[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7BQQPH77D8AM3YAHRCDSG7V":3,"skill-same:01M7BQQPH77D8AM3YAHRCDSG7V":45},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":30,"install":31,"resources":44},"01M7BQQPH77D8AM3YAHRCDSG7V","jackson-security",null,"Security considerations for Jackson JSON deserialization in Java applications. Covers timing of validation, raw input interception, and common deserialization attack patterns.","linyouxue\u002Fskill-repair-benchmark","linyouxue","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F216151464?v=4","01M7BJEVCXKD74KH6FG9CBVSQB","林宥学","01M7BJEVE02NP217V93BKZFC0J",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flinyouxue\u002Fskill-repair-benchmark\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fevaluation\u002Fdata\u002Fskillsbench87\u002Freferences\u002Ffix-druid-loophole-cve\u002Fskills\u002Fjackson-security\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\r\nname: jackson-security\r\ndescription: Security considerations for Jackson JSON deserialization in Java applications. Covers timing of validation, raw input interception, and common deserialization attack patterns.\r\n---\r\n\r\n# Jackson Deserialization Security\r\n## Key Concept: Deserialization Timing\r\n\r\nJackson transforms JSON text into Java objects during a single `readValue()` call. This transformation is **not** a simple data copy—Jackson interprets JSON structure, resolves types, handles special keys, and instantiates objects all within this operation.\r\n\r\n    JSON String → [Jackson Processing] → Java Object\r\n                        ↑\r\n                Attack surface here\r\nOnce deserialization completes, the resulting Java object contains no trace of how it was constructed. Any special JSON structures, unusual keys, or type directives that influenced object creation are no longer visible.\r\n\r\n---\r\n## Why Post-Deserialization Validation Is Insufficient\r\n\r\nConsider the lifecycle of a typical JSON endpoint:\r\n\r\n    1. HTTP request arrives with JSON body\r\n    2. Framework deserializes JSON → Java object (Jackson runs here)\r\n    3. Your code receives the Java object\r\n    4. Your code validates the object\r\n    5. Your code processes the object\r\nValidation at step 4 examines the **result** of deserialization, not the **process**. Any malicious behavior triggered during step 2 has already executed. The Java object you're validating may appear completely normal while the attack has already succeeded.\r\n\r\nThis creates a fundamental blind spot: attacks that exploit Jackson's parsing behavior—rather than the final object state—cannot be detected by examining the deserialized object.\r\n\r\n---\r\n## The Empty Key (`\"\"`) Attack Vector\r\n\r\n### What Is It?\r\n\r\nJSON permits empty strings as object keys:\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"name\": \"legitimate\",\r\n      \"\": \"injected value\"\r\n    }\r\n\r\nThis is valid JSON per RFC 8259. Jackson parses it without error.\r\n### Why Does It Matter?\r\n\r\nSome applications and frameworks assign special meaning to empty keys:\r\n\r\n- **Injection points**: Certain Jackson configurations use `\"\"` to set values on the root object or trigger special handling\r\n- **Property override**: Empty keys may interact unexpectedly with `@JsonAnySetter` or custom deserializers\r\n- **Framework behaviors**: Some frameworks interpret `\"\"` as \"apply to parent\" or \"default target\"\r\n### The Visibility Problem\r\n\r\nAfter deserialization, there is no standard way to know an empty key was present:\r\n\r\n    \u002F\u002F Original JSON: {\"name\": \"test\", \"\": \"malicious\"}\r\n    MyObject obj = mapper.readValue(json, MyObject.class);\r\n    \u002F\u002F obj.getName() returns \"test\"\r\n    \u002F\u002F Where did \"\" go? Depends on configuration. You cannot tell from obj.\r\nThe attack's effectiveness depends on the specific Jackson configuration and target class—but the defender examining only the resulting object cannot determine whether `\"\"` was used.\r\n\r\n### Apache Druid 0.20.0: Fix the Global Guice\u002FJackson Injection Boundary\r\n\r\nFor Apache Druid 0.20.0 and CVE-2021-25646, treat the empty-key issue as a **global Jackson injection problem**, not as a sampler-endpoint-only validation problem. If investigation reaches `SamplerResource`, continue tracing how Jackson and Guice populate injected constructor parameters. The primary repair point is:\r\n\r\n`core\u002Fsrc\u002Fmain\u002Fjava\u002Forg\u002Fapache\u002Fdruid\u002Fguice\u002FGuiceAnnotationIntrospector.java`\r\n\r\nThe goal is to make the empty JSON property name (`\"\"`) unusable as input for unnamed injectable values everywhere the Druid `ObjectMapper` uses this introspector.