azure-bgp
Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-14
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- azure-bgp
- description
- Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments). Detect preference cycles, identify valley-free violations, and propose allowed policy-level mitigations while rejecting prohibited fixes.
03 SKILL.md 正文
Azure BGP Oscillation & Route Leak Analysis
Analyze and resolve BGP oscillation and BGP route leaks in Azure Virtual WAN–style hub-and-spoke topologies (and similar cloud-managed BGP environments).
This skill trains an agent to:
- Detect preference cycles that cause BGP oscillation
- Identify valley-free violations that constitute route leaks
- Propose allowed, policy-level mitigations (routing intent, UDR, ingress filtering)
- Reject prohibited fixes (disabling BGP, shutting down peering, removing connectivity)
The focus is cloud-correct reasoning, not on-prem router manipulation.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when a task involves:
- Azure Virtual WAN, hub-and-spoke BGP, ExpressRoute, or VPN gateways
- Repeated route flapping or unstable path selection
- Unexpected transit, leaked prefixes, or valley-free violations
- Choosing between routing intent, UDRs, or BGP policy fixes
- Evaluating whether a proposed "fix" is valid in Azure
Core Invariants (Must Never Be Violated)
An agent must internalize these constraints before reasoning:
- ❌ BGP sessions between hubs cannot be administratively disabled by customers as it's owned by azure
- ❌ Peering connections cannot be shut down as a fix as it break all other traffic running on the connections
- ❌ Removing connectivity is not a valid solution as it break all other traffic running
- ✅ Problems must be fixed using routing policy, not topology destruction
Any solution violating these rules is invalid.
Expected Inputs
Tasks using this skill typically provide small JSON files:
| File | Meaning |
|---|---|
topology.json |
Directed BGP adjacency graph |
relationships.json |
Economic relationship per edge (provider, customer, peer) |
preferences.json |
Per-ASN preferred next hop (may cause oscillation) |
route.json |
Prefix and origin ASN |
route_leaks.json |
Evidence of invalid propagation |
possible_solutions.json |
Candidate fixes to classify |
Reasoning Workflow (Executable Checklist)
Step 1 — Sanity-Check Inputs
- Every ASN referenced must exist in
topology.json - Relationship symmetry must hold:
provider(A→B)⇔customer(B→A)peermust be symmetric
- If this fails, the input is invalid.
Step 2 — Detect BGP Oscillation (Preference Cycle)
Definition
BGP oscillation exists if ASes form a preference cycle, often between peers.
Detection Rule
- Build a directed graph:
ASN → preferred next-hop ASN - If the graph contains a cycle, oscillation is possible
- A 2-node cycle is sufficient to conclude oscillation.
Example pseudocode:
pref = {asn: prefer_via_asn, ...}
def find_cycle(start):
path = []
seen = {}
cur = start
while cur in pref:
if cur in seen:
return path[seen[cur]:] # cycle found
seen[cur] = len(path)
path.append(cur)
cur = pref[cur]
return None
Step 3 — Detect BGP Route Leak (Valley-Free Violation)
Valley-Free Rule
| Learned from | May export to |
|---|---|
| Customer | Anyone |
| Peer | Customers only |
| Provider | Customers only |
Leak Conditions
A route leak exists if either is true:
- Route learned from a provider is exported to a peer or provider
- Route learned from a peer is exported to a peer or provider
Step 4 — Classify Each Candidate Solution (Explicit output contract)
Many benchmark tasks require a JSON mapping of solution_name -> {oscillation_resolved, route_leak_resolved}.
Use these task-aligned definitions when setting booleans:
- oscillation_resolved = True only if the change breaks the preference cycle (
preferences.json) or enforces deterministic forwarding such that the cycle no longer affects route choice. - route_leak_resolved = True only if the change prevents hub-to-hub propagation of provider/peer-learned routes (i.e., stops the specific valley-free violation / hub-to-hub transit behavior).
When evaluating a solution string, do not require device restarts or topology removal to count as a fix; prefer policy mechanisms available in Azure.
Fix Selection Logic (Ranked)
Tier 1 — Virtual WAN Routing Intent (Preferred)
Applies to:
- ✔ Oscillation
- ✔ Route leaks
Why it works (classification rule):
- If a candidate says it enables Virtual WAN hub routing intent to force hub-to-hub traffic through Virtual WAN (e.g., via the Virtual WAN core/ASN), then classify:
oscillation_resolved = Truebecause intent overrides BGP path selection, eliminating the operational effect of a preference cycle on forwarding.route_leak_resolved = Truebecause it prevents hubs from using each other as unintended transit, constraining hub-to-hub routing to the Virtual WAN policy path.
Notes:
- Routing intent operates above BGP: BGP can still learn routes, but forwarding is policy-driven.
