[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7B6FSJXZ667BE8TEPDZVRRX":3,"skill-same:01M7B6FSJXZ667BE8TEPDZVRRX":80},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":15,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":44,"commitSha":45,"skillDirectory":46,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":47,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":48,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":49,"install":50,"resources":63},"01M7B6FSJXZ667BE8TEPDZVRRX","exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api",null,"Tests APIs for excessive data exposure (OWASP API3:2023) by intercepting raw API responses and comparing them against what the UI actually renders, looking for leaked PII, internal identifiers, debug data, or business-sensitive fields the frontend filters but the API still transmits. Use when auditing REST or mobile-app APIs for over-fetching, response filtering bypass, or unintended data leakage in endpoint responses.","vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","vikasvardhanv","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F99010657?v=4","01M7B2B0VN78W7529RQX5BR6DZ","01M7B2B0WDNTXJHRK3QNPNWRP6",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api\ndescription: >-\n  Tests APIs for excessive data exposure (OWASP API3:2023) by intercepting raw API\n  responses and comparing them against what the UI actually renders, looking for\n  leaked PII, internal identifiers, debug data, or business-sensitive fields the\n  frontend filters but the API still transmits. Use when auditing REST or mobile-app\n  APIs for over-fetching, response filtering bypass, or unintended data leakage in\n  endpoint responses.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: api-security\ntags:\n- api-security\n- owasp\n- data-exposure\n- rest-security\n- pii-leakage\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- ID.RA-01\n- PR.DS-10\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1190\n- T1059.007\n- T1552.001\n- T1027\n- T1070\n---\n# Exploiting Excessive Data Exposure in API\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Testing APIs where the frontend displays a subset of data but the API response includes additional fields\n- Assessing mobile application APIs where responses are designed for multiple client types and may contain excess data\n- Identifying PII leakage in API responses that include email addresses, phone numbers, SSNs, or payment data not shown in the UI\n- Testing GraphQL APIs where clients can request arbitrary fields including sensitive attributes\n- Evaluating APIs after microservice refactoring where internal service-to-service data leaks into public endpoints\n\n**Do not use** without written authorization. Data exposure testing involves capturing and analyzing potentially sensitive personal data.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization specifying target API endpoints and scope\n- Burp Suite Professional or mitmproxy configured as intercepting proxy\n- Two test accounts at different privilege levels (regular user and admin)\n- Browser developer tools or mobile proxy setup for traffic capture\n- Python 3.10+ with `requests` and `json` libraries\n- API documentation (OpenAPI spec) for comparison against actual responses\n\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Response Schema Discovery\n\nCompare documented API responses with actual responses:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport json\n\nBASE_URL = \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget-api.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\"\nheaders = {\"Authorization\": \"Bearer \u003Cuser_token>\", \"Content-Type\": \"application\u002Fjson\"}\n\n# Fetch a resource and analyze all returned fields\nendpoints_to_test = [\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\u002Forders\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fproducts\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\u002Fsettings\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Ftransactions\", None),\n]\n\nfor method, path, body in endpoints_to_test:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        data = resp.json()\n        # Recursively extract all field names\n        def extract_fields(obj, prefix=\"\"):\n            fields = []\n            if isinstance(obj, dict):\n                for k, v in obj.items():\n                    full_key = f\"{prefix}.{k}\" if prefix else k\n                    fields.append(full_key)\n                    fields.extend(extract_fields(v, full_key))\n            elif isinstance(obj, list) and obj:\n                fields.extend(extract_fields(obj[0], f\"{prefix}[]\"))\n            return fields\n\n        all_fields = extract_fields(data)\n        print(f\"\\n{method} {path} - {len(all_fields)} fields returned:\")\n        for f in sorted(all_fields):\n            print(f\"  {f}\")\n```\n\n### Step 2: Sensitive Data Pattern Detection\n\nScan API responses for sensitive data patterns:\n\n```python\nimport re\n\nSENSITIVE_PATTERNS = {\n    \"email\": r'[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}',\n    \"phone\": r'(\\+?1?\\s?\\(?\\d{3}\\)?[\\s.-]?\\d{3}[\\s.-]?\\d{4})',\n    \"ssn\": r'\\b\\d{3}-\\d{2}-\\d{4}\\b',\n    \"credit_card\": r'\\b(?:4[0-9]{12}(?:[0-9]{3})?|5[1-5][0-9]{14}|3[47][0-9]{13})\\b',\n    \"password_hash\": r'\\$2[aby]?\\$\\d{2}\\$[.\u002FA-Za-z0-9]{53}',\n    \"api_key\": r'(?:api[_-]?key|apikey)[\"\\s:=]+[\"\\']?([a-zA-Z0-9_\\-]{20,})',\n    \"internal_ip\": r'\\b(?:10\\.