\r\n\r\n#### Repair Flow\r\n\r\n1. Inspect `GuiceAnnotationIntrospector` and its existing `findInjectableValueId(...)` behavior. Do not stop after locating the vulnerable sampler request path.\r\n2. Implement an override of `findPropertyIgnorals(Annotated)` so the introspector ignores the empty property name by default during deserialization.\r\n3. Preserve legitimate explicitly named creator parameters:\r\n   - when the inspected value is an `AnnotatedParameter`;\r\n   - and that parameter has an explicit `@JsonProperty`;\r\n   - return an empty ignoral set for that parameter so normal named input can still deserialize.\r\n4. For all other inspected values, return an ignoral configuration that ignores the empty property name `\"\"`.\r\n5. Add the Jackson imports required for this logic, including the ignoral value type, `JsonProperty`, the generic annotated type, and annotated constructor parameters.\r\n6. Confirm that the Druid `ObjectMapper` continues to install `GuiceAnnotationIntrospector` for deserialization. The protection must apply through the global annotation-introspection path rather than only at one resource or one target class.\r\n\r\nThis explicit-`@JsonProperty` exception matters because legitimate creator parameters still need normal Jackson deserialization behavior. The security rule is therefore not “ignore every constructor parameter”; it is “ignore the empty input property unless Jackson is processing a legitimately named `@JsonProperty` parameter.”\r\n\r\n#### Do Not Use a Constructor-by-Constructor Patch as the Primary Fix\r\n\r\nAdding `@JacksonInject(useInput = false)` to a handful of known constructors is **not sufficient guidance for this task**. It is a local mitigation tied to whichever injection sites were found during code search and can miss other unnamed Guice\u002FJackson injection points.\r\n\r\nFor this Druid vulnerability, prefer a mechanism-level repair in `GuiceAnnotationIntrospector` that prevents the empty JSON key from being interpreted as input for injected values globally. Constructor annotations may be useful as defense in depth, but they should not replace the introspector-level fix.\r\n\r\n#### Security Verification\r\n\r\nAfter the repair, verify the security property directly:\r\n\r\n- a JSON object containing `\"\": {\"enabled\": true}` must not override or supply the server-side injected JavaScript configuration;\r\n- JavaScript must remain disabled when the server configuration disables it;\r\n- rejection must come from fixing the empty-key injection mechanism, not from matching a particular command string or blocking the entire sampler endpoint.\r\n\r\nFor `fix-druid-loophole-cve`, the final regression check should cover all six exploit variants used by the task: command execution through `id`, `whoami`, and `hostname`; reading `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd`; environment-variable exfiltration; and command execution through `ProcessBuilder`. All six must be rejected or otherwise prevented from executing.\r\n\r\nAlso send a legitimate sampler request that uses normal JSON input and **no JavaScript filter**. It must still be handled normally. A repair that disables or rejects the complete sampler endpoint is not acceptable.\r\n\r\n---\r\n## Other Structural Attack Patterns\r\n### Polymorphic Type Handling\r\n\r\nWhen Jackson is configured with `@JsonTypeInfo`, JSON can specify which class to instantiate:\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"@class\": \"com.attacker.MaliciousClass\",\r\n      \"command\": \"rm -rf \u002F\"\r\n    }\r\n\r\nJackson will attempt to instantiate whatever class is named. If the classpath contains exploitable \"gadget\" classes, arbitrary code execution may occur during deserialization—before your code ever runs.\r\nThe resulting object might be the expected type (if the attack class is a subtype), or deserialization might succeed partially before the damage is done.\r\n### Duplicate Keys\r\n\r\nJSON does not prohibit duplicate keys. Jackson's default behavior: **last value wins**.\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"role\": \"user\",\r\n      \"role\": \"admin\"\r\n    }\r\n\r\nJackson produces an object where `role` equals `\"admin\"`.