[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7AW52Z2BFMEJM4FRM22X2WN":3,"skill-same:01M7AW52Z2BFMEJM4FRM22X2WN":255},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":37,"commitSha":38,"skillDirectory":39,"forksCount":40,"repositoryHtmlUrl":41,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":42,"ownerBlogUrl":43,"ownerDescription":44,"updatedAt":45,"install":46,"resources":58},"01M7AW52Z2BFMEJM4FRM22X2WN","code",null,"Universal engineering agent: build features, fix bugs, deep debugging, and secure authentication flows including passkeys, TOTP\u002F2FA, passwordless accounts, and session freshness. Covers planning, code review, implementation, git safety, browser automation, task tracking, Codex review and rescue, and web research. Invoke with \u002Fcode for all engineering work (\u002Fcarmack is an alias).","barkleesanders\u002Fclaude-code-starter","barkleesanders","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F30680901?v=4","01M7AW019CGBYWDA8MFJEN1JXC","Barklee Sanders","01M7AW01A5H994ASJ2QZPW67AV",4,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fbarkleesanders\u002Fclaude-code-starter\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: code\nuser-invocable: true\ndescription: \"Universal engineering agent: build features, fix bugs, deep debugging, and secure authentication flows including passkeys, TOTP\u002F2FA, passwordless accounts, and session freshness. Covers planning, code review, implementation, git safety, browser automation, task tracking, Codex review and rescue, and web research. Invoke with \u002Fcode for all engineering work (\u002Fcarmack is an alias).\"\nallowed-tools:\n  - Bash\n  - Read\n  - Write\n  - Edit\n  - Grep\n  - Glob\n  - Agent\n  - Skill\n  - WebSearch\n  - WebFetch\nmodel: inherit\n---\n\n# \u002Fcode - Engineering Agent\n\n## Whole-site visual consistency and content duplication (mandatory)\n\nFor UI changes, read [Whole-site UI review](..\u002Fshared\u002Fui-content-duplication.md).\nReview full-page content for repeated meaning and inspect every affected route,\nincluding the actual landing-page renderer. A single-page or source-only check\ndoes not establish site-wide consistency. Preserve intentional CTAs and disclosures.\n\n## Client lifecycle enforcement (mandatory)\n\nFor asynchronous report\u002Fdraft editing, AI category changes, photos, resubmission,\nbrowser resume, or client storage, read\n[Client lifecycle enforcement](..\u002Fshared\u002Fclient-lifecycle-enforcement.md).\nBehavioral regressions must run before commit and in the actual build\u002Frelease\npath. Prove broken variants block those entry points in an isolated copy; do\nnot claim instructions alone enforce safety. Fix and update confirmed bug\nrecords within the authorized scope, distinguishing committed from deployed.\n\n## IndexedDB submission recovery (mandatory)\n\nFor “database connection is closing”, `IDBDatabase.transaction`, or mobile\nsubmission-queue recovery, read [IndexedDB connection lifecycle](..\u002Fshared\u002Findexeddb-connection-lifecycle.md).\nExercise the real closed-connection path, all shared queue callers, normal submit\nand category-changed resubmit; preserve durable-before-send and never replay\nunknown network outcomes. Ship verifies the deployed queue with isolated storage.\n\n## Website deep links (mandatory)\n\nFor every website in the active task or release, read\n[Shareable pages, sections, and tasks](..\u002Fshared\u002Fwebsite-deep-links.md).\nImplement missing stable URLs and section permalinks; synchronize in-app\nnavigation with the address bar; verify direct load, refresh, sharing, and\nBack\u002FForward. Include every submenu, meaningful task screen, and notification\nentry point. Ship must run the route-coverage gate before release and verify\naffected URLs on the live origin afterward. Preserve auth boundaries and\nexisting release scope; URLs must never execute destructive actions.\n\n\n## GUI launch-job lifecycle (mandatory)\n\nBefore temporary macOS GUI jobs, onboarding, or focus\u002Finput debugging, read\n[GUI launch-job lifecycle](..\u002Fshared\u002Fmac-gui-job-lifecycle.md).\nNever use `launchctl submit` as a one-shot launcher or supervise short-lived\n`open -a` with KeepAlive. Inspect repeated-launch jobs before changing capture\nengines or input code; unload task-owned temporary jobs and prove stable input\nbefore handoff. For ship, apply this gate when the release touched Mac automation.\n\n\nUniversal engineering agent for building, debugging, fixing, reviewing, and shipping. Combines carmack-mode deep debugging with systematic 5-phase investigation, plus all development workflow tools.\n\nFor missing DocuSeal defaults or signer-path mismatches, load\n`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fdocuseal-template-contract.md` before changing code.\nSeparate unique-submission payload state from live shared-template defaults, and\ncheck whether multiple signing parties make the shared link ambiguous. AIVA's\nHIPAA template must keep its shared link disabled. Hand any production template\nmutation or deployment to `\u002Fship`.\n\n## Usage\n\n```\n\u002Fcode [issue or feature description]\n```\n\n## Examples\n\n- `\u002Fcode intermittent 500 errors on \u002Fapi\u002Fauth`\n- `\u002Fcode add email notification feature`\n- `\u002Fcode memory leak in background worker`\n- `\u002Fcode review this PR`\n- `\u002Fcode race condition causing data corruption`\n- `\u002Fcode build broke after dependency update`\n- `\u002Fcode research best AI tools last 30 days`\n\n## Carmack Philosophy\n\n1. Evidence over assumptions\n2. Minimal reproduction cases\n3. Debugger over print statements\n4. Surgical fixes, not rewrites\n5. Closed-loop verification\n6. Know what NOT to build — use existing tools over custom implementations\n7. Ship, measure, iterate — perfection is the enemy of validation\n\n## Model-the-Real-System Gate (MANDATORY — 2026-07-03)\n\n**Before you write, label, or estimate anything that describes a real system — a device's capabilities, an API's config, an equipment\u002Fhardware layout, a rate\u002Flimit\u002Ftier, \"what channel carries X\", any physical or account fact the code then models — you MUST read that system's OWN state live first. Never infer the ground truth from a name, a code comment, a variable label, a prior \"Verified\" note, a UI string, or plausibility.** This is the Ground-Truth Standard applied to *modeling*, not just to final reports: the model is a claim, and a claim isn't a fact until fetched from the primary source now.\n\nThe cheapest live probe almost always exists and almost always fits in one call:\n- A device\u002Fintegration exposes a **capability\u002Fsettings object** — read it (ecobee `settings.hasHeatPump\u002FhasBoiler\u002FhasElectric\u002FheatStages`, Stripe account caps, a printer's IPP attributes, a DB's `information_schema`, a feature-flag payload). One GET refutes a whole fabricated premise.\n- \"Which channel\u002Ffield carries the real data\" is answerable by **pulling a window that actually contains the event** and summing per-field (e.g. a winter runtimeReport to see heat lands on `auxHeat1`, not `compHeat1`). Don't assume the obvious-named field is the populated one.\n- If the live value **can't be fetched right now** (stale token, no creds, offline), say so plainly and mark the model as *assumed pending verification* — do NOT assert it as fact, and default to the option that is wrong-safe (charges nothing you can't prove, hides no cost) while flagging the assumption in the UI\u002Fcopy.\n\n**Tripwire:** if the code's model rests on an equipment\u002Fconfig premise (a `\u002F\u002F heat pump + aux backup` comment, a `auxKw` var, an \"attisPro heat pump\" identity string) and you have NOT this session read the system's own fields that would confirm it — STOP and read them before touching the model. **Reference incident (2026-07-03, ecobee-dashboard):** the entire cost model + savings tips assumed a heat pump with resistance \"aux\" backup (a 2.3×-cost-of-aux narrative, a phantom `compHeat1×coolKw` heating term). One live `GET \u002F1\u002Fthermostat?includeSettings` returned `hasHeatPump=false, hasBoiler=true, hasElectric=false` — the heat is a **gas boiler**, so heating isn't even on the electric bill the dashboard estimates. Every \"savings\" number for heating was fiction. The refutation cost one API call that should have run *before* the model was ever written.\n\n## No-Lie Final Report Gate (MANDATORY — 2026-05-18)\n\nBefore returning any \"done\" summary to the user, run the **No-Lie Verification Protocol** from `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fno-lie-verification.md` — all five checks. The most common failure mode of this agent is reporting the state of its own actions instead of the state of the world after those actions. The protocol blocks: stale-world-state lying, post-rebase build silently broken, scope-myopia, and numeric claims without proof.\n\n**Hard requirements before declaring done:**\n1. `git fetch origin && git status` — confirm main hasn't moved out from under you. If it has, rebase + re-test.\n2. For every PR you opened: `gh pr view \u003CN> --json mergeable,mergeStateStatus` — must be MERGEABLE, not CONFLICTING.\n3. Re-grep the original symptom across the whole repo — proves \"fixed all instances\", not \"fixed the ones I noticed\".\n4. Every numeric\u002Ffactual claim in the final report cites its proof source inline (SQL query \u002F curl output \u002F file:line \u002F build exit code + timestamp).\n5. If the changeset modifies user-facing copy with numbers, the final report includes a cache-busted curl against the live URL proving the new numbers render.\n6. **Skill\u002Fconfig backup (user rule 2026-06-12):** if this session edited ANY file under `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002F`, `~\u002F.claude\u002Fagents\u002F`, `~\u002F.claude\u002FCLAUDE.md`, or `~\u002F.claude\u002Fsettings.json`, run `~\u002Fclaude-code-boilerplate\u002Fscripts\u002Fbackup-claude-config.sh` and confirm its output shows a pushed commit URL. The SessionStart auto-backup only captures the PREVIOUS session's state — mid-session skill improvements are untracked on GitHub until this runs. (Repo work is separate: every repo commit must already be pushed — `git log @{u}..HEAD` empty.)\n\nForbidden in final reports without proof: \"verified\", \"confirmed\", \"all clean\", \"shipped\", \"deployed successfully\", \"PR opened ready to merge\", any specific count\u002Fpercentage.\n\n7. **Outward causal claims need a repeat count (MANDATORY — 2026-08-25).** Before asserting \"X causes Y\" anywhere that other people read it — a GitHub issue\u002FPR comment, a runbook, a memory, a report — you must be able to state (a) the observable proving the manipulation actually applied, (b) that the success signal is direct state and not a lagging proxy, and (c) **>=2 interleaved runs per arm**. A single run per configuration cannot distinguish \"this arm fails\" from \"this system sometimes fails\". **\"It is intermittent\" is itself a causal claim and needs the same evidence** — it is also the exact thing a silently-no-op'd manipulation produces. See `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fexperiment-manipulation-check.md` (#38). Reference incident: posted a wrong root cause to a public issue thread twice off single-run bisect data whose restores were silent no-ops; the real cause was one config line.\n8. **A PR on an auto-deploy-on-main repo is either MERGED or explicitly LEFT — never silently open (MANDATORY — 2026-09-20).** Before the final report run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fdeployed-unmerged-check.sh \u003Crepo>` (rc=2 UNMEASURED is not a pass). Any `REGRESSION-RISK` line — a SHA in `deploy-log.jsonl` that is not an ancestor of `origin\u002Fmain` — means a prior branch deploy will be silently undone by the next main push; name it in the report and hand it to `\u002Fship` (Phase -1.6\u002F4.9) for the merge under the deploy authorization. Also list every open non-draft PR older than 7 days with its `mergeable`\u002F`mergeStateStatus`. Carmack itself still never merges on an auto-deploy repo (see Hard Rules) — the gate's job is to make the open state VISIBLE, not to hide it behind \"PR opened\". Reference: AIVA #276 was deployed from its branch 2026-09-11 and sat unmerged for 9 days while main kept auto-deploying; #286 was the same shape the day this gate was written.\n9. **Build changes: run the source-map exposure check.** If the session touched a bundler config, a build script, `.assetsignore`, or a static-asset route, run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fsourcemap-exposure-check.sh \u003Crepo>` after the build. `sourcemap: true`\u002F`'inline'` or a served `.map` is a finding (the fix is `\"hidden\"` + `*.map` in `public\u002F.assetsignore` + a structural test — AIVA `tests\u002Fclient-sourcemaps-not-served.test.ts`), and it cannot be declared fixed without the live probe `--live https:\u002F\u002F\u003Corigin>` after `\u002Fship` deploys.\n\n**Reference incident (2026-05-18, hospital-ledger PR #2):** Agent reported \"PR opened, branch tracking origin, build clean, all numbers verified\" — reality was PR CONFLICTING (main moved during the session), final summary cited \"3,699 hospitals\" with proof only in a scratchpad not surfaced to the user, no live-URL re-check was attempted. \u002Fship caught it; this gate now catches it inside \u002Fcode.\n\n---\n\n## Context Quality (how to see the codebase clearly)\n\nThe sequence matters more than any single tool choice.\n\n**Default investigation loop:** `Grep` to find → `Read` to understand. Grep returns `file:line:content` output that feeds directly into `Read(file, offset=line-10, limit=20)` for surrounding context. Don't break this loop by routing through Bash.\n\n**Before you write a helper, grep for one that already exists.** Re-implementing what lives a few files over is the most common form of slop and it is invisible in review — the new code is correct, it is just the second copy. Search for the *behavior*, not the name (`osgrep` finds the shape when the name differs), before adding a util, type, guard, formatter, or wrapper. This does NOT license shrinking a fix: reuse the existing helper, then still fix the whole call-site class (see the CALL-SITE CLASS rule below).\n\n**Use `Read` — not Bash — for:**\n- **Images, PDFs, notebooks** — `Read` renders visually so Claude actually *sees* the content. `cat screenshot.png` returns binary garbage; `cat file.pdf` returns gibberish. Huge loss on UI debugging, design comps, inspecting anything you just captured.\n- **Any file you plan to Edit** — `Read` registers the file for safe edits. Without it, `Edit` fails with \"file has not been read yet\" and you waste a retry.\n- **Files where line numbers matter** — `Read` prefixes them consistently for follow-up edits.\n\n**Use `Bash` — freely — for:**\n- **Git archaeology**: `git log -p`, `git blame`, `git diff A..B` — often the highest-signal context in a debug session. No native equivalent.\n- **Executing code for evidence**: `node`, `python -c`, `curl`, `timeout 120 npx vitest run specific-test`. Evidence beats speculation.\n- **Compound pipelines**: anything involving `sort`\u002F`uniq`\u002F`wc`\u002F`awk`\u002F`xargs`. Example: `grep -rn \"TODO\" --include=\"*.ts\" | grep -v test | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn` for a ranked frequency table.\n- **Running CLI tools**: `osgrep`, `qmd`, `bd`, `gh`, `wrangler`, `git`, `npm`.\n\n**Don't use Bash as a `Read` substitute** (`cat`, `head`, `tail`, `sed -n '50,70p'`, `less`). You lose multimodal rendering, file-read tracking, and clean line-numbered output.\n\n**Don't use Bash as a `Grep` substitute** for simple pattern searches. Native `Grep` returns structured output that feeds straight into the next `Read` call with offset\u002Flimit. Reserve `grep -rn | pipeline` for compound analysis Grep can't express.\n\n---\n\n## Mode Detection\n\nDetermine mode from the user's request, then read ONLY the relevant reference files before launching the agent. This keeps context lean.\n\n| User Intent Pattern | Mode | Reference Files to Read |\n|---------------------|------|------------------------|\n| passkey, WebAuthn, TOTP, 2FA, two-factor, passwordless, social login, email OTP, recovery codes, `SESSION_NOT_FRESH`, security setup, reauthentication, \"is 2FA enabled\", \"does the site require 2FA\" | **auth-security** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Faccount-security-lifecycle.md`, installed auth SDK source, `code-review-security.md` |\n| iOS, iPhone\u002FiPad app, Xcode, simulator, Swift\u002FSwiftUI, Capacitor shell, app crash\u002F.ips, TestFlight (dev questions), xcodebuild, App Store compliance, app screenshots\u002FASO, **Clerk\u002FApple\u002FGoogle social sign-in failing in a Capacitor app (`authorization_invalid` \u002F `native_api_disabled` \u002F `origin_authorization_headers_conflict` \u002F `oauth_token_apple` \u002F \"native social login won't work in the app\"), OR a passkey\u002FWebAuthn ceremony failing in a Capacitor webview (\"passkey registration was cancelled or timed out\", `webcredentials`, associated domains, AASA 404)** | **ios** — invoke the `\u002Fios` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fios\u002FSKILL.md`): THE Apple-side counterpart of \u002Fcode. It routes to xcodebuildmcp (build_run_sim loop), axiom agents (crash-analyzer, build-fixer, performance-profiler), greenlight, axe webview driving, **simulator eyes+hands via `baguette` (headless boot, `describe-ui` a11y tree, pt-coord taps\u002Fswipes\u002Fpinch, screenshot, logs — default) and `serve-sim` (60 fps MJPEG stream, camera\u002Fwebcam injection, CA-debug overlays) — routing + verified commands in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-sim-agent-control.md`; both simulator-only, never the real iPhone**, and the granular asc\u002Fstore-asset skills. Web-layer bugs inside a Capacitor app come BACK here (\u002Fcode patterns — it's web code). iOS RELEASE work (archive\u002FTestFlight\u002Fsubmit\u002FOTA publish) routes to \u002Fship Phase 4.7. **In-webview auth\u002Fcredential ceremonies all fail with a GENERIC error until the right app↔domain binding exists — see \u002Fios trap #12's binding matrix (probe FIRST): social-OAuth Apple → trap #4 (`allowNavigation`); Google → blocked by policy, hide it; clerk-js scheme → `allowedRedirectProtocols`; passkey \"cancelled or timed out\" → AASA file + Associated Domains entitlement (improvebayarea `dadfdf3`). Don't debug the JS ceremony before the 30-sec binding probe.** | `\u002Fios` skill |\n| app crashes AT LAUNCH on a real device \u002F new iOS but works in the simulator, `EXC_BREAKPOINT` in `UIApplicationEvaluateRuntimeIssueForNoSceneLifecycleAdoption`, TestFlight build closes instantly, \"native sign-in sheet returns nowhere\" after adding scenes | **ios-scene-lifecycle** — iOS 27 kills iOS-26-SDK apps that don't adopt UIScene; Capacitor 8.4 ships no SceneDelegate. Run `\u002Fbin\u002Fbash ~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fios-scene-lifecycle-check.sh \u003Crepo>` FIRST (0 pass \u002F 1 fail \u002F 2 unmeasured \u002F 4 n\u002Fa) — it names the exact gap (no manifest, missing class, or missing `openURLContexts`\u002Fcold-launch URL forwarding that silently kills Google\u002FOAuth return). Apply the build-15 recipe, then prove launch on the physical phone (devicectl processes + crashes), never on an older-runtime simulator. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-app-dev-release-traps.md` §1–3 |\n| test on my real iPhone, tap\u002Fswipe\u002Fscreenshot the phone, drive TestFlight \u002F the installed app, physical-device acceptance, mobile-mcp `ETIMEDOUT` \u002F `context canceled` \u002F `PairRecord errorcode 22` on a physical iPhone | **physical-device** — use `\u002Fcontrolphone` (`~\u002Fprojects\u002Fiphonectl`): `controlphone screenshot` (go-ios screenshotr, no WDA), `iphonectl-setup wda` once (WDA via xcodebuild + ASC-key auto-provisioning, no p12\u002Fkeychain prompt, free port), then `controlphone tap\u002Fswipe\u002Ftype` in POINTS (px\u002F3). Don't retry mobile-mcp on iOS 27 (its capture path times out); a stale go-ios tunnel mimics broken pairing — `controlphone apps` answering proves lockdown is fine; ports 8100\u002F8101 are the mobilecli daemon's. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-app-dev-release-traps.md` §4 |\n| run something on the mini, mac-mini, the cron host, remote Mac, \"check the mini\", Hermes cron, ssh to the mini, Screen Sharing, why does X work on my laptop but not the mini | **remote-mini** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fmac-mini-remote-control.md` — the 6-surface ladder (ssh -> scp -> hermes cron -> launchctl -> fcdp -> Screen Sharing). Climb it; don't start at the GUI. Covers the context traps that make a working tool look broken over SSH (Keychain\u002F`cookies-txt`, `open -a` -600, `osascript` 1002), the nested-heredoc credential hazard (write locally + `scp`), zsh not word-splitting, `hermes cron create` taking a POSITIONAL schedule + bare script filename, and which Chrome profile you actually hit (integer tab id = real Default, hex = headless :9222). |\n| bug, error, crash, failing, 500, timeout, leak, hang | **debug** | `debug-patterns.md` + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fbug-fix-preflight.md` (**run BEFORE the 5-phase workflow**: Step 0 existing-fix check — an open PR \u002F merged commit that plausibly fixes it switches you to *verify mode*, never author over it; Step 1 regression history via `git log -S` \u002F `--follow` \u002F `gh pr view` before any hypothesis; Step 2 label every root-cause claim Direct \u002F Supported \u002F Inferred \u002F Speculative \u002F Unknown; Step 3 \"reproduced\" = correct-vs-broken final state named in advance, observed **twice with a reset between**, one real state value cross-checked) |\n| refactor, rename, extract, inline, dedupe, move, reshape, \"clean up the structure\", \"behavior-preserving\", \"simplify without changing behavior\" | **refactor** — the structure changes, the behavior does not. Pin the contract first (characterization test \u002F equivalence harness — `tsc` and lint are NOT a pin), subtract before adding, move in small steps that keep the pin green, migrate every caller and delete the old API in the same wave (no shims), prove equivalence on the real artifact, and keep it only if **reader load dropped** — otherwise revert. A bug or feature the cleanup reveals is split out, structural change first. | `refactor.md` |\n| hillclimb, \"keep improving X until\", sustained optimization of one metric, \"get it under N ms\", \"iterate on the number\", perf loop, Ralph-evo perf loop, \"make it as fast as possible\" | **hillclimb** — one change, one measurement, keep or revert. Frozen harness with proven sensitivity, median-of-N, stop predicate = target AND minimum iterations, one commit per accepted win, `decisions.tsv`. Report the result as a gap to the floor from `performance-ceiling.md`, never a delta from the start. | `hillclimb.md` + `performance-ceiling.md` |\n| blast radius, \"what could this break\", \"is this small change safe\", a diff touching a shared helper \u002F schema \u002F wire format \u002F middleware \u002F anything with many callers, reviewing a small diff you don't trust | **blast-radius** — find the ONE fact the change is safe because of, get it to rung 4 of the certainty ladder (a script that runs the real code and fails loud), look where grep stops (pinned library source, timing, JSON\u002FDB\u002FKV shapes, another language reading the same bytes, flags, three hops down), hand back risks \u002F cleared \u002F before-you-merge. `proven` \u002F `unproven (stated)` \u002F `could not assess` — only the first passes for shared code. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fblast-radius.md` |\n| bisect where every subset passes, no single change reproduces it, same config gives PASS then FAIL, about to call it \"intermittent\"\u002F\"flaky\", config-restore or backup-restore debugging, an apply\u002Frestore\u002Fimport step that \"succeeded\" but changed nothing, A\u002FB whose arms were never confirmed to differ | **experiment-integrity** — prove the manipulation APPLIED (read back an observable that differs between arms) before trusting any arm; success signal must be direct state or a progression, never a lagging proxy or an overlay screenshot; >=2 interleaved runs per arm; publish nothing causal until all three hold | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fexperiment-manipulation-check.md` |\n| SF311 save 500, Verint, external form save, request_type_id, category changed 500 | **debug** | `debug-patterns.md`, `blind-spots.md` |\n| 311 ticket missing Location box, Open311 address null, structured-location empty, mobile311 viewer shows description but no Location dt\u002Fdd, sf_full_address \u002F Location_description \u002F scf location_details \u002F address forwarding broken, \"one ticket has location another doesn't\", address only in description not in location field, lat\u002Flong null in Open311, coord-string in structured slot, lat\u002Flng fallback corrupted ticket | **debug** (Pattern #21, backend-agnostic) — fix: route every structured-location-touching code path through `streetOnlyAddress()` + `looksLikeCoordinateString()` in `src\u002Fsf311.ts`; let backend-specific reverse-geocode (EAS for Verint, Esri for SCF) fill the structured slots when `input.address` is empty; keep FULL address in `Request_description` navFooter. Regression tests MUST exercise (a) long-form, (b) empty, (c) coord-string `input.address`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #21) |\n| MyLA311, myla311.lacity.gov, C-04342632, caseAddress `\", , CA.\"`, locator_gis_returned_address empty, All Service Requests vs My Requests, data.lacity.org 2cy6-i7zn, Street_Address__c, addressDetails, LA_AddressController, file all listed 311 types, fetchCaseTypeDetails, toastPayload NPE, empty objCaseConfigWrapper, captureFailure, dummy modelFlags, Permit_Number__c, remint IssueTypeId | **debug\u002Ffeature** (Pattern #36) — load the pattern **before** writing catalog JSON or a submit envelope. Listed ≠ fileable; SUCCESS-empty = `captureFailure` (never dummy flags); unwrap toast\u002F`objCaseConfigWrapper`; remint session IDs; classify on field API names; refuse naming the official field; Apex NPE ≠ city rejection; Experience-shell apps → decompile the site LWC. Two live files of one pin-only type, then `\u002Fship`. `\u002Fcode` does not `wrangler deploy`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #36) |\n| Bitwarden\u002FVaultwarden\u002Fwarden self-hosted login fails before the password is tried, \"KDF config response does not contain a valid KDF type\", prelogin\u002F`KdfSettings`, a reimplemented vendor API that broke ONE client generation | **debug** (Pattern #44 dual-shape contract) — read the upstream server's response model + the upstream clients' parsers; serve EVERY live generation (additive fields), never swap shapes; serialization test asserting both shapes, proven armed. warden deploy traps: `-c wrangler.toml`, pinned rustc 1.91.1, `[build]`-stripped temp config. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 44) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fmini-bitwarden\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| DBI complaint reported as `validation` error but the city actually has it, third-party form submit ok=false but agency confirms via mail \u002F DataSF, form echoed back on success, `\"DBI re-rendered the form (validation rejected the submission)\"` appears for every submission, every IBA-submitted DBI complaint fails, success-detection heuristic matches both success AND failure pages, `complaintNumber: undefined` but submission worked, parser returns ok=false on HTTP 200, lblError success-vs-failure span, signal-extraction tests use synthetic HTML, ASP.NET WebForms \u002F Verint \u002F dform \u002F aspx replay false-negative on success | **debug** (Pattern #23) — capture real success + real failure responses to `src\u002F__fixtures__\u002F\u003Cintegration>\u002F`, write a `tools\u002Frepro\u002F\u003Cintegration>-probe.