\\d{1,3}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])|192\\.168)\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\b',\n    \"aws_key\": r'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}',\n    \"jwt_token\": r'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+',\n    \"uuid\": r'[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}',\n}\n\nSENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES = [\n    \"password\", \"password_hash\", \"secret\", \"token\", \"ssn\", \"social_security\",\n    \"credit_card\", \"card_number\", \"cvv\", \"pin\", \"private_key\", \"api_key\",\n    \"internal_id\", \"debug\", \"trace\", \"stack_trace\", \"created_by_ip\",\n    \"last_login_ip\", \"salt\", \"session_id\", \"refresh_token\", \"mfa_secret\",\n    \"date_of_birth\", \"bank_account\", \"routing_number\", \"tax_id\"\n]\n\ndef scan_response(endpoint, response_text):\n    findings = []\n    # Check for sensitive data patterns in values\n    for pattern_name, pattern in SENSITIVE_PATTERNS.items():\n        matches = re.findall(pattern, response_text)\n        if matches:\n            findings.append({\n                \"endpoint\": endpoint,\n                \"type\": \"sensitive_value\",\n                \"pattern\": pattern_name,\n                \"count\": len(matches),\n                \"sample\": matches[0][:20] + \"...\" if len(matches[0]) > 20 else matches[0]\n            })\n\n    # Check for sensitive field names\n    response_lower = response_text.lower()\n    for field in SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES:\n        if f'\"{field}\"' in response_lower or f\"'{field}'\" in response_lower:\n            findings.append({\n                \"endpoint\": endpoint,\n                \"type\": \"sensitive_field\",\n                \"field_name\": field\n            })\n\n    return findings\n\n# Scan all endpoint responses\nfor method, path, body in endpoints_to_test:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        findings = scan_response(f\"{method} {path}\", resp.text)\n        for f in findings:\n            print(f\"[FINDING] {f['endpoint']}: {f['type']} - {f.get('pattern', f.get('field_name'))}\")\n```\n\n### Step 3: Compare UI Display vs API Response\n\n```python\n# Fields the UI shows (observed from the frontend application)\nui_displayed_fields = {\n    \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\": {\"name\", \"email\", \"avatar_url\", \"role\"},\n    \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\u002Forders\": {\"order_id\", \"date\", \"status\", \"total\"},\n    \"\u002Fproducts\": {\"id\", \"name\", \"price\", \"image_url\", \"description\"},\n}\n\n# Fields the API actually returns\nfor method, path, body in endpoints_to_test:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        data = resp.json()\n        if isinstance(data, list):\n            actual_fields = set(data[0].keys()) if data else set()\n        elif isinstance(data, dict):\n            # Handle paginated responses\n            items_key = next((k for k in data if isinstance(data[k], list)), None)\n            if items_key and data[items_key]:\n                actual_fields = set(data[items_key][0].keys())\n            else:\n                actual_fields = set(data.keys())\n        else:\n            continue\n\n        expected = ui_displayed_fields.get(path, set())\n        excess = actual_fields - expected\n        if excess:\n            print(f\"\\n{method} {path} - EXCESS FIELDS (not shown in UI):\")\n            for field in sorted(excess):\n                print(f\"  - {field}\")\n```\n\n### Step 4: Test User Object Exposure in Related Endpoints\n\n```python\n# Many APIs embed full user objects in responses for orders, comments, etc.\nendpoints_with_user_objects = [\n    \"\u002Forders\",          # Each order may include full seller\u002Fbuyer profile\n    \"\u002Fcomments\",        # Comments may include full author profile\n    \"\u002Freviews\",         # Reviews may expose reviewer details\n    \"\u002Ftransactions\",    # Transactions may include counterparty info\n    \"\u002Fteam\u002Fmembers\",    # Team listing may expose excessive member data\n]\n\nfor path in endpoints_with_user_objects:\n    resp = requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        text = resp.text\n        # Check for user data leakage in nested objects\n        user_fields_found = []\n        for field in [\"password_hash\", \"last_login_ip\", \"mfa_enabled\", \"phone_number\",\n                      \"date_of_birth\", \"ssn\", \"internal_notes\", \"salary\", \"address\"]:\n            if f'\"{field}\"' in text:\n                user_fields_found.append(field)\n        if user_fields_found:\n            print(f\"[EXCESSIVE] {path} exposes user fields: {user_fields_found}\")\n```\n\n### Step 5: GraphQL Over-Fetching Analysis\n\n```python\n# GraphQL allows clients to request any available field\nGRAPHQL_URL = f\"{BASE_URL}\u002Fgraphql\"\n\n# Introspection query to discover all fields on User type\nintrospection = {\n    \"query\": \"\"\"\n    {\n      __type(name: \"User\") {\n        fields {\n          name\n          type {\n            name\n            kind\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    \"\"\"\n}\n\nresp = requests.post(GRAPHQL_URL, headers=headers, json=introspection)\nif resp.status_code == 200:\n    fields = resp.json().get(\"data\", {}).get(\"__type\", {}).get(\"fields\", [])\n    print(\"Available User fields via GraphQL:\")\n    for f in