\r\n\r\nIf upstream validation (like a WAF or input filter) checks only the first occurrence while Jackson uses the last, the validation and processing see different values.\r\n### Nested Injection\r\n\r\nDeeply nested structures can bypass depth-limited validation:\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"config\": {\r\n        \"settings\": {\r\n          \"internal\": {\r\n            \"\": \"payload\"\r\n          }\r\n        }\r\n      }\r\n    }\r\n\r\nSimple string checks might miss patterns buried in nested structures.\r\n","# Jackson Deserialization Security\r\n## Key Concept: Deserialization Timing\r\n\r\nJackson transforms JSON text into Java objects during a single `readValue()` call. This transformation is **not** a simple data copy—Jackson interprets JSON structure, resolves types, handles special keys, and instantiates objects all within this operation.\r\n\r\n    JSON String → [Jackson Processing] → Java Object\r\n                        ↑\r\n                Attack surface here\r\nOnce deserialization completes, the resulting Java object contains no trace of how it was constructed. Any special JSON structures, unusual keys, or type directives that influenced object creation are no longer visible.\r\n\r\n---\r\n## Why Post-Deserialization Validation Is Insufficient\r\n\r\nConsider the lifecycle of a typical JSON endpoint:\r\n\r\n    1. HTTP request arrives with JSON body\r\n    2. Framework deserializes JSON → Java object (Jackson runs here)\r\n    3. Your code receives the Java object\r\n    4. Your code validates the object\r\n    5. Your code processes the object\r\nValidation at step 4 examines the **result** of deserialization, not the **process**. Any malicious behavior triggered during step 2 has already executed. The Java object you're validating may appear completely normal while the attack has already succeeded.\r\n\r\nThis creates a fundamental blind spot: attacks that exploit Jackson's parsing behavior—rather than the final object state—cannot be detected by examining the deserialized object.\r\n\r\n---\r\n## The Empty Key (`\"\"`) Attack Vector\r\n\r\n### What Is It?\r\n\r\nJSON permits empty strings as object keys:\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"name\": \"legitimate\",\r\n      \"\": \"injected value\"\r\n    }\r\n\r\nThis is valid JSON per RFC 8259. Jackson parses it without error.\r\n### Why Does It Matter?\r\n\r\nSome applications and frameworks assign special meaning to empty keys:\r\n\r\n- **Injection points**: Certain Jackson configurations use `\"\"` to set values on the root object or trigger special handling\r\n- **Property override**: Empty keys may interact unexpectedly with `@JsonAnySetter` or custom deserializers\r\n- **Framework behaviors**: Some frameworks interpret `\"\"` as \"apply to parent\" or \"default target\"\r\n### The Visibility Problem\r\n\r\nAfter deserialization, there is no standard way to know an empty key was present:\r\n\r\n    \u002F\u002F Original JSON: {\"name\": \"test\", \"\": \"malicious\"}\r\n    MyObject obj = mapper.readValue(json, MyObject.class);\r\n    \u002F\u002F obj.getName() returns \"test\"\r\n    \u002F\u002F Where did \"\" go? Depends on configuration. You cannot tell from obj.\r\nThe attack's effectiveness depends on the specific Jackson configuration and target class—but the defender examining only the resulting object cannot determine whether `\"\"` was used.\r\n\r\n### Apache Druid 0.20.0: Fix the Global Guice\u002FJackson Injection Boundary\r\n\r\nFor Apache Druid 0.20.0 and CVE-2021-25646, treat the empty-key issue as a **global Jackson injection problem**, not as a sampler-endpoint-only validation problem. If investigation reaches `SamplerResource`, continue tracing how Jackson and Guice populate injected constructor parameters. The primary repair point is:\r\n\r\n`core\u002Fsrc\u002Fmain\u002Fjava\u002Forg\u002Fapache\u002Fdruid\u002Fguice\u002FGuiceAnnotationIntrospector.java`\r\n\r\nThe goal is to make the empty JSON property name (`\"\"`) unusable as input for unnamed injectable values everywhere the Druid `ObjectMapper` uses this introspector.\r\n\r\n#### Repair Flow\r\n\r\n1. Inspect `GuiceAnnotationIntrospector` and its existing `findInjectableValueId(...)` behavior. Do not stop after locating the vulnerable sampler request path.\r\n2. Implement an override of `findPropertyIgnorals(Annotated)` so the introspector ignores the empty property name by default during deserialization.