, URL scheme or IPC → CRITICAL. A service exposed to the LAN without authentication → HIGH. Another local user reading credentials or driving a privileged helper → HIGH. A secret on argv → MEDIUM.\n\n## Common Mistakes\n\n- Assuming `127.0.0.1` means \"only this app can call it\" — browsers can, and so can every local process.\n- Reporting a loopback API without checking whether the token middleware already wraps it.\n- Reporting same-user file permissions on a single-user desktop as a vulnerability.\n- Treating `contextIsolation: true` as protection for an `ipcMain` handler that executes whatever the renderer sends.\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- A new route registered on the local server outside the authenticated group, or authenticated by cookie.\n- `listen(\":port\")`, `0.0.0.0` or `[::]` on a local-only service.\n- `ipcMain.handle`\u002F`ipcMain.on` that never reads `event.senderFrame`, and passes arguments to `exec`, `spawn`, `fs` or `shell.openExternal`.\n- `setAsDefaultProtocolClient` or `open-url` handling that performs an action directly.\n- `git`, `npm`, `make` or a build tool spawned with `cwd` set to an extracted or downloaded directory.\n\n## References (names and links only)\n\n[Electron security checklist](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.electronjs.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Ftutorial\u002Fsecurity) · [Tauri security](https:\u002F\u002Fv2.tauri.app\u002Fsecurity\u002F) · [OWASP Desktop App Security Top 10](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-desktop-app-security-top-10\u002F) · CWE-214, 306, 346, 427, 668, 1385 · [Cloudflare security-audit-skill](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcloudflare\u002Fsecurity-audit-skill)\n","# Desktop and Local IPC Security\n\n## Overview\n\nA desktop app's attackers are not \"the internet\" in general. They are a web page open in the user's browser (which can send requests to `127.0.0.1`), another app or OS user on the same machine, a document or archive the user opened, a link the user clicked, and remote content loaded into a webview. Each reaches the app through a different door: a loopback port, a socket, a URL scheme, an IPC channel, a file.\n\n**Core principle:** name the attacker's starting position, then show the check that stops it at that door. A process name, a path, a port number or a claimed sender field is not authentication — an OS peer credential, a code-signature check, or an unguessable per-launch token is.\n\n## 1. Loopback HTTP and WebSocket Servers\n\nAny web page can send requests to `http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:\u003Cport>`. \"Simple\" requests — a form `POST`, `text\u002Fplain` bodies, `GET` with side effects — need no CORS preflight and still execute; DNS rebinding lets a page on `attacker.example` read responses once its name resolves to `127.0.0.1`; a WebSocket upgrade carries no CORS check at all.\n\n```go\n\u002F\u002F ❌ a local API that runs agent tasks, open to every page in every browser on the machine\nmux.HandleFunc(\"\u002Fapi\u002Frun\", runHandler)\nhttp.ListenAndServe(\"127.0.0.1:\"+port, mux)\n\n\u002F\u002F ✅ a per-launch random token in a header (pages cannot read or guess it, and it is never a cookie),\n\u002F\u002F    plus a Host check that defeats DNS rebinding for the routes that need no token\nfunc guard(next http.Handler, token string, port string) http.Handler {\n\tallowed := map[string]bool{\"127.0.0.1:\" + port: true, \"localhost:\" + port: true}\n\treturn http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tif !allowed[r.Host] { http.Error(w, \"bad host\", http.StatusForbidden); return }\n\t\tif subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(r.Header.Get(\"Authorization\")), []byte(\"Bearer \"+token)) != 1 {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"unauthorized\", http.StatusUnauthorized); return\n\t\t}\n\t\tnext.ServeHTTP(w, r)\n\t})\n}\n```\n\nFindings: a new local route outside the token middleware that changes state or returns private data; authentication by cookie on a loopback API (CSRF from any page); CORS on the local server reflecting any origin; a WebSocket endpoint that skips the token or the `Origin` check; the token placed in a URL query string that lands in logs or browser history.\n\n## 2. Bind Address\n\n`\":8080\"`, `\"0.0.0.0\"` and `\"[::]\"` listen on every interface — the LAN, a café Wi-Fi, a VPN. A local-only service must bind `127.0.0.1` (or `::1`). Go's `http.ListenAndServe(\":\"+port, …)`, Node's `server.listen(port)` with no host and Python's `host=\"0.0.0.0\"` all expose it.\n\n## 3. Unix Sockets, Named Pipes, XPC, D-Bus\n\n- **Unix sockets:** created in a world-writable directory (`\u002Ftmp`) with a predictable name, or with mode `0777`\u002Fa permissive umask — another OS user connects or pre-creates the path. Check `SO_PEERCRED`\u002F`getpeereid` when the service acts for a specific user.