{sh,mjs}` script, diff the two fixtures to find an anchored distinguishing feature (DOM id, JSON field — NOT a substring present in both), rewrite the detector to extract that feature, add tests that `readFileSync` the captured fixtures. Then surface the upstream's actual reason through the `error.message`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #23) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fthird-party-signal-fixtures.md` |\n| YouTube \"Error 153\" \u002F \"Video player configuration error\", embed shows a gray panel, Vimeo\u002FSpotify\u002FSoundCloud embed won't load, \"video plays on youtube.com but not on my site\", embed broke after adding security headers \u002F `secureHeaders()`, rendered `href` contains prose, bare URLs render as dead text | **debug** (Pattern #27) — the page sends `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` (Hono `secureHeaders()` **default**); YouTube has rejected Referer-less embeds since late 2025. It is NOT CSP and NOT the video. Two-command probe before any fix: `curl -sI https:\u002F\u002F\u003Csite>\u002F \\| grep -i referrer-policy` and the oembed status for the video id. Fix = `referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\"` on the iframe (never weaken the global header). Verify on the DEPLOYED artifact + a browser screenshot — `hono\u002Fjsx` vs React attribute casing silently drops it, and Worker propagation takes >30s so an immediate curl false-negatives. Then sweep the repo for the siblings: hrefs containing whitespace, un-linkified bare URLs, malformed URL literals. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Fcsp-cache-patterns.md` (Pattern 27) |\n| provider swap, replace Resend\u002FAuth0\u002FStripe\u002FS3 with X, migrate email\u002Fauth\u002Fpayments provider, remove the old SDK, delete the old API key, \"switch us completely to X\" | **provider-migration** — run the 7-item checklist BEFORE declaring done: one seam, discriminated-union result, zero guards naming the old env vars, legacy ids discriminated by shape, emulator rules re-derived from the live API, every integration point actually removed, cron blast radius measured against PROD data. Report cost honestly (a swap often saves \\$0). | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fprovider-migration-safety.md` |\n| status chip lies, zero rows reported as \"expired\", fresh record reads as missing, status from an analytics\u002FGraphQL backend, non-throwing SDK result treated as success, `{data, error}` never checked | **debug** (#29 + signal-audit #13\u002F#14) | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 29) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsignal-logic-audit.md` |\n| my edit didn't take, repost\u002Fresubmit filed the OLD value, stale photo or category reused, user's new value silently replaced by a prior\u002Fdefault one, merged payload with overlapping fields (`x_url` + `x_urls` + `x_data_url`), \"broken since release X\" | **debug** (#37 implicit precedence) — declare the winner at construction and pin it with an order test proven armed by re-injection; do NOT delete a writer that is a deliberate feature. Verify the culprit commit with `git log -L`\u002F`-S` before blaming the newest deploy. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 37) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Fsingle-winner-merge-check.sh` |\n| third-party submit \"worked\" (200 + id, no error) but never went live \u002F never got a public number \u002F `openedAt: null` \u002F `publicId: null`; guest\u002Fanon create silently dead-ends; A\u002FB-tested a flag or category and the symptom stayed IDENTICAL; \"is it the payload or the account\u002Fidentity\"; freshly-minted guest token; prove which backend gives instant IDs | **debug** (#30) — a sync 200+id is *pending*, not *done*: gate success on the async lifecycle transition (public number\u002F`opened`), polled, vs a known-good baseline. Symptom byte-identical across payload edits ⇒ stop editing the request, the ACTOR\u002Fidentity you held constant is the variable — re-run the SAME payload under a known-good established identity first. Prove the working backend by running the REAL function live (repro harness → real id), never old code or a \"Verified\" comment. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 30) |\n| same opaque error survives a fix you PROVED deployed, \"my fix didn't work\" but the error is byte-identical, one `400 {\"error\":\"Invalid\"}` \u002F bare `500` for several unrelated causes, multi-deploy fix-probe-fix loop, \"no events in tail\" \u002F \"counter didn't move\", health probe green while 100% of writes fail | **debug** (#32) — a STATIC error means the instrument is too coarse, not that the premise is wrong (mutating error = wrong premise; identical error = missing discriminator). Ship a **discriminator first** (report the measurable properties of what you sent — flags + lengths, never payload\u002FPII); bisect by COMPONENT with exactly ONE variable per probe; cross-reference successes as hard as failures; when failures have no side effect, probing prod is FREE. **Prove the instrument is alive before trusting silence.** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fopaque-multi-cause-failure.md` |\n| \"deploy broke prod\", MIME type text\u002Fhtml on a .js, SPA won't mount after deploy, verifying in a clone browser | **debug** (#28) — curl the origin before you roll back; the tab is probably stale | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Fcsp-cache-patterns.md` (Pattern 28) |\n| `iba` CLI, improvebayarea.com, file a 311 ticket from the CLI, \"did my 311 report actually go through\", SF311 category registry, `request_type_id`, no power-wash\u002Fsteam-clean category, `recategorized_from`, ref-vs-caseid | **iba-311** — `~\u002Ftools\u002Fiba\u002Fiba` (on PATH) files REAL SF311 cases. **`--mode prefill` is the default and it FILES** (all modes do; only `--dry-run` doesn't). Registry: 42 SF categories baked in, regenerated 2026-08-01 after silently running 20-of-42 — `iba categories --check` diffs vs the live API and exits 1 on drift; `--live [--city oakland]` for the authoritative list. **Verint assigns a public caseid synchronously only for SOME forms** (`pw_street_cleaning` yes, `pw_graffiti` no → UUID ref + `caseid_pending`): resolve with `iba lookup \u003Cref>` (a **ref**, not a caseid) or `iba submit --wait \u003Csecs>`. **Three false \"it failed\" signals:** `mobile311.sfgov.org\u002Fservices\u002Fcase\u002F\u003Cid>` 404s even for filed cases and by design for refs (improvebayarea `src\u002Fsf311.ts:1770`); `\u002Fapi\u002Frecent` is a 25-item sample (use `?q=`); DataSF `vw6y-z8j6` lags 1-2 days and is the only real confirmation. Always capture the FULL submit response — the id is unrecoverable, which is why the result banner now goes to **stderr**. Website side: `SF311_CATEGORIES` (`src\u002Fsf311.ts:159`) is the source of truth with **no fetchable upstream** (SF Open311 `services.json` = 7 services, different namespace), so a count-drift guard is NOT buildable there; its parameter-drift risk is covered by `\u002Fapi\u002Fcategories\u002Fhealth` (`src\u002Findex.ts:3978`) + `src\u002Fsf311.test.ts`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fprojects\u002F-Users-\u003Cyou>\u002Fmemory\u002Freference_local_tools.md`; regression harness `~\u002Ftools\u002Fiba\u002Ftest_submit_result.py` |\n| review, PR, check code, audit code | **review** | `code-review-react.md`, `code-review-security.md`, `code-review-general.md`, `production-readiness-checklist.md` |\n| build, add, implement, feature, create | **feature** | `feature-implementation.md` |\n| brainstorm, plan, PRD, spec, requirements | **plan** | `feature-implementation.md` |\n| research, find, investigate, last 30 days | **research** | `research.md` |\n| browser, screenshot, CDP, inspect page | **browser** | `browser-automation.md` |\n| git, commit, push, branch, worktree, secrets | **git** | `git-workflow.md` |\n| skill, create skill, edit skill | **skill** | `skill-creation.md` |\n| codex, second opinion, rescue | **codex** | `codex-integration.md` |\n| task, prd.json, stories, tracking | **task** | `task-tracking.md` |\n| deploy, CI, push, ship (read-only context) | **deploy** | `deploy-patterns.md`, `production-readiness-checklist.md` |\n| production readiness, pre-launch, is this ready, prod checklist, launch audit | **prod-readiness** | `production-readiness-checklist.md`, `code-review-security.md`, `preflight-checks.md` |\n| UX, accessibility, responsive, mobile | **ux** | `ux-patterns.md`, `responsive-design.md` |\n| consent checkbox, opt-in\u002Fopt-out, TCPA, A2P 10DLC, SMS consent, ToS acceptance, HIPAA authorization, cookie\u002FGDPR consent banner, e-signature attestation, age verification, \"record that they agreed\", proof of consent, audit trail for a user agreement | **debug\u002Ffeature** (consent-evidence integrity, Pattern #35) | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fconsent-evidence-integrity.md` — 6 failure shapes for any field whose STORED value is later offered as PROOF: collected-but-never-persisted (N checkboxes, 1 writer); stale closure over the evidence value (records an opt-in as a DECLINE — treat an exhaustive-deps warning here as P1, never a lint nit); schema-strictness mismatch (non-strict zod SILENTLY STRIPS it, `.strict()` 400s the whole form — same root, opposite symptoms); dedup discarding evidence (`INSERT OR IGNORE` skips a returning user who consents today — consent is an EVENT, so append-only is the primary store); client-supplied disclosure text (forgeable ⇒ worthless); affirmatives-only logging (an absent row can't distinguish *declined* from *never asked* from *writer broken*). Includes the grep-instrument discipline that nearly hid all of it — case-sensitivity (`smsConsent` misses `contactSmsConsent`) and single-line grep vs formatter-wrapped JSX prose — always pair a probe with a positive control. Reference incident 2026-08-12 (AIVA): 3 checkboxes, 2 wrote nowhere, all of it typechecking + linting + 106 tests green. |\n| renders undefined, shows NaN, \"Invalid Date\", \"[object Object]\", toggle\u002Fsection\u002Fcontrol disappeared or silently vanished, \"make sure nothing is undefined\", Cannot read properties of undefined, is not iterable, null-gate hides UI, `useState\u003CT\\|null>` gates a render, `.map`\u002Fproperty\u002Fstring\u002FDate on possibly-undefined API data, audit the admin\u002Fdashboard portal, full admin audit | **debug** (undefined\u002Fnull-render) | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fundefined-null-render-safety.md` — 9-pattern catalog + live DOM grep for rendered `undefined`\u002F`NaN`\u002F`[object Object]` + console `TypeError`. Also re-sweeps the admin blind-spot class (default-LIMIT truncation, NULL-aggregate sort burial, count-source mismatch, inner-JOIN row drop, admin-auth DB fallback). Reference incident: AIVA admin \"Test account\" toggle hidden by an `isTest !== null` gate (2026-06-01). |\n| double down arrow, double chevron, double caret, two arrows, two chevrons, twin chevrons, stacked icons, duplicate icon, duplicate affordance, \"showing twice\", \"appears twice\", \"X is rendered twice\", select chevron, dropdown arrow doubled, tailwind forms + native chevron | **debug** + **ui-duplicate-affordance** | `ui-duplicate-affordance.md` (loaded with `debug-patterns.md`) — detection recipe in 5 steps: (1) does the page load `@tailwindcss\u002Fforms` \u002F Bootstrap `form-select` \u002F Bulma; (2) classify every `\u003Cselect>` as native-chevron-only (`appearance:auto` + `background-image:none !important`), inline-icon-only (`appearance:none !important` + `background-image:none !important`), or BUG (anything else); (3) verify against rendered output; (4) check `\u003Cdetails>`\u002F`\u003Csummary>` for native-marker + inline-glyph stack; (5) write a regression test that locks the CSS rule AND enforces every control on the page carries a discipline class. Reference incident: IBA-m69 (2026-05-17) — `.report-select` on improvebayarea.com\u002Freports had `appearance:auto` but missed `background-image:none !important`, so the `@tailwindcss\u002Fforms` background chevron stacked with the native browser chevron on the \"Closed reports\" filter. Fix: `background-image: none !important;` on the class. Test: `~\u002Ftools\u002Fimprovebayarea\u002Fsrc\u002Fui_select_chevron.test.ts`. |\n| lighthouse, 100\u002F100, perf audit, core web vitals, LCP, TBT, \"slow site\", SEO audit | **lighthouse** | `lighthouse-optimization.md`, `debug-patterns.md` |\n| slow page, slow route, slow dashboard, \"why is X so slow\", full table scan, COUNT(*) on every request, \"loading the whole database\", route reads wrong cache, cron warms wrong KV key, prewarm warms the wrong thing, 24h\u002Flast-N window returns empty, lagged data source (Socrata\u002FDataSF\u002Fbatch ETL) | **debug** | `debug-patterns.md` — and run the Hot-Path Data-Volume & Cache-Topology Audit (section in `debug-patterns.md`): measure every per-request query with `wrangler d1 execute --json` → `meta.rows_read` (>~100k = bug), verify every cache read has a writer + every cache-warmer warms keys something reads, and `MAX(ts)`-anchor lagged windows. |\n| high 5xx \u002F error-rate on a route family but every manual probe returns 200, 522, 524, `originResponseStatus: 0`, \"origin unreachable\" on a Workers-only zone, errors cluster at :00\u002F:02\u002F:30, empty User-Agent in analytics, single-colo errors, error count ≈ a fleet size (cities\u002Ftenants\u002Fshards), \"is it users or us\", cron\u002Fprewarm\u002Fwarmer\u002Fpoller\u002Fhealthcheck suspected, \"intermittent outage\" nobody can reproduce | **debug** (Pattern #40) — **ATTRIBUTE BEFORE YOU DIAGNOSE: the first question is WHO is making these requests, not why they fail.** One `httpRequestsAdaptiveGroups` query grouped by `datetimeMinute` + UA + colo + `cacheStatus` either eliminates the whole user-facing hypothesis or confirms it, before a line of the handler is read. Cron-boundary clustering + empty UA + one colo + `cacheStatus:bypass` + count ≈ fleet size ⇒ **self-inflicted**. Platform fact: **a Worker cannot `fetch()` its own Custom Domain** — CF forwards the same-zone subrequest to the zone origin, and a Workers-only zone has none (`AAAA 100::`) ⇒ 522\u002Forigin=0 every time. Also check whether a test *asserts the buggy behavior* (a mocked `fetch` returns 200 and cannot observe the failure) and whether the warmer actually populates the cache (`cf-cache-status` well after the run). | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #40) |\n| D1 near its size cap, \"how big can this database get\", `Exceeded maximum DB size`, 10 GB limit, D1 query hit the 30s timeout, `SELECT MIN(x), MAX(x)` full scan, `COUNT(*)` takes 20+ seconds, `no such table: dbstat`, `pragma_freelist_count` → `SQLITE_AUTH`, \"should this table move to R2 \u002F Iceberg\", R2 Data Catalog, compaction, R2 SQL, Pipelines, archiving a giant append-only table | **cloudflare-ceilings** — report the number as a **% of the platform ceiling** (10 GB\u002Fdb · 30 s\u002Fquery · 25B rows-read\u002Fmo), never as a delta from last week. Four measured query-shape traps: combined `MIN\u002FMAX` disables SQLite's index optimization (9,984,941 rows read → **1** when split); `COUNT(*)` walks the heap and is ~37× costlier per row than an indexed range scan; `dbstat`+pragmas are BLOCKED in D1 so per-table bytes are unmeasurable (use `meta.size_after`, present on every D1 response); and whether `DELETE` reclaims space is **undocumented** — never promise a post-archive size without measuring it on a copy. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fcloudflare-data-ceilings.md` |\n| audit docs, check for lies, verify against source, legal document, fabrication, hallucination | **legal-audit** | `legal-document-audit.md` |\n| D1 route 500s with generic \"Internal Server Error\", `no such column`\u002F`no such table`, `D1_ERROR`, a Worker write (intake\u002Fsave\u002Finsert\u002Fupdate) fails for every user, migration file exists but column\u002Ftable missing in prod, `wrangler tail` shows outcome Ok with empty exceptions, D1 schema drift, migration not applied to remote | **debug** (D1 schema drift #26) — a migration FILE existing ≠ its DDL is in prod. Get the real cause from `wrangler tail --format json` (grep `logs[]` for `D1_ERROR`\u002F`no such column`, NOT `exceptions[]`); confirm via `PRAGMA table_info(\u003Ct>)` on `--remote`. Fix additively on remote (`ALTER … ADD COLUMN`\u002F`CREATE … IF NOT EXISTS`) + `INSERT OR IGNORE` the filename into `d1_migrations`; NEVER bulk `wrangler d1 migrations apply` (re-runs non-idempotent data migrations → corruption). Run the gate `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Fd1-schema-drift-check.sh \u003Crepo>` to catch it before it ships. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fd1-schema-drift.md` |\n| \"the API only shows N records so X is missing\", \"these certs\u002Frecords\u002Froutes are redundant — delete them\", audit a cloud account for stray\u002Fduplicate resources, DNS or CAA record \"absent\" per the provider API but working live, orphaned resource nothing appears to reference, cleanup\u002Fprune a Cloudflare\u002FAWS\u002FGCP account, a config table that disagrees with observed behavior | **infra** (#31) — **a management API is not authoritative state.** It returns what was DECLARED; it does not show what the platform INJECTED on your behalf, nor WHY a resource exists. Before ANY \"absent\" or \"redundant\u002Fsafe-to-delete\" conclusion, answer two questions: (1) *Is my view complete?* — probe the CONSUMER (`dig` not `dns_records`; `openssl s_client` not the cert-pack list; a really-delivered message's `Authentication-Results` not your SPF records). A count mismatch between declared and authoritative IS the finding. (2) *What created it?* — `GET \u002Faudit_logs` → `actor.type`; `system` means the platform provisioned it and something depends on it. **Never recommend deleting a resource you cannot name the creator of.** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fmanagement-api-vs-authoritative-state.md` |\n| health check \u002F liveness probe \u002F validator \u002F drift or reconciliation job \u002F \"N\u002FN verified\" \u002F \"all healthy\" \u002F 30-of-30 match \u002F a sweep that passed \u002F about to RETRACT a finding because a different measurement came back clean \u002F a hardcoded `verified:` or `lastChecked:` date on harvested-from-upstream data \u002F joining on an id you did not mint \u002F a dataset field whose absence degrades silently | **negative-control** (#33) — **a check that cannot fail is not a check.** Before recording ANY green result, feed the instrument a known-bad input (corrupted token, mutated id, nonexistent resource) and require RED; a negative control that passes is a P0 finding about your tooling, ahead of the original investigation. Commit the control as a test. Always three outcomes, never two: `ok` \u002F `genuinely bad` \u002F `could not measure`. Corollaries: a `verified:` stamp is a decaying claim (rename to `harvestedAt`, re-ask on a cadence, mark stale past ~2 intervals); check upstream ALIAS keys before concluding a record is absent; a silently-degrading dataset field needs a completeness invariant with written exemptions. Reference incident 2026-08-10 nps-report: a \"consumer-path\" probe reported 20\u002F20 parks healthy — `o=DEADBEEF00` also returned HTTP 200 and a full form, so 435 dead tokens would have scored 435\u002F435. The real sweep found 5 drifted. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fnegative-control-gate.md` |\n| photo\u002Fupload routed by current GPS, \"wrong location on the report\", EXIF, DateTimeOriginal, geotag, a document dated by processing time instead of its own date, metadata lost after resize\u002Foptimise\u002Fconvert, a late async fix clobbering a good value | **artifact-provenance** (#34) — use the ARTIFACT's own metadata, not ambient state at processing time. Read provenance from the ORIGINAL bytes *before* any re-encode (canvas\u002Foptimiser\u002Fthumbnailer strips it) and assert that ordering in a test; route every writer through one precedence helper so a late-arriving ambient value cannot clobber the artifact's; tell the user which source won. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fnegative-control-gate.md` (Pattern #34) |\n| an old copy of one of our sites is live somewhere nobody watches, stale site on a `*.workers.dev`\u002F`*.pages.dev`\u002Fpreview URL, retired marketing or legal copy still reachable at a second URL, duplicate-content exposure, orphaned worker\u002Fapp nothing references, \"audit the account for strays\", \"what else is still serving?\" | **orphan-content** (#41) — **a SCOPE gap, not a trigger gap: the orphan is in no repo, so no repo-scoped gate can EVER see it, no matter how often it runs.** Ask the account, not the repo: `python3 ~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Forphan-worker-content-check.py` (0 ok \u002F 1 flagged \u002F **2 UNMEASURED — never a pass** \u002F 3 no creds). Match on the page's **`og:url`\u002F`canonical`** — the copy's own claim of which site it is, which staleness cannot erode. Do NOT match on `og:title` (drifts — that is *what* is stale), body text (an SPA shell has ~21 chars, scoring 0.0 like \"unrelated\"), or `modified_on` (a settings sweep bumps it). **Report, never delete** (#31 + Deployment Prohibition). | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #41) |\n| double submit, filed twice, two tickets from one tap, duplicate persist, one-shot submit, submitLocked, beginSubmitAttempt, cooldown helper unused, second tap files again | **debug\u002Ffeature** (Pattern #42) — persist\u002Fqueue\u002Ffiling must lock **synchronously on first tap before any await**, stay locked after successful queue, unlock only on explicit new-report\u002Fedit-and-resubmit or persist failure. `disabled={isLoading}` + finally-reenable is not this lock. A cooldown helper with zero callers is not a lock. Tests must **count persist calls** on the shipped click path. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #42) |\n| \"tapped N times, nothing happened\", submit does nothing, no confirmation and no error, works on my laptop but not in the VM\u002Fwebview\u002Fheadless agent, warn-once guard, native confirm()\u002Falert() on a filing path, map\u002FWebGL failure loop, pin accuracy inherited from the IP seed | **debug\u002Ffeature** (Pattern #43) — reproduce FIRST in a **constrained browser** (headless, no WebGL, no geolocation, dialogs auto-dismissed, every `POST \u002Fapi\u002F*` intercepted, a control arm, 2 runs per arm) and record per tap: dialogs, POSTs, the hold reason, the control's `data-*-hold`, the state the guard read. Then enumerate every early `return` in the handler and where its message lands: each must route through ONE adjacent, `role=alert`, focused hold funnel or file. Zero native dialogs on the path; a deliberate placement is its own measurement (never inherit the previous pin's accuracy); non-modal questions need a generation abort + fingerprint re-read. Ship the `probe:constrained` script with the fix so 1.45i can prove it. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #43) |\n| infra, config, plugin, gateway, systemd, openclaw, upgrade, restart, schema | **infra** | `blind-spots.md`, `debug-patterns.md` |\n| launchd\u002Fcron watchdog false alerts, \"job-not-loaded\" but service is up, gateway DOWN alert spam, bootstrap rc=5, `launchctl list` empty in launchd context, health-check passes interactively but false-positives on schedule, watchdog keeps \"restarting\" a healthy service | **infra** | `blind-spots.md` §13 — probe with `launchctl print` exit-code (NOT `launchctl list \\| grep`, which is empty in a launchd session); rc=5 = already-loaded no-op; defer to KeepAlive; require a sustained outage; alert only on a real action; VERIFY the fix in the real launchd context via `launchctl kickstart`. |\n| VPS, bsclaudebot, openclaw-gateway, remote agent, cron job on vps | **vps-openclaw** | `blind-spots.md` + **ALWAYS run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fopenclaw-remote-doctor.sh all` FIRST** before any config change — captures native `openclaw doctor` output, main-agent token usage, tool-usage data, and extracts remediation hints from error text. Apply 🧭 hints before inventing fixes. |\n| site security, cloudflare alert, security.txt, HSTS, CSP, headers audit, securityheaders.com, mozilla observatory, A+ rating, COOP, CORP, CAA records, DNSSEC, leaked credentials, WAF managed ruleset, \"make my site secure\", \"harden my cloudflare\" | **site-security** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsite-security-defaults.md` — 12-item baseline + auto-fix recipes (security.txt, header middleware, TLS min). **Account-wide CF hardening tools** (idempotent, `DRY_RUN=1` to preview): `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fcf-account-harden.py` = DNSSEC + Free WAF Managed Ruleset + Leaked-Credential detection + CAA (mail fixes gated `INCLUDE_MAIL=1`); `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fcf-security-insights.sh --apply` = security.txt + worker-preview lock. **Do NOT enable AI Labyrinth \u002F Block-AI-bots** (user 2026-07-07: AI bots need to reach the sites for AI SEO). Run the curl-based check FIRST against the live URL, then auto-fix in source + run the account tools. |\n| socket, sfw, socket firewall, supply chain, malicious package, install script, typosquat, postinstall, \"npm install is blocked\", \"exiting due to risks\", SOCKET_CLI_ACCEPT_RISKS, 429 insufficient quota, obfuscated dependency | **supply-chain** | Run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Fsocket-health-check.sh --live` FIRST — it separates the four states that look alike from the error text: **ARMED** (sfw on PATH + npm() wrapper + live proxy banner), **UNPROTECTED** (sfw missing\u002Foff-PATH → npm() falls through to plain npm, prints a yellow warning, still exits 0), **DISARMED** (`SOCKET_CLI_ACCEPT_RISKS` in a shell rc → looks protected, blocks nothing), and **NOT CONFIGURED**. Protection is **Socket Firewall `sfw`**, a network proxy with no API key and no quota; the shell `npm()` function routes only install-class commands through it. **Verify with an observable:** `SFW_VERBOSE=true npm install` → `Protected by Socket Firewall`. NEVER \"fix\" a block with `SOCKET_CLI_ACCEPT_RISKS=1`; use `command npm` for a scoped bypass. ⚠️ `sfw` installs into npm's global prefix, which is not on PATH — symlinked to `\u002Fopt\u002Fhomebrew\u002Fbin\u002Fsfw`; re-run `npm i -g sfw` + re-symlink after a node upgrade. `sfw` Free blocks confirmed malware only, NOT CVEs (npm audit + Dependabot own that). |\n| dependabot, npm audit, CVE, GHSA-xxxx, \"security alert\", \"vulnerable dependency\", \"dependency update\", transitive vuln, \"fix the security\u002Fdependabot page\", overrides, esbuild\u002Ftar\u002Fminimatch\u002Fws\u002Fvite\u002Fuuid vuln | **dependency-audit** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fdependency-audit.md` — 7-step protocol: enumerate from BOTH `gh api ...