fields:\n        sensitivity = \"SENSITIVE\" if f[\"name\"] in SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES else \"normal\"\n        print(f\"  {f['name']} ({f['type']['name']}) [{sensitivity}]\")\n\n# Try to query sensitive fields\nsensitive_query = {\n    \"query\": \"\"\"\n    query {\n      users {\n        id\n        email\n        passwordHash\n        socialSecurityNumber\n        internalNotes\n        lastLoginIp\n        mfaSecret\n        apiKey\n      }\n    }\n    \"\"\"\n}\nresp = requests.post(GRAPHQL_URL, headers=headers, json=sensitive_query)\nif resp.status_code == 200 and \"errors\" not in resp.json():\n    print(\"[CRITICAL] GraphQL exposes sensitive user fields without restriction\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Debug and Internal Data Leakage\n\n```python\n# Test for debug information in responses\ndebug_headers_to_check = [\n    \"X-Debug-Token\", \"X-Debug-Info\", \"Server\", \"X-Powered-By\",\n    \"X-Request-Id\", \"X-Correlation-Id\", \"X-Backend-Server\",\n    \"X-Runtime\", \"X-Version\", \"X-Build-Version\"\n]\n\nresp = requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}\u002Fusers\u002Fme\", headers=headers)\nfor h in debug_headers_to_check:\n    if h.lower() in {k.lower(): v for k, v in resp.headers.items()}:\n        print(f\"[INFO LEAK] Header {h}: {resp.headers.get(h)}\")\n\n# Test error responses for stack traces\nerror_payloads = [\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Finvalid-id-format\", None),\n    (\"POST\", \"\u002Forders\", {\"invalid\": \"payload\"}),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002F-1\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002F0\", None),\n]\n\nfor method, path, body in error_payloads:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code >= 400:\n        text = resp.text.lower()\n        if any(kw in text for kw in [\"stack trace\", \"traceback\", \"at com.\", \"at org.\",\n                                      \"file \\\"\", \"line \", \"exception\", \"sql\", \"query\"]):\n            print(f\"[DEBUG LEAK] {method} {path} -> {resp.status_code}: Contains stack trace or query info\")\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **Excessive Data Exposure** | API returns more data fields than the client needs, relying on frontend filtering to hide sensitive information from users |\n| **Over-Fetching** | Requesting or receiving more data than needed for a specific operation, common in REST APIs that return fixed response schemas |\n| **Response Filtering** | Client-side filtering of API response data to display only relevant fields, which provides zero security since the full response is interceptable |\n| **Object Property Level Authorization** | OWASP API3:2023 - ensuring that users can only read\u002Fwrite object properties they are authorized to access |\n| **PII Leakage** | Unintended exposure of Personally Identifiable Information in API responses including names, emails, addresses, SSNs, or financial data |\n| **Schema Validation** | Enforcing that API responses conform to a defined schema, stripping unauthorized fields before transmission |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Burp Suite Professional**: Intercept API responses and use the Comparer tool to diff expected vs actual response schemas\n- **mitmproxy**: Scriptable proxy for automated response analysis with Python-based content inspection scripts\n- **OWASP ZAP**: Passive scanner detects information disclosure in headers, error messages, and response bodies\n- **Postman**: Compare documented response schemas against actual API responses using test scripts\n- **jq**: Command-line JSON processor for extracting and analyzing specific fields from API responses\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Mobile Banking API Data Exposure Assessment\n\n**Context**: A mobile banking application's API returns full account objects to the mobile client, which only displays account nickname and balance. The API is accessed by both iOS and Android apps and a web portal.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Configure mitmproxy on a test device and authenticate as the test user\n2. Capture all API responses during a complete user session (login, view accounts, transfer, logout)\n3. Analyze `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Faccounts` response: UI shows 4 fields but API returns 23 fields\n4. Discover that the API returns `routing_number`, `account_holder_ssn_last4`, `internal_risk_score`, `kyc_verification_status`, and `linked_external_accounts` - none shown in UI\n5. Analyze `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftransactions` response: API returns `merchant_id`, `terminal_id`, `authorization_code`, `processor_response` fields not needed by the client\n6. Check `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002Fme`: API returns `last_login_ip`, `mfa_backup_codes_remaining`, `account_officer_name`, and `credit_score_band`\n7. Test error responses: `POST \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftransfers` with invalid payload returns SQL table name in error message\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Only checking top-level fields and missing sensitive data in deeply nested objects\n- Not testing paginated responses where subsequent pages may include different fields\n- Ignoring response headers that may leak server version, backend technology, or internal routing information\n- Missing data exposure in error responses which often contain stack