\r\n3. Preserve legitimate explicitly named creator parameters:\r\n   - when the inspected value is an `AnnotatedParameter`;\r\n   - and that parameter has an explicit `@JsonProperty`;\r\n   - return an empty ignoral set for that parameter so normal named input can still deserialize.\r\n4. For all other inspected values, return an ignoral configuration that ignores the empty property name `\"\"`.\r\n5. Add the Jackson imports required for this logic, including the ignoral value type, `JsonProperty`, the generic annotated type, and annotated constructor parameters.\r\n6. Confirm that the Druid `ObjectMapper` continues to install `GuiceAnnotationIntrospector` for deserialization. The protection must apply through the global annotation-introspection path rather than only at one resource or one target class.\r\n\r\nThis explicit-`@JsonProperty` exception matters because legitimate creator parameters still need normal Jackson deserialization behavior. The security rule is therefore not “ignore every constructor parameter”; it is “ignore the empty input property unless Jackson is processing a legitimately named `@JsonProperty` parameter.”\r\n\r\n#### Do Not Use a Constructor-by-Constructor Patch as the Primary Fix\r\n\r\nAdding `@JacksonInject(useInput = false)` to a handful of known constructors is **not sufficient guidance for this task**. It is a local mitigation tied to whichever injection sites were found during code search and can miss other unnamed Guice\u002FJackson injection points.\r\n\r\nFor this Druid vulnerability, prefer a mechanism-level repair in `GuiceAnnotationIntrospector` that prevents the empty JSON key from being interpreted as input for injected values globally. Constructor annotations may be useful as defense in depth, but they should not replace the introspector-level fix.\r\n\r\n#### Security Verification\r\n\r\nAfter the repair, verify the security property directly:\r\n\r\n- a JSON object containing `\"\": {\"enabled\": true}` must not override or supply the server-side injected JavaScript configuration;\r\n- JavaScript must remain disabled when the server configuration disables it;\r\n- rejection must come from fixing the empty-key injection mechanism, not from matching a particular command string or blocking the entire sampler endpoint.\r\n\r\nFor `fix-druid-loophole-cve`, the final regression check should cover all six exploit variants used by the task: command execution through `id`, `whoami`, and `hostname`; reading `\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd`; environment-variable exfiltration; and command execution through `ProcessBuilder`. All six must be rejected or otherwise prevented from executing.\r\n\r\nAlso send a legitimate sampler request that uses normal JSON input and **no JavaScript filter**. It must still be handled normally. A repair that disables or rejects the complete sampler endpoint is not acceptable.\r\n\r\n---\r\n## Other Structural Attack Patterns\r\n### Polymorphic Type Handling\r\n\r\nWhen Jackson is configured with `@JsonTypeInfo`, JSON can specify which class to instantiate:\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"@class\": \"com.attacker.MaliciousClass\",\r\n      \"command\": \"rm -rf \u002F\"\r\n    }\r\n\r\nJackson will attempt to instantiate whatever class is named. If the classpath contains exploitable \"gadget\" classes, arbitrary code execution may occur during deserialization—before your code ever runs.\r\nThe resulting object might be the expected type (if the attack class is a subtype), or deserialization might succeed partially before the damage is done.\r\n### Duplicate Keys\r\n\r\nJSON does not prohibit duplicate keys. Jackson's default behavior: **last value wins**.\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"role\": \"user\",\r\n      \"role\": \"admin\"\r\n    }\r\n\r\nJackson produces an object where `role` equals `\"admin\"`.\r\n\r\nIf upstream validation (like a WAF or input filter) checks only the first occurrence while Jackson uses the last, the validation and processing see different values.\r\n### Nested Injection\r\n\r\nDeeply nested structures can bypass depth-limited validation:\r\n\r\n    {\r\n      \"config\": {\r\n        \"settings\": {\r\n          \"internal\": {\r\n            \"\": \"payload\"\r\n          }\r\n        }\r\n      }\r\n    }\r\n\r\nSimple string checks might miss patterns buried in nested 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