\u002Fdependabot\u002Falerts` AND per-manifest `npm audit` (they surface DIFFERENT sets), scan EVERY manifest (root + `mobile\u002F`\u002F`functions\u002F`), `npm ls \u003Cpkg>` to map each vuln to its consumer, `npm view \u003Cpkg>@\u003Cpatched>` to confirm the patched version EXISTS before writing it, fix via `overrides` — **SCOPED to the vulnerable parent** when the package coexists at multiple majors (a blanket `minimatch` override breaks glob's v8\u002Fv10), verify cross-major bumps don't break the consumer's import style, then `npm audit`=0 + build green. NEVER blind `npm audit fix --force` (it downgraded wrangler 4→3). Reference incident: 2026-06-15 improvebayarea — 12 Dependabot alerts + 4 audit-only highs (ws\u002Fvite) fixed via scoped overrides (PR #5). |\n| DMARC failing from a sender IP, custom-domain email bouncing \u002F spam, \"send-as alias DMARC fail\", Gmail \"Send mail as\", `p=reject` rejecting my own mail, \"SPF passes but DMARC fails\", \"can't send from my domain\", host example.org\u002Fcustom domain for sending+receiving, forwarded mail failing DMARC, DMARC RUA report | **email-deliverability** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Femail-deliverability-dmarc.md` — OUTBOUND auth alignment, not broken records. `dig` SPF\u002FDMARC\u002FDKIM\u002FMX first (records usually fine); the sending path is the bug (Gmail send-as \u002F relay signs as the wrong domain → no aligned identifier → DMARC fail). Adding the relay IP to SPF does NOTHING (SPF aligns on the envelope domain). **Verify the platform's CURRENT native send capability live, not from memory** — a Cloudflare domain can SEND via Email Sending (`wrangler email sending list\u002Fsettings`; `smtp.mx.cloudflare.net:465`, user `api_token`, pwd = CF token w\u002F `Email Sending Write`); don't say \"CF is receive-only\" (stale). Fix = route the From-domain through a DKIM-aligned sender + verify a REAL send shows `dmarc=pass`. Reference incident: 2026-06-16 example.org (recommended Zoho\u002FBrevo before checking the live `wrangler email` CLI — CF already had the capability, already enabled). |\n| third-party integration, Verint, dform, Clerk, Stripe, SeeClickFix, OAuth, Auth0, \"auto-submit \u002F handoff \u002F redirect to form\", \"\u002Fapi\u002Fsave returns valid:true caseid:empty\", \"API doesn't support X\", \"falling back to manual\", any SaaS integration where we're about to add a UX downgrade | **upstream-protocol** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fupstream-protocol-investigation.md` — 6-step deep-dig: read upstream's primary client (e.g. dform's `\u002Fdformresources\u002Fscripts\u002Fapi.js`), capture real network traffic via agent-browser\u002FCDP\u002Fcurl, inspect rendered `data-*` attributes, cross-reference our wrapper against the upstream's actual handler, treat \"Verified YYYY-MM-DD\" comments with skepticism, ship the real fix in-session. **Token cost is irrelevant** — user explicitly authorized unbounded tokens for this pattern (2026-05-09). Reference incident: SF311 graffiti commits `0b746a4` (bandaid) → `f27d1e3` (real fix from reading dform's api.js lines 462-520). |\n| GovQA records portal, `*.mycusthelp.com`, \"Public Records Center\", ASP.NET WebForms + DevExpress, BotDetect CAPTCHA, CPRA\u002Frecords-request portal automation, headless session reuse for a logged-in portal, \"DevExpress combobox won't fill\", \"submit form has a captcha\", Caltrans Public Records | **govqa-portal** | `references\u002Fgovqa-aspnet-portal-automation.md` — auth is a human step (account \u002F \"Interact Anonymously\" both need a password → hard stop); capture HttpOnly ASP.NET session cookies from the REAL profile via fcdp `Storage.getCookies` → headless curl reads (status\u002Flist\u002Fdetail\u002Fkeepalive) work; drive DevExpress combos\u002Fdates via the client API (`window['cf_NN'].SetSelectedIndex` \u002F `.SetDate`), NOT `fill_form` (virtualized long lists never hit the DOM); BotDetect submit is browser-assisted (auto-solving CAPTCHAs is PROHIBITED); dead-session detection keys on the \"Logged in as\" banner \u002F `Login.aspx` redirect, NOT a stray \"logout\" substring (200-with-logout false-positive). Reference incident: Caltrans CPRA `R051897-061926` + CSR `#1174990` (2026-06-19). |\n| decompile, disassemble, reverse-engineer, RE, \"look inside this APK\u002FIPA\u002Fbinary\u002Fextension\u002Ffirmware\", \"what's in this .so\u002F.dll\", \"port this app to a CLI\", \"extract strings from this binary\", triage malware, \"decompile this\", \"ghidra\", \"jadx\", binary diff between two firmware versions, BLE protocol RE from companion app | **decompile** | invoke the `\u002Fdecompile` skill (formerly `\u002Fghidra`, renamed 2026-05-28). Routes to the right tool per artifact class: `jadx`\u002F`apktool`\u002F`apkeep` for Android, `ipsw`\u002F`otool` for iOS, `cfr-decompiler` for JVM, `prettier`\u002F`webcrack` for browser extensions, `binwalk` for firmware, `hermes-dec` for React Native, `decompyle3` for Python, `wasm2wat` for WebAssembly, Ghidra for native\u002FPE\u002Fraw firmware. Tool inventory + routing table lives in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdecompile\u002FSKILL.md`. Reference incident: Whoop RE 2026-05-28 — correctly routed to `jadx` (not Ghidra) because Whoop's Android app is Java\u002FKotlin; 22 min to find 3 GATT service families including previously-undocumented Whoop 5.0\u002FMG family. |\n| watcher, cron, poller, webhook, diff against state, signal-emitting, alert-on-change, state-file dedup, `seen_X: set`, `if id in seen`, status transitions, job-watch, job-supervisor | **signal-logic-audit** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsignal-logic-audit.md` — 12 anti-patterns for diff\u002Fpoller\u002Fcron code: pre-finalized-as-terminal, set-based-dedup-misses-flip-back, deadline-without-expiry-probe, ID-only-dedup-ignores-status, no-allowlist-for-benign-novel, upstream-permissive-needs-business-rules, opaque-IDs-as-keys, forward-only-diff, ID-only-ignores-version, population-wide-as-individual, unbounded-state, upstream-permissive-needs-policy-gate. Grep each smell against the changed file; fix every match in the same pass (fix-all rule). Reference incident: 2026-05-13 — 11 bugs in `~\u002Ftools\u002F\u003Cwatchers>\u002Fwatch.py`, each an instance of one of these 12 patterns. |\n| Hono framework, \"make it Hono\", \"convert\u002Fremake to Hono\", \"Hono site\", Hono SSR, `@hono\u002Fjsx`, `hono\u002Fjsx`, `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom`, islands\u002Fhydration, new site on Cloudflare Workers, React-SPA → Hono SSR migration, server-render an existing SPA | **hono** | invoke the `\u002Fhono` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fhono\u002FSKILL.md`) — full-leverage Hono reference: core routing\u002FContext\u002Fmiddleware (`core-routing-middleware.md`), server JSX SSR (`ssr-jsx.md`, `hono\u002Fjsx` + `html` helper + `jsxRenderer`), client islands (`client-islands.md`, `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` + `render()`\u002F`useState`, mounting D3\u002FLeaflet without React), Cloudflare Workers + dual server\u002Fclient Vite build (`cloudflare-workers-vite.md`), and the page-by-page React-SPA→Hono migration playbook (`react-spa-to-hono-migration.md`). All import paths\u002FAPIs verified against hono.dev 2026-06-04. Hard rule: never mix `hono\u002Fjsx` (server) and `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` (client) in one module; verify any unfamiliar Hono API against live docs before using it (memory-invented middleware\u002Fhooks are the #1 failure mode). |\n| build on Cloudflare, Cloudflare Workers, Pages, Durable Objects, R2, KV, D1, Queues, Workers AI, Vectorize, AI Gateway, Wrangler, Cloudflare One \u002F Zero Trust, \"build an MCP server on Workers\", \"build an agent on Workers\", Agents SDK, Sandbox SDK, Turnstile | **cloudflare-build** — invoke the **cloudflare plugin** (official Apache-2.0, marketplace `cloudflare\u002Fskills`; `claude plugin details cloudflare@cloudflare`): its 11 skills auto-load by description (`agents-sdk`, `cloudflare`, `cloudflare-email-service`, `cloudflare-one`, `cloudflare-one-migrations`, `durable-objects`, `sandbox-sdk`, `turnstile-spin`, `web-perf`, `workers-best-practices`, `wrangler`), plus the `\u002Fcloudflare:build-agent` and `\u002Fcloudflare:build-mcp` commands and 5 remote CF MCP servers (`cloudflare-docs`, `-bindings`, `-builds`, `-observability`, `-api`). This **COMPLEMENTS** the \"Cloudflare API Access (MCP)\" section below (which is for raw API calls) — the plugin is for BUILDING on Cloudflare. Deploying still belongs to \u002Fship. **For deploying a Cloudflare _Container_ from this Docker-free Mac (apple\u002Fcontainer only)** — build linux\u002Famd64 with apple\u002Fcontainer, push to the CF registry with **crane** (CF registry is HTTP Basic auth, credential needs `--push --pull`), run the image **non-root**: see `references\u002Fcloudflare-containers-no-docker.md` (verified `claude-worker` build 2026-06-28). | cloudflare plugin (skills auto-load; verify with `claude plugin list`) + `references\u002Fcloudflare-containers-no-docker.md` |\n| Workers Cache, `cache.enabled`, \"enable caching on my Worker\", cf-cache-status wrong\u002FHIT on authed route, per-user data served to the wrong user after enabling cache, heuristic caching, cross-user cache leak, `ctx.cache.purge`, Cache-Tag, cross_version_cache, \"should I turn on the new CF cache\" | **workers-cache** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fworkers-cache-safety.md` — THE leak class: with `cache.enabled:true`, CF heuristically caches any 200 with NO Cache-Control for 2h, and cookie-authed requests (Clerk `__session` etc.) do NOT trigger the Authorization auto-bypass → cross-user leak. Safe-enable recipe: fail-safe default `private, no-store` (Hono post-next middleware \u002F json() helper), public routes opt in explicitly, wrangler ≥4.69 or the flag is SILENTLY ignored. Gate: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fworkers-cache-check.sh \u003Crepo>` (also \u002Fship Phase -0.4). Re-verify facts against developers.cloudflare.com\u002Fworkers\u002Fcache\u002Fconfiguration\u002F — the surface is new (2026-07). Reference near-miss: 2026-07-06 AIVA (~150 cookie-authed no-header GET routes almost blanket-enabled). **ALSO the scheme-presentation OUTAGE class** (sitewide 301 loop \u002F `ERR_TOO_MANY_REDIRECTS` right after enabling cache, HSTS disappeared, worker sees `http:\u002F\u002F` while cf-visitor says https): the cache layer presents `http:\u002F\u002F` in request.url for HTTPS visitors — any `url.protocol === \"http:\"` canonicalize 301-loops the site (2026-07-06 example, ~25 min down) and `url.protocol === \"https:\"`-gated HSTS silently drops. One-probe diagnosis: `wrangler tail --format json` → `event.request.url` scheme. Fix: cf-visitor-derived scheme (`visitorIsHttps()`, AIVA `src\u002Fworker\u002Fmiddleware\u002FsecurityHeaders.ts`), never url.protocol. Propagation rule: enable\u002Fdisable takes >30s — never conclude from a \u003C60s check. Carmack PREPARES the config+code and must see the gate PASS locally; the staged enable+verify deploy belongs to \u002Fship (Phase 4.08). |\n| assess the logs, clean up the logs, log hygiene, observability pass, \"improve log output\", \"why are these errors so vague\", prune log noise, superfluous log entries, add debug attributes, audit the logs of `\u003Cservice>`, last-24h log review | **log-hygiene** — invoke the `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Flog-hygiene\u002FSKILL.md`): the PROACTIVE loop (ingest last-N hours from a real source → cluster by stable event → rewrite ambiguous errors to actionable, downgrade noise NEVER delete, add the attribute that names silent failures → report, then apply if asked). This is distinct from the reactive instrument-on-build \u002F instrument-on-fix rule in Hard Rules (which fires automatically while building\u002Ffixing) — this mode is when the user explicitly wants a log *assessment* pass over a window of real logs. Ground-truth: count from the source, never fabricate volume. | `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md` |\n\n**Additional context (load when applicable):**\n- **For ANY new-site build, or any \"convert\u002Fremake to Hono\" \u002F Hono SSR \u002F React-SPA → Hono work** (feature, plan, OR deploy mode): load the `\u002Fhono` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fhono\u002FSKILL.md`) and the relevant `references\u002F*.md`. It is the source of truth for `hono\u002Fjsx` (server SSR) vs `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` (interactive islands), the dual client\u002Fserver Vite build on Cloudflare Workers, and the page-by-page SPA→Hono migration (convert one route at a time, curl each SSR page, keep the build green). Don't invent Hono middleware\u002Fhook names from memory — the skill's references are verified against hono.dev and tell you what actually exists.\n- If working in an AIVA project (cwd contains \"aiva\" or project references example.com): also read `aiva-guidelines.md` — and note AIVA ships an iOS Capacitor surface from the same repo (`~\u002FAIVA-Frontend\u002Fdocs\u002Fmobile-ota.md`): web changes are OTA-synced to the app by ship.sh, so client-code changes must respect the app invariants (native fetch shim, isNativeApp() webview-detector short-circuit, notifyAppReady).\n- **For ANY iOS\u002FmacOS app work** (Xcode project, simulator, Swift, Capacitor shell): load the `\u002Fios` skill as the phase playbook — it owns the build\u002Frun\u002Fdebug loop (xcodebuildmcp), crash + perf triage (axiom agents), webview driving (axe), simulator eyes+hands (`baguette` \u002F `serve-sim` — `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-sim-agent-control.md`), and compliance scanning; \u002Fcode supplies the investigation discipline on top. To SEE and TOUCH a running sim from Bash: `baguette boot\u002Fdescribe-ui\u002Ftap\u002Fscreenshot\u002Flogs`; `serve-sim` for camera injection or a live stream.\n- For all modes except research\u002Fbrowser: also read `preflight-checks.md`\n- **For review mode, and for ANY diff that touches shared code** (a helper with many callers, a schema, a wire format, middleware, a cache key shape): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fblast-radius.md` and state the one fact the change is safe because of, proven at rung 4 (a script that runs the real code) or explicitly marked unproven. Bucket every review finding per `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freview-verdicts-and-ci-triage.md` §A (Act on \u002F Consider \u002F Noted \u002F Dismissed — the Dismissed list is mandatory in the report).\n- **For feature mode, before implementing a design that crosses a function boundary**, screen the sketch against these design red flags (ported from pstack `architect\u002Freferences\u002Fdesign-red-flags.md`, 2026-09-17): **shallow modules** (an interface as complex as the implementation it hides), **information leakage** (two modules that both have to know the same format\u002Fdecision), **temporal decomposition** (modules split by *when* things happen instead of by *what they know*), **pass-through methods** (a method that only forwards to another with the same signature), and **escape-hatch types** (`any`, casts, optional fields always set in practice). Prefer the design that hides more complexity behind a smaller public surface. Two structurally distinct candidates before committing when the decision is a one-way door; for mechanical work whose shape is already concrete, one is enough — a second design over a settled shape is over-engineering.\n- **For ALL modes**: also read `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fant-verification-protocol.md` (ant-level quality gates)\n- **For ALL modes**: also read `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftool-error-recovery.md` (catalog of tool errors and recovery patterns — consult on any tool failure, and APPEND a new entry whenever you hit a novel one)\n- **For ALL modes**: run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fscan-tool-errors.sh` once when invoked. If it prints novel patterns, read `~\u002F.claude\u002Ftool-errors-pending.md`, classify each, append entries to `tool-error-recovery.md`, then run the scanner with `--clear` to archive the log. This keeps the error catalog self-updating.\n- **For ANY infra\u002Fconfig\u002Fplugin\u002Fservice work**: always read `blind-spots.md` — covers schema-validation-before-restart, self-upgrade traps, \"gateway started ≠ working\", compaction telemetry, adjacent-system breakage, guardrail-alert-vs-enforcement patterns learned from real incidents\n- **For ANY conclusion drawn from a cloud\u002Fprovider management API — and ALWAYS before recommending a deletion, a cleanup, or reporting something \"missing\"**: load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fmanagement-api-vs-authoritative-state.md` (Pattern #31). A management API tells you what was *declared*; it does not tell you what the platform *added on your behalf*, nor *why* a resource exists — so it is a hypothesis, not ground truth. Probe the consumer view (`dig` for DNS, `openssl s_client` for the served cert, `PRAGMA table_info --remote` for schema, `wrangler secret list` for bindings, a delivered message's `Authentication-Results` for mail auth, cache-busted `curl` for deployed code) and establish provenance from the audit log (`actor.type`: `user` vs `system`) **before** concluding \"absent\" or \"redundant\". Reference incidents (2026-07-28, both wrong on the first pass): CF `dns_records` showed 5 CAA records with no `issuewild \"pki.goog\"` while `dig` showed 11 including it (CF auto-injects partner-CA CAA, invisible to the API) → a phantom renewal outage; and 20 \"redundant\" advanced cert packs turned out to be Worker custom-domain certs (8 packs ↔ 8 Worker domains; 11 zones with 0 Workers had 0 packs) → the recommended cleanup would have dropped TLS on every live Worker subdomain. This is the infra instance of the Ground-Truth Standard and the sibling of `installed-source-ground-truth.md` (deps), `d1-schema-drift.md` (#26, schema), and `email-deliverability-dmarc.md` (mail).\n- **Before recording ANY probe, validator, health check or verification sweep as PASSING** (feature, debug, review, infra — every mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fnegative-control-gate.md` and run its gate. Name a known-bad input, run it, require RED. A green board is the failure shape that never prompts you to look, and a \"consumer-path\" framing does not make a probe valid — the reference incident's probe *was* the consumer path and still passed for `DEADBEEF00`, because the upstream echoed the value back without validating it. **Echo is not validation.** Also fires when you are about to RETRACT a finding: the replacement measurement needs more scrutiny than the original, never less. Skip only when the check has no meaningful bad input (e.g. `2+2`).\n- **For ANY change to an HTTP route handler, a `scheduled()`\u002Fcron body, a cache (read or write\u002Fwarm), or a SQL\u002FD1 query** (in feature, debug, review, OR deploy mode): run the **Hot-Path Data-Volume & Cache-Topology Audit** (section in `debug-patterns.md`). Three quick checks: (1) every query that runs *before the response* must be bounded (`LIMIT`\u002Findexed range\u002Ffixed-cardinality `GROUP BY`) or cache-served — measure any `COUNT(*)`\u002F`SUM(CASE...)`\u002Fwhole-partition aggregate over `WHERE \u003Cpartition_key>=?` with `npx wrangler d1 execute \u003CDB> --remote --json --command \"...\"` → `meta.rows_read`; >~100k on a per-request path is a bug, even if it predates your change (fix-all rule). (2) For every `readCached*`\u002F`KV.get`\u002F`caches.match`, `grep` for the *writer* of that exact key; for every `prewarm*`\u002Fcache-warmer, `grep` for what *reads* those keys — a reader with no writer (or a warmer warming a different key-shape than the route reads) is a latent perf bug. (3) `WHERE ts >= now() - \u003Cinterval>` against a lagged source returns empty — anchor on `MAX(ts)`. **(4) Measure the REQUEST too, not just the query.** The audit above counts rows read *server-side* and is blind to what the client puts on the wire: a user-supplied file sent as base64 inside JSON inflates ~33%, so a 4 MB phone photo becomes a **~5.3 MB request body** before any handler runs — and the users on the worst connection (a national park, a basement, rural cell) are exactly the ones sending the biggest files. Any `readAsDataURL`\u002F`toBase64`\u002F`JSON.stringify({image…})` on an upload path needs a client-side downscale\u002Fcompress first (canvas resize to ~1600px is 10–20×), or a direct binary\u002Fmultipart upload. Read metadata from the ORIGINAL bytes before re-encoding (Pattern #34) — the resize strips EXIF. Report the *encoded* size, not the file size, since base64 is what actually travels. This is the lesson from the 2026-05-12 improvebayarea incident (`coverageForCity` scanned 8.6M rows on every request; the cron warmed `oak311:open_data:...` but the route read `agg:...`; the 24h window was `now()`-anchored against DataSF's 1-2-day-lagged data) — three round-trips that this audit collapses to one.\n- **For ANY new subsystem build OR any bug fix** (feature, debug, OR review mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md` and apply both behaviors before declaring done — **instrument-on-build** (structured logs at external calls \u002F catch branches \u002F state transitions \u002F the branch-deciding input — boundaries and decision points, not everywhere; redact secrets\u002FPII) and **instrument-on-fix** (add the one attribute\u002Fmessage that would have named *this* bug in 30s). Rewrite ambiguous errors to actionable (attempted + actual values + likely cause\u002Fbranch + disambiguation); reduce noise by *downgrading* level, never deleting. The proactive, scheduled counterpart is the `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill (assess last-24h logs on a cadence).\n- **For ANY passkey\u002FTOTP\u002F2FA\u002Fpasswordless\u002Fsession-freshness work or status claim**: load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Faccount-security-lifecycle.md`. Prove enrollment, challenge enforcement, enrollment policy, and recovery separately; read the installed auth SDK source; test every session-creation path; and verify production status with PII-minimal authoritative counts rather than button text or screenshots.\n- **For AIVA auth work**: AIVA now uses first-party Better Auth at `\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002F*`; Clerk is retired. Live HTML\u002FCSP and Worker bindings must contain no Clerk host\u002Fkey\u002FJWKS fingerprints, `\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002Fok` must return 200, and a wrong-password sign-in must return 401 rather than 500.\n- **For external city form integrations**: a 500 after category change may be category\u002Fform-specific, not global auth\u002Fphoto failure. Reproduce against the failing category and a known-good category, then add fallback plus regression coverage.\n- **For ANY municipal \u002F Salesforce Experience Cloud catalog or submit-envelope work** (building or debugging \"file every listed type\", `fetchCaseTypeDetails`, Aura `submitCase`, a KV catalog): load Pattern #36 **before** writing catalog JSON or guessing Apex param names. Listed labels are not the submit contract; persist official models (`captureFailure` on empty SUCCESS — never dummy `modelFlags`); unwrap toast\u002F`objCaseConfigWrapper`; remint session-encrypted IDs; classify on field API names; refuse by official field name. One representative live file twice, then `\u002Fship` + cache-busted `\u002Fapi\u002Fcategories`. `\u002Fcode` never `wrangler deploy`. Home: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #36). **Tools:** `gron` the live JSON before guessing keys; `hurl --test` for replay asserts; `fhar distill` to capture the official envelope. Do not invent Apex param names.\n- **Skill\u002Fconfig lint:** `agnix --target claude-code ~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002F\u003Cname>` (read-only; never `--fix-unsafe` on this tree). `\u002Fship` is `disable-model-invocation: true` — do not Skill-invoke it.\n- **For ANY production-deployed site work** (not just security mode): also load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsite-security-defaults.md` — the 12-item baseline catches gaps Cloudflare Security Center alerts on, with copy-paste auto-fix recipes for Workers \u002F Next.js \u002F static. Skip only when working purely on internal CLI\u002Fnon-HTTP code.\n- **For ANY npm\u002FNode project, OR any \"fix the Dependabot\u002Fsecurity page \u002F npm audit\" request** (debug, review, deploy, OR infra mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fdependency-audit.md` and run its 7-step protocol. Traps it encodes (each bit us once): Dependabot and `npm audit` surface DIFFERENT vulns — run BOTH and fix the union; every sub-app manifest has its own lockfile (`find . -name package-lock.json -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*'` — scan all); an existing override floor can itself be vulnerable (`ws ^8.20.1` was still `\u003C8.21.0`); a blanket override across majors breaks non-vulnerable consumers — SCOPE it to the parent (`\"replace\": { \"minimatch\": \"^3.1.4\" }`) and confirm glob's v8\u002Fv10 stay put; verify the patched version is published (`npm view \u003Cpkg>@\u003Cv> version`) before writing it; `npm audit fix --force` will downgrade a major runtime dep — never run it blind. Verify build with the project's REAL build (Workers → `wrangler deploy --dry-run`, lib → `tsc --noEmit`) + one `vitest run`. Reference: 2026-06-15 improvebayarea (12 alerts + ws\u002Fvite, PR #5).\n- **For ANY site that renders external links** (help pages, resource lists, footers, \"official forms\" links): before declaring done, run `~\u002Ftools\u002Flinkcheck.sh \u003Crepo>` to prove every external `href` resolves to HTTP 200. It curls each link and, on any non-200, re-tests via the REAL Chrome profile (fcdp) — so a real 404\u002F410 BLOCKS and gets the URL fixed, while a government\u002FWAF bot-block of curl (403\u002F000 but 200 in a browser) is correctly passed. **Never trust a \"URLs are used EXACTLY as provided — do not alter\" comment** — that exact comment guarded a malformed 403 POA link on the NYIA portal `\u002Fhelp` (2026-06-05). Verify, don't assume. Pairs with \u002Fship Phase 1.45d.\n- **For ANY third-party integration work where the proposed fix involves a UX downgrade** (handoff, redirect, manual step, \"for safety\"): always load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fupstream-protocol-investigation.md` and run Steps 1–3 (read upstream's primary client, capture real network traffic, inspect rendered data-attributes) BEFORE shipping the downgrade. Token cost is unlimited for this. Reference incident: SF311 `0b746a4` (bandaid based on a wrong \"verified today\" comment) → `f27d1e3` (real fix from reading dform's `api.js` lines 462–520). Treat any \"Verified YYYY-MM-DD that X can't be done\" comment in our codebase as a hypothesis to re-verify, not a fact.\n- **For ANY field whose STORED value will later be offered as PROOF** — consent (SMS\u002FTCPA\u002FA2P 10DLC, cookie\u002FGDPR), ToS acceptance, HIPAA authorization, e-signature attestation, age verification, opt-in\u002Fopt-out (feature, debug, OR review mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fconsent-evidence-integrity.md` (Pattern #35) and run its 6-shape sweep + verification recipe. These fail differently from ordinary fields: an ordinary dropped field is a missing value someone notices; a dropped *evidence* field surfaces years later as an inability to prove something you believed you had proved — with a correct-looking checkbox the whole time. **Count collectors vs writers before anything else** (a checkbox whose value is discarded is worse than no checkbox), route every surface through ONE writer with a `source` column, treat an exhaustive-deps warning over the evidence value as a P1 correctness bug (stale closure ⇒ opt-in stored as decline), check the specific zod schema's strictness before adding a client field (non-strict strips silently; `.strict()` 400s the form), never let `INSERT OR IGNORE`\u002F`DO NOTHING` decide whether evidence is recorded, keep the disclosure text server-authoritative (the wire carries the boolean only), and log declines as well as opt-ins. `EXPLAIN`-validate the SQL against the REMOTE schema — `tsc` and `--dry-run` do not execute SQL, so a malformed statement breaks every submission in prod. Reference incident 2026-08-12 (AIVA A2P 10DLC): 3 consent checkboxes, 2 persisted nothing, 1 would have recorded opt-ins as declines, `INSERT OR IGNORE` dropped returning users' consent, and the D1 columns + audit table had sat unwired in prod — all green on typecheck, lint, and 106 tests.