traces, SQL queries, or internal paths\n- Assuming that HTTPS encryption prevents data exposure (it protects in transit, not from the authenticated client)\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## Finding: Excessive Data Exposure in Account and Transaction APIs\n\n**ID**: API-DATA-001\n**Severity**: High (CVSS 7.1)\n**OWASP API**: API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization\n**Affected Endpoints**:\n  - GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Faccounts\n  - GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftransactions\n  - GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002Fme\n\n**Description**:\nThe API returns full database objects to the client, including sensitive fields\nthat are not displayed in the mobile application UI. The mobile app filters\nthese fields client-side, but they are fully accessible by intercepting the\nAPI response. This exposes SSN fragments, internal risk scores, and KYC\nverification data for any authenticated user.\n\n**Excess Fields Discovered**:\n- \u002Faccounts: routing_number, account_holder_ssn_last4, internal_risk_score,\n  kyc_verification_status, linked_external_accounts (18 excess fields total)\n- \u002Ftransactions: merchant_id, terminal_id, authorization_code,\n  processor_response (12 excess fields total)\n- \u002Fusers\u002Fme: last_login_ip, mfa_backup_codes_remaining, credit_score_band\n\n**Impact**:\nAn authenticated user can extract sensitive financial data, internal risk\nassessments, and PII for their own account that the application is not\nintended to reveal. Combined with BOLA vulnerabilities, this data could\nbe extracted for all users.\n\n**Remediation**:\n1. Implement server-side response filtering using DTOs\u002Fview models that only include fields needed by the client\n2. Use GraphQL field-level authorization or REST response schemas per endpoint per role\n3. Remove sensitive fields from API responses at the serialization layer\n4. Implement response schema validation in the API gateway to strip undocumented fields\n5. Add automated tests that verify response schemas match documentation\n```\n","# Exploiting Excessive Data Exposure in API\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Testing APIs where the frontend displays a subset of data but the API response includes additional fields\n- Assessing mobile application APIs where responses are designed for multiple client types and may contain excess data\n- Identifying PII leakage in API responses that include email addresses, phone numbers, SSNs, or payment data not shown in the UI\n- Testing GraphQL APIs where clients can request arbitrary fields including sensitive attributes\n- Evaluating APIs after microservice refactoring where internal service-to-service data leaks into public endpoints\n\n**Do not use** without written authorization. Data exposure testing involves capturing and analyzing potentially sensitive personal data.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization specifying target API endpoints and scope\n- Burp Suite Professional or mitmproxy configured as intercepting proxy\n- Two test accounts at different privilege levels (regular user and admin)\n- Browser developer tools or mobile proxy setup for traffic capture\n- Python 3.10+ with `requests` and `json` libraries\n- API documentation (OpenAPI spec) for comparison against actual responses\n\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Response Schema Discovery\n\nCompare documented API responses with actual responses:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport json\n\nBASE_URL = \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget-api.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\"\nheaders = {\"Authorization\": \"Bearer \u003Cuser_token>\", \"Content-Type\": \"application\u002Fjson\"}\n\n# Fetch a resource and analyze all returned fields\nendpoints_to_test = [\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\u002Forders\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fproducts\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\u002Fsettings\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Ftransactions\", None),\n]\n\nfor method, path, body in endpoints_to_test:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        data = resp.json()\n        # Recursively extract all field names\n        def extract_fields(obj, prefix=\"\"):\n            fields = []\n            if isinstance(obj, dict):\n                for k, v in obj.items():\n                    full_key = f\"{prefix}.{k}\" if prefix else k\n                    fields.append(full_key)\n                    fields.extend(extract_fields(v, full_key))\n            elif isinstance(obj, list) and obj:\n                fields.extend(extract_fields(obj[0], f\"{prefix}[]\"))\n            return fields\n\n        all_fields = extract_fields(data)\n        print(f\"\\n{method} {path} - {len(all_fields)} fields returned:\")\n        for f in sorted(all_fields):\n            print(f\"  {f}\")\n```\n\n### Step 2: Sensitive Data Pattern Detection\n\nScan API responses for sensitive data patterns:\n\n```python\nimport re\n\nSENSITIVE_PATTERNS = {\n    \"email\": r'[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}',\n    \"phone\": r'(\\+?1?\\s?\\(?\\d{3}\\)?[\\s.-]?\\d{3}[\\s.-]?\\d{4})',\n    \"ssn\": r'\\b\\d{3}-\\d{2}-\\d{4}\\b',\n    \"credit_card\": r'\\b(?:4[0-9]{12}(?:[0-9]{3})?|5[1-5][0-9]{14}|3[47][0-9]{13})\\b',\n    \"password_hash\": r'\\$2[aby]?\\$\\d{2}\\$[.\u002FA-Za-z0-9]{53}',\n    \"api_key\": r'(?:api[_-]?key|apikey)[\"\\s:=]+[\"\\']?([a-zA-Z0-9_\\-]{20,})',\n    \"internal_ip\": r'\\b(?:10\\.\\d{1,3}|172\\.(?:1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])|192\\.168)\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}\\b',\n    \"aws_key\": r'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}',\n    \"jwt_token\": r'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+',\n    \"uuid\": r'[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}',\n}\n\nSENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES = [\n    \"password\", \"password_hash\", \"secret\", \"token\", \"ssn\", \"social_security\",\n    \"credit_card\", \"card_number\", \"cvv\", \"pin\", \"private_key\", \"api_key\",\n    \"internal_id\", \"debug\", \"trace\", \"stack_trace\", \"created_by_ip\",\n    \"last_login_ip\", \"salt\", \"session_id\", \"refresh_token\", \"mfa_secret\",\n    \"date_of_birth\", \"bank_account\", \"routing_number\", \"tax_id\"\n]\n\ndef scan_response(endpoint, response_text):\n    findings = []\n    # Check for sensitive data patterns in values\n    for pattern_name, pattern in SENSITIVE_PATTERNS.items():\n        matches = re.findall(pattern, response_text)\n        if matches:\n            findings.append({\n                \"endpoint\": endpoint,\n                \"type\": \"sensitive_value\",\n                \"pattern\": pattern_name,\n                \"count\": len(matches),\n                \"sample\": matches[0][:20] + \"...\" if len(matches[0]) > 20 else matches[0]\n            })\n\n    # Check for sensitive field names\n    response_lower = response_text.lower()\n    for field in SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES:\n        if f'\"{field}\"' in response_lower or f\"'{field}'\" in response_lower:\n            findings.append({\n                \"endpoint\": endpoint,\n                \"type\": \"sensitive_field\",\n                \"field_name\": field\n            })\n\n    return findings\n\n# Scan all endpoint responses\nfor method, path, body in endpoints_to_test:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        findings = scan_response(f\"{method} {path}\", resp.text)\n        for f in findings:\n            print(f\"[FINDING] {f['endpoint']}: {f['type']} - {f.get('pattern', f.get('field_name'))}\")\n```\n\n### Step 3: Compare UI Display vs API Response\n\n```python\n# Fields the UI shows (observed from the frontend application)\nui_displayed_fields = {\n    \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\": {\"name\", \"email\", \"avatar_url\", \"role\"},\n    \"\u002Fusers\u002Fme\u002Forders\": {\"order_id\", \"date\", \"status\", \"total\"},\n    \"\u002Fproducts\": {\"id\", \"name\", \"price\", \"image_url\", \"description\"},\n}\n\n# Fields the API actually returns\nfor method, path, body in endpoints_to_test:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        data = resp.json()\n        if isinstance(data, list):\n            actual_fields = set(data[0].keys()) if data else set()\n        elif isinstance(data, dict):\n            # Handle paginated responses\n            items_key = next((k for k in data if isinstance(data[k], list)), None)\n            if items_key and data[items_key]:\n                actual_fields = set(data[items_key][0].keys())\n            else:\n                actual_fields = set(data.keys())\n        else:\n            continue\n\n        expected = ui_displayed_fields.get(path, set())\n        excess = actual_fields - expected\n        if excess:\n            print(f\"\\n{method} {path} - EXCESS FIELDS (not shown in UI):\")\n            for field in sorted(excess):\n                print(f\"  - {field}\")\n```\n\n### Step 4: Test User Object Exposure in Related Endpoints\n\n```python\n# Many APIs embed full user objects in responses for orders, comments, etc.\nendpoints_with_user_objects = [\n    \"\u002Forders\",          # Each order may include full seller\u002Fbuyer profile\n    \"\u002Fcomments\",        # Comments may include full author profile\n    \"\u002Freviews\",         # Reviews may expose reviewer details\n    \"\u002Ftransactions\",    # Transactions may include counterparty info\n    \"\u002Fteam\u002Fmembers\",    # Team listing may expose excessive member data\n]\n\nfor path in endpoints_with_user_objects:\n    resp = requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers)\n    if resp.status_code == 200:\n        text = resp.text\n        # Check for user data leakage in nested objects\n        user_fields_found = []\n        for field in [\"password_hash\", \"last_login_ip\", \"mfa_enabled\", \"phone_number\",\n                      \"date_of_birth\", \"ssn\", \"internal_notes\", \"salary\", \"address\"]:\n            if f'\"{field}\"' in text:\n                user_fields_found.append(field)\n        if user_fields_found:\n            print(f\"[EXCESSIVE] {path} exposes user fields: {user_fields_found}\")\n```\n\n### Step 5: GraphQL Over-Fetching Analysis\n\n```python\n# GraphQL allows clients to request any available field\nGRAPHQL_URL = f\"{BASE_URL}\u002Fgraphql\"\n\n# Introspection query to discover all fields on User type\nintrospection = {\n    \"query\": \"\"\"\n    {\n      __type(name: \"User\") {\n        fields {\n          name\n          type {\n            name\n            kind\n          }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    \"\"\"\n}\n\nresp = requests.post(GRAPHQL_URL, headers=headers, json=introspection)\nif resp.status_code == 200:\n    fields = resp.json().get(\"data\", {}).get(\"__type\", {}).get(\"fields\", [])\n    print(\"Available User fields via GraphQL:\")\n    for f in fields:\n        sensitivity = \"SENSITIVE\" if f[\"name\"] in SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES else \"normal\"\n        print(f\"  {f['name']} ({f['type']['name']}) [{sensitivity}]\")\n\n# Try to query sensitive fields\nsensitive_query = {\n    \"query\": \"\"\"\n    query {\n      users {\n        id\n        email\n        passwordHash\n        socialSecurityNumber\n        internalNotes\n        lastLoginIp\n        mfaSecret\n        apiKey\n      }\n    }\n    \"\"\"\n}\nresp = requests.post(GRAPHQL_URL, headers=headers, json=sensitive_query)\nif resp.status_code == 200 and \"errors\" not in resp.json():\n    print(\"[CRITICAL] GraphQL exposes sensitive user fields without restriction\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Debug and Internal Data Leakage\n\n```python\n# Test for debug information in responses\ndebug_headers_to_check = [\n    \"X-Debug-Token\", \"X-Debug-Info\", \"Server\", \"X-Powered-By\",\n    \"X-Request-Id\", \"X-Correlation-Id\", \"X-Backend-Server\",\n    \"X-Runtime\", \"X-Version\", \"X-Build-Version\"\n]\n\nresp = requests.get(f\"{BASE_URL}\u002Fusers\u002Fme\", headers=headers)\nfor h in debug_headers_to_check:\n    if h.lower() in {k.lower(): v for k, v in resp.headers.items()}:\n        print(f\"[INFO LEAK] Header {h}: {resp.headers.get(h)}\")\n\n# Test error responses for stack traces\nerror_payloads = [\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002Finvalid-id-format\", None),\n    (\"POST\", \"\u002Forders\", {\"invalid\": \"payload\"}),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002F-1\", None),\n    (\"GET\", \"\u002Fusers\u002F0\", None),\n]\n\nfor method, path, body in error_payloads:\n    resp = requests.request(method, f\"{BASE_URL}{path}\", headers=headers, json=body)\n    if resp.status_code >= 400:\n        text = resp.text.lower()\n        if any(kw in text for kw in [\"stack trace\", \"traceback\", \"at com.\", \"at org.\",\n                                      \"file \\\"\", \"line \", \"exception\", \"sql\", \"query\"]):\n            print(f\"[DEBUG LEAK] {method} {path} -> {resp.status_code}: Contains stack trace or query info\")\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **Excessive Data Exposure** | API returns more data fields than the client needs, relying on frontend filtering to hide sensitive information from users |\n| **Over-Fetching** | Requesting or receiving more data than needed for a specific operation, common in REST APIs that return fixed response schemas |\n| **Response Filtering** | Client-side filtering of API response data to display only relevant fields, which provides zero security since the full response is interceptable |\n| **Object Property Level Authorization** | OWASP API3:2023 - ensuring that users can only read\u002Fwrite object properties they are authorized to access |\n| **PII Leakage** | Unintended exposure of Personally Identifiable Information in API responses including names, emails, addresses, SSNs, or financial data |\n| **Schema Validation** | Enforcing that API responses conform to a defined schema, stripping unauthorized fields before transmission |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Burp Suite Professional**: Intercept API responses and use the Comparer tool to diff expected vs actual response schemas\n- **mitmproxy**: Scriptable proxy for automated response analysis with Python-based content inspection scripts\n- **OWASP ZAP**: Passive scanner detects information disclosure in headers, error messages, and response bodies\n- **Postman**: Compare documented response schemas against actual API responses using test scripts\n- **jq**: Command-line JSON processor for extracting and analyzing specific fields from API responses\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Mobile Banking API Data Exposure Assessment\n\n**Context**: A mobile banking application's API returns full account objects to the mobile client, which only displays account nickname and balance. The API is accessed by both iOS and Android apps and a web portal.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Configure mitmproxy on a test device and authenticate as the test user\n2. Capture all API responses during a complete user session (login, view accounts, transfer, logout)\n3. Analyze `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Faccounts` response: UI shows 4 fields but API returns 23 fields\n4. Discover that the API returns `routing_number`, `account_holder_ssn_last4`, `internal_risk_score`, `kyc_verification_status`, and `linked_external_accounts` - none shown in UI\n5. Analyze `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftransactions` response: API returns `merchant_id`, `terminal_id`, `authorization_code`, `processor_response` fields not needed by the client\n6. Check `GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002Fme`: API returns `last_login_ip`, `mfa_backup_codes_remaining`, `account_officer_name`, and `credit_score_band`\n7. Test error responses: `POST \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftransfers` with invalid payload returns SQL table name in error message\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Only checking top-level fields and missing sensitive data in deeply nested objects\n- Not testing paginated responses where subsequent pages may include different fields\n- Ignoring response headers that may leak server version, backend technology, or internal routing information\n- Missing data exposure in error responses which often contain stack traces, SQL queries, or internal paths\n- Assuming that HTTPS encryption prevents data exposure (it protects in transit, not from the authenticated client)\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## Finding: Excessive Data Exposure in Account and Transaction APIs\n\n**ID**: API-DATA-001\n**Severity**: High (CVSS 7.1)\n**OWASP API**: API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization\n**Affected Endpoints**:\n  - GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Faccounts\n  - GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Ftransactions\n  - GET \u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fusers\u002Fme\n\n**Description**:\nThe API returns full database objects to the client, including sensitive fields\nthat are not displayed in the mobile application UI. The mobile app filters\nthese fields client-side, but they are fully accessible by intercepting the\nAPI response. This exposes SSN fragments, internal risk scores, and KYC\nverification data for any authenticated user.\n\n**Excess Fields Discovered**:\n- \u002Faccounts: routing_number, account_holder_ssn_last4, internal_risk_score,\n  kyc_verification_status, linked_external_accounts (18 excess fields total)\n- \u002Ftransactions: merchant_id, terminal_id, authorization_code,\n  processor_response (12 excess fields total)\n- \u002Fusers\u002Fme: last_login_ip, mfa_backup_codes_remaining, credit_score_band\n\n**Impact**:\nAn authenticated user can extract sensitive financial data, internal risk\nassessments, and PII for their own account that the application is not\nintended to reveal. Combined with BOLA vulnerabilities, this data could\nbe extracted for all users.\n\n**Remediation**:\n1. Implement server-side response filtering using DTOs\u002Fview models that only include fields needed by the client\n2. Use GraphQL field-level authorization or REST response schemas per endpoint per role\n3. Remove sensitive fields from API responses at the serialization layer\n4. Implement response schema validation in the API gateway to strip undocumented fields\n5. Add automated tests that verify response schemas match documentation\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":30,"domain":31,"license":14,"version":32,"nist_csf":33,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":38},[25,26,27,28,29],"api-security","owasp","data-exposure","rest-security","pii-leakage","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0.0",[34,35,36,37],"PR.PS-01","ID.RA-01","PR.DS-10","DE.CM-01",[39,40,41,42,43],"T1190","T1059.007","T1552.001","T1027","T1070","main","1eb986d0b0ecc180291597e08eb5a58288843536","skills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv","2026-08-25 13:16:33",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":51,"prompt":61,"zipAvailable":62},[52,55,58],{"tool":53,"command":54},"npx","npx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api",{"tool":56,"command":57},"bunx","bunx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api",{"tool":59,"command":60},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api\u002FSKILL.md",true,[64,68,74],{"path":65,"resourceType":65,"resourceTypeDesc":66,"sizeBytes":67,"sourceHtmlUrl":15},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":69,"resourceType":70,"resourceTypeDesc":71,"sizeBytes":72,"sourceHtmlUrl":73},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2231,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":75,"resourceType":76,"resourceTypeDesc":77,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5722,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[81,89,96,103,110,117],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":85,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BESR1CJ3H5SP9XM8KYJZ9W","syllabus","Generates a curated supplementary reading list from any course syllabus using Consensus academic search. Grill-me intake (syllabus input format + course audience + year range) plus a grouping forcing-options checkpoint before any search runs — so the reading list matches the course's level and recency need. Parses the syllabus to extract topics and learning outcomes, searches Consensus for recent peer-reviewed papers per topic, and produces a professionally formatted .docx with clickable Consensus links, plain-language summaries calibrated to audience level, and Bloom-higher-order discussion questions tied to course learning goals. Use when the user uploads a syllabus, course outline, or curriculum document and wants supplementary readings (e.g., 'create a reading list from this syllabus', 'find recent papers for my course') — even casual mentions with a syllabus attached should trigger this skill.