[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7B5YYP58FK0QWH0G46MWWR5":3,"skill-same:01M7B5YYP58FK0QWH0G46MWWR5":106},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":15,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":52,"commitSha":53,"skillDirectory":54,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":55,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":56,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":57,"install":58,"resources":71},"01M7B5YYP58FK0QWH0G46MWWR5","detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",null,"Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.","vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","vikasvardhanv","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F99010657?v=4","01M7B2B0VN78W7529RQX5BR6DZ","01M7B2B0WDNTXJHRK3QNPNWRP6",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\ndescription: Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- active-directory\n- dcsync\n- credential-theft\n- mitre-t1003-006\n- mimikatz\n- kerberos\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1003\n---\n\n# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments\n- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions\n- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump\n- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials\n- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled\n- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled\n- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs\n- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Legitimate Replication Sources**: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.\n2. **Enable Required Auditing**: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.\n3. **Monitor Replication Rights Access**: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).\n4. **Detect Non-DC Replication Requests**: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.\n5. **Correlate with Network Traffic**: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR\u002FRPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.\n6. **Investigate Source Context**: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.\n7. **Check for Credential Abuse**: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |\n| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |\n| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |\n| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n","# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments\n- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions\n- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump\n- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials\n- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled\n- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled\n- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs\n- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Legitimate Replication Sources**: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.\n2. **Enable Required Auditing**: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.\n3. **Monitor Replication Rights Access**: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).\n4. **Detect Non-DC Replication Requests**: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.\n5. **Correlate with Network Traffic**: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR\u002FRPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.\n6. **Investigate Source Context**: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.\n7. **Check for Credential Abuse**: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |\n| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |\n| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |\n| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":14,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":25,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40,"d3fend_techniques":46},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","active-directory","dcsync","credential-theft","mitre-t1003-006","mimikatz","kerberos","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[36,37,38,39],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[41,42,43,44,45],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1003",[47,48,49,50,51],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform Monitoring","main","1eb986d0b0ecc180291597e08eb5a58288843536","skills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv","2026-08-25 13:16:33",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":59,"prompt":69,"zipAvailable":70},[60,63,66],{"tool":61,"command":62},"npx","npx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",{"tool":64,"command":65},"bunx","bunx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",{"tool":67,"command":68},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FSKILL.md",true,[72,78,82,88,92,96,102],{"path":73,"resourceType":74,"resourceTypeDesc":75,"sizeBytes":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":77},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",1674,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":79,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":15},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":83,"resourceType":84,"resourceTypeDesc":85,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2081,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":89,"resourceType":84,"resourceTypeDesc":85,"sizeBytes":90,"sourceHtmlUrl":91},"references\u002Fstandards.md",2372,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":93,"resourceType":84,"resourceTypeDesc":85,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3106,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":97,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":100,"sourceHtmlUrl":101},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6252,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":103,"resourceType":98,"resourceTypeDesc":99,"sizeBytes":104,"sourceHtmlUrl":105},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",5977,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[107,115,122,129,136,143],{"skillNo":108,"name":109,"nameZh":6,"description":110,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BESR1CJ3H5SP9XM8KYJZ9W","syllabus","Generates a curated supplementary reading list from any course syllabus using Consensus academic search. Grill-me intake (syllabus input format + course audience + year range) plus a grouping forcing-options checkpoint before any search runs — so the reading list matches the course's level and recency need. Parses the syllabus to extract topics and learning outcomes, searches Consensus for recent peer-reviewed papers per topic, and produces a professionally formatted .docx with clickable Consensus links, plain-language summaries calibrated to audience level, and Bloom-higher-order discussion questions tied to course learning goals. Use when the user uploads a syllabus, course outline, or curriculum document and wants supplementary readings (e.g., 'create a reading list from this syllabus', 'find recent papers for my course') — even casual mentions with a syllabus attached should trigger this skill.