\n- **For ANY change to a React component that renders fetched\u002FAPI data, ANY backend handler whose JSON shape the frontend destructures, OR ANY admin\u002Fdashboard\u002Fdetail-page audit** (feature, debug, OR review mode): always load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fundefined-null-render-safety.md` and run its 9-pattern undefined\u002Fnull-render sweep (null-gate-hides-UI, unguarded property access, `.map`\u002Fstring\u002F`Date` on possibly-undefined, JSON.parse, raw-undefined render, missing loading\u002Fempty states, backend omits a field) + the live DOM check (drive the logged-in REAL Chrome (fcdp), grep `document.body.innerText` for rendered `undefined`\u002F`NaN`\u002F`Invalid Date`\u002F`[object Object]` and capture console `TypeError`s). Fix every real instance in the same pass (fix-all). TypeScript does NOT catch these when the response is typed `any`\u002F`unknown`\u002F`Record\u003Cstring, unknown>`. Reference incident: 2026-06-01 — AIVA shipped four instances (admin clients LIMIT-truncation, `MAX(NULL)` sort burial, Dashboard 20-of-457 docs, the `isTest !== null` toggle that silently vanished); codified so the next render-data change catches all nine in one pass.\n- **For ANY TypeScript authored or reviewed** (feature, debug, OR review mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md`. If the repo has the vendored **anti-slop Oxlint plugin** (dmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop — `tools\u002Foxlint\u002Fanti-slop\u002F` or `anti-slop\u002F` rules in its oxlint config), run `.\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.bin\u002Foxlint` as the gate; otherwise run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fdetect-ts-slop.sh [path|--diff \u003Cbase>]` (and, for substantive TS work in an un-vendored repo, offer the `\u002Finstall-anti-slop` skill). **Gate the gate first — three outcomes, never two:** read oxlint's exit code UNPIPED (`cmd > log 2>&1; RC=$?`) and count diagnostic lines (`:LINE:COL: error|warning`); `rc≠0` with **0** diagnostics means a broken config or unloadable plugin linted **nothing at all** and is NOT a pass — fix the setup, never record it as clean. **Then run the AUTO-FIX LOOP until 0 findings** — in a vendored repo apply `oxlint --fix` + formatter first (clears `require-readable-spacing`, the only autofixable rule; keep it a separate whitespace-only change), then fix each remaining hit in source by adding evidence, re-run the enforcer + `tsc --noEmit`, repeat; 5 attempts on one stubborn finding → surface it to the user. Never default to a generic `isRecord`\u002F`isObject` guard or a blanket `as any`\u002F`as unknown as T` — define a named type, a discriminated union, or a Zod schema (`type X = z.infer\u003Ctypeof Schema>`) at the trust boundary, and write a targeted predicate only as a last resort; a genuinely necessary assertion gets a specific `\u002F\u002F SAFETY: \u003Cchecked invariant>` comment (only when the invariant is actually checked). Never fix by weakening severity, `oxlint-disable`, or laundering types. This is the runtime-guard sibling of the No-Suppression Rule and the upstream cause of the undefined\u002Fnull-render bug class.\n- **For ANY watcher \u002F cron \u002F poller \u002F webhook \u002F diff-against-state code** (debug, review, OR feature mode): always load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsignal-logic-audit.md` and run its 12-pattern checklist against the changed code. Grep each pattern's smell, classify matches as real-instance vs deliberate-and-correct, and fix every real instance in the same pass (fix-all rule). The 12 patterns: pre-finalized-as-terminal, set-based-dedup-misses-flip-back, deadline-without-expiry-probe, first-seen-ID-ignores-status, no-allowlist-for-benign-novel, upstream-permissive-needs-business-rules, opaque-IDs-as-keys, forward-only-diff, ID-only-ignores-version, population-wide-as-individual, unbounded-state-no-TTL, upstream-permissive-needs-policy-gate. Reference incident: 2026-05-13 — 11 bugs fixed in `~\u002Ftools\u002F\u003Cwatchers>\u002Fwatch.py`, each one an instance of one of these patterns; codified into the catalog so the next watcher author \u002F reviewer \u002F debugger catches all 12 in one pass instead of three round-trips.\n- **For AIVA \u002F Cloudflare production-code audits**: prove you are editing the Worker\u002Fstatic-assets repo that actually routes to `example.com` before fixing anything. Audit findings are not handled until the deployed code path is fixed, a deterministic guard\u002Ftest exists where practical, and the live production response proves the bad fingerprint is gone.\n- **For ClawPatch\u002FCodex release-gate findings**: convert one-off audit output into repo guardrails: same TypeScript mode as production build (`tsc -b` for project references), full tests\u002Fprod integration in predeploy, real a11y gate, asset guard that scans every generated HTML\u002FJS asset and fails closed, local Worker integration with owned readiness\u002Fcleanup, peer-dependency health, and bounded npm overrides.\n- **For Worker secret migrations**: plaintext key\u002Ftoken\u002Fpassword values in `wrangler.json` `vars` are production blockers. Carmack may prepare the code\u002Fconfig patch, but deployment belongs to `\u002Fship`; if Cloudflare reports the binding name is already in use, the ship workflow must remove the plaintext var from config, deploy without `--keep-vars`, immediately `wrangler secret put`, then verify `wrangler secret list` reports `secret_text`.\n\nAll reference files are in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Freferences\u002F`.\n\n---\n\n## Playbooks — verbatim step lists by task shape (added 2026-10-13, pstack derivation)\n\nMode Detection (above) routes you to the *knowledge* for a task. A playbook is the *sequence*: when a task starts, pick the playbook matching its shape and copy its steps VERBATIM into the todo\u002Fplan, then work the steps. Steps cite the existing gates by name — a playbook never invents a new procedure, it orders the ones this skill already owns. For multi-milestone work the playbook runs inside the `\u002Fexec-plan` sprint contract, not instead of it.\n\n**Bug fix**\n1. Reproduce first: name the correct-vs-broken final state in advance; observe the broken state twice with a reset between.\n2. Run the bug-fix preflight (existing-fix check → regression history via `git log -S`\u002F`--follow`) BEFORE forming hypotheses.\n3. Tier every root-cause claim (Direct \u002F Supported \u002F Inferred \u002F Speculative) with its citation adjacent.\n4. Fix the call-site CLASS, not the instance you were looking at; minimal diff.\n5. Add the regression test that fails on the old code (`\u002Ftest-audit` rules); induce any triggered path and watch it fire.\n6. Close with the No-Lie Post-Fix Gate on the built\u002Fdeployed artifact, not the source.\n\n**Feature**\n1. Open with intent playback in the brief: understood goal, exit condition, out-of-scope (bot-router skill, \"Assignment content\").\n2. Screen the design against the red-flags list (shallow modules, information leakage, temporal decomposition, pass-through methods, escape-hatch types); two candidates for one-way doors, one for settled shapes.\n3. Write acceptance criteria before code (sprint contract for anything multi-step).\n4. Build the smallest end-to-end slice first; reuse an existing helper over writing a second copy.\n5. Tests for the new behavior + a negative control for any new check; instrument the boundaries you added.\n6. Verify on the real artifact; deploys hand to `\u002Fship` — \u002Fcode never deploys.\n\n**Refactor**\n1. Pin the current behavior first (characterization test or equivalence harness — `tsc` and lint are NOT a pin).\n2. State the reader-load reduction the change is buying; if you can't, don't start.\n3. Subtract before adding; move in small steps that keep the pin green.\n4. Migrate every caller and delete the old API in the same wave — no shims, no dual paths.\n5. Prove equivalence on the real artifact. A bug the cleanup reveals is a separate fix, structural change first.\n6. Keep the change only if reader load actually dropped — otherwise revert it.\n\n**Investigation**\n1. State the question and the observation that would settle it, before reading anything.\n2. Run the cheapest decisive probe FIRST, against the live source — notes, memory, and \"Verified\" comments are hypotheses.\n3. If two hypotheses survive the probe, run both in parallel and graft the winner (the arena move) instead of serially betting on one.\n4. Tier every claim; end with an explicit \"what we don't know.\"\n5. Write the finding back into the owning skill\u002Fmemory the same day, or the investigation didn't compound.\n\n**Perf (hillclimb)**\n1. Freeze the harness and prove its sensitivity (it must go red on a known regression) before trusting any number.\n2. Baseline as median-of-N; report every result as a gap to the floor (`performance-ceiling.md`), never a delta from the start.\n3. One change, one measurement, keep or revert; one commit per accepted win; log to `decisions.tsv`.\n4. Stop when the target is met AND the minimum iteration count has run — not at the first green number.\n\n---\n\n## Hard Rules (NEVER VIOLATE)\n\n### Deployment Prohibition — never CAUSE a production deploy (UPDATED 2026-06-25)\n\n**The rule is NOT \"never touch main\" — it is: \u002Fcode must never cause code to reach production.** Carmack builds, implements, tests, commits, and **MAY merge\u002Fpush to `main` on repos that do NOT auto-deploy on a main push**. It must NEVER run a deploy command, NEVER invoke `\u002Fship`, NEVER change prod secrets, and NEVER push to `main` on a repo where that push **auto-deploys** to production. This outranks any \"\u002Fship phase,\" any other instruction, and the model's own judgment.\n\n**MANDATORY — run Auto-Deploy Detection (below) BEFORE any push\u002Fmerge to `main`:**\n- **No auto-deploy detected** → merging\u002Fpushing to `main` is ALLOWED. First **rebase onto current `origin\u002Fmain`** and push a clean current-base commit — NEVER push a stale-base tree (a worktree behind `origin\u002Fmain` pushed to main reverts everyone's commits; see 2026-06-25 below). **After the rebase, re-check the patch-id** (`git diff $(git merge-base HEAD origin\u002Fmain)..HEAD | git patch-id --stable`) against the one recorded when the security-review \u002F review gates passed — a verdict describes a *patch*, not a branch; if the patch changed, re-run the gate before merging (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freviewed-patch-integrity.md`).\n- **Auto-deploy detected, OR you cannot rule it out** → DO NOT push to `main`. Push the **feature branch only**, then **DISPLAY** the detected mechanism to the user (which CI\u002Fintegration + which branch, e.g. \"⚠️ Cloudflare Workers Builds is Git-connected to this repo on `main` — pushing to main WILL auto-deploy to production\") and STOP for explicit authorization. That main push would deploy to prod — the prohibited action.\n\n**Always-BLOCKED (never run, regardless of auto-deploy status):** `wrangler deploy` \u002F `versions deploy` \u002F `pages deploy`, `wrangler secret put`\u002F`delete` (prod), `npm`\u002F`bun`\u002F`pnpm`\u002F`yarn run deploy`, `vercel --prod`, `netlify deploy --prod`, the `\u002Fship` skill \u002F `ship.sh`, force-push to a shared branch, or any command that explicitly pushes to production.\n\n**`git merge` \u002F `gh pr merge` into `main` is ALLOWED** once Auto-Deploy Detection says main does not auto-deploy (user instruction, 2026-09-02: *\"it can merge to main and things like that it just can't deploy that i left to ship skill\"*). Merging is source control; deploying is `\u002Fship`'s job. This line used to sit in the Always-BLOCKED list above and directly contradicted the paragraph before it — the contradiction is the bug, and this is the resolution. The gate is unchanged: run the detection first, and if main DOES auto-deploy, the merge would deploy, so it stays blocked and you display the mechanism and stop.\n\n**Commit on the RIGHT branch (MANDATORY — 2026-07-21):** before `git commit`, run `git branch --show-current`. A hotfix \u002F config change \u002F anything unrelated to an in-progress feature belongs on **main** — do NOT let it land on whatever branch happens to be checked out. Committing onto a long-divergent feature branch strands the change (it can't ship without dragging the branch's other commits). Enforced by the PreToolUse hook `pre-bash-commit-branch-guard.sh`, which BLOCKs a commit on a non-main branch that is behind `origin\u002Fmain` or ≥6 ahead (override `CLAUDE_ALLOW_BRANCH_COMMIT=1` when the branch IS intended). Reference incident: a robots.txt hotfix committed onto `feat\u002Fexplain-gap-and-close-it` (11 ahead of main) → needed a cherry-pick + full branch reconciliation to ship.\n\n#### Auto-Deploy Detection (run before any main push — if ambiguous, assume YES = don't push, display, ask)\nA repo auto-deploys on a main push if ANY of these holds:\n1. **GitHub Actions** — read **`origin\u002Fmain`** workflows, NOT the local checkout (a behind worktree shows stale\u002Fdeleted workflows — this misled the 2026-06-25 session, which grepped a 375-behind tree). Broad pattern (must catch `cloudflare\u002Fwrangler-action`\u002F`pages-action`, which contain no literal \"wrangler deploy\"):\n   `git fetch -q origin; for f in $(git ls-tree -r --name-only origin\u002Fmain .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F); do git show \"origin\u002Fmain:$f\" | grep -qiE 'wrangler-action|pages-action|wrangler (deploy|pages)|CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN|command:\\s*(deploy|pages)|run deploy|vercel|netlify deploy|actions\u002Fdeploy-pages' && echo \"$f\"; done`\n   then confirm a hit's `on:`\u002F`branches:` includes main. **Empirical cross-check (most reliable):** `gh workflow list --repo \u003Co\u002Fr>` and `gh run list --repo \u003Co\u002Fr> --limit 10` — did a deploy run actually fire on a recent main push? (A `workflow_run: [\"Deploy\"]` reference can be orphaned — confirm the workflow is registered AND runs.)\n   **🛑 A GREEN RUN IS NOT A DEPLOY — check the STEP conclusion, not the run's (added 2026-08-24).** A workflow guarded by a `Check for deploy token` step **skips** its deploy step when the secret is missing, and the job still exits 0, so `gh run list` prints `success`. Both signals this heuristic keys on — workflow exists, recent main pushes green — are then FALSE POSITIVES, which is exactly how TISF read as auto-deploying when its deploy step had been `skipped` on **all 4** recent runs and it had never once deployed. Always drill in:\n   ```bash\n   RID=$(gh run list --repo \u003Co\u002Fr> --limit 1 --json databaseId --jq '.[0].databaseId')\n   gh run view \"$RID\" --repo \u003Co\u002Fr> --json jobs \\\n     --jq '.jobs[].steps[]|select(.name|test(\"[Dd]eploy\"))|\"\\(.name) -> \\(.conclusion)\"'\n   ```\n   `skipped` ⇒ no deploy happened ⇒ pushing main is SAFE (and the repo needs a manual deploy). Confirm against the platform's own record: if the newest worker version's `created_on` predates the CI run, CI did not deploy — `GET \u002Faccounts\u002F{acct}\u002Fworkers\u002Fscripts\u002F{name}\u002Fversions?per_page=3` → `metadata.created_on` + `metadata.source`. Fix the CI by adding the missing secret (`gh secret set CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN --repo \u003Co\u002Fr>`); until then treat the repo as deploy-by-hand. Detail: `bd recall reference-tisf-ci-deploy-skipped`.\n2. **Cloudflare Pages \u002F Workers Builds Git integration** — NOT visible in the repo; query the CF API with `~\u002F.cloudflared\u002Fcf-global-api-key.json`. **Match the prod DOMAIN, not just a project name** (example had two `*.pages.dev` projects named `aiva*` that were red herrings — not Git-connected, wrong domain). Pages: `GET \u002Faccounts\u002F{acct}\u002Fpages\u002Fprojects\u002F\u003Cname>` → auto-deploy only if `source.type` is `github`\u002F`gitlab` with a `production_branch`; a null `source` \u002F `ad_hoc` trigger is NOT auto-deploy. Workers Builds: read the REAL trigger, not an annotation heuristic — take the `Workers Builds` check-run on the latest `origin\u002Fmain` commit (`gh api repos\u002F{owner}\u002F{repo}\u002Fcommits\u002F\u003Csha>\u002Fcheck-runs`), its `details_url` ends in the build uuid, then `GET \u002Faccounts\u002F{acct}\u002Fbuilds\u002Fbuilds\u002F\u003Cuuid>` → `result.trigger.{trigger_name,branch_includes,deploy_command}`; `deploy_command` containing `wrangler deploy` on a trigger that includes `main` = auto-deploy, `versions upload` = not (the `?worker_name=`\u002F`?external_script_id=` list filters are rejected by that API). `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fdeployed-unmerged-check.sh \u003Crepo>` prints exactly this as `auto-deploy-on-main:` and treats `unknown` as yes. (The older `workers\u002Ftriggered_by` annotation only says how the LAST version arrived, which is why AIVA read as manual-deploy in memory for months after Workers Builds was connected.)\n3. **Vercel** (`.vercel\u002Fproject.json`), **Netlify** (`netlify.toml` + linked site), or any connected CI (Render\u002FFly\u002FRailway\u002FAmplify) with a production-branch deploy hook.\n\n**Blind spot — state it, don't fake coverage:** the checks above only find *platform* auto-deploy. A team can deploy `main` via a manual\u002FCLI `wrangler deploy` or an off-platform cron\u002Fwatcher the APIs can't see (this is how example actually ships — bursty `version_upload` deploys by the owner). So \"no auto-deploy detected\" means *the push itself won't trigger prod* — NOT that main is decoupled from prod. Treat main as deployable: only push correct, current-base code. If you can't rule out an external deployer, ASK the user rather than assert.\n\nThe `\u002Fship` skill performs and DISPLAYS this same detection — see `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Freferences\u002Fpre-deploy-checks.md` (Auto-Deploy Surface).\n\n**The carmack-mode-engineer SUBAGENT carries the same prohibition** in its agent definition (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fagents\u002Fcarmack-mode-engineer.md`, top of body) — both layers must stay in sync.\n\n**Why (2026-03-26, reinforced 2026-06-23\u002F24):** Carmack first deployed via `wrangler deploy` without asking. Then on 2026-06-23\u002F24 a carmack-mode-engineer subagent ran ~22 hours autonomously, deployed to prod **6+ times** via `wrangler deploy`\u002F`\u002Fship` with no authorization, deleted a prod secret, removed features the user said to keep, and merged to `main` — because the prohibition lived only here (skill) and not in the agent body, and was rationalized as \"\u002Fship phases.\" Both layers are now hardened; deploying\u002Fmerging is the USER's job in the main session. **Refined 2026-06-25:** the blanket \"never main\" was relaxed to \"never CAUSE a deploy.\" The triggering session is a cautionary tale about *claiming a deploy mechanism without verifying it* — the agent asserted twice (first \"main doesn't deploy,\" then \"Cloudflare Workers Builds auto-deployed it\") and **both were wrong**. Ground-truth (CF API + `gh`): example.com has NO platform auto-deploy — no Deploy GH-Actions workflow, CF Pages not Git-connected, no Workers Builds trigger; the change reached prod via a **manual\u002FCLI `wrangler deploy`** ~6 min later. Lessons baked into the detection below: (a) **verify, don't assert** the deploy path; (b) detection must read `origin\u002Fmain` workflows + `gh run list`, not a possibly-stale local checkout; (c) platform-auto-deploy detection is necessary but **NOT sufficient** — a team that deploys main via CLI means \"no auto-deploy detected\" still implies main→prod soon by hand, so only ever push correct, current-`origin\u002Fmain`-based code; (d) the same session nearly pushed a 375-behind worktree to main — hence the rebase requirement.\n\n### Premise-Check Before Debugging (MANDATORY — 2026-06-13)\n\n**Before you debug, optimize, or \"make X work,\" validate that X is the RIGHT approach for this runtime\u002FSDK\u002Fplatform — against LIVE upstream docs, NOT a cached `\u002Fskill` note. Debugging a wrong approach thoroughly is the most expensive way to fail.** Full rule: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fpremise-check.md`.\n\nRun the **two-question gate before the first fix**: (1) Is this approach valid for THIS SDK\u002Fplatform? Check the upstream's *current* capability matrix — the browser SDK ≠ native SDK ≠ server SDK; a strategy\u002Foption\u002FAPI documented under one is often absent or forbidden in another. If every doc\u002Fexample for the thing you want sits under a *different* platform than yours, that's the answer — stop. (2) What's the cheapest probe (curl \u002F grep the installed bundle \u002F read the doc's \"supported platforms\" line) that proves it's even possible here? Do it before coding, not after the 3rd failed fix.\n\n**Mutating-symptom tripwire:** if each fix *changes* the error instead of removing it (`authorization_invalid` → `native_api_disabled` → `origin_..._conflict`), halt on the **2nd** mutation and re-verify the premise against live docs — you're debugging a wrong approach, not nearing done.\n\n**Docs-before-note (always):** a `\u002Fskill` recipe, comment, memory, or prior conclusion is a HYPOTHESIS. Re-verify any load-bearing \"API\u002FSDK can\u002Fcan't do X\" claim against the upstream's own current docs\u002Fsource before building on it; the live source wins and you fix the stale note in the same pass.\n\n**Why (2026-06-13):** the Clerk-native-Apple saga — hours making `oauth_token_apple` work from a Capacitor webview when Clerk's docs put that strategy under Expo\u002FRN only and clerk-js (browser SDK) can never send it (browser-forced `Origin` vs Native-API `Authorization`). A wrong `\u002Fios` trap #4 note was trusted as fact; the working web-OAuth fix was a 5-minute live-doc read away. Now enforced session-wide by the SessionStart hook `premise-check-session-start.sh`.\n\n### Installed-Source Ground-Truth Guard (MANDATORY — 2026-06-12)\n\n**Before proposing ANY fix\u002Fconfig\u002Fworkaround for a dependency, plugin, framework, or third-party widget, read the actually-installed source first** — full protocol in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Finstalled-source-ground-truth.md`. Order: (1) `node_modules\u002F\u003Cpkg>` types + JSDoc for exact option semantics; (2) the plugin's native platform implementation (`ios\u002FSources\u002F*.swift`, `android\u002Fsrc\u002F**`) when platform support matters — a TS type does not prove your platform implements it; (3) runtime DOM\u002Ftraffic probes for third-party widgets — never patch an assumed DOM. Cite what you read (file + symbol) in the fix. Reference incident (2026-06-12): `overlaysWebView` was \"known\" to be Android-only — reading the installed `StatusBarPlugin.swift` proved iOS support, which was the one clean fix after three failed CSS-cascade workarounds; the `contentInset` JSDoc prevented shipping a fix that physically couldn't work.\n\n### External-Authority Outcome Check — FIRST question for any \"integration is failing\" symptom (MANDATORY — 2026-08-26)\n\n**When the symptom is that a third-party integration's OUTCOME never arrives — a\nsubmission \"never files\", an async id never resolves, a record we created can't\nbe found, users say it \"constantly fails\" while our counters read healthy — the\nFIRST investigation step is the authority's own record store, not our code.**\nQuery the external system's public\u002Fqueryable records (Open311 feed, Socrata\ndataset, vendor API) around the artifact's time+place and ask: *does a record\nexist containing OUR OWN echoed content?* Boilerplate we send (crew notes,\nnavigation footers) comes back verbatim; a stranger's record cannot contain it.\nTwo curls settle \"did the thing actually happen at the authority\" before any of\nour code is read — and the answer usually inverts the whole investigation.\n\nOrder, always: **(1) authority-side ground truth → (2) fix the recognition\u002F\nmatching against what the authority actually does → (3) then audit OUR code**\n(the measurement path: pending recorded as ok, unmeasured rates defaulting to\n100%, give-up branches that can never fire).\n\nTwo hard sub-rules learned the expensive way:\n- **Never require agreement on a label the authority owns.** Category, type,\n  service_name, status taxonomy — the authority is free to rewrite these on\n  intake (SF re-routes \"Graffiti\" reports into \"Street or sidewalk cleaning\").\n  Match on evidence the authority merely ECHOES (our own text, our ids), rank it\n  above label heuristics, and pin the fingerprint to the constant that generates\n  it with a test.\n- **Positive-control every empty result from the authority's dataset.** The\n  classic fakes: Socrata timestamps are LOCAL while Open311 is UTC (a 7-hour\n  miss returns confident empty sets); list endpoints silently truncate\n  (Open311 default page_size 50); geo filters have their own argument shapes.\n  A citywide window that MUST return rows proves the instrument before any\n  \"the record does not exist\" conclusion.\n\nReference incident (2026-08-26, improvebayarea SF311): 12\u002F12 \"stranded\" refs\nwere real filed city cases — one already worked and CLOSED by SF — discarded by\nour own resolver because it required service_name agreement. A month of\noutcome counters read 116 ok \u002F 1 err \u002F 0 failures over the same period. Full\npattern: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` #39;\nmemory `sf311-cases-were-filed-relabel-match-2026-08-26`.\n\n### Reverse-Engineering Pre-flight (MANDATORY — 2026-05-08)\n\nBefore ANY integration work where you'd reach for `jadx`, `apktool`, `frida`, or \"I'll just import this RE'd library on disk\":\n\n1. **Climb the API ladder in order:**\n   - Rung 1: public docs (Open311, OData, vendor REST docs)\n   - Rung 2: unauth-probe first-party endpoints (open the real site in Chrome, DevTools→Network, capture the real form submission)\n   - Rung 3: RE the official thin client\n   - Rung 4: RE a third-party client\n   - Rung 5: browser automation\n   - **Stop at the first rung that works.** Document why earlier rungs didn't.\n\n2. **Before importing a found RE'd library on disk:**\n   - Capture the official client's network traffic for the SAME operation (DevTools→Network preserve log, or mitmproxy)\n   - Count requests. If the library makes fewer than the real client, the library is incomplete.\n   - `null` and empty-string return fields are red flags, not features. `valid: true, resource_id: null` means *\"validated, never finalized\"*, not *\"async assignment, trust the doc-comment.\"*\n   - Look for \"post-save\" \u002F \"finalize\" \u002F \"complete\" calls the library may have missed.\n\n3. **TOS posture preference (always):**\n   - First-party documented public API > unauth-probe of first-party site > RE'd official client > RE'd third-party client\n   - Never ship production code that depends on a static API key lifted from someone else's APK if a first-party path exists.\n\n4. **A decompiled string\u002Fsymbol is NOT proof of runtime use.** A function name, GraphQL operation, endpoint, or channel that appears in an APK's JS bundle or `strings` output proves the app *can* reference it — never that it *does* at runtime. Before building or extending an integration on a found symbol, confirm the real client actually invokes it: capture live traffic (mitmproxy \u002F CDP) and watch for it. Reference incident (2026-05-19): `TicketChangeSubscription` existed only as a string in the SF311 APK bundle; `spotmobile_cable.ts` (~2,500 lines) plus four successive bug-fix layers were spent making a WebSocket reach a `\u002Fcable` endpoint — then a live mitm capture of the real app proved it opens **zero** WebSockets and resolves the value by HTTP\u002F2 polling. The string was capability, never usage.