\n- **Windows named pipes:** the default DACL, a missing `PIPE_REJECT_REMOTE_CLIENTS`, or a pipe name another process can create first (squatting).\n- **macOS XPC and helpers:** the client verified by PID (reusable) instead of its audit token and code-signing requirement.\n- **D-Bus:** a method on the system bus with no polkit action or a policy that allows any user.\n- **Claimed identity:** the channel belongs to one app or user but a request field names another — bind every method to the peer credential, not the field.\n\n## 4. Electron and Tauri Main Process\n\nRenderer-side settings are in web-frontend-security §7; the main process is where privilege lives.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F ❌ any frame — including remote content or an injected iframe — can ask the main process to run a command\nipcMain.handle(\"run\", (_e, cmd: string, args: string[]) => execFile(cmd, args));\n\n\u002F\u002F ✅ check the sender's origin on every call, and expose an operation, not a primitive\nipcMain.handle(\"open-project\", (e, id: string) => {\n  if (new URL(e.senderFrame.url).origin !== \"app:\u002F\u002Ftasktrooper\") throw new Error(\"forbidden\");\n  return projects.open(validateId(id));\n});\n```\n\nAlso: `shell.openExternal(url)` without a scheme allowlist (`file:`, `smb:`, custom schemes launch other programs); missing `setWindowOpenHandler` and `will-navigate` handlers, so a link navigates the privileged window to remote content; a custom protocol handler (`protocol.handle`) that serves files by joining a path from the URL (path-traversal-and-file-handling); Tauri commands with broad `fs`\u002F`shell` scopes reachable from remote content.\n\n## 5. URL Schemes, File Associations and argv\n\nA custom scheme (`tasktrooper:\u002F\u002F`), a file association or a share target can be fired by any web page, email or file. Treat everything it carries as untrusted:\n\n- an action triggered without user confirmation or session binding (import a project, connect an account, run a task, change a setting);\n- an auth callback through the scheme accepted without the pending `state` and PKCE verifier of a flow this app started;\n- argv from `second-instance` or `open-url` passed on to a child process or parsed for switches — a URL can carry `--flag`-shaped text; put `--` before operands and parse the URL, not the argv string.\n\n## 6. Privileged Helpers, Updaters and Installers\n\n- A helper running as root\u002FSYSTEM that takes a path, command or setting from an unprivileged caller and acts without its own per-operation check.\n- A path the helper reads or executes that a lower-privileged user can write (an update staging directory, a log directory, a plugin folder) — or that it checks, then reopens (TOCTOU, path-traversal-and-file-handling §2).\n- An updater that does not verify the signature, accepts a downgrade, or fetches over plain HTTP (supply-chain-and-dependency-review §7).\n\n## 7. Spawning Tools in Supplied Directories\n\nA directory the user did not author — an extracted archive, a downloaded workspace, a cloned third-party repo — carries configuration that tools execute: `.git\u002Fconfig` (`core.fsmonitor`, `core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`), `.npmrc`, `.envrc`, `Makefile`, `.vscode\u002Ftasks.json`, a `pyproject.toml` build backend. Code that runs `git status`, `npm`, `make` or a language server inside such a directory without isolation runs the directory's code. Also: resolving a bare program name through a `PATH` that includes the working directory.\n\n## 8. Local Secrets and Device Lifecycle\n\n- A token file or local database readable by other OS users (`0644` in a shared location, a world-readable temp file).\n- Secrets passed on argv (visible in `ps` to every local user) — pass them by environment or file descriptor.\n- Cached data, notifications or webview storage that survive sign-out and appear under the next account.\n\n## Not Findings\n\n- The same OS user reading their own files, config or keychain items — the attacker is the victim.\n- Malware already running as the user — it already has the user's authority.\n- A loopback route that needs the token, or a health check that returns nothing private.\n\n## Severity Guide\n\nAny web page reaching command execution, file read or account actions through a loopback server, URL scheme or IPC → CRITICAL. A service exposed to the LAN without authentication → HIGH. Another local user reading credentials or driving a privileged helper → HIGH. A secret on argv → MEDIUM.\n\n## Common Mistakes\n\n- Assuming `127.0.0.1` means \"only this app can call it\" — browsers can, and so can every local process.\n- Reporting a loopback API without checking whether the token middleware already wraps it.\n- Reporting same-user file permissions on a single-user desktop as a vulnerability.\n- Treating `contextIsolation: true` as protection for an `ipcMain` handler that executes whatever the renderer sends.