signed-audit-trails-recipe
Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tamper detection, CI/CD integration, and SLSA composition.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-10
- Stars
- ★ 1
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- signed-audit-trails-recipe
- description
- Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tamper detection, CI/CD integration, and SLSA composition.
03 SKILL.md 正文
Signed Audit Trails for Claude Code Tool Calls
Cookbook-style walkthrough for cryptographically signed receipts on every
Claude Code tool call. This is the teaching skill. For the runtime
implementation, install the protect-mcp plugin.
What this gives you
Every tool call (Bash, Edit, Write, WebFetch) is:
- Evaluated against a Cedar policy before execution. If the policy denies the call, the tool does not run.
- Signed as an Ed25519 receipt after execution. Receipts are JCS-canonical, hash-chained, and verifiable offline by anyone with the public key.
An auditor, regulator, or counterparty can verify the full chain later with a
single CLI command (npx @veritasacta/verify receipts/*.json). No network
call, no vendor lookup, no trust in the operator.
When to use the pattern
- Regulated environments (finance, healthcare, critical infrastructure) where you need tamper-evident evidence of agent behavior
- CI/CD pipelines where you want to prove that a policy gate held for every automated build step
- Multi-party collaboration where a counterparty wants to verify your agent's behavior without trusting your operator
- Compliance contexts (EU AI Act Article 12, SLSA provenance for agent-built software) where standard logging is not sufficient
Step 1: Install the hook configuration
Create .claude/settings.json in your project root:
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": ".*",
"hook": {
"type": "command",
"command": "npx protect-mcp@latest evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool \"$TOOL_NAME\" --input \"$TOOL_INPUT\" --fail-on-missing-policy false"
}
}
],
"PostToolUse": [
{
"matcher": ".*",
"hook": {
"type": "command",
"command": "npx protect-mcp@latest sign --tool \"$TOOL_NAME\" --input \"$TOOL_INPUT\" --output \"$TOOL_OUTPUT\" --receipts ./receipts/ --key ./protect-mcp.key"
}
}
]
}
}
The first run of protect-mcp sign generates ./protect-mcp.key (Ed25519
private key) if one does not exist. Commit the public key fingerprint
(visible in any receipt's public_key field); do not commit the private
key.
Add the private key and receipt directory to .gitignore:
echo "./protect-mcp.key" >> .gitignore
echo "./receipts/" >> .gitignore
Step 2: Write a Cedar policy
Create ./protect.cedar:
// Allow all read-oriented tools by default.
permit (
principal,
action in [Action::"Read", Action::"Glob", Action::"Grep", Action::"WebSearch"],
resource
);
// Allow Bash commands from a safe list only.
permit (
principal,
action == Action::"Bash",
resource
) when {
context.command_pattern in [
"git", "npm", "pnpm", "yarn", "ls", "cat", "pwd",
"echo", "test", "node", "python", "make"
]
};
// Explicit deny on destructive commands. Cedar deny is authoritative.
forbid (
principal,
action == Action::"Bash",
resource
) when {
context.command_pattern in ["rm -rf", "dd", "mkfs", "shred"]
};
// Restrict writes to the project directory.
permit (
principal,
action in [Action::"Write", Action::"Edit"],
resource
) when {
context.path_starts_with == "./"
};
Four rules:
- Read-oriented tools always allowed
Bashallowed for safe command patterns (git,npm, etc.)Bash rm -rfand similar destructive commands explicitly denied- Writes allowed only within the project (
./prefix)
Cedar forbid rules take precedence over permit rules, so destructive
commands cannot be bypassed by a later permissive rule.
Step 3: Use Claude Code normally
Start Claude Code. Every tool call goes through both hooks:
You: Please read the README and summarize it.
Claude: I will read README.md.
[PreToolUse: Read ./README.md -> allow]
[Tool: Read executes]
[PostToolUse: receipt rcpt-a8f3c9d2 signed to ./receipts/]
... summary of README ...
A session of 20 tool calls produces 20 receipts, each hash-chained to its predecessor.