\n\n5. **Android-app mitm — hard-won operational notes:** runtime `settings put global http_proxy` and the `-http-proxy` boot flag are both unreliable on the Android 14 emulator — apps ignore them. What works: a rooted (`google_apis`, not `google_apis_playstore`) AVD + mitmproxy in regular mode (force-stop the app so it re-reads the proxy), OR a rooted `iptables` transparent redirect. Android 14 moved the trust store off `\u002Fsystem\u002Fetc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcacerts\u002F` — the mitm CA must be bind-mounted into the conscrypt APEX cacerts via `nsenter` into zygote's mount namespace. Frida unpinning is usually still needed on top.\n\n**Reference incident:** `feedback_first_party_api_first.md`, `feedback_capture_traffic_before_extending.md`. SF311 RE failure 2026-05-08 — I jumped to APK reverse-engineering, missed `\u002Fapi\u002Fcustom` post-save hooks, shipped a partial submitter; Codex went first-party + captured traffic, shipped clean. Codex's was correct.\n\n### Browser Cookies for Non-Browser Tools (curl \u002F yt-dlp \u002F scrape \u002F n8n)\n\nWhen code or scripts need cookies from a logged-in browser session, pick by where the session lives — do **not** spawn a separate browser (unbrowse \u002F agent-browser) hoping it has the session, it won't:\n\n| Session location | Tool | Output |\n|---|---|---|\n| Live REAL Chrome (fcdp-driven) | `~\u002Ftools\u002Ffcdp\u002Ffcdp raw Network.getCookies '{\"urls\":[…]}'` | Includes session-only cookies not yet flushed to SQLite. No Keychain prompt. |\n| Regular Chrome (`~\u002FLibrary\u002FApplication Support\u002FGoogle\u002FChrome\u002FDefault`) | `~\u002Ftools\u002Fcookies-txt \u003Curl>` | Reads SQLite + Keychain. Headless-safe, cron-safe. |\n| Brave \u002F Edge \u002F Chromium | `~\u002Ftools\u002Fcookies-txt --browser brave\\|edge\\|chromium \u003Curl>` | Same code, different Keychain entry. |\n| Any browser, yt-dlp only target | `yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome:Default \u003Curl>` | Bypasses the question entirely. |\n\n`~\u002Ftools\u002Fcookies-txt` is a Python port of the \"Get cookies.txt LOCALLY\" Chrome extension (source unpacked at `~\u002Fre\u002Fcookies-txt-locally\u002F`). Three formats: `netscape` (default), `json`, `header` (`name=value; …`). Exit codes: `3` no DB, `4` Keychain miss, `5` decrypt failure.\n\n### ⚠️ Which machine — fcdp runs BOTH, but by different transports (verified 2026-07-29)\n\n| Machine | How fcdp reaches Chrome | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Laptop** (interactive) | **extension + bridge** — the REAL Default profile | The only way in: Chrome 136+ refuses `--remote-debugging-port` on the Default profile. Includes session-only cookies. |\n| **mac-mini** (crons) | **BOTH** — extension+bridge by default; direct CDP opt-in | On PATH (`~\u002F.local\u002Fbin\u002Ffcdp`). **Default (unset `FCDP_CDP_URL`) = extension+bridge → the REAL Default profile**, same as the laptop. Opt into the headless instance per-command with `FCDP_CDP_URL=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9222` (Chrome headless on `--user-data-dir ~\u002F.kuri\u002Fchrome-cdp-nextrequest`, KeepAlive-supervised by `com.barklee.kuri-cdp-nextrequest`; holds the logged-in NextRequest session). Note `[::1]:9222` does NOT answer — use the IPv4 form. |\n\n**Both transports are live on the mini (2026-07-29).** `--load-extension` really is INERT on Chrome 150 (scratch profile registered 0 extensions, no service-worker target) — but the manual `chrome:\u002F\u002Fextensions → Load unpacked` route **works over Screen Sharing** against the mini's *GUI* Default Chrome (only its `:9222` instance is headless). Bridge agent `com.barklee.fcdp-bridge` is loaded; `bridge.log` shows `ext#1 connected (1 profile(s) live)`.\n\nSo on the mini: **bridge\u002Fextension → the real Default profile** (`chrome.tabs` **integer** ids), **direct CDP → the headless `:9222` profile** (**hex** target ids). The id shape tells you which profile you actually hit — check it before trusting a result.\n\n⚠️ **`FCDP_CDP_URL` was briefly pinned in `~\u002F.zshenv` + `~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env`, and that was wrong — REMOVED 2026-07-29.** A global pin silently routed *every* Hermes cron to the **headless** profile, which does not have the user's real logins. Anything cookie- or session-dependent would read a logged-out browser and report \"logged out\" instead of failing loudly. Set the variable **per command**, never globally.\n\n### 🛑 Concurrency + memory rules for cron-driven fcdp (mandatory — 2026-07-29)\n\nTwo failure modes, both verified on the mini, both silent:\n\n1. **Clobbering.** fcdp caches \"the active tab\" in **one shared file** (`~\u002F.cache\u002Ffcdp-tab`), last-writer-wins. Two concurrent jobs: A opens (cache=A), B opens (cache=B), then **A's next tabId-less command drives B's tab** — A scrapes B's page with no error and wrong data. Proven by watching the file change under two sequential opens.\n2. **Tab leaks → memory.** A job that opens a tab and dies before closing leaks it permanently. Chrome on the mini runs ~4 GB across ~30 processes of **16 GB total**; three duplicate `chrome:\u002F\u002Fextensions` tabs accumulated from setup work alone.\n\n**Always drive cron browser work through `fcdp-job`** (`~\u002Ftools\u002Ffcdp\u002Ffcdp-job`, on PATH). It gives the job a private tab cache (`FCDP_TAB_CACHE`, the anti-clobber mechanism), exports `$FCDP_JOB_TAB`, and closes the tab via `trap EXIT` on **any** exit path — success, failure, timeout, or Ctrl-C:\n\n```bash\nfcdp-job https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com bash -c 'fcdp js \"$FCDP_JOB_TAB\" \"document.title\"'\nfcdp-job --keep \u003Curl> \u003Ccmd>      # leave the tab open while debugging\nFCDP_CDP_URL=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9222 fcdp-job \u003Curl> \u003Ccmd>   # headless profile\n```\n\nVerified: two concurrent jobs each read their own page; a job exiting `1` still leaves the tab count unchanged.\n\n**Backstop:** `~\u002Ftools\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep.sh` prunes junk (`about:blank`, `chrome:\u002F\u002Fnewtab`), duplicate URLs, and anything past `MAX_TABS` (default 10) on **both** profiles. It **never** closes a URL matching `PROTECT` (default `nextrequest\\.com` — sf-nr depends on that session) and never closes a profile's last tab. Dry-runs by default; `--apply` to act. Hermes cron `fcdp-tabkeep` (`04a06f080be9`) runs it hourly at :37 via `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fscripts\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep-cron.sh` (the wrapper exists because the script dry-runs by default). Log: `~\u002FLibrary\u002FLogs\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep.log`, which also records Chrome's RSS + process count each run.\n\n**Layering:** `fcdp-job` *prevents* leaks; the pruner only *catches repeated* ones (duplicates + cap). A single stale non-duplicate tab under the cap survives by design — that conservatism is what keeps the NextRequest session safe. Don't \"fix\" it by making the pruner more aggressive.\n\n**Trap when closing on direct CDP:** Chrome's `\u002Fjson\u002Fclose\u002F\u003Cid>` replies with the plain string `Target is closing`, **not JSON**. fcdp used to crash on it *after* the close had already succeeded — so callers logged `FAILED` for tabs that were in fact closed. Fixed 2026-07-29 (`_http_text`, 404 = already-closed = success). If you see a close \"fail\", re-list the tabs before believing it.\n\n**Driving Screen Sharing (hard-won, 2026-07-29):**\n- `left_click` does **not** forward to the remote. `mouse_move` + separate `left_mouse_down` \u002F `left_mouse_up` **does**. A ~1s hold between them opens Dock context menus — press fast.\n- Typing forwards but **drops characters** on longer strings, and `~` triggers the accent picker which then **swallows all input** (Escape will not clear it). Navigate with AppleScript over ssh instead: `osascript -e 'tell application \"Google Chrome\" to set URL of active tab of front window to \"chrome:\u002F\u002Fextensions\"'`.\n- `osascript` can *query* System Events but **cannot send keystrokes** (`error 1002`) without Accessibility; `launchctl asuser` fails with `Could not switch to audit session`.\n- If the remote window renders stale\u002Finvisible, **reconnect Screen Sharing** — it forces a fresh framebuffer.\n- Drop a symlink where the file picker lands (`ln -s \u003Ctarget> ~\u002FDesktop\u002F\u003Cname>`) to cut deep folder navigation to two clicks.\n\n**Cookies specifically:** `cookies-txt` remains the right tool for a *file* of cookies on the mini — but note it **fails over SSH** (`keychain: could not read 'Chrome Safe Storage'`) while succeeding under launchd in the GUI session. That is an SSH-session artifact, not a broken tool; run the probe in the context the cron will actually use before concluding cookies are unavailable.\n\n**The mini's trap:** `cookies-txt` **fails over SSH** with `keychain: could not read 'Chrome Safe Storage'` — an SSH-session artifact, NOT a broken tool. The same binary **succeeds under launchd** in the user's GUI session (verified: 24 cookies returned via `launchctl submit`). So never conclude \"cookies are unavailable on the mini\" from an ssh test; run the probe in the context the cron will actually use.\n\n**Corollary for portable tooling:** a capture step that requires a browser belongs on the laptop; ship the result to the cron host (e.g. `caltrans-pra push-session mac-mini`) rather than trying to run the browser where the cron lives.\n\nWhen porting any browser-extension behavior to a CLI, see the **`\u002Fdecompile` skill's \"Browser extension\" workflow** (renamed from `\u002Fghidra` on 2026-05-28; the skill is now a universal RE router covering APKs, IPAs, .NET, Hermes, WASM, firmware, browser extensions, etc.). Ghidra itself is the wrong tool for extensions (no compiled code), but the skill routes you to the right JS toolkit (`prettier`, `webcrack`, etc.). For ANY reverse-engineering task — decompile, disassemble, \"look inside this binary\u002Fapp\u002Ffirmware\" — invoke `\u002Fdecompile` first; it handles tool routing.\n\n### Test Safety (CRITICAL)\n\nVitest fork workers leak ~5GB memory each when they hang:\n\n1. **ALWAYS** wrap test commands: `timeout 120 npx vitest run src\u002Fspecific\u002Ftest.ts 2>&1`\n2. **NEVER** run full test suite (`npm test`, `npx vitest run` with no args)\n3. **Maximum 3 test runs** per investigation phase\n4. **Clean up**: `pgrep -f vitest | xargs kill 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull`\n\n### Infrastructure Safety\n\n- **NEVER** execute `terraform destroy`, `terraform apply -auto-approve`, `DROP TABLE\u002FDATABASE`, or cloud CLI delete\u002Fterminate commands\n- **NEVER** modify .tfstate files\n- **ALWAYS** show `terraform plan` output and get approval before any `apply`\n- Before ANY infra command: what resources are affected? Is it reversible? Could it affect unintended resources?\n- **Worker preview hostnames are LOCKED by default (user policy 2026-07-07)** — never set `previews_enabled: true` (CF API) or `preview_urls: true` (wrangler config), and never share a `\u003Cname>.cloudflare.app` URL, without an explicit same-session user \"yes\" (AskUserQuestion; offer the Access-gated option first — CF supports Cloudflare Access on preview URLs). Preview hostnames bypass all zone security. Hook `pre-preview-lock-guard.sh` blocks the attempt; after user approval, prefix `CLAUDE_ALLOW_PREVIEW_PUBLIC=1`. The stop hook `preview-lock-stop-check.sh` re-sweeps after any deploy session; \u002Fship Phases 4.09\u002F4.05d re-lock on every ship.\n\n### Post-Change Verification (MANDATORY — from internal VERIFICATION_AGENT pattern)\n\nAfter implementing ANY code change:\n1. **Read the changed file(s) back** — verify the edit was applied correctly\n2. **If tests exist**, run them (with `timeout 120`)\n3. **If the change affects a build**, run the build and confirm exit 0\n4. **If the change is a bug fix**, verify the original symptom no longer reproduces\n5. **If the change adds\u002Fmodifies TRIGGERED behavior** (failover, retry, fallback chain, circuit-breaker, rate-limit cooldown, error\u002F`catch` branch, conditional cron, feature-flag gate) — **induce the trigger and watch the behavior fire end-to-end on an isolated copy.** \"Each component works in isolation\" is NOT proof the behavior fires: \"the fallback is configured\" ≠ \"the fallback fires.\" Force the 429 \u002F kill the primary \u002F trip the breaker \u002F feed the bad input, confirm the right downstream component served, then confirm the live instance is untouched. Don't wait for the user to ask. See `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fno-lie-verification.md` **Check 6** (reference incident: 2026-06-19 Hermes 429→DeepSeek failover wired + each hop verified but never exercised until the user prompted; a forced-429 throwaway-config test then proved it).\n6. **Never report \"done\" based on the edit alone** — verify the outcome with evidence\n\n### Semantic Security Review Gate — LOOP UNTIL CLEAN (MANDATORY — 2026-07-22)\n\n**Before declaring ANY implementation or fix \"done\", run the built-in `security-review` skill on the changeset and loop until it is clean.** This is AI\u002Fsemantic dataflow analysis (SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets, business-logic flaws) — the vulnerability class that grep-based checks and `npm audit` cannot see, and that the carmack subagent's own review passes are not a substitute for.\n\n**⚠️ OPERATIONAL (verified 2026-07-22):** `security-review` runs against the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY's git repo — NO path argument; hard-fails `\"needs to run inside a git repository\"` if cwd isn't the repo, so `cd \u003Crepo-root>` FIRST. It reviews the **COMMITTED** branch diff vs the base (merge-base with origin\u002Fmain) — NOT uncommitted working-tree edits (proven: unstaged changes produce an empty diff). **So commit your fix before running this gate**, or it reviews nothing. It returns a markdown report (file:line, severity, category, confidence 1–10) and self-filters false positives at confidence ≥8 — a \"real finding\" = any HIGH\u002FMEDIUM in that report. If the Skill call returns unknown-skill (unavailable in this environment), do NOT silently pass — tell the user the semantic gate couldn't run.\n\n**The loop (do not skip, do not defer):**\n1. `cd` into the repo root, then invoke the `security-review` skill (Skill tool) on the current branch diff\u002Fchangeset.\n2. Triage each finding: real vulnerability vs. genuine false positive.\n3. **FIX every real finding in source, inline** — obey the No-Suppression Rule (never `@ts-ignore`\u002F`eslint-disable`\u002F`biome-ignore`\u002F`as any` a finding away; refactor to remove the actual vulnerability).\n4. Re-invoke `security-review`.\n5. Repeat 1–4 until it reports **0 actionable findings**.\n\nA genuine false positive is documented inline with its reason; everything else is fixed, never deferred (this composes with the Fix-All-Issues-Found Rule below). **Do NOT report the work complete while a real security finding is open.** Loop guard: if the same finding survives 5 fix attempts, STOP and surface it to the user with the finding + why the fix isn't landing — don't declare done past an unresolved vulnerability. The carmack subagent still NEVER deploys (Deployment Prohibition) — this gate makes the code security-clean before the user runs `\u002Fship`, whose Phase 1.29 re-runs the same loop as the deploy-time backstop. Skip only for pure docs\u002Fcomment\u002Ftest-copy diffs with zero code change.\n\n**A finding's PREMISE is a hypothesis too — measure it on THIS runtime before you\nact on it (2026-08-03).** Findings routinely assert an engine\u002Flibrary behavior\n(\"V8 embeds the input in that error\", \"this SDK throws\", \"that header is\nforwarded\"). Docs-before-note applies to the reviewer exactly as it applies to a\n`\u002Fskill` comment. **Run the cheapest experiment that would falsify it** — usually\none `node -e` over the real failure inputs — *before* writing the fix.\n\nThen take one of three dispositions, and **name which one in the code comment and\nthe commit** so the record is not overstated:\n\n| Premise holds | → | fix it; it is a real vulnerability |\n| Premise fails, mitigation is cheap | → | keep the change as **defense-in-depth**, and say plainly it closes no live leak — the value is not depending on an engine detail you neither chose nor control |\n| Premise fails, mitigation is costly | → | do not implement; record the measurement that refutes it |\n\nThis is **not** licence to dismiss findings. The default is still \"fix it\"; the\nbar to downgrade is a *reproducible measurement*, never an argument. A reviewer's\nfinding you cannot falsify is a finding you fix.\n\nReference incident: a review flagged that a `JSON.parse` SyntaxError could carry\ncookie bytes into an error `detail` field. Testing five malformed shapes on the\nactual runtime (Node 26 \u002F V8) showed all produce positional messages only\n(`\"Unterminated string in JSON at position 70\"`) — no input bytes, so no live\nleak. The constant-string change shipped anyway as defense-in-depth, with the\ncomment and commit stating the measurement rather than implying a leak was\nclosed. Writing \"fixed a token leak\" there would have been a fabrication in the\npermanent record.\n\n### Instrument-Liveness + Discriminator-First (MANDATORY — 2026-08-03)\n\n**An instrument that reports nothing is indistinguishable from a broken instrument until you prove otherwise.** Before ANY conclusion of the form \"no events\", \"nothing logged\", \"the counter didn't move\", \"it isn't even being called\" — prove the instrument was live in that window. Three real false-negatives from one session, each of which sent the investigation the wrong way:\n\n- `wrangler tail` wrote **0 bytes** (never connected) → \"no events\" was vacuous. `wc -c` the capture first; require ≥1 unrelated event as proof of life.\n- `wrangler tail --format json` emits **pretty-printed multi-line** objects, NOT JSONL → line-wise `grep`\u002F`json.loads` silently match nothing. Parse with a concatenated-object decoder and fail loudly at 0 objects.\n- **KV reads lag** (eventually consistent) — a counter read frozen for minutes, then jumped. Never conclude from a single read.\n\n**And when a fix leaves the symptom BYTE-IDENTICAL: stop fixing, start discriminating.** That is Pattern #32 (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fopaque-multi-cause-failure.md`), the static-error sibling of the mutating-symptom tripwire. Ship the one-line diagnostic that reports the measurable properties of what you sent (lengths + boolean flags — never the payload, it can carry user PII) BEFORE attempting fix N+1. When every property you encoded reads clean and it still fails, you have positively excluded your whole hypothesis space — that is the finding, and it is worth more than another guess.\n\nTwo bisect disciplines that belong with it: **change exactly ONE variable per probe** (if a probe flips fail→pass, ask what ELSE changed in that step — a confounded step attributes the pass to the wrong cause and ships a non-fix), and **cross-reference successes as hard as failures** (the cause is usually the property present in 100% of failures and 0% of successes). If the failure mode has no side effect, every failing probe against the real upstream is FREE — order expected-fails first, stop at the first success, and state that cost out loud before you start.\n\n**Reference incident (2026-08-03, improvebayarea Solve SF):** one `400 {\"error\":\"Invalid\"}` covered FIVE independent causes (`\u002F\u002F` sequence, astral\u002Femoji char, two reserved phrases, length). Each single-cause fix looked like a non-fix, costing ~6 deploys. A confounded bisect step (removing a URL *also* cut 371→261 chars and dropped an emoji) sent the fix in the wrong direction for two of them. Shipping the properties-diagnostic ended it in one deploy.\n\n### Fix the CALL-SITE CLASS, not the instance you were looking at (MANDATORY — 2026-08-05)\n\n**Before you call a bug fixed, enumerate every site that could exhibit it, and leave behind\na test that fails on a NEW one.** Fixing the instance in front of you is the default failure\nmode, and it is invisible: the symptom goes away, the tests you just wrote pass, and the\nsibling call site ships the same bug in a narrower window.\n\nThree steps, none optional:\n\n1. **Name the class, then grep for it repo-wide** — not \"the watch is fixed\" but \"every\n   writer of `STATE.geo`\". `grep -n \"setGeoFromSource(\\|applyGeoFromSource(\\|STATE\\.geo = \"`\n   returns the denominator. Check EVERY hit, including other files.\n2. **Ask what else reaches the same sink by a different path.** A one-shot and a subscription\n   are different code but the same class; so are a cron and an HTTP handler that call one\n   helper, or two components rendering one API shape.\n3. **Add a STRUCTURAL test** that asserts the invariant over the whole artifact, not a\n   behavioral test of the one site you fixed. Behavioral tests prove today's instance;\n   structural tests fail on tomorrow's. Then **prove it fails** by re-injecting the bug.\n\n```bash\n# structural: no PASSIVE writer may use the deliberate-action source tag\noffenders = renderedBundle.split(\"\\n\").filter(l => \u002FsetGeoFromSource\\([^)]*['\"]gps['\"]\\s*\\)\u002F.test(l))\nexpect(offenders).toEqual([])        # fails on any FUTURE passive writer, naming its line\n```\n\n**Reference incident (2026-08-05, improvebayarea — the same miss twice in one session).**\nA moving-vehicle GPS watch was overwriting a committed report location. Fix #1 (`b11d1f7`)\ntagged `watchPosition` `'gps_watch'` and guarded it — and missed that `startGeo()` ALSO\ncalls `getCurrentPosition`, still tagged `'gps'`. `clearWatch()` cannot cancel an in-flight\n`getCurrentPosition`, so with `timeout: 12000` a user tapping the camera within ~12s of page\nload (the normal case — GPS cold-start is slow) got the identical bug back. Fix #2\n(`fa7265b`) added the structural test above; reverting only the source tag makes it fail and\nprint the offending line number. Nothing behavioral would have caught it, because the\nbehavior of the site I fixed was correct.\n\n**Corollary — a lint\u002Ftype complaint on your own new code is a design signal, not a chore.**\nThe same session, biome flagged `{ ...h.STATE.geo! }` in a new test. Removing the non-null\nassertion (rather than suppressing it) revealed the assertion had made the test **vacuous**:\nspreading a null yields `{}`, and `{} toEqual {}` passes while proving nothing. Snapshot-then-\ncompare assertions are the common shape for this — if the snapshot can silently become empty,\nthe comparison always passes. Read what the tool is telling you about the code, not just what\nit wants you to type.\n\n**The three vacuous shapes, by name (2026-08-25).** A negative control does not just prove the\ntest is armed — it tells you *how many* assertions were armed. If you delete the guard and only\nsome of the assertions go red, **the green ones are lying**, and they are usually the ones you\nwere proudest of:\n\n| Shape | Why it passes when the code is broken |\n|---|---|\n| `expect(s.indexOf(a)).toBeLessThan(s.indexOf(b))` | `indexOf` returns **-1** when absent, and `-1 \u003C` anything. Passes exactly when the thing you are ordering has been deleted. Fix: assert **both** indices `>= 0` first. |\n| `expect({...maybeNull}).toEqual({})` | Spreading `null` yields `{}`, so `{} toEqual {}` proves nothing. |\n| `expect(bodySlice).toContain(x)` over a **fixed character window** | A 200- or 1200-char window is a *proxy* for \"inside this block\". It silently shrinks when anyone adds a comment (breaking for an unrelated reason) **and** is simultaneously too weak — it matches an identical line in a neighbouring block. Fix: **brace-match** the real body. |\n\n**Five more shapes, and the one probe that finds all of them (ported from pstack\n`principle-test-behavior-not-implementation`, 2026-09-17).** Before you keep a test, ask:\n*would it still pass if every function it imports returned `undefined`?* If yes, it observes\nno behavior and cannot fail for a defect — rewrite the assertion or delete the test.\n\n| Shape | Example | Why it cannot fail |\n|---|---|---|\n| Weak or no assertion | only `toBeDefined`, `toBeTruthy`, `not.toThrow`, `toBeInstanceOf`, `toBeGreaterThan(0)` | `undefined`-returning code satisfies most of these or throws nothing |\n| Mock \u002F absence only | only `toHaveBeenCalled`, `not.toHaveBeenCalled`, `toBeUndefined`, `toEqual([])`, `toHaveLength(0)`, `not.toBe(wrong)` | asserts the mock, or an absence the broken code also produces |\n| Self-referential | `expect(f(a)).toBe(f(a))`, `expect(parsed.url).toBe(buildUrl(...))` | the expected value comes from the code under test |\n| Constant pin | `expect(LIMITS.maxTools).toBe(8)`, `expect(PROMPT).toContain(\"You are\")` | restates a hand-maintained constant; fails only when someone edits it, which blocks the edit and catches no defect |\n| Fixture asserts fixture | the assertion reads data the test built or computed in `beforeEach`; the subject never runs inside the body | the subject is not in the loop |\n\nFix: call the subject in the test body with one concrete input and assert the **literal**\noutput or observable effect — `expect(slugify(\"Hello, World!\")).toBe(\"hello-world\")`. For an\nabsence, assert the presence on the other input in the same test. A test that mostly tests\nmocks, encodes implementation details, or would be deleted right after proving the fix is\na bad test; prefer no new test over a bad one, and say why in the report.\n\nBrace-matching is the right instrument whenever you assert \"X appears inside this function\u002Fhandler\":\n\n```ts\nfunction bodyOf(needle: string, src: string): string {\n  const start = src.indexOf(needle);\n  let depth = 0, seen = false;\n  for (let i = start; i \u003C src.length; i++) {\n    if (src[i] === \"{\") { depth++; seen = true; }\n    else if (src[i] === \"}\" && seen && --depth === 0) return src.slice(start, i + 1);\n  }\n  throw new Error(`unbalanced: ${needle}`);   \u002F\u002F fail loudly, never return \"\"\n}\n```\n\nNote the throw: a body-extractor that returns `\"\"` on failure makes every `toContain` fail and\nevery `not.toContain` pass — it converts one broken helper into a suite-wide false negative.\nThree separate assertions were caught vacuous this way in a single session (a fixed window\nreplaced twice, then the `indexOf` pair), each of them only because the negative control was\nread as *\"how many went red?\"* rather than *\"did anything go red?\"*.\n\n### Fix-All-Issues-Found Rule (MANDATORY — 2026-04-12)\n\n**When an audit\u002Freview\u002Fdiagnostic step surfaces issues, FIX THEM — do not only report.** This overrides the \"don't refactor beyond scope\" global rule for issues uncovered during carmack's own investigations.\n\nTriggers (non-exhaustive):\n- `tsc --noEmit` reports errors → fix every error, even if unrelated to the task\n- `biome check` reports lint errors or warnings → auto-fix with `--fix`, then resolve remaining manually\n- `npm audit` reports vulnerabilities → apply overrides and verify\n- Code review uncovers bugs in adjacent code → fix them\n- Security sweep finds XSS\u002Finjection risks in files you didn't edit → fix them\n- Build warnings → resolve, don't ignore\n\nBehavior:\n1. Enumerate every finding (count them, don't truncate)\n2. Fix in batches, rebuilding \u002F re-running the diagnostic after each batch\n3. Loop until count reaches 0 OR a finding is genuinely not fixable (documented with reason)\n4. Only then report \"done\" — and only after re-running the diagnostic one final time to confirm 0\n\n**Escape hatches** (narrow):\n- If fixing would require a breaking API change or major version upgrade → create a beads issue describing the blocker and continue with the rest\n- If fixing is >10x the cost of the original task → pause, report the finding, ask the user before continuing\n- \"Pre-existing\" is NOT a valid excuse. \"Unrelated to my change\" is NOT a valid excuse.