- For benchmark-style tasks, treat intent as a valid “resolution” when the intent statement explicitly enforces the intended hub-to-hub path.
Tier 2 — Export / Route Policy (Protocol-Correct)
For oscillation:
- Filter routes learned from a peer before re-advertising — Removes one edge of the preference cycle
- Why this works: In a cycle where Hub A prefers routes via Hub B and vice versa, filtering breaks one "leg":
- If Hub A filters routes learned from Hub B before re-announcing, Hub B stops receiving routes via Hub A
- Hub B can no longer prefer the path through Hub A because it no longer exists
- The cycle collapses, routing stabilizes
Example: If vhubvnet1 (ASN 65002) filters routes learned from vhubvnet2 (ASN 65003) before re-advertising, vhubvnet2 stops receiving routes via vhubvnet1, breaking the oscillation cycle.
For route leaks:
- Enforce valley-free export rules — Prevent announcing provider/peer-learned routes to peers/providers
- Use communities (e.g.,
no-export) where applicable - Ingress filtering — Reject routes with invalid AS_PATH from peers
RPKI origin validation (how to classify)
RPKI is a route validity gate. In tasks where the leak is modeled as acceptance/propagation of an invalid origin, enabling RPKI origin validation at a hub should be classified as:
oscillation_resolved = False(it does not change the preference graph/cycle)route_leak_resolved = Truewhen the solution explicitly states it will validate the prefix’s correct origin ASN, because invalid leaked announcements will be dropped and therefore not propagated.
(If a task instead defines leak purely as export-policy violation independent of origin validity, then RPKI may be insufficient. When in doubt, follow the task’s leak definition and the solution wording: RPKI resolves leaks only insofar as it blocks the bad route from being accepted/propagated.)
Limitation: Does not control forwarding if multiple valid paths remain.
Tier 3 — User Defined Routes (UDR)
Applies to:
- ✔ Oscillation
- ✔ Route leaks
Purpose: Authoritative, static routing mechanism in Azure that explicitly defines the next hop for network traffic based on destination IP prefixes, overriding Azure system routes and BGP-learned routes.
Routing Behavior: Enforces deterministic forwarding independent of BGP decision processes. UDRs operate at the data plane layer and take precedence over dynamic BGP routes.
Classification rule (important for benchmarks):
- If a solution proposes a UDR/route-table override that forces a specific next hop / path,
set:
oscillation_resolved = Truebecause the preference cycle no longer affects forwarding choice.route_leak_resolved = Truebecause traffic is prevented from using the leaked hub-to-hub transit path.
Trade-off: UDR is a data-plane fix that may “mask” the control-plane issue. However, for tasks that define “resolved” in terms of breaking the cycle’s effect and stopping hub-to-hub transit via Virtual WAN, UDR counts as resolved when it enforces the correct next hop.
Prohibited Fixes (Must Be Rejected)
These solutions are always invalid:
| Proposed Fix | Reason |
|---|---|
| Disable BGP | Not customer-controllable |
| Disable peering | prohibited operation and cannot solve the issue |
| Shutdown gateways | Breaks SLA / shared control plane |
| Restart devices | Resets symptoms only |
Required explanation:
Cloud providers separate policy control from connectivity existence to protect shared infrastructure and SLAs.
Why these are not allowed in Azure:
BGP sessions and peering connections in Azure (Virtual WAN, ExpressRoute, VPN Gateway) cannot be administratively shut down or disabled by customers. This is a fundamental architectural constraint:
- Shared control plane: BGP and peering are part of Azure's provider-managed, SLA-backed control plane that operates at cloud scale.
- Availability guarantees: Azure's connectivity SLAs depend on these sessions remaining active.
- Security boundaries: Customers control routing policy (what routes are advertised/accepted) but not the existence of BGP sessions themselves.
- Operational scale: Managing BGP session state for thousands of customers requires automation that manual shutdown would undermine.
Correct approach: Fix BGP issues through policy changes (route filters, preferences, export controls, communities) rather than disabling connectivity.
Common Pitfalls
- ❌ Timer tuning or dampening fixes oscillation — False. These reduce symptoms but don't break preference cycles.
- ❌ Accepting fewer prefixes prevents route leaks — False. Ingress filtering alone doesn't stop export of other leaked routes.
- ❌ Removing peers is a valid mitigation — False. This is prohibited in Azure.
- ❌ Restarting gateways fixes root cause — False. Only resets transient state.
All are false.
Output Expectations
A correct solution should:
- Identify oscillation and/or route leak correctly
- Explain why it occurs (preference cycle or valley-free violation)
- Recommend allowed policy-level fixes
- Explicitly reject prohibited fixes with reasoning
- When required by the task, produce
solution_resultswhere each candidate fix is mapped to booleans using the definitions in Step 4 above.
References
- RFC 4271 — Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)
- Gao–Rexford model — Valley-free routing economics
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