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fsyllabus\u002Fskills\u002Fsyllabus\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BES1YA6R97W7QPMFFM1PED","pulse","Multi-source recency research skill that takes the pulse of any topic across Reddit, Hacker News, the open web, and optionally X\u002FTwitter within a configurable recent window (default 30 days). Forcing intake clarifies topic specificity, angle (trend\u002Fsentiment\u002Fproblems\u002Fopportunities\u002Fcomparison), time window, and platform scope before searching. Returns a synthesized briefing with citations, engagement metrics, and cross-platform pattern analysis. Use when the user requests multi-source recency intelligence on a topic (e.g., 'pulse on [topic]', 'what's happening with [topic]', 'what are people saying about [topic]', 'current conversation about [topic]', 'take the pulse of [topic]', 'trending: [topic]', 'find me info on [topic]'), and for competitor research, trend discovery, tool comparisons, and audience sentiment analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpulse\u002Fskills\u002Fpulse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":123,"name":124,"nameZh":6,"description":125,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":126,"categories":127,"keywords":128,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERNHYGY035AR00VRT03KE","patent","Patent prior-art and landscape intelligence skill — not generic patent help. Commits to one of five sub-use-cases via forcing intake (novelty search \u002F freedom-to-operate \u002F competitive landscape \u002F acquisition diligence \u002F litigation prior-art) before any search runs. Searches Google Patents, Espacenet, USPTO, and optionally Lens.org for citation-graph signals. Output is an editable Word document (.docx) with verdict, ranked closest art (claim-text extracted), CPC-class-aware landscape, family-resolved hits, geographic coverage, FTO flags where applicable, strategy recommendations, and full audit log. Use when the user asks for patent searching or analysis (e.g., 'prior art search for [invention]', 'freedom to operate analysis for [product]'). Produces search signal, not legal advice — always recommends consulting a patent attorney before filing or licensing decisions. Trademark, copyright, and trade-secret questions are out of scope.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpatent\u002Fskills\u002Fpatent\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERCK1EAKTWW7R436WAR0J","notebooklm","Browser automation skill for controlling Google's NotebookLM. Use when the user wants anything done in NotebookLM (e.g., 'open NotebookLM', 'check my [name] notebook', 'ask my notebook about X', 'add [source] to NotebookLM', 'generate a Video Overview from my notebook', 'use NotebookLM Studio'). Handles reading and querying notebooks, adding sources (URLs, text, files, YouTube links, synthesized content), generating Studio outputs (Audio\u002FVideo Overviews, Mind Maps, Reports incl. Briefing Doc\u002FStudy Guide\u002FFAQ, Flashcards, Quiz, slide decks, infographics — discover the exact set from the live Studio panel; the UI evolves fast), and creating new notebooks. Requires browser automation environment — fails gracefully when unavailable.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fnotebooklm\u002Fskills\u002Fnotebooklm\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":137,"name":138,"nameZh":6,"description":139,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":140,"categories":141,"keywords":142,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQZAZAQRTXFJRY7RHV3TY","litreview","Academic literature orientation skill that searches papers via free keyless APIs (PubMed E-utilities + OpenAlex) by default — with the Consensus MCP as an optional enhancement lane when connected — builds a strategic search plan using PICO (default) or SPIDER \u002F Decomposition \u002F hybrid as fallbacks, and synthesizes findings into a formatted Word (.docx) research guide. Grill-me intake (research question specificity + framework hint + tentative depth) before the recon search; a second forcing checkpoint after Phase 2 confirms framework + sub-areas + depth before searches consume budget. Configurable depth (5\u002F10\u002F20 queries) controls coverage vs. speed. Output is a 'launching pad' — an orientation guide that lets a researcher dive in confidently, not a finished review. Use when the user starts literature-oriented research (e.g., 'litreview on [topic]', 'literature review on [topic]', 'I'm starting a literature review on X', 'I'm writing a paper on X', 'help me research X', 'I'm doing research on X', 'can you help me research X'). Do NOT use for single one-off paper searches wanting a quick list — that's a plain PubMed\u002FOpenAlex (or Consensus) query.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Flitreview\u002Fskills\u002Flitreview\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":144,"name":145,"nameZh":6,"description":146,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":111,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":147,"categories":148,"keywords":149,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQKJ45K31QK5VRAQSVJCJ","grants","NIH grant research skill for clinical researchers. Grill-me intake (research idea + career stage + preliminary data + environment + submission posture + known institute targets) locks down the funding strategy before any search runs. Runs a 5-facet Consensus positioning analysis (with draft Significance\u002FInnovation language), maps the research to the right NIH institutes and study sections via RePORTER, finds NOSIs and funded overlap, and produces an editable Word document (.docx) with budget\u002Fscope-aware mechanism recommendations, submission timelines, and a mandatory program officer recommendation. Use when the user asks about research funding or makes any grant-related request (e.g., 'grants for [topic]', 'find grants for my research idea', 'what grants match my research', 'help me find NIH funding', 'grant opportunities for my research'). NIH-only scope — non-NIH funders (PCORI, DOD CDMRP, VA, foundations) are out of scope and flagged at intake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fgrants\u002Fskills\u002Fgrants\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]