\n\n**Why (2026-04-12):** Session ended with 93 pre-existing `tsconfig.worker.json` TypeScript errors merely reported, not fixed. User set this as a permanent rule: if carmack sees it, carmack fixes it.\n\n### No-Suppression Rule (MANDATORY — 2026-04-12)\n\n**NEVER use `@ts-expect-error`, `@ts-ignore`, `\u002F\u002F eslint-disable`, `\u002F\u002F biome-ignore`, `\u002F\u002F @ts-nocheck`, or equivalent suppressions as a \"fix\".** Suppressions hide bugs — they don't resolve them.\n\nWhen a type-system complaint appears legitimate:\n1. **Investigate the root cause** — library version regression, missing generics, ambient type collision, wrong middleware signature, etc.\n2. **Refactor to make the types line up** — extract to a helper, use chain-style routing, replace a validator with inline `safeParse()`, upgrade a package, or rename a conflicting type\n3. **Only as a last resort**: if all of the above genuinely cannot resolve it and the code is demonstrably safe at runtime, use a **narrow** type assertion (`as unknown as T`) at the exact expression — NEVER a line-level suppression comment that hides all errors on that line\n\nWhen a lint rule complaint appears:\n1. **Fix the code** to satisfy the rule\n2. If the rule is wrong for the project, disable it in config (`biome.json`, `.eslintrc`) with a comment — not per-line suppressions\n\n**Acceptable suppressions (rare, must document why):**\n- Third-party type declarations that are definitively wrong — suppress with a comment citing the upstream issue URL\n- Intentional runtime behavior the type-system can't model (e.g., WASM boundary) — suppress with detailed explanation\n\n**Unacceptable:**\n- \"Hono 4.12 regression\" → refactor to chain-style, switch to inline parse, or upgrade\n- \"Timing out on the fix\" → stop and ask the user before suppressing\n- \"Pre-existing\" suppressions in the file → remove them as you refactor\n\n**Why (2026-04-12):** Carmack added 4 `@ts-expect-error` suppressions instead of refactoring 4 routes to drop the broken zValidator chain and use inline `safeParse()`. User flagged this immediately. Permanent rule.\n\n**Complement — the `ceiling:` comment (NOT a suppression).** A suppression hides a problem the tools found. A `ceiling:` comment documents a limit *you* deliberately chose, at the site you chose it, so the next reader inherits the denominator instead of re-deriving it:\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F ceiling: global lock — move to per-account locks if throughput matters\n```\n\nUse it for a deliberate corner-cut with a known ceiling (global lock, O(n²) scan over a set assumed small, naive heuristic). Name the ceiling AND the upgrade path — a marker with only one of the two is noise. This is the \"Compared to What?\" rule applied at the cut site.\n\n**Never valid for anything a linter or typechecker flagged** — that is the No-Suppression Rule above, and a `ceiling:` comment does not launder it. Verified 2026-08-24 to survive `\u002Fship` Phase 1.26, which rewrites `TODO`\u002F`FIXME`\u002F`HACK` → `NOTE:` but does not match this marker.\n\n### Single-Affordance Rule for Form Controls (MANDATORY — 2026-05-17)\n\n**When changing CSS for any `\u003Cselect>` \u002F `\u003Cdetails>` \u002F form control on a page that loads a forms-styling framework (`@tailwindcss\u002Fforms`, Bootstrap `form-select`, Bulma, etc.), the CSS MUST resolve which chevron\u002Fmarker is visible — never let two systems paint the same affordance.**\n\nTwo valid patterns for `\u003Cselect>`:\n\n```css\n\u002F* Pattern A: native chevron only *\u002F\n.your-select {\n  appearance: auto;\n  background-image: none !important;  \u002F* kill framework overlay *\u002F\n}\n\n\u002F* Pattern B: inline-icon only (use with adjacent \u003Cspan> chevron in markup) *\u002F\n.your-select {\n  appearance: none !important;\n  -webkit-appearance: none !important;\n  background-image: none !important;\n}\n```\n\nForbidden state: `appearance` unset\u002Fauto AND `background-image` unset, **with a forms-plugin loaded** → double chevron.\n\nSame rule for `\u003Cdetails>\u003Csummary>`: either hide `::-webkit-details-marker` and use an inline glyph, or use the native marker and skip the glyph — never both.\n\n**How to apply:** when invoked in **debug** or **review** mode and the user mentions \"double down arrow\", \"two chevrons\", \"stacked icons\", \"duplicate caret\", \"X is showing twice\", or any UI page mixing Tailwind\u002FBootstrap forms with native `\u003Cselect>`\u002F`\u003Cdetails>`, load `references\u002Fui-duplicate-affordance.md` and run its 5-step detection recipe. Add a regression test that locks the CSS rule AND enforces every control on the page carries a discipline class.\n\n**Why (2026-05-17, IBA-m69):** ImproveBayArea `\u002Freports?city=san-francisco` showed two stacked ▼ on the \"Closed reports\" filter because `.report-select` used `appearance: auto` (native chevron) without `background-image: none` (`@tailwindcss\u002Fforms` painted a second chevron on top). Fix took 1 CSS line + 1 regression test. Cataloged so the next instance — on any project — is caught in the audit pass.\n\n### Anti-Slop TypeScript — No Generic Type-Guard Boilerplate (MANDATORY — 2026-06-25)\n\n**When writing or reviewing TypeScript, never default to a generic loose type guard — reach for a specific type, discriminated union, or schema first.** This is the runtime-guard sibling of the No-Suppression Rule: `isRecord`\u002F`isObject`\u002F`as unknown as T`\u002F`(x as any).field` make code *run* on data of unknown shape without ever stating the shape, pushing type errors to a 2am production `TypeError`. It's the #1 AI \"vibe-coding\" tell. Full standard + alternatives + Zod patterns: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md`.\n\n**Forbidden:** `function isRecord(o: unknown): o is Record\u003Cstring, unknown>`, `isObject`, copy-pasted structural guards across files, blanket `as any` \u002F `as unknown as T` launder-casts, `(obj as any).field` reach-casts.\n\n**Required (priority order):** (1) a named `interface`\u002F`type`; (2) a discriminated union narrowed on a literal field; (3) a **Zod\u002FValibot schema at every trust boundary** with `type X = z.infer\u003Ctypeof Schema>` (one source of truth); (4) library-inferred types (`z.infer`, Prisma\u002FDrizzle `$inferSelect`, tRPC, Hono `InferResponseType`); (5) a *targeted* predicate checking the fields you actually use — last resort, justified inline.\n\n**How to apply:** in **feature**, **debug**, or **review** mode on any `.ts`\u002F`.tsx`, run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fdetect-ts-slop.sh [path|--diff \u003Cbase>]`. It flags generic guards, launder-casts, and reach-casts with file:line + a refactor hint. Treat every hit as a fix-list item (Fix-All-Issues rule), not a report — refactor to a specific type\u002Fschema; a guard that's genuinely the right tool stays but is justified inline. Typed code should compile (`tsc --noEmit`) with **zero** casts added to make it pass.\n\n**Mechanical enforcement — vendored `anti-slop` Oxlint plugin, AUTO-FIX LOOP UNTIL 0 (added 2026-08-16):** the standard is now lint-enforceable via the vendored [dmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop) Oxlint jsPlugin (18 generic rules: chained assertions, `unknown` params\u002Freturns\u002Faliases, `object` params, `Record\u003Cstring, unknown>` dictionaries, widen-then-assert, known-value widening, conditional-`{}` spreads, `Reflect.apply\u002Fget`, ad-hoc runtime `typeof`, module mocking, \"Shape\" names, `\u002F\u002F SAFETY:` comments required on every non-const assertion, plus — since upstream c44ef22 (2026-09-10) — eager `filter().map()` chains, accumulator copies inside reducers, and missing blank lines between declarations (`require-readable-spacing`, the one rule WITH an autofix); and 5 opt-in `anti-slop-effect\u002F*` rules for Effect repos). Routing: if the repo has it vendored (`tools\u002Foxlint\u002Fanti-slop\u002F` or `anti-slop\u002F` rules in its oxlint config), **`.\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.bin\u002Foxlint` IS the anti-slop gate**; if the repo lacks it and you're doing substantive TS work there, offer\u002Frun the `\u002Finstall-anti-slop` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Finstall-anti-slop\u002F`) to vendor it; `detect-ts-slop.sh` remains the zero-dep fallback for repos without oxlint. **Findings are never report-only — only `require-readable-spacing` has a mechanical `--fix`; for everything else YOU are the autofixer. Run the loop:** (1) run the enforcer (in a vendored repo, `oxlint --fix` + formatter first for the spacing rule, kept as a separate whitespace-only change); (2) fix every finding in source by adding evidence (inference \u002F `as const` \u002F `satisfies`, named owner contracts, discriminated unions, Zod boundary parsing, or a genuinely-checked `\u002F\u002F SAFETY: \u003Cinvariant>` line); (3) re-run the enforcer + `tsc --noEmit`; (4) repeat until **0 findings**; (5) loop guard — a finding surviving 5 fix attempts → STOP and surface it to the user with why the fix isn't landing. Never `oxlint-disable`, weaken severity, launder types, or write a hollow SAFETY comment to reach green. Full rule table + loop protocol: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md` (Enforcement + Auto-fix loop sections; bundle tracks upstream c44ef22 \u002F v0.1.2; verified armed 2026-09-10 on oxlint 1.82.0 — 26 diagnostics on a known-bad file spanning every new rule, 0 on a clean control).\n\n**Why (2026-06-25):** user flagged repetitive generic `isRecord`\u002Floose-guard output as slop — code that compiles and runs but is never actually typed, the upstream cause of the undefined\u002Fnull-render bug class. Stating the type (or a schema) IS the work; the generic guard is the avoidance of it.\n\n### New-Site Default = Hono Framework (MANDATORY — 2026-06-04)\n\n**Any time the user asks to build, create, scaffold, or \"make\" a new website or web app — OR to convert\u002Fremake an existing site — DEFAULT to the Hono framework (SSR + islands on Cloudflare Workers) by loading the `\u002Fhono` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fhono\u002FSKILL.md`).** Do not reach for a React\u002FVue\u002FNext SPA scaffold unless the user *explicitly* names a different stack. `hono\u002Fjsx` for server SSR, `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` for interactive islands, dual client\u002Fserver Vite build, static assets via wrangler `assets`. The `\u002Fhono` references are verified against hono.dev — use them; don't invent Hono APIs from memory.\n\n**🛑 \"Hono\" means SSR — importing Hono and serving static HTML is NOT compliance (added 2026-08-31).** The failure mode is not reaching for React; it is building a correct Hono *router* (typed `Bindings`, `secureHeaders()`, `\u002Fapi\u002F*` routes) and then serving the actual page as a hand-written `public\u002Findex.html` through the `ASSETS` binding. Every Hono symbol is present and **zero HTML is server-rendered** — which forfeits the entire reason this default exists (real markup to crawlers\u002Fcurl\u002FWayback, no CSR shell, FCP). It survives `tsc --noEmit` clean and `wrangler deploy --dry-run` rc=0, so no gate you would normally run catches it.\n\n**Before claiming any site is built on Hono, run:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'c\\.html(' src\u002F | grep -v node_modules   # ZERO hits => a router, not SSR\ngrep -rln 'hono\u002Fjsx' src\u002F                          # ZERO files => no server JSX at all\n```\n`ASSETS.fetch` serves **assets** (`.js`\u002F`.css`\u002Fimages\u002Ffonts). The document goes through `c.html(\u003CPage\u002F>)`. Two build traps that follow: JSX in a `.ts` file is `error TS1005: '>' expected` (rename to `.tsx` **and** update `main` in `wrangler.toml` — the rename alone points the config at a deleted file), and when a test harness executes code extracted from the shipped HTML, move those blocks to a real `public\u002F*.js`, `\u003Cscript src>` it from the SSR page, and repoint the tests there (deleting the old HTML then doubles as a free negative control). Full pattern + the improvecortland incident: `\u002Fhono` SKILL.md.\n\n**Reference incident (2026-08-31, improvecortland):** built the Worker in Hono, wrote the portal as static `public\u002Findex.html`, and reported the site as \"built on Hono.\" The user asked *\"did you build this on hono framework btw like \u002Fcode says to\"* — the honest answer was *partially*, and only the grep above would have caught it before he did.\n\n### SPA→SSR Conversion = Audit Global App.tsx Mounts FIRST (MANDATORY — 2026-06-28)\n\n**Before converting ANY React-SPA route to SSR (`hono\u002Fjsx`, Astro, Next RSC), enumerate every component mounted globally in `App.tsx`\u002Fthe SPA root — and re-provide each one on the SSR page. SSR does not mount your React tree, so each global component silently disappears from the converted route with NO error, NO console log, NO diff that flags it.** The at-risk set: floating support\u002Fchat widget, cookie\u002Fconsent banner (legal!), analytics beacon, exit-intent modal, toast host, providers, and any `?param` deep-link handler (`?support=open`, `?ref=`, UTM-driven UI).\n\nRun before the first conversion and re-run after each route:\n```bash\ngrep -nE \"\u003C[A-Z][A-Za-z]+ ?\u002F?>\" src\u002Freact-app\u002FApp.tsx | grep -viE \"Route|Router|Routes|Suspense|ErrorBoundary|Navigate|HelmetProvider\"\n```\nFor each hit, the SSR page must provide it as a **shared island** (mount the *existing* React component — reuse, don't rewrite — into a placeholder via the SSR layout, on EVERY SSR page), an SSR equivalent, or a static fallback that *itself* still works. Watch the incremental trap: an affordance can keep \"working\" because a static link bounces to a route that's *still* SPA — then you SSR-convert that route too and the last mount point vanishes. Verify the thing **acts** (chat opens, banner shows, deep-link fires) in a real browser — not that the link\u002Fmarkup is merely present. Single-affordance: hide the static no-JS fallback once the island hydrates.\n\n**Why (2026-06-28, example):** SSR-converting the 7 public pages — including `\u002F` — dropped the global `SupportChatWidget` (`App.tsx:167`); `public-layout.tsx` had only a static `\u003Ca href=\"\u002F?support=open\">` that relied on `\u002F` being the SPA, so once `\u002F` was SSR the live chat + the `?support=open` email deep-link were dead on all 7 pages. Fix `7a25f67`: a shared `support-island.tsx` mounting the existing widget on every SSR page. Full pattern: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Freact-patterns.md` #24.\n\n**ALSO verify the rendered CASCADE, not just presence (the 🛑 hardest rule):** after wiring islands, the bundled island\u002FTailwind CSS you `\u003Clink>` for the widgets often transitively imports the app's global `index.css`, whose element-selector rules (`body{background:var(--color-bg);color:var(--color-text)}`) load AFTER the SSR page's inline `\u003Cstyle>` and **silently override the SSR design** → invisible text, wrong background, on EVERY SSR page — with no error, clean diff, passing CSP\u002F`\u003Ch1>` checks. After ANY SSR+island change you MUST drive the live browser on EVERY SSR route and assert `getComputedStyle(document.body)` bg\u002Fcolor equals the intended token (not a leaked fallback like `rgb(240,240,240)`) and that headings pass WCAG-AA against their ACTUAL computed bg — plus eyeball a screenshot. Fix: SSR layout `body{background:…!important;color:…!important}` (leaked rules carry no `!important`) or stop the island bundle emitting global `body` rules. Reference: 2026-06-28 — `support-island.css` leaked `body{background:#f0f0f0}` → white headings invisible site-wide, shipped twice undetected (checks verified \"chat opens\", not page background); fix `cd0cdfe`. Full pattern: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Freact-patterns.md` #25; `\u002Fship` gate 1.3c.\n\n### Site a11y + CSP Baseline — always add when building\u002Ftouching a public site (MANDATORY — 2026-06-04)\n\n**When building a new site OR modifying any public-facing site, ALWAYS add\u002Fverify these three before declaring done — they are not optional polish:**\n\n1. **Content-Security-Policy header.** Set one via Hono `secureHeaders({ contentSecurityPolicy: {...} })` (or equivalent middleware). Start strict (`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'`) and allow-list ONLY what the islands actually load — inspect the client code for external hosts (map tile CDNs e.g. `*.basemaps.cartocdn.com`, Google Fonts `fonts.googleapis.com`\u002F`fonts.gstatic.com`, `data:` images, `'unsafe-inline'` for `style-src` when a lib injects inline styles). Then **browser-verify the islands still work under the CSP** (load the page, confirm tiles\u002Fcharts\u002Fmaps render, grep the console for `Refused to … Content Security Policy` — zero violations).\n2. **Color-contrast (WCAG AA ≥4.5:1).** No body\u002FUI text below 4.5:1 against its background (3:1 for large\u002Fbold ≥24px). Audit muted grays on dark backgrounds especially — bump theme tokens until they pass; don't ship `text-*\u002F40`–`\u002F60` opacity text or sub-#8-luminance grays on near-black.\n3. **Heading-order \u002F single `\u003Ch1>`.** Exactly one content `\u003Ch1>` per page, no skipped levels (h1→h3). Brand wordmarks\u002Flogos in the header are `\u003Cspan>`\u002F`\u003Cdiv>`, NOT `\u003Ch1>` — a logo `\u003Ch1>` plus a page `\u003Ch1>` is a heading-order failure.\n\nVerify with a real browser\u002FLighthouse pass, not just source review. Reference incident (2026-06-04, sanders-king-heritage): the Hono conversion shipped with no CSP, `#6b7280` footer text (~3.7:1, failed AA), and a logo `\u003Ch1>` colliding with each page's content `\u003Ch1>` — all three fixed in one pass and codified here so the next site build includes them from the start.\n\n### Observability — Instrument on Build, Improve on Fix (MANDATORY — 2026-06-17)\n\n**Two behaviors, both required before declaring done.** Full standard: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md`.\n\n1. **Instrument-on-build** — when you build or substantially touch a subsystem, add structured logging at its *seams* (external calls, error\u002Fcatch branches, state transitions, the input that selects the branch) before it's \"done\". Log at boundaries and decision points, NOT everywhere — blanket logging just recreates the noise problem. Structured `log({event, ...attrs})`, never prose; redact secrets\u002FPII\u002Ftokens.\n2. **Instrument-on-fix (boy-scout)** — when you fix a bug, before leaving the code path, add the one log line \u002F attribute \u002F error-message rewrite that **would have made this bug obvious in 30 seconds**. You just root-caused it — you have maximal context. This is the compounding win.\n\nError messages must be actionable: what was attempted + the actual values + the likely cause\u002Fbranch + disambiguation (an \"ambiguous error\" is almost always two root causes sharing one string — split them). Surface the upstream's real reason, not a generic wrapper. When *reducing* log noise, **downgrade the level (`info`→`debug`), never delete** — a line that looks like noise may be load-bearing for another debug path.\n\n**Why (2026-06-17):** codifies the user's standing practice (assess logs → fix ambiguous errors → prune noise → add debug attributes) as a reactive build\u002Ffix discipline; the proactive scheduled half is the `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill. Same family as the catch-all-masking and third-party-signal-fixtures rules — a silent or vague log is the log-equivalent of a masked error.\n\nWord budget: **25 words max between tool calls, 100 words max final answer.** Lead with action, not explanation.\n\n---\n\n## Agent Spawning Rules (from internal Coordinator Mode)\n\nWhen using the Agent tool to delegate work:\n1. **Each agent prompt MUST be fully self-contained** — include all file paths, context, constraints, and verification steps\n2. **Never reference \"the current file\" or \"what we discussed\"** — the subagent has zero context from this conversation\n3. **Include the verification step in the agent prompt itself** — don't rely on post-agent verification\n4. **Synthesize findings before delegating follow-up** — never chain agents blindly\n5. **Use parallel agents when work is independent** — launch multiple Agent calls in a single message\n\n---\n\n## Reference Files Index\n\n| File | Content |\n|------|---------|\n| `code-review-react.md` | TypeScript\u002FReact 19 review rules, useEffect ban, hook patterns, state management |\n| `code-review-security.md` | XSS 10-vector audit, escapeHtml\u002FisSafeUrl implementations, severity matrix |\n| `code-review-general.md` | Performance, quality, testing, Rust, config compat, full review checklist (42 items) |\n| `ux-patterns.md` | UX pre-checks, error handling patterns, WCAG 2.2 AA, iOS Safari, scope errors |\n| `ui-duplicate-affordance.md` | Double-chevron \u002F double-arrow \u002F duplicate-icon detection. 5-step recipe for `\u003Cselect>` + `\u003Cdetails>` + redundant badges. Forms-framework + native-control collision patterns. Reference incident: IBA-m69. |\n| `responsive-design.md` | Responsive rules, mobile\u002Fdesktop strategy, frontend design principles |\n| `feature-implementation.md` | Build decision framework, brainstorming, PRD generation, Ralph mode |\n| `browser-automation.md` | chrome-cdp (live session), agent-browser (headless), commands reference |\n| `git-workflow.md` | Git pre-flight, security scanning, worktree management, fork mass-integration |\n| `debug-patterns.md` | 5-phase workflow, code search tools, repro harnesses, React-specific checks |\n| `deploy-patterns.md` | Session invalidation, CF Pages debugging, cross-platform CI, code scanning, GH Actions |\n| `codex-integration.md` | Codex review (quality gate), adversarial review, rescue (escalation) |\n| `research.md` | Last30days web research, Reddit\u002FX\u002Fweb synthesis, prompt generation |\n| `skill-creation.md` | Creating & editing SKILL.md files, frontmatter, progressive disclosure |\n| `task-tracking.md` | PRD to prd.json conversion, agent-testable tasks, beads tracking |\n| `aiva-guidelines.md` | AIVA-specific: color ban, VA palette, OG\u002Ffavicon standards, admin auth pattern |\n| `preflight-checks.md` | Pre-flight: CDP warmup, codebase audit, code coverage, lint\u002Fsecurity auto-fix |\n| `legal-document-audit.md` | 5 hallucination patterns (fabricated citations, fake phones, invented people, name transposition, exhibit drift), audit procedure, sweep script |\n| `lighthouse-optimization.md` | Lighthouse 100\u002F100 playbook: 3-run median audit loop, 10 high-leverage patterns (defer third-party, kill CF Bot Fight JS, SSR hero, async CSS, preload LCP, bundle analysis, bf-cache headers, SEO fallback, a11y quick wins, CSP fixes), 4-stage fix order, known ceilings |\n| `refactor.md` | **Refactor mode** (ported from pstack 2026-09-17): pin the behavior contract first (characterization test \u002F equivalence harness — tsc\u002Flint are not a pin) → name the missing structure → subtract before adding → small pin-green steps, migrate callers + delete old API in one wave → prove equivalence on the real artifact → keep only if reader load dropped, else revert → commits ordered pin\u002Fsubtract\u002Freshape |\n| `hillclimb.md` | **Hillclimb mode** (ported from pstack 2026-09-17): sustained one-metric improvement — ground the workload, frozen harness with proven sensitivity, median-of-N, stop predicate = target AND min iterations, one hypothesis per iteration (mechanism-named, 8 strategy families as generators), keep past noise \u002F revert in full, one commit per win, `decisions.tsv`, push past the first plateau, report as gap-to-floor |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fbug-fix-preflight.md` | **Bug-fix preflight** (ported from pstack + benny 2026-09-17): Step 0 existing-fix check → verify mode (baseline ×2 \u002F patched ×2 → Confirmed \u002F Insufficient \u002F Inconclusive); Step 1 regression history (`git log -S`, `--follow`, `gh pr view`) before hypotheses; Step 2 epistemics tiers Direct \u002F Supported \u002F Inferred \u002F Speculative \u002F Unknown on every root-cause claim; Step 3 \"reproduced\" = named correct-vs-broken final state, observed twice with a reset, one real state value |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fblast-radius.md` | **Blast radius** (ported from pstack 2026-09-17): the one fact the change is safe because of, the 5-rung certainty ladder (said so → line → walked → **ran it** → in the running app), where grep stops, risks \u002F cleared \u002F before-you-merge; `proven` \u002F `unproven` \u002F `could not assess` |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freview-verdicts-and-ci-triage.md` | **Review verdict buckets** (Act on \u002F Consider \u002F Noted \u002F Dismissed + agreement map; nitpick gravity, hypothetical-vs-actual, \"I'd have done it differently\" is not a finding), **CI flake policy** (stale-base check, one fresh build not a job retry, identical 2nd failure ≠ flake), **bot-comment triage** (fix \u002F dismiss \u002F ask; ask-by-default list; run the cited test first; never churn code to quiet a bot) |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freviewed-patch-integrity.md` | **Patch-id verdict binding**: record `git patch-id --stable` when a gate passes, re-check before any deploy\u002Fmerge and after any rebase or conflict merge; mismatch ⇒ re-run the gate; SHAs and commit messages are not substitutes |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Faccount-security-lifecycle.md` | Passkey\u002FTOTP\u002Fpasswordless lifecycle: alternate-login enforcement, fresh-session management, recovery, safe redirects, authoritative status, recovery-code custody, and leaked-token response |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md` | **Observability standard**: instrument-on-build + instrument-on-fix (boy-scout), boundary\u002Fdecision-point logging, structured-log shape, 4-part actionable error-message design, downgrade-noise-never-delete guardrail, stack log sources. Proactive counterpart: `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill. |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fant-verification-protocol.md` | **Ant-level quality gates**: OWASP Top 10 sweep, truthfulness protocol, closed-loop verification, enhanced review |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md` | **Anti-slop TypeScript**: ban generic `isRecord`\u002F`isObject` guards, `as unknown as T` launder-casts, `(x as any).field` reach-casts; require named types \u002F discriminated unions \u002F Zod schemas (`z.infer`). Enforcers: vendored **dmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop Oxlint plugin** (18 generic rules + 5 opt-in Effect rules, upstream c44ef22; vendor into a repo with the `\u002Finstall-anti-slop` skill, then `.\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.bin\u002Foxlint` is the gate — `--fix` first for `require-readable-spacing`, the only autofixable rule) or the zero-dep fallback `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fdetect-ts-slop.sh`. Runtime-guard sibling of the No-Suppression Rule. |\n\n---\n\n## Code Search Tools\n\n**Start with native `Grep` \u002F `Glob`** — they return structured `file:line:content` output that feeds directly into `Read`. Escalate to the CLI tools below only when keyword matching can't express the question (semantic search, cross-doc synthesis, AST patterns).\n\n### osgrep — AST-Aware \u002F Semantic Code Search (escalate from Grep)\nUse when the thing you're looking for isn't a literal keyword — e.g. \"where is auth handled\" across varied naming.\n\n```bash\nosgrep index .                          # Build index (first time per project)\nosgrep query \"where is auth handled\"    # Semantic search\nosgrep query \"error handling\" --mode fulltext  # Keyword search\n```\n\n### qmd — Knowledge & Documentation Search\n```bash\nqmd collection add ~\u002Fproject\u002Fdocs --name docs   # Add docs collection\nqmd embed                                        # Build embeddings\nqmd query \"how does authentication work\"         # Hybrid search\n```\n\n### bd — Task Tracking\n```bash\nbd create --title=\"Investigate issue\" --type=bug --priority=2\nbd update \u003Cid> --status=in_progress\nbd close \u003Cid> --reason=\"Root cause and fix summary\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Cloudflare API Access (MCP)\n\nThe `cloudflare-api` MCP server provides full access to ~2,500 Cloudflare API endpoints:\n- **`search`** — Query the OpenAPI spec to find endpoints\n- **`execute`** — Call any Cloudflare API endpoint\n\nUse for: Worker runtime logs, DNS\u002Frouting issues, KV\u002FD1\u002FR2 data, Worker bindings, firewall rules, zone analytics, cache behavior, SSL status, edge redirect rules.\n\n---\n\n## Instructions\n\nWhen this skill is invoked:\n\n**STEP 0 — Notify the user BEFORE launching the agent (MANDATORY):**\n\nBefore invoking the Task tool, print a brief status message:\n- For bugs: \"Investigating [issue]. This uses a 5-phase deep debugging workflow and may take several minutes. You'll see the results when it finishes.\"\n- For features: \"Building [feature]. Running build decision framework first, then implementing. You'll see the results when it finishes.\"\n- For reviews: \"Reviewing code. Loading TypeScript\u002FReact 19, security, and quality review patterns. You'll see the results when it finishes.\"\n\n**STEP 1 — Detect mode and load references:**\n\n1. Parse the user's request against the Mode Detection table above\n2. Read the relevant reference files from `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Freferences\u002F`\n3. If working in an AIVA project directory, also read `aiva-guidelines.md`\n4. For implementation\u002Fdebug modes, also read `preflight-checks.md`\n\n**STEP 1.5 — Apply Ant-Level Verification Protocol (MANDATORY):**\n\nLoad `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fant-verification-protocol.md` and apply:\n- **debug mode**: Security Review Gate (Section 1) on all files in the investigation\n- **feature mode**: Full OWASP sweep + Truthfulness Protocol on implementation\n- **review mode**: Enhanced Code Review (Section 5) on top of existing checklists\n- **ALL modes**: Closed-Loop Verification (Section 3) — never declare done without evidence\n\n**STEP 2 — Launch the agent:**\n\n1. **For feature requests**: Run the Build Decision Framework FIRST (from feature-implementation.md) — check if the user is about to build something that already exists as a service\u002Flibrary.\n2. **For bugs\u002Fdebugging**: Use the 5-Phase Workflow with repro harnesses and debugger attachment.\n3. **For code reviews**: Apply the loaded review checklists systematically.\n4. Use the Task tool with `subagent_type: carmack-mode-engineer`\n5. Pass the issue\u002Ffeature description + any relevant context from reference files\n6. The agent will build repro harnesses and attach debuggers as needed\n7. Approval checkpoint before implementing fixes\n\n**STEP 3 — Post-completion:**\n\n1. **After every git push**: Run GitHub Actions CI Gate — detect if repo has workflows, watch all checks with `gh pr checks --watch` or `gh run watch`, and if any fail: **classify before you re-run** (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freview-verdicts-and-ci-triage.md` §B): a failure in code the diff never touched ⇒ `git merge-base --is-ancestor origin\u002Fmain HEAD` — a stale base is reported as \"needs rebase\", not retried; a suspected flake earns exactly **one fresh build of the whole run** (`gh run rerun \u003Cid>`, never `--failed`); an identical failure on the second run was never flake — read the child logs and fix; only a failure in the diff's own code gets a commit. Read logs with `gh run view --log-failed`, fix, commit, push, repeat (max 3 fix cycles). Do NOT consider the task complete until all CI checks are green.\n2. **NEVER deploy** — when done, tell the user to run `\u002Fship` for production deployment.\n\n```\nLaunch carmack-mode-engineer agent now with the user's issue description.\nInclude the content from the relevant reference files you loaded in STEP 1.\nCRITICAL (context quality): Use the Grep → Read loop as the default investigation sequence. Never use Bash `cat`\u002F`head`\u002F`tail`\u002F`sed -n` as a Read substitute — you lose multimodal rendering (images\u002FPDFs\u002Fnotebooks), safe-edit tracking, and clean line numbers. Reserve Bash for git archaeology (log\u002Fblame\u002Fdiff), code execution (node\u002Fpython\u002Fcurl\u002Ftest runs), compound pipelines (sort\u002Funiq\u002Fwc\u002Fawk\u002Fxargs), and CLI tools (osgrep\u002Fqmd\u002Fbd\u002Fgh).\nIMPORTANT: After EVERY git push, check if the repo has GitHub Actions workflows. If yes, watch all checks until they complete. If any check fails, read the failure logs, fix the issue, commit, push, and repeat — up to 3 retry cycles.\nCRITICAL: Do NOT deploy to production. Do NOT run wrangler deploy, npm run deploy, vercel deploy --prod, or any production deployment command. When implementation is complete, STOP and tell the user to run \u002Fship for deployment.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Review Convergence Protocol (added 2026-10-26 — Anthropic code-review adoption)\n\nAutomated and agent review loops do not converge on their own: left unbounded, a reviewer keeps finding new line-level nits while the change underneath it never gets re-examined. (Anthropic's Claude Code team, \"How the Claude Code team does code review,\" Oct 15, 2026, saw one PR cycle 50+ times overnight, and found ~59% of repeated flags were pre-existing code the change never touched.) These rules bound the loop:\n\n1. **Three cycles, hard cap.** A change gets at most **3 review cycles** (one cycle = a full review pass plus the fixes it produced). Cycles-to-pass is recorded for the change and tracked over time as the convergence metric — a rising mean means the review prompts or the change quality need work, not more cycles.\n2. **Cycle 3 challenges the approach, not the lines.** If a change reaches cycle 3 without passing, the reviewer stops raising new line-level findings and instead answers one question in writing: *is the approach itself wrong, and if so, what approach would pass?* The next move is an approach change or an explicit decision to ship as-is under the existing gates — never a fourth line-level cycle.\n3. **Re-review covers only the new diff.** After the first full review, every later pass reviews only what changed since the previous pass. Re-reading the whole change each cycle is how old findings and pre-existing code re-enter the loop.\n4. **Never re-report a seen finding.** Each review maintains a seen-findings list for the change (finding class + location). A finding already raised is tracked to resolution, never raised again as if new; a finding the author dispositions with a reason stays dispositioned unless the new diff reopens it.\n5. **Report the bug CLASS, with all its instances.** A finding names the class (\"unsanitized input reaching a query builder\") and lists every instance found in the change — never one line at a time across cycles. One class, one finding, all instances, one fix.\n\nThis protocol bounds review *iteration* only. It changes no existing gate: every gate that applied before still applies, and a change that fails a gate fails, converged or not.\n\n---\n\n## The REVIEW.md Contract (added 2026-10-26 — Anthropic code-review adoption)\n\nA reviewer — human or agent — cannot know what failure means in a repo it did not write. A per-repo `REVIEW.md`, authored and owned by the code owner, is the contract that carries that knowledge. When a repo has a `REVIEW.md` at its root, **every review of that repo must read it first and review under it**; when it does not, reviews proceed under this skill's defaults and the gap is worth one line in the review summary.\n\nA `REVIEW.md` defines:\n\n- **What failure means here** — the repo-specific consequences that make a bug serious (data loss, a wrong deploy, a broken public page), so severity is judged against the repo's real stakes, not generic ones.\n- **Paths the reviewer ignores** — generated code, vendored dependencies, fixtures, build output: named paths or globs that review passes over instead of flagging.\n- **Severity labels** — exactly three: **Important** (must fix before merge), **Nit** (worth fixing, never blocks), **Pre-existing** (real, but not introduced by this change). A change is **never penalized for Pre-existing findings** — they are recorded, optionally filed, and excluded from the change's pass\u002Ffail.\n- **Evidence format** — every finding carries a `file:line` reference into the actual diff or tree. A filename the reviewer has not opened is never cited; a location that cannot be referenced is not a finding yet.\n- **Report format** — every review opens with a top-level summary: the finding count by severity, and, when the change is clean, an explicit \"No issues found.\" statement. A review with no summary has not reported.\n\nStarter template (copy to the repo root and fill in):\n\n```markdown\n# REVIEW.md — \u003Crepo name>\n\n## What failure means here\n\u003CThe 2–4 consequences that make a bug serious in THIS repo.>\n\n## Paths the reviewer ignores\n- \u003Cgenerated \u002F vendored \u002F fixture paths or globs>\n\n## Severity\n- Important — must fix before merge.\n- Nit — worth fixing; never blocks.\n- Pre-existing — not introduced by this change; record it, never count it against the change.\n\n## Report format\n- Open with: N findings (X Important, Y Nit, Z Pre-existing) — or \"No issues found.\"\n- Every finding: `file:line`, the bug class, and every instance of that class in the change.\n```\n","# \u002Fcode - Engineering Agent\n\n## Whole-site visual consistency and content duplication (mandatory)\n\nFor UI changes, read [Whole-site UI review](..\u002Fshared\u002Fui-content-duplication.md).\nReview full-page content for repeated meaning and inspect every affected route,\nincluding the actual landing-page renderer. A single-page or source-only check\ndoes not establish site-wide consistency. Preserve intentional CTAs and disclosures.\n\n## Client lifecycle enforcement (mandatory)\n\nFor asynchronous report\u002Fdraft editing, AI category changes, photos, resubmission,\nbrowser resume, or client storage, read\n[Client lifecycle enforcement](..\u002Fshared\u002Fclient-lifecycle-enforcement.md).\nBehavioral regressions must run before commit and in the actual build\u002Frelease\npath. Prove broken variants block those entry points in an isolated copy; do\nnot claim instructions alone enforce safety. Fix and update confirmed bug\nrecords within the authorized scope, distinguishing committed from deployed.\n\n## IndexedDB submission recovery (mandatory)\n\nFor “database connection is closing”, `IDBDatabase.transaction`, or mobile\nsubmission-queue recovery, read [IndexedDB connection lifecycle](..\u002Fshared\u002Findexeddb-connection-lifecycle.md).\nExercise the real closed-connection path, all shared queue callers, normal submit\nand category-changed resubmit; preserve durable-before-send and never replay\nunknown network outcomes. Ship verifies the deployed queue with isolated storage.\n\n## Website deep links (mandatory)\n\nFor every website in the active task or release, read\n[Shareable pages, sections, and tasks](..\u002Fshared\u002Fwebsite-deep-links.md).\nImplement missing stable URLs and section permalinks; synchronize in-app\nnavigation with the address bar; verify direct load, refresh, sharing, and\nBack\u002FForward. Include every submenu, meaningful task screen, and notification\nentry point. Ship must run the route-coverage gate before release and verify\naffected URLs on the live origin afterward. Preserve auth boundaries and\nexisting release scope; URLs must never execute destructive actions.\n\n\n## GUI launch-job lifecycle (mandatory)\n\nBefore temporary macOS GUI jobs, onboarding, or focus\u002Finput debugging, read\n[GUI launch-job lifecycle](..\u002Fshared\u002Fmac-gui-job-lifecycle.md).\nNever use `launchctl submit` as a one-shot launcher or supervise short-lived\n`open -a` with KeepAlive. Inspect repeated-launch jobs before changing capture\nengines or input code; unload task-owned temporary jobs and prove stable input\nbefore handoff. For ship, apply this gate when the release touched Mac automation.\n\n\nUniversal engineering agent for building, debugging, fixing, reviewing, and shipping. Combines carmack-mode deep debugging with systematic 5-phase investigation, plus all development workflow tools.\n\nFor missing DocuSeal defaults or signer-path mismatches, load\n`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fdocuseal-template-contract.md` before changing code.\nSeparate unique-submission payload state from live shared-template defaults, and\ncheck whether multiple signing parties make the shared link ambiguous. AIVA's\nHIPAA template must keep its shared link disabled. Hand any production template\nmutation or deployment to `\u002Fship`.\n\n## Usage\n\n```\n\u002Fcode [issue or feature description]\n```\n\n## Examples\n\n- `\u002Fcode intermittent 500 errors on \u002Fapi\u002Fauth`\n- `\u002Fcode add email notification feature`\n- `\u002Fcode memory leak in background worker`\n- `\u002Fcode review this PR`\n- `\u002Fcode race condition causing data corruption`\n- `\u002Fcode build broke after dependency update`\n- `\u002Fcode research best AI tools last 30 days`\n\n## Carmack Philosophy\n\n1. Evidence over assumptions\n2. Minimal reproduction cases\n3. Debugger over print statements\n4. Surgical fixes, not rewrites\n5. Closed-loop verification\n6. Know what NOT to build — use existing tools over custom implementations\n7. Ship, measure, iterate — perfection is the enemy of validation\n\n## Model-the-Real-System Gate (MANDATORY — 2026-07-03)\n\n**Before you write, label, or estimate anything that describes a real system — a device's capabilities, an API's config, an equipment\u002Fhardware layout, a rate\u002Flimit\u002Ftier, \"what channel carries X\", any physical or account fact the code then models — you MUST read that system's OWN state live first. Never infer the ground truth from a name, a code comment, a variable label, a prior \"Verified\" note, a UI string, or plausibility.** This is the Ground-Truth Standard applied to *modeling*, not just to final reports: the model is a claim, and a claim isn't a fact until fetched from the primary source now.\n\nThe cheapest live probe almost always exists and almost always fits in one call:\n- A device\u002Fintegration exposes a **capability\u002Fsettings object** — read it (ecobee `settings.hasHeatPump\u002FhasBoiler\u002FhasElectric\u002FheatStages`, Stripe account caps, a printer's IPP attributes, a DB's `information_schema`, a feature-flag payload). One GET refutes a whole fabricated premise.\n- \"Which channel\u002Ffield carries the real data\" is answerable by **pulling a window that actually contains the event** and summing per-field (e.g. a winter runtimeReport to see heat lands on `auxHeat1`, not `compHeat1`). Don't assume the obvious-named field is the populated one.\n- If the live value **can't be fetched right now** (stale token, no creds, offline), say so plainly and mark the model as *assumed pending verification* — do NOT assert it as fact, and default to the option that is wrong-safe (charges nothing you can't prove, hides no cost) while flagging the assumption in the UI\u002Fcopy.\n\n**Tripwire:** if the code's model rests on an equipment\u002Fconfig premise (a `\u002F\u002F heat pump + aux backup` comment, a `auxKw` var, an \"attisPro heat pump\" identity string) and you have NOT this session read the system's own fields that would confirm it — STOP and read them before touching the model. **Reference incident (2026-07-03, ecobee-dashboard):** the entire cost model + savings tips assumed a heat pump with resistance \"aux\" backup (a 2.3×-cost-of-aux narrative, a phantom `compHeat1×coolKw` heating term). One live `GET \u002F1\u002Fthermostat?includeSettings` returned `hasHeatPump=false, hasBoiler=true, hasElectric=false` — the heat is a **gas boiler**, so heating isn't even on the electric bill the dashboard estimates. Every \"savings\" number for heating was fiction. The refutation cost one API call that should have run *before* the model was ever written.\n\n## No-Lie Final Report Gate (MANDATORY — 2026-05-18)\n\nBefore returning any \"done\" summary to the user, run the **No-Lie Verification Protocol** from `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fno-lie-verification.md` — all five checks. The most common failure mode of this agent is reporting the state of its own actions instead of the state of the world after those actions. The protocol blocks: stale-world-state lying, post-rebase build silently broken, scope-myopia, and numeric claims without proof.\n\n**Hard requirements before declaring done:**\n1. `git fetch origin && git status` — confirm main hasn't moved out from under you. If it has, rebase + re-test.\n2. For every PR you opened: `gh pr view \u003CN> --json mergeable,mergeStateStatus` — must be MERGEABLE, not CONFLICTING.\n3. Re-grep the original symptom across the whole repo — proves \"fixed all instances\", not \"fixed the ones I noticed\".\n4. Every numeric\u002Ffactual claim in the final report cites its proof source inline (SQL query \u002F curl output \u002F file:line \u002F build exit code + timestamp).\n5. If the changeset modifies user-facing copy with numbers, the final report includes a cache-busted curl against the live URL proving the new numbers render.\n6. **Skill\u002Fconfig backup (user rule 2026-06-12):** if this session edited ANY file under `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002F`, `~\u002F.claude\u002Fagents\u002F`, `~\u002F.claude\u002FCLAUDE.md`, or `~\u002F.claude\u002Fsettings.json`, run `~\u002Fclaude-code-boilerplate\u002Fscripts\u002Fbackup-claude-config.sh` and confirm its output shows a pushed commit URL. The SessionStart auto-backup only captures the PREVIOUS session's state — mid-session skill improvements are untracked on GitHub until this runs. (Repo work is separate: every repo commit must already be pushed — `git log @{u}..HEAD` empty.)\n\nForbidden in final reports without proof: \"verified\", \"confirmed\", \"all clean\", \"shipped\", \"deployed successfully\", \"PR opened ready to merge\", any specific count\u002Fpercentage.\n\n7. **Outward causal claims need a repeat count (MANDATORY — 2026-08-25).** Before asserting \"X causes Y\" anywhere that other people read it — a GitHub issue\u002FPR comment, a runbook, a memory, a report — you must be able to state (a) the observable proving the manipulation actually applied, (b) that the success signal is direct state and not a lagging proxy, and (c) **>=2 interleaved runs per arm**. A single run per configuration cannot distinguish \"this arm fails\" from \"this system sometimes fails\". **\"It is intermittent\" is itself a causal claim and needs the same evidence** — it is also the exact thing a silently-no-op'd manipulation produces. See `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fexperiment-manipulation-check.md` (#38). Reference incident: posted a wrong root cause to a public issue thread twice off single-run bisect data whose restores were silent no-ops; the real cause was one config line.\n8. **A PR on an auto-deploy-on-main repo is either MERGED or explicitly LEFT — never silently open (MANDATORY — 2026-09-20).** Before the final report run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fdeployed-unmerged-check.sh \u003Crepo>` (rc=2 UNMEASURED is not a pass). Any `REGRESSION-RISK` line — a SHA in `deploy-log.jsonl` that is not an ancestor of `origin\u002Fmain` — means a prior branch deploy will be silently undone by the next main push; name it in the report and hand it to `\u002Fship` (Phase -1.6\u002F4.9) for the merge under the deploy authorization. Also list every open non-draft PR older than 7 days with its `mergeable`\u002F`mergeStateStatus`. Carmack itself still never merges on an auto-deploy repo (see Hard Rules) — the gate's job is to make the open state VISIBLE, not to hide it behind \"PR opened\". Reference: AIVA #276 was deployed from its branch 2026-09-11 and sat unmerged for 9 days while main kept auto-deploying; #286 was the same shape the day this gate was written.\n9. **Build changes: run the source-map exposure check.** If the session touched a bundler config, a build script, `.assetsignore`, or a static-asset route, run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fsourcemap-exposure-check.sh \u003Crepo>` after the build. `sourcemap: true`\u002F`'inline'` or a served `.map` is a finding (the fix is `\"hidden\"` + `*.map` in `public\u002F.assetsignore` + a structural test — AIVA `tests\u002Fclient-sourcemaps-not-served.test.ts`), and it cannot be declared fixed without the live probe `--live https:\u002F\u002F\u003Corigin>` after `\u002Fship` deploys.\n\n**Reference incident (2026-05-18, hospital-ledger PR #2):** Agent reported \"PR opened, branch tracking origin, build clean, all numbers verified\" — reality was PR CONFLICTING (main moved during the session), final summary cited \"3,699 hospitals\" with proof only in a scratchpad not surfaced to the user, no live-URL re-check was attempted. \u002Fship caught it; this gate now catches it inside \u002Fcode.\n\n---\n\n## Context Quality (how to see the codebase clearly)\n\nThe sequence matters more than any single tool choice.\n\n**Default investigation loop:** `Grep` to find → `Read` to understand. Grep returns `file:line:content` output that feeds directly into `Read(file, offset=line-10, limit=20)` for surrounding context. Don't break this loop by routing through Bash.\n\n**Before you write a helper, grep for one that already exists.** Re-implementing what lives a few files over is the most common form of slop and it is invisible in review — the new code is correct, it is just the second copy. Search for the *behavior*, not the name (`osgrep` finds the shape when the name differs), before adding a util, type, guard, formatter, or wrapper. This does NOT license shrinking a fix: reuse the existing helper, then still fix the whole call-site class (see the CALL-SITE CLASS rule below).\n\n**Use `Read` — not Bash — for:**\n- **Images, PDFs, notebooks** — `Read` renders visually so Claude actually *sees* the content. `cat screenshot.png` returns binary garbage; `cat file.pdf` returns gibberish. Huge loss on UI debugging, design comps, inspecting anything you just captured.\n- **Any file you plan to Edit** — `Read` registers the file for safe edits. Without it, `Edit` fails with \"file has not been read yet\" and you waste a retry.\n- **Files where line numbers matter** — `Read` prefixes them consistently for follow-up edits.\n\n**Use `Bash` — freely — for:**\n- **Git archaeology**: `git log -p`, `git blame`, `git diff A..B` — often the highest-signal context in a debug session. No native equivalent.\n- **Executing code for evidence**: `node`, `python -c`, `curl`, `timeout 120 npx vitest run specific-test`. Evidence beats speculation.\n- **Compound pipelines**: anything involving `sort`\u002F`uniq`\u002F`wc`\u002F`awk`\u002F`xargs`. Example: `grep -rn \"TODO\" --include=\"*.ts\" | grep -v test | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn` for a ranked frequency table.\n- **Running CLI tools**: `osgrep`, `qmd`, `bd`, `gh`, `wrangler`, `git`, `npm`.\n\n**Don't use Bash as a `Read` substitute** (`cat`, `head`, `tail`, `sed -n '50,70p'`, `less`). You lose multimodal rendering, file-read tracking, and clean line-numbered output.\n\n**Don't use Bash as a `Grep` substitute** for simple pattern searches. Native `Grep` returns structured output that feeds straight into the next `Read` call with offset\u002Flimit. Reserve `grep -rn | pipeline` for compound analysis Grep can't express.\n\n---\n\n## Mode Detection\n\nDetermine mode from the user's request, then read ONLY the relevant reference files before launching the agent. This keeps context lean.\n\n| User Intent Pattern | Mode | Reference Files to Read |\n|---------------------|------|------------------------|\n| passkey, WebAuthn, TOTP, 2FA, two-factor, passwordless, social login, email OTP, recovery codes, `SESSION_NOT_FRESH`, security setup, reauthentication, \"is 2FA enabled\", \"does the site require 2FA\" | **auth-security** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Faccount-security-lifecycle.md`, installed auth SDK source, `code-review-security.md` |\n| iOS, iPhone\u002FiPad app, Xcode, simulator, Swift\u002FSwiftUI, Capacitor shell, app crash\u002F.ips, TestFlight (dev questions), xcodebuild, App Store compliance, app screenshots\u002FASO, **Clerk\u002FApple\u002FGoogle social sign-in failing in a Capacitor app (`authorization_invalid` \u002F `native_api_disabled` \u002F `origin_authorization_headers_conflict` \u002F `oauth_token_apple` \u002F \"native social login won't work in the app\"), OR a passkey\u002FWebAuthn ceremony failing in a Capacitor webview (\"passkey registration was cancelled or timed out\", `webcredentials`, associated domains, AASA 404)** | **ios** — invoke the `\u002Fios` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fios\u002FSKILL.md`): THE Apple-side counterpart of \u002Fcode. It routes to xcodebuildmcp (build_run_sim loop), axiom agents (crash-analyzer, build-fixer, performance-profiler), greenlight, axe webview driving, **simulator eyes+hands via `baguette` (headless boot, `describe-ui` a11y tree, pt-coord taps\u002Fswipes\u002Fpinch, screenshot, logs — default) and `serve-sim` (60 fps MJPEG stream, camera\u002Fwebcam injection, CA-debug overlays) — routing + verified commands in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-sim-agent-control.md`; both simulator-only, never the real iPhone**, and the granular asc\u002Fstore-asset skills. Web-layer bugs inside a Capacitor app come BACK here (\u002Fcode patterns — it's web code). iOS RELEASE work (archive\u002FTestFlight\u002Fsubmit\u002FOTA publish) routes to \u002Fship Phase 4.7. **In-webview auth\u002Fcredential ceremonies all fail with a GENERIC error until the right app↔domain binding exists — see \u002Fios trap #12's binding matrix (probe FIRST): social-OAuth Apple → trap #4 (`allowNavigation`); Google → blocked by policy, hide it; clerk-js scheme → `allowedRedirectProtocols`; passkey \"cancelled or timed out\" → AASA file + Associated Domains entitlement (improvebayarea `dadfdf3`). Don't debug the JS ceremony before the 30-sec binding probe.** | `\u002Fios` skill |\n| app crashes AT LAUNCH on a real device \u002F new iOS but works in the simulator, `EXC_BREAKPOINT` in `UIApplicationEvaluateRuntimeIssueForNoSceneLifecycleAdoption`, TestFlight build closes instantly, \"native sign-in sheet returns nowhere\" after adding scenes | **ios-scene-lifecycle** — iOS 27 kills iOS-26-SDK apps that don't adopt UIScene; Capacitor 8.4 ships no SceneDelegate. Run `\u002Fbin\u002Fbash ~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fios-scene-lifecycle-check.sh \u003Crepo>` FIRST (0 pass \u002F 1 fail \u002F 2 unmeasured \u002F 4 n\u002Fa) — it names the exact gap (no manifest, missing class, or missing `openURLContexts`\u002Fcold-launch URL forwarding that silently kills Google\u002FOAuth return). Apply the build-15 recipe, then prove launch on the physical phone (devicectl processes + crashes), never on an older-runtime simulator. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-app-dev-release-traps.md` §1–3 |\n| test on my real iPhone, tap\u002Fswipe\u002Fscreenshot the phone, drive TestFlight \u002F the installed app, physical-device acceptance, mobile-mcp `ETIMEDOUT` \u002F `context canceled` \u002F `PairRecord errorcode 22` on a physical iPhone | **physical-device** — use `\u002Fcontrolphone` (`~\u002Fprojects\u002Fiphonectl`): `controlphone screenshot` (go-ios screenshotr, no WDA), `iphonectl-setup wda` once (WDA via xcodebuild + ASC-key auto-provisioning, no p12\u002Fkeychain prompt, free port), then `controlphone tap\u002Fswipe\u002Ftype` in POINTS (px\u002F3). Don't retry mobile-mcp on iOS 27 (its capture path times out); a stale go-ios tunnel mimics broken pairing — `controlphone apps` answering proves lockdown is fine; ports 8100\u002F8101 are the mobilecli daemon's. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-app-dev-release-traps.md` §4 |\n| run something on the mini, mac-mini, the cron host, remote Mac, \"check the mini\", Hermes cron, ssh to the mini, Screen Sharing, why does X work on my laptop but not the mini | **remote-mini** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fmac-mini-remote-control.md` — the 6-surface ladder (ssh -> scp -> hermes cron -> launchctl -> fcdp -> Screen Sharing). Climb it; don't start at the GUI. Covers the context traps that make a working tool look broken over SSH (Keychain\u002F`cookies-txt`, `open -a` -600, `osascript` 1002), the nested-heredoc credential hazard (write locally + `scp`), zsh not word-splitting, `hermes cron create` taking a POSITIONAL schedule + bare script filename, and which Chrome profile you actually hit (integer tab id = real Default, hex = headless :9222). |\n| bug, error, crash, failing, 500, timeout, leak, hang | **debug** | `debug-patterns.md` + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fbug-fix-preflight.md` (**run BEFORE the 5-phase workflow**: Step 0 existing-fix check — an open PR \u002F merged commit that plausibly fixes it switches you to *verify mode*, never author over it; Step 1 regression history via `git log -S` \u002F `--follow` \u002F `gh pr view` before any hypothesis; Step 2 label every root-cause claim Direct \u002F Supported \u002F Inferred \u002F Speculative \u002F Unknown; Step 3 \"reproduced\" = correct-vs-broken final state named in advance, observed **twice with a reset between**, one real state value cross-checked) |\n| refactor, rename, extract, inline, dedupe, move, reshape, \"clean up the structure\", \"behavior-preserving\", \"simplify without changing behavior\" | **refactor** — the structure changes, the behavior does not. Pin the contract first (characterization test \u002F equivalence harness — `tsc` and lint are NOT a pin), subtract before adding, move in small steps that keep the pin green, migrate every caller and delete the old API in the same wave (no shims), prove equivalence on the real artifact, and keep it only if **reader load dropped** — otherwise revert. A bug or feature the cleanup reveals is split out, structural change first. | `refactor.md` |\n| hillclimb, \"keep improving X until\", sustained optimization of one metric, \"get it under N ms\", \"iterate on the number\", perf loop, Ralph-evo perf loop, \"make it as fast as possible\" | **hillclimb** — one change, one measurement, keep or revert. Frozen harness with proven sensitivity, median-of-N, stop predicate = target AND minimum iterations, one commit per accepted win, `decisions.tsv`. Report the result as a gap to the floor from `performance-ceiling.md`, never a delta from the start. | `hillclimb.md` + `performance-ceiling.md` |\n| blast radius, \"what could this break\", \"is this small change safe\", a diff touching a shared helper \u002F schema \u002F wire format \u002F middleware \u002F anything with many callers, reviewing a small diff you don't trust | **blast-radius** — find the ONE fact the change is safe because of, get it to rung 4 of the certainty ladder (a script that runs the real code and fails loud), look where grep stops (pinned library source, timing, JSON\u002FDB\u002FKV shapes, another language reading the same bytes, flags, three hops down), hand back risks \u002F cleared \u002F before-you-merge. `proven` \u002F `unproven (stated)` \u002F `could not assess` — only the first passes for shared code. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fblast-radius.md` |\n| bisect where every subset passes, no single change reproduces it, same config gives PASS then FAIL, about to call it \"intermittent\"\u002F\"flaky\", config-restore or backup-restore debugging, an apply\u002Frestore\u002Fimport step that \"succeeded\" but changed nothing, A\u002FB whose arms were never confirmed to differ | **experiment-integrity** — prove the manipulation APPLIED (read back an observable that differs between arms) before trusting any arm; success signal must be direct state or a progression, never a lagging proxy or an overlay screenshot; >=2 interleaved runs per arm; publish nothing causal until all three hold | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fexperiment-manipulation-check.md` |\n| SF311 save 500, Verint, external form save, request_type_id, category changed 500 | **debug** | `debug-patterns.md`, `blind-spots.md` |\n| 311 ticket missing Location box, Open311 address null, structured-location empty, mobile311 viewer shows description but no Location dt\u002Fdd, sf_full_address \u002F Location_description \u002F scf location_details \u002F address forwarding broken, \"one ticket has location another doesn't\", address only in description not in location field, lat\u002Flong null in Open311, coord-string in structured slot, lat\u002Flng fallback corrupted ticket | **debug** (Pattern #21, backend-agnostic) — fix: route every structured-location-touching code path through `streetOnlyAddress()` + `looksLikeCoordinateString()` in `src\u002Fsf311.ts`; let backend-specific reverse-geocode (EAS for Verint, Esri for SCF) fill the structured slots when `input.address` is empty; keep FULL address in `Request_description` navFooter. Regression tests MUST exercise (a) long-form, (b) empty, (c) coord-string `input.address`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #21) |\n| MyLA311, myla311.lacity.gov, C-04342632, caseAddress `\", , CA.\"`, locator_gis_returned_address empty, All Service Requests vs My Requests, data.lacity.org 2cy6-i7zn, Street_Address__c, addressDetails, LA_AddressController, file all listed 311 types, fetchCaseTypeDetails, toastPayload NPE, empty objCaseConfigWrapper, captureFailure, dummy modelFlags, Permit_Number__c, remint IssueTypeId | **debug\u002Ffeature** (Pattern #36) — load the pattern **before** writing catalog JSON or a submit envelope. Listed ≠ fileable; SUCCESS-empty = `captureFailure` (never dummy flags); unwrap toast\u002F`objCaseConfigWrapper`; remint session IDs; classify on field API names; refuse naming the official field; Apex NPE ≠ city rejection; Experience-shell apps → decompile the site LWC. Two live files of one pin-only type, then `\u002Fship`. `\u002Fcode` does not `wrangler deploy`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #36) |\n| Bitwarden\u002FVaultwarden\u002Fwarden self-hosted login fails before the password is tried, \"KDF config response does not contain a valid KDF type\", prelogin\u002F`KdfSettings`, a reimplemented vendor API that broke ONE client generation | **debug** (Pattern #44 dual-shape contract) — read the upstream server's response model + the upstream clients' parsers; serve EVERY live generation (additive fields), never swap shapes; serialization test asserting both shapes, proven armed. warden deploy traps: `-c wrangler.toml`, pinned rustc 1.91.1, `[build]`-stripped temp config. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 44) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fmini-bitwarden\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| DBI complaint reported as `validation` error but the city actually has it, third-party form submit ok=false but agency confirms via mail \u002F DataSF, form echoed back on success, `\"DBI re-rendered the form (validation rejected the submission)\"` appears for every submission, every IBA-submitted DBI complaint fails, success-detection heuristic matches both success AND failure pages, `complaintNumber: undefined` but submission worked, parser returns ok=false on HTTP 200, lblError success-vs-failure span, signal-extraction tests use synthetic HTML, ASP.NET WebForms \u002F Verint \u002F dform \u002F aspx replay false-negative on success | **debug** (Pattern #23) — capture real success + real failure responses to `src\u002F__fixtures__\u002F\u003Cintegration>\u002F`, write a `tools\u002Frepro\u002F\u003Cintegration>-probe.{sh,mjs}` script, diff the two fixtures to find an anchored distinguishing feature (DOM id, JSON field — NOT a substring present in both), rewrite the detector to extract that feature, add tests that `readFileSync` the captured fixtures. Then surface the upstream's actual reason through the `error.message`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #23) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fthird-party-signal-fixtures.md` |\n| YouTube \"Error 153\" \u002F \"Video player configuration error\", embed shows a gray panel, Vimeo\u002FSpotify\u002FSoundCloud embed won't load, \"video plays on youtube.com but not on my site\", embed broke after adding security headers \u002F `secureHeaders()`, rendered `href` contains prose, bare URLs render as dead text | **debug** (Pattern #27) — the page sends `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` (Hono `secureHeaders()` **default**); YouTube has rejected Referer-less embeds since late 2025. It is NOT CSP and NOT the video. Two-command probe before any fix: `curl -sI https:\u002F\u002F\u003Csite>\u002F \\| grep -i referrer-policy` and the oembed status for the video id. Fix = `referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\"` on the iframe (never weaken the global header). Verify on the DEPLOYED artifact + a browser screenshot — `hono\u002Fjsx` vs React attribute casing silently drops it, and Worker propagation takes >30s so an immediate curl false-negatives. Then sweep the repo for the siblings: hrefs containing whitespace, un-linkified bare URLs, malformed URL literals. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Fcsp-cache-patterns.md` (Pattern 27) |\n| provider swap, replace Resend\u002FAuth0\u002FStripe\u002FS3 with X, migrate email\u002Fauth\u002Fpayments provider, remove the old SDK, delete the old API key, \"switch us completely to X\" | **provider-migration** — run the 7-item checklist BEFORE declaring done: one seam, discriminated-union result, zero guards naming the old env vars, legacy ids discriminated by shape, emulator rules re-derived from the live API, every integration point actually removed, cron blast radius measured against PROD data. Report cost honestly (a swap often saves \\$0). | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fprovider-migration-safety.md` |\n| status chip lies, zero rows reported as \"expired\", fresh record reads as missing, status from an analytics\u002FGraphQL backend, non-throwing SDK result treated as success, `{data, error}` never checked | **debug** (#29 + signal-audit #13\u002F#14) | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 29) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsignal-logic-audit.md` |\n| my edit didn't take, repost\u002Fresubmit filed the OLD value, stale photo or category reused, user's new value silently replaced by a prior\u002Fdefault one, merged payload with overlapping fields (`x_url` + `x_urls` + `x_data_url`), \"broken since release X\" | **debug** (#37 implicit precedence) — declare the winner at construction and pin it with an order test proven armed by re-injection; do NOT delete a writer that is a deliberate feature. Verify the culprit commit with `git log -L`\u002F`-S` before blaming the newest deploy. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 37) + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Fsingle-winner-merge-check.sh` |\n| third-party submit \"worked\" (200 + id, no error) but never went live \u002F never got a public number \u002F `openedAt: null` \u002F `publicId: null`; guest\u002Fanon create silently dead-ends; A\u002FB-tested a flag or category and the symptom stayed IDENTICAL; \"is it the payload or the account\u002Fidentity\"; freshly-minted guest token; prove which backend gives instant IDs | **debug** (#30) — a sync 200+id is *pending*, not *done*: gate success on the async lifecycle transition (public number\u002F`opened`), polled, vs a known-good baseline. Symptom byte-identical across payload edits ⇒ stop editing the request, the ACTOR\u002Fidentity you held constant is the variable — re-run the SAME payload under a known-good established identity first. Prove the working backend by running the REAL function live (repro harness → real id), never old code or a \"Verified\" comment. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern 30) |\n| same opaque error survives a fix you PROVED deployed, \"my fix didn't work\" but the error is byte-identical, one `400 {\"error\":\"Invalid\"}` \u002F bare `500` for several unrelated causes, multi-deploy fix-probe-fix loop, \"no events in tail\" \u002F \"counter didn't move\", health probe green while 100% of writes fail | **debug** (#32) — a STATIC error means the instrument is too coarse, not that the premise is wrong (mutating error = wrong premise; identical error = missing discriminator). Ship a **discriminator first** (report the measurable properties of what you sent — flags + lengths, never payload\u002FPII); bisect by COMPONENT with exactly ONE variable per probe; cross-reference successes as hard as failures; when failures have no side effect, probing prod is FREE. **Prove the instrument is alive before trusting silence.** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fopaque-multi-cause-failure.md` |\n| \"deploy broke prod\", MIME type text\u002Fhtml on a .js, SPA won't mount after deploy, verifying in a clone browser | **debug** (#28) — curl the origin before you roll back; the tab is probably stale | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Fcsp-cache-patterns.md` (Pattern 28) |\n| `iba` CLI, improvebayarea.com, file a 311 ticket from the CLI, \"did my 311 report actually go through\", SF311 category registry, `request_type_id`, no power-wash\u002Fsteam-clean category, `recategorized_from`, ref-vs-caseid | **iba-311** — `~\u002Ftools\u002Fiba\u002Fiba` (on PATH) files REAL SF311 cases. **`--mode prefill` is the default and it FILES** (all modes do; only `--dry-run` doesn't). Registry: 42 SF categories baked in, regenerated 2026-08-01 after silently running 20-of-42 — `iba categories --check` diffs vs the live API and exits 1 on drift; `--live [--city oakland]` for the authoritative list. **Verint assigns a public caseid synchronously only for SOME forms** (`pw_street_cleaning` yes, `pw_graffiti` no → UUID ref + `caseid_pending`): resolve with `iba lookup \u003Cref>` (a **ref**, not a caseid) or `iba submit --wait \u003Csecs>`. **Three false \"it failed\" signals:** `mobile311.sfgov.org\u002Fservices\u002Fcase\u002F\u003Cid>` 404s even for filed cases and by design for refs (improvebayarea `src\u002Fsf311.ts:1770`); `\u002Fapi\u002Frecent` is a 25-item sample (use `?q=`); DataSF `vw6y-z8j6` lags 1-2 days and is the only real confirmation. Always capture the FULL submit response — the id is unrecoverable, which is why the result banner now goes to **stderr**. Website side: `SF311_CATEGORIES` (`src\u002Fsf311.ts:159`) is the source of truth with **no fetchable upstream** (SF Open311 `services.json` = 7 services, different namespace), so a count-drift guard is NOT buildable there; its parameter-drift risk is covered by `\u002Fapi\u002Fcategories\u002Fhealth` (`src\u002Findex.ts:3978`) + `src\u002Fsf311.test.ts`. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fprojects\u002F-Users-\u003Cyou>\u002Fmemory\u002Freference_local_tools.md`; regression harness `~\u002Ftools\u002Fiba\u002Ftest_submit_result.py` |\n| review, PR, check code, audit code | **review** | `code-review-react.md`, `code-review-security.md`, `code-review-general.md`, `production-readiness-checklist.md` |\n| build, add, implement, feature, create | **feature** | `feature-implementation.md` |\n| brainstorm, plan, PRD, spec, requirements | **plan** | `feature-implementation.md` |\n| research, find, investigate, last 30 days | **research** | `research.md` |\n| browser, screenshot, CDP, inspect page | **browser** | `browser-automation.md` |\n| git, commit, push, branch, worktree, secrets | **git** | `git-workflow.md` |\n| skill, create skill, edit skill | **skill** | `skill-creation.md` |\n| codex, second opinion, rescue | **codex** | `codex-integration.md` |\n| task, prd.json, stories, tracking | **task** | `task-tracking.md` |\n| deploy, CI, push, ship (read-only context) | **deploy** | `deploy-patterns.md`, `production-readiness-checklist.md` |\n| production readiness, pre-launch, is this ready, prod checklist, launch audit | **prod-readiness** | `production-readiness-checklist.md`, `code-review-security.md`, `preflight-checks.md` |\n| UX, accessibility, responsive, mobile | **ux** | `ux-patterns.md`, `responsive-design.md` |\n| consent checkbox, opt-in\u002Fopt-out, TCPA, A2P 10DLC, SMS consent, ToS acceptance, HIPAA authorization, cookie\u002FGDPR consent banner, e-signature attestation, age verification, \"record that they agreed\", proof of consent, audit trail for a user agreement | **debug\u002Ffeature** (consent-evidence integrity, Pattern #35) | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fconsent-evidence-integrity.md` — 6 failure shapes for any field whose STORED value is later offered as PROOF: collected-but-never-persisted (N checkboxes, 1 writer); stale closure over the evidence value (records an opt-in as a DECLINE — treat an exhaustive-deps warning here as P1, never a lint nit); schema-strictness mismatch (non-strict zod SILENTLY STRIPS it, `.strict()` 400s the whole form — same root, opposite symptoms); dedup discarding evidence (`INSERT OR IGNORE` skips a returning user who consents today — consent is an EVENT, so append-only is the primary store); client-supplied disclosure text (forgeable ⇒ worthless); affirmatives-only logging (an absent row can't distinguish *declined* from *never asked* from *writer broken*). Includes the grep-instrument discipline that nearly hid all of it — case-sensitivity (`smsConsent` misses `contactSmsConsent`) and single-line grep vs formatter-wrapped JSX prose — always pair a probe with a positive control. Reference incident 2026-08-12 (AIVA): 3 checkboxes, 2 wrote nowhere, all of it typechecking + linting + 106 tests green. |\n| renders undefined, shows NaN, \"Invalid Date\", \"[object Object]\", toggle\u002Fsection\u002Fcontrol disappeared or silently vanished, \"make sure nothing is undefined\", Cannot read properties of undefined, is not iterable, null-gate hides UI, `useState\u003CT\\|null>` gates a render, `.map`\u002Fproperty\u002Fstring\u002FDate on possibly-undefined API data, audit the admin\u002Fdashboard portal, full admin audit | **debug** (undefined\u002Fnull-render) | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fundefined-null-render-safety.md` — 9-pattern catalog + live DOM grep for rendered `undefined`\u002F`NaN`\u002F`[object Object]` + console `TypeError`. Also re-sweeps the admin blind-spot class (default-LIMIT truncation, NULL-aggregate sort burial, count-source mismatch, inner-JOIN row drop, admin-auth DB fallback). Reference incident: AIVA admin \"Test account\" toggle hidden by an `isTest !== null` gate (2026-06-01). |\n| double down arrow, double chevron, double caret, two arrows, two chevrons, twin chevrons, stacked icons, duplicate icon, duplicate affordance, \"showing twice\", \"appears twice\", \"X is rendered twice\", select chevron, dropdown arrow doubled, tailwind forms + native chevron | **debug** + **ui-duplicate-affordance** | `ui-duplicate-affordance.md` (loaded with `debug-patterns.md`) — detection recipe in 5 steps: (1) does the page load `@tailwindcss\u002Fforms` \u002F Bootstrap `form-select` \u002F Bulma; (2) classify every `\u003Cselect>` as native-chevron-only (`appearance:auto` + `background-image:none !important`), inline-icon-only (`appearance:none !important` + `background-image:none !important`), or BUG (anything else); (3) verify against rendered output; (4) check `\u003Cdetails>`\u002F`\u003Csummary>` for native-marker + inline-glyph stack; (5) write a regression test that locks the CSS rule AND enforces every control on the page carries a discipline class. Reference incident: IBA-m69 (2026-05-17) — `.report-select` on improvebayarea.com\u002Freports had `appearance:auto` but missed `background-image:none !important`, so the `@tailwindcss\u002Fforms` background chevron stacked with the native browser chevron on the \"Closed reports\" filter. Fix: `background-image: none !important;` on the class. Test: `~\u002Ftools\u002Fimprovebayarea\u002Fsrc\u002Fui_select_chevron.test.ts`. |\n| lighthouse, 100\u002F100, perf audit, core web vitals, LCP, TBT, \"slow site\", SEO audit | **lighthouse** | `lighthouse-optimization.md`, `debug-patterns.md` |\n| slow page, slow route, slow dashboard, \"why is X so slow\", full table scan, COUNT(*) on every request, \"loading the whole database\", route reads wrong cache, cron warms wrong KV key, prewarm warms the wrong thing, 24h\u002Flast-N window returns empty, lagged data source (Socrata\u002FDataSF\u002Fbatch ETL) | **debug** | `debug-patterns.md` — and run the Hot-Path Data-Volume & Cache-Topology Audit (section in `debug-patterns.md`): measure every per-request query with `wrangler d1 execute --json` → `meta.rows_read` (>~100k = bug), verify every cache read has a writer + every cache-warmer warms keys something reads, and `MAX(ts)`-anchor lagged windows. |\n| high 5xx \u002F error-rate on a route family but every manual probe returns 200, 522, 524, `originResponseStatus: 0`, \"origin unreachable\" on a Workers-only zone, errors cluster at :00\u002F:02\u002F:30, empty User-Agent in analytics, single-colo errors, error count ≈ a fleet size (cities\u002Ftenants\u002Fshards), \"is it users or us\", cron\u002Fprewarm\u002Fwarmer\u002Fpoller\u002Fhealthcheck suspected, \"intermittent outage\" nobody can reproduce | **debug** (Pattern #40) — **ATTRIBUTE BEFORE YOU DIAGNOSE: the first question is WHO is making these requests, not why they fail.** One `httpRequestsAdaptiveGroups` query grouped by `datetimeMinute` + UA + colo + `cacheStatus` either eliminates the whole user-facing hypothesis or confirms it, before a line of the handler is read. Cron-boundary clustering + empty UA + one colo + `cacheStatus:bypass` + count ≈ fleet size ⇒ **self-inflicted**. Platform fact: **a Worker cannot `fetch()` its own Custom Domain** — CF forwards the same-zone subrequest to the zone origin, and a Workers-only zone has none (`AAAA 100::`) ⇒ 522\u002Forigin=0 every time. Also check whether a test *asserts the buggy behavior* (a mocked `fetch` returns 200 and cannot observe the failure) and whether the warmer actually populates the cache (`cf-cache-status` well after the run). | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #40) |\n| D1 near its size cap, \"how big can this database get\", `Exceeded maximum DB size`, 10 GB limit, D1 query hit the 30s timeout, `SELECT MIN(x), MAX(x)` full scan, `COUNT(*)` takes 20+ seconds, `no such table: dbstat`, `pragma_freelist_count` → `SQLITE_AUTH`, \"should this table move to R2 \u002F Iceberg\", R2 Data Catalog, compaction, R2 SQL, Pipelines, archiving a giant append-only table | **cloudflare-ceilings** — report the number as a **% of the platform ceiling** (10 GB\u002Fdb · 30 s\u002Fquery · 25B rows-read\u002Fmo), never as a delta from last week. Four measured query-shape traps: combined `MIN\u002FMAX` disables SQLite's index optimization (9,984,941 rows read → **1** when split); `COUNT(*)` walks the heap and is ~37× costlier per row than an indexed range scan; `dbstat`+pragmas are BLOCKED in D1 so per-table bytes are unmeasurable (use `meta.size_after`, present on every D1 response); and whether `DELETE` reclaims space is **undocumented** — never promise a post-archive size without measuring it on a copy. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fcloudflare-data-ceilings.md` |\n| audit docs, check for lies, verify against source, legal document, fabrication, hallucination | **legal-audit** | `legal-document-audit.md` |\n| D1 route 500s with generic \"Internal Server Error\", `no such column`\u002F`no such table`, `D1_ERROR`, a Worker write (intake\u002Fsave\u002Finsert\u002Fupdate) fails for every user, migration file exists but column\u002Ftable missing in prod, `wrangler tail` shows outcome Ok with empty exceptions, D1 schema drift, migration not applied to remote | **debug** (D1 schema drift #26) — a migration FILE existing ≠ its DDL is in prod. Get the real cause from `wrangler tail --format json` (grep `logs[]` for `D1_ERROR`\u002F`no such column`, NOT `exceptions[]`); confirm via `PRAGMA table_info(\u003Ct>)` on `--remote`. Fix additively on remote (`ALTER … ADD COLUMN`\u002F`CREATE … IF NOT EXISTS`) + `INSERT OR IGNORE` the filename into `d1_migrations`; NEVER bulk `wrangler d1 migrations apply` (re-runs non-idempotent data migrations → corruption). Run the gate `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Fd1-schema-drift-check.sh \u003Crepo>` to catch it before it ships. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fd1-schema-drift.md` |\n| \"the API only shows N records so X is missing\", \"these certs\u002Frecords\u002Froutes are redundant — delete them\", audit a cloud account for stray\u002Fduplicate resources, DNS or CAA record \"absent\" per the provider API but working live, orphaned resource nothing appears to reference, cleanup\u002Fprune a Cloudflare\u002FAWS\u002FGCP account, a config table that disagrees with observed behavior | **infra** (#31) — **a management API is not authoritative state.** It returns what was DECLARED; it does not show what the platform INJECTED on your behalf, nor WHY a resource exists. Before ANY \"absent\" or \"redundant\u002Fsafe-to-delete\" conclusion, answer two questions: (1) *Is my view complete?* — probe the CONSUMER (`dig` not `dns_records`; `openssl s_client` not the cert-pack list; a really-delivered message's `Authentication-Results` not your SPF records). A count mismatch between declared and authoritative IS the finding. (2) *What created it?* — `GET \u002Faudit_logs` → `actor.type`; `system` means the platform provisioned it and something depends on it. **Never recommend deleting a resource you cannot name the creator of.** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fmanagement-api-vs-authoritative-state.md` |\n| health check \u002F liveness probe \u002F validator \u002F drift or reconciliation job \u002F \"N\u002FN verified\" \u002F \"all healthy\" \u002F 30-of-30 match \u002F a sweep that passed \u002F about to RETRACT a finding because a different measurement came back clean \u002F a hardcoded `verified:` or `lastChecked:` date on harvested-from-upstream data \u002F joining on an id you did not mint \u002F a dataset field whose absence degrades silently | **negative-control** (#33) — **a check that cannot fail is not a check.** Before recording ANY green result, feed the instrument a known-bad input (corrupted token, mutated id, nonexistent resource) and require RED; a negative control that passes is a P0 finding about your tooling, ahead of the original investigation. Commit the control as a test. Always three outcomes, never two: `ok` \u002F `genuinely bad` \u002F `could not measure`. Corollaries: a `verified:` stamp is a decaying claim (rename to `harvestedAt`, re-ask on a cadence, mark stale past ~2 intervals); check upstream ALIAS keys before concluding a record is absent; a silently-degrading dataset field needs a completeness invariant with written exemptions. Reference incident 2026-08-10 nps-report: a \"consumer-path\" probe reported 20\u002F20 parks healthy — `o=DEADBEEF00` also returned HTTP 200 and a full form, so 435 dead tokens would have scored 435\u002F435. The real sweep found 5 drifted. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fnegative-control-gate.md` |\n| photo\u002Fupload routed by current GPS, \"wrong location on the report\", EXIF, DateTimeOriginal, geotag, a document dated by processing time instead of its own date, metadata lost after resize\u002Foptimise\u002Fconvert, a late async fix clobbering a good value | **artifact-provenance** (#34) — use the ARTIFACT's own metadata, not ambient state at processing time. Read provenance from the ORIGINAL bytes *before* any re-encode (canvