AGENT SKILL

azure-bgp

Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes.

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Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-11-14
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
azure-bgp
description
Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes.

03 SKILL.md 正文

Azure BGP Oscillation & Route Leak Analysis

Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments).

This skill trains an agent to:

  • Detect preference cycles that cause BGP oscillation
  • Identify valley-free violations that constitute route leaks
  • Propose allowed, policy-level mitigations (routing intent, UDR, ingress filtering)
  • Reject prohibited fixes (disabling BGP, shutting down peering, removing connectivity)

The focus is cloud-correct reasoning, not on-prem router manipulation.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when a task involves:

  • Azure Virtual WAN, hub-and-spoke BGP, ExpressRoute, or VPN gateways
  • Repeated route flapping or unstable path selection
  • Unexpected transit, leaked prefixes, or valley-free violations
  • Choosing between routing intent, UDRs, or BGP policy fixes
  • Evaluating whether a proposed "fix" is valid in Azure

Core Invariants (Must Never Be Violated)

An agent must internalize these constraints before reasoning:

  • ❌ BGP sessions between hubs cannot be administratively disabled by customers as it's owned by azure
  • ❌ Peering connections cannot be shut down as a fix as it break all other traffic running on the connections
  • ❌ Removing connectivity is not a valid solution as it break all other traffic running
  • ✅ Problems must be fixed using routing policy, not topology destruction

Any solution violating these rules is invalid.

Expected Inputs

Tasks using this skill typically provide small JSON files:

File Meaning
topology.json Directed BGP adjacency graph
relationships.json Economic relationship per edge (provider, customer, peer)
preferences.json Per-ASN preferred next hop (may cause oscillation)
route.json Prefix and origin ASN
route_leaks.json Evidence of invalid propagation
possible_solutions.json Candidate fixes to classify

Reasoning Workflow (Executable Checklist)

Step 1 — Sanity-Check Inputs

  • Every ASN referenced must exist in topology.json
  • Relationship symmetry must hold:
    • provider(A→B) ⇔ customer(B→A)
    • peer must be symmetric
  • If this fails, the input is invalid.

Step 2 — Detect BGP Oscillation (Preference Cycle)

Definition

BGP oscillation exists if ASes form a preference cycle, often between peers.

Detection Rule

  1. Build a directed graph: ASN → preferred next-hop ASN
  2. If the graph contains a cycle, oscillation is possible
  3. A 2-node cycle is sufficient to conclude oscillation.

Example pseudocode:

pref = {asn: prefer_via_asn, ...}

def find_cycle(start):
    path = []
    seen = {}
    cur = start
    while cur in pref:
        if cur in seen:
            return path[seen[cur]:]  # cycle found
        seen[cur] = len(path)
        path.append(cur)
        cur = pref[cur]
    return None

Step 3 — Detect BGP Route Leak (Valley-Free Violation)

Valley-Free Rule

Learned from May export to
Customer Anyone
Peer Customers only
Provider Customers only

Leak Conditions

A route leak exists if either is true:

  1. Route learned from a provider is exported to a peer or provider
  2. Route learned from a peer is exported to a peer or provider

Step 4 — Classify Each Candidate Solution (Explicit output contract)

Many benchmark tasks require a JSON mapping of solution_name -> {oscillation_resolved, route_leak_resolved}.

Use these task-aligned definitions when setting booleans:

  • oscillation_resolved = True only if the change breaks the preference cycle (preferences.json) or enforces deterministic forwarding such that the cycle no longer affects route choice.
  • route_leak_resolved = True only if the change prevents hub-to-hub propagation of provider/peer-learned routes (i.e., stops the specific valley-free violation / hub-to-hub transit behavior).

When evaluating a solution string, do not require device restarts or topology removal to count as a fix; prefer policy mechanisms available in Azure.

Fix Selection Logic (Ranked)

Tier 1 — Virtual WAN Routing Intent (Preferred)

Applies to:

  • ✔ Oscillation
  • ✔ Route leaks

Why it works (classification rule):

  • If a candidate says it enables Virtual WAN hub routing intent to force hub-to-hub traffic through Virtual WAN (e.g., via the Virtual WAN core/ASN), then classify:
    • oscillation_resolved = True because intent overrides BGP path selection, eliminating the operational effect of a preference cycle on forwarding.
    • route_leak_resolved = True because it prevents hubs from using each other as unintended transit, constraining hub-to-hub routing to the Virtual WAN policy path.

Notes:

  • Routing intent operates above BGP: BGP can still learn routes, but forwarding is policy-driven.
  • For benchmark-style tasks, treat intent as a valid “resolution” when the intent statement explicitly enforces the intended hub-to-hub path.

Tier 2 — Export / Route Policy (Protocol-Correct)

For oscillation:

  • Filter routes learned from a peer before re-advertising — Removes one edge of the preference cycle
  • Why this works: In a cycle where Hub A prefers routes via Hub B and vice versa, filtering breaks one "leg":
    • If Hub A filters routes learned from Hub B before re-announcing, Hub B stops receiving routes via Hub A
    • Hub B can no longer prefer the path through Hub A because it no longer exists
    • The cycle collapses, routing stabilizes

Example: If vhubvnet1 (ASN 65002) filters routes learned from vhubvnet2 (ASN 65003) before re-advertising, vhubvnet2 stops receiving routes via vhubvnet1, breaking the oscillation cycle.

For route leaks:

  • Enforce valley-free export rules — Prevent announcing provider/peer-learned routes to peers/providers
  • Use communities (e.g., no-export) where applicable
  • Ingress filtering — Reject routes with invalid AS_PATH from peers

RPKI origin validation (how to classify)

RPKI is a route validity gate. In tasks where the leak is modeled as acceptance/propagation of an invalid origin, enabling RPKI origin validation at a hub should be classified as:

  • oscillation_resolved = False (it does not change the preference graph/cycle)
  • route_leak_resolved = True when the solution explicitly states it will validate the prefix’s correct origin ASN, because invalid leaked announcements will be dropped and therefore not propagated.

(If a task instead defines leak purely as export-policy violation independent of origin validity, then RPKI may be insufficient. When in doubt, follow the task’s leak definition and the solution wording: RPKI resolves leaks only insofar as it blocks the bad route from being accepted/propagated.)

Limitation: Does not control forwarding if multiple valid paths remain.

Tier 3 — User Defined Routes (UDR)

Applies to:

  • ✔ Oscillation
  • ✔ Route leaks

Purpose: Authoritative, static routing mechanism in Azure that explicitly defines the next hop for network traffic based on destination IP prefixes, overriding Azure system routes and BGP-learned routes.

Routing Behavior: Enforces deterministic forwarding independent of BGP decision processes. UDRs operate at the data plane layer and take precedence over dynamic BGP routes.

Classification rule (important for benchmarks):

  • If a solution proposes a UDR/route-table override that forces a specific next hop / path, set:
    • oscillation_resolved = True because the preference cycle no longer affects forwarding choice.
    • route_leak_resolved = True because traffic is prevented from using the leaked hub-to-hub transit path.

Trade-off: UDR is a data-plane fix that may “mask” the control-plane issue. However, for tasks that define “resolved” in terms of breaking the cycle’s effect and stopping hub-to-hub transit via Virtual WAN, UDR counts as resolved when it enforces the correct next hop.

Prohibited Fixes (Must Be Rejected)

These solutions are always invalid:

Proposed Fix Reason
Disable BGP Not customer-controllable
Disable peering prohibited operation and cannot solve the issue
Shutdown gateways Breaks SLA / shared control plane
Restart devices Resets symptoms only

Required explanation:

Cloud providers separate policy control from connectivity existence to protect shared infrastructure and SLAs.

Why these are not allowed in Azure:

BGP sessions and peering connections in Azure (Virtual WAN, ExpressRoute, VPN Gateway) cannot be administratively shut down or disabled by customers. This is a fundamental architectural constraint:

  1. Shared control plane: BGP and peering are part of Azure's provider-managed, SLA-backed control plane that operates at cloud scale.
  2. Availability guarantees: Azure's connectivity SLAs depend on these sessions remaining active.
  3. Security boundaries: Customers control routing policy (what routes are advertised/accepted) but not the existence of BGP sessions themselves.
  4. Operational scale: Managing BGP session state for thousands of customers requires automation that manual shutdown would undermine.

Correct approach: Fix BGP issues through policy changes (route filters, preferences, export controls, communities) rather than disabling connectivity.

Common Pitfalls

  • ❌ Timer tuning or dampening fixes oscillation — False. These reduce symptoms but don't break preference cycles.
  • ❌ Accepting fewer prefixes prevents route leaks — False. Ingress filtering alone doesn't stop export of other leaked routes.
  • ❌ Removing peers is a valid mitigation — False. This is prohibited in Azure.
  • ❌ Restarting gateways fixes root cause — False. Only resets transient state.

All are false.

Output Expectations

A correct solution should:

  1. Identify oscillation and/or route leak correctly
  2. Explain why it occurs (preference cycle or valley-free violation)
  3. Recommend allowed policy-level fixes
  4. Explicitly reject prohibited fixes with reasoning
  5. When required by the task, produce solution_results where each candidate fix is mapped to booleans using the definitions in Step 4 above.

References

  • RFC 4271 — Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)
  • Gao–Rexford model — Valley-free routing economics

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