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fsyllabus\u002Fskills\u002Fsyllabus\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":85,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BES1YA6R97W7QPMFFM1PED","pulse","Multi-source recency research skill that takes the pulse of any topic across Reddit, Hacker News, the open web, and optionally X\u002FTwitter within a configurable recent window (default 30 days). Forcing intake clarifies topic specificity, angle (trend\u002Fsentiment\u002Fproblems\u002Fopportunities\u002Fcomparison), time window, and platform scope before searching. Returns a synthesized briefing with citations, engagement metrics, and cross-platform pattern analysis. Use when the user requests multi-source recency intelligence on a topic (e.g., 'pulse on [topic]', 'what's happening with [topic]', 'what are people saying about [topic]', 'current conversation about [topic]', 'take the pulse of [topic]', 'trending: [topic]', 'find me info on [topic]'), and for competitor research, trend discovery, tool comparisons, and audience sentiment analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpulse\u002Fskills\u002Fpulse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":85,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERNHYGY035AR00VRT03KE","patent","Patent prior-art and landscape intelligence skill — not generic patent help. Commits to one of five sub-use-cases via forcing intake (novelty search \u002F freedom-to-operate \u002F competitive landscape \u002F acquisition diligence \u002F litigation prior-art) before any search runs. Searches Google Patents, Espacenet, USPTO, and optionally Lens.org for citation-graph signals. Output is an editable Word document (.docx) with verdict, ranked closest art (claim-text extracted), CPC-class-aware landscape, family-resolved hits, geographic coverage, FTO flags where applicable, strategy recommendations, and full audit log. Use when the user asks for patent searching or analysis (e.g., 'prior art search for [invention]', 'freedom to operate analysis for [product]'). Produces search signal, not legal advice — always recommends consulting a patent attorney before filing or licensing decisions. Trademark, copyright, and trade-secret questions are out of scope.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpatent\u002Fskills\u002Fpatent\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":85,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":109,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERCK1EAKTWW7R436WAR0J","notebooklm","Browser automation skill for controlling Google's NotebookLM. Use when the user wants anything done in NotebookLM (e.g., 'open NotebookLM', 'check my [name] notebook', 'ask my notebook about X', 'add [source] to NotebookLM', 'generate a Video Overview from my notebook', 'use NotebookLM Studio'). Handles reading and querying notebooks, adding sources (URLs, text, files, YouTube links, synthesized content), generating Studio outputs (Audio\u002FVideo Overviews, Mind Maps, Reports incl. Briefing Doc\u002FStudy Guide\u002FFAQ, Flashcards, Quiz, slide decks, infographics — discover the exact set from the live Studio panel; the UI evolves fast), and creating new notebooks. Requires browser automation environment — fails gracefully when unavailable.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fnotebooklm\u002Fskills\u002Fnotebooklm\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":85,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQZAZAQRTXFJRY7RHV3TY","litreview","Academic literature orientation skill that searches papers via free keyless APIs (PubMed E-utilities + OpenAlex) by default — with the Consensus MCP as an optional enhancement lane when connected — builds a strategic search plan using PICO (default) or SPIDER \u002F Decomposition \u002F hybrid as fallbacks, and synthesizes findings into a formatted Word (.docx) research guide. Grill-me intake (research question specificity + framework hint + tentative depth) before the recon search; a second forcing checkpoint after Phase 2 confirms framework + sub-areas + depth before searches consume budget. Configurable depth (5\u002F10\u002F20 queries) controls coverage vs. speed. Output is a 'launching pad' — an orientation guide that lets a researcher dive in confidently, not a finished review. Use when the user starts literature-oriented research (e.g., 'litreview on [topic]', 'literature review on [topic]', 'I'm starting a literature review on X', 'I'm writing a paper on X', 'help me research X', 'I'm doing research on X', 'can you help me research X'). Do NOT use for single one-off paper searches wanting a quick list — that's a plain PubMed\u002FOpenAlex (or Consensus) query.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Flitreview\u002Fskills\u002Flitreview\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":118,"name":119,"nameZh":6,"description":120,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":85,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":121,"categories":122,"keywords":123,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQKJ45K31QK5VRAQSVJCJ","grants","NIH grant research skill for clinical researchers. Grill-me intake (research idea + career stage + preliminary data + environment + submission posture + known institute targets) locks down the funding strategy before any search runs. Runs a 5-facet Consensus positioning analysis (with draft Significance\u002FInnovation language), maps the research to the right NIH institutes and study sections via RePORTER, finds NOSIs and funded overlap, and produces an editable Word document (.docx) with budget\u002Fscope-aware mechanism recommendations, submission timelines, and a mandatory program officer recommendation. Use when the user asks about research funding or makes any grant-related request (e.g., 'grants for [topic]', 'find grants for my research idea', 'what grants match my research', 'help me find NIH funding', 'grant opportunities for my research'). NIH-only scope — non-NIH funders (PCORI, DOD CDMRP, VA, foundations) are out of scope and flagged at intake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fgrants\u002Fskills\u002Fgrants\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]