\n\n## Red Flags\n\n- A new route registered on the local server outside the authenticated group, or authenticated by cookie.\n- `listen(\":port\")`, `0.0.0.0` or `[::]` on a local-only service.\n- `ipcMain.handle`\u002F`ipcMain.on` that never reads `event.senderFrame`, and passes arguments to `exec`, `spawn`, `fs` or `shell.openExternal`.\n- `setAsDefaultProtocolClient` or `open-url` handling that performs an action directly.\n- `git`, `npm`, `make` or a build tool spawned with `cwd` set to an extracted or downloaded directory.\n\n## References (names and links only)\n\n[Electron security checklist](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.electronjs.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Ftutorial\u002Fsecurity) · [Tauri security](https:\u002F\u002Fv2.tauri.app\u002Fsecurity\u002F) · [OWASP Desktop App Security Top 10](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-desktop-app-security-top-10\u002F) · CWE-214, 306, 346, 427, 668, 1385 · [Cloudflare security-audit-skill](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcloudflare\u002Fsecurity-audit-skill)\n",{"name":5,"source":24,"category":25,"tech_stack":26,"description":7},"cloudflare\u002Fsecurity-audit-skill (MIT) desktop, mobile and local-IPC attack classes, adapted to diff review; own wording; Electron security checklist and platform IPC documentation cited, not reproduced","security","Desktop & local IPC","main","910394a0b6db9fc8c9a8f36328ec421d3ebd8b38","catalog\u002Fagents\u002Fsecurity-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fdesktop-and-local-ipc-security",18,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper","https:\u002F\u002Ftasktrooper.ai","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal","Senior Software Developer","2026-11-15 04:50:29",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add makifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper --skill desktop-and-local-ipc-security",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add makifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper --skill desktop-and-local-ipc-security",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add makifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper --skill desktop-and-local-ipc-security","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fsecurity-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fdesktop-and-local-ipc-security\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M7CSVEPQW6J6TD6CS2T5FPNZ","visual-craft","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fui-designer\u002Fskills\u002Fvisual-craft\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M7CSVAQG91ETHQ0HBNZDG5FR","ux-copy","Use when you write any words a user reads in a mockup or a hand-off - content language and voice, buttons, labels, errors, empty states, confirmations, numbers and dates, and the longest-string check","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fui-designer\u002Fskills\u002Fux-copy\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":19},"01M7CSV6H0J38659NDXHJQ8396","screen-mockup-html","Use when you draw screens as the design task's HTML mockup - ONE canvas document holding every screen and every variant side by side, the sanitizer-safe recipe, phone and wide frames, the states grid, static control states, and the loopback self-check with screenshots at 375, 768 and 1440 attached to the task","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fui-designer\u002Fskills\u002Fscreen-mockup-html\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":19},"01M7CSV3JFRF3BM3XK52M7YEYR","performance-awareness","How the performance score moves for your role. Use when the score context shows a declining trend, or before handing off work you have not self-checked against every criterion.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fui-designer\u002Fskills\u002Fperformance-awareness\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M7CSTZDH00YRF5SCT7BRT9QD","design-variants","Use when a screen design needs variants - how many, variants as side-by-side rows on the one canvas, what makes two variants genuinely different, recommending one, how the human's choice is read, and narrowing to the chosen one in revision","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fui-designer\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign-variants\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M7CSTV6P3SM3PAE28DB0RF77","design-system-authoring","Use when you derive, change or extend a design system - where tokens live per stack, the DTCG token tree, role-based names for both themes, base vs layer vs drift, the DESIGN.md section order, the inventory format, the contrast check and the lint every proposal returns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmakifbaysal\u002Ftasktrooper\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcatalog\u002Fagents\u002Fui-designer\u002Fskills\u002Fdesign-system-authoring\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]