Step 4: Inspect a receipt
cat ./receipts/$(ls -t ./receipts/ | head -1)
{
"receipt_id": "rcpt-a8f3c9d2",
"receipt_version": "1.0",
"issuer_id": "claude-code-protect-mcp",
"event_time": "2026-04-17T12:34:56.123Z",
"tool_name": "Read",
"input_hash": "sha256:a3f8c9d2e1b7465f...",
"decision": "allow",
"policy_id": "protect.cedar",
"policy_digest": "sha256:b7e2f4a6c8d0e1f3...",
"parent_receipt_id": "rcpt-3d1ab7c2",
"public_key": "4437ca56815c0516...",
"signature": "4cde814b7889e987..."
}
Every field except signature and public_key is covered by the Ed25519
signature. Modifying any field after signing invalidates the signature.
Step 5: Verify the receipt chain
npx @veritasacta/verify ./receipts/*.json
Exit codes:
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
All receipts verified; chain intact |
1 |
A receipt failed signature verification (tampered, or wrong key) |
2 |
A receipt was malformed |
Step 6: Demonstrate tamper detection
Modify any receipt's decision field from allow to deny:
python3 -c "
import json, os
path = './receipts/' + sorted(os.listdir('./receipts'))[-1]
r = json.loads(open(path).read())
r['decision'] = 'deny'
open(path, 'w').write(json.dumps(r))
"
npx @veritasacta/verify ./receipts/*.json
The verifier exits with code 1 and reports which receipt failed. The
Ed25519 signature no longer matches the JCS-canonical bytes of the
tampered payload.
Restore the field and verification passes again.
How the cryptography works
Three invariants make receipts verifiable offline across any conformant implementation:
- JCS canonicalization (RFC 8785) before signing. Keys sorted, whitespace minimized, strings NFC-normalized. Two independent implementations produce byte-identical signing payloads for the same receipt content.
- Ed25519 signatures (RFC 8032) over the canonical bytes. Deterministic, fixed-size, no nonce dependency.
- Hash chain linkage. Each receipt's
parent_receipt_hashis the SHA-256 of the predecessor's canonical form. Insertions, deletions, and reorderings break later receipts.
For the formal wire format see draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts.
Cross-implementation interop
The receipt format has four independent implementations today:
| Implementation | Language | Use case |
|---|---|---|
| protect-mcp | TypeScript | Claude Code, Cursor, MCP hosts |
| protect-mcp-adk | Python | Google Agent Development Kit |
| sb-runtime | Rust | OS-level sandbox (Landlock + seccomp) |
| APS governance hook | Python | CrewAI, LangChain |
A receipt produced by any of them verifies against
@veritasacta/verify.
The auditor does not need to trust the operator's tooling choice: the format
is the contract.
CI/CD integration
Gate merges on receipt chain verification so no build lands with a broken evidence chain:
# .github/workflows/verify-receipts.yml
name: Verify Decision Receipts
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
verify:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with: { node-version: '20' }
- name: Run governed agent
run: python scripts/run_agent.py > receipts.jsonl
- name: Verify receipt chain
run: npx @veritasacta/verify receipts.jsonl
Archive the receipts as an artifact so the chain survives beyond the job run:
- name: Upload receipts
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: decision-receipts
path: receipts/
Composition with SLSA provenance for agent-built software
When Claude Code builds and releases software (running npm install,
npm build, npm publish as tool calls), the receipt chain is the
per-step build log. SLSA Provenance v1 has an extension point for this: the
byproducts field can reference the receipt chain alongside the build
attestation.
The agent-commit build type documents the pattern using the ResourceDescriptor shape:
{
"name": "decision-receipts",
"digest": { "sha256": "..." },
"uri": "oci://registry/org/build-xyz/receipts:sha256-...",
"annotations": {
"predicateType": "https://veritasacta.com/attestation/decision-receipt/v0.1",
"signerRole": "supervisor-hook"
}
}
The SLSA provenance is signed by the builder identity; the receipt attestation is signed by the supervisor-hook identity. Two trust domains, cross-referenced at the byproduct layer. See slsa-framework/slsa#1594 for the composition discussion.
Common pitfalls
Private key in version control. The generated ./protect-mcp.key must
not be committed. The examples above add it to .gitignore. If a key is
accidentally committed, rotate immediately (delete the key file and let the
hook regenerate on next run).
Hook command quoting. The hooks receive $TOOL_NAME and $TOOL_INPUT
as environment variables. Keep the quoting "$TOOL_INPUT" so inputs with
spaces or special characters pass through intact.
Receipts directory in CI. If Claude Code runs in CI, upload receipts as an artifact at the end of the job or the chain is lost at job end.
Policy is missing. The example PreToolUse hook uses
--fail-on-missing-policy false so an absent ./protect.cedar does not
break Claude Code out of the box. Remove this flag in production so a
missing policy is treated as a hard failure.
Related in this marketplace
protect-mcp— the runtime hook implementation (use this plugin in production)review-agent-governance— require human approval before review-surface actions; composes with protect-mcp
References
draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts— IETF draft, receipt wire format- RFC 8032 — Ed25519
- RFC 8785 — JCS
- Cedar policy language
- protect-mcp on npm
- @veritasacta/verify on npm
- in-toto/attestation#549 — Decision Receipt predicate proposal
- agent-commit build type — SLSA provenance for agent-produced commits
- Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit (
examples/protect-mcp-governed/) - AWS Cedar for Agents
04 同仓库更多 Skills
vercel-sandbox
Run agent-browser + Chrome inside Vercel Sandbox microVMs for browser automation from any Vercel-deployed app. Use when the user needs browser automation in a Vercel app (Next.js, SvelteKit, Nuxt, Remix, Astro, etc.), wants to run headless Chrome without binary size limits, needs persistent browser sessions across commands, or wants ephemeral isolated browser environments. Triggers include "Vercel Sandbox browser", "microVM Chrome", "agent-browser in sandbox", "browser automation on Vercel", or any task requiring Chrome in a Vercel Sandbox.
slack
Interact with Slack workspaces using browser automation. Use when the user needs to check unread channels, navigate Slack, send messages, extract data, find information, search conversations, or automate any Slack task. Triggers include "check my Slack", "what channels have unreads", "send a message to", "search Slack for", "extract from Slack", "find who said", or any task requiring programmatic Slack interaction.
electron
Automate Electron desktop apps (VS Code, Slack, Discord, Figma, Notion, Spotify, etc.) using agent-browser via Chrome DevTools Protocol. Use when the user needs to interact with an Electron app, automate a desktop app, connect to a running app, control a native app, or test an Electron application. Triggers include "automate Slack app", "control VS Code", "interact with Discord app", "test this Electron app", "connect to desktop app", or any task requiring automation of a native Electron application.
dogfood
Systematically explore and test a web application to find bugs, UX issues, and other problems. Use when asked to "dogfood", "QA", "exploratory test", "find issues", "bug hunt", "test this app/site/platform", or review the quality of a web application. Produces a structured report with full reproduction evidence -- step-by-step screenshots, repro videos, and detailed repro steps for every issue -- so findings can be handed directly to the responsible teams.
agent-browser
Browser automation CLI for AI agents. Use when the user needs to interact with websites, including navigating pages, filling forms, clicking buttons, taking screenshots, extracting data, testing web apps, or automating any browser task. Triggers include requests to "open a website", "fill out a form", "click a button", "take a screenshot", "scrape data from a page", "test this web app", "login to a site", "automate browser actions", or any task requiring programmatic web interaction.
shadcn
Manages shadcn components and projects — adding, searching, fixing, debugging, styling, and composing UI, including chat interfaces. Provides project context, component docs, and usage examples. Applies when working with shadcn/ui, component registries, presets, --preset codes, or any project with a components.json file. Also triggers for "shadcn init", "create an app with --preset", "switch to --preset", and for building a design system or applying a DESIGN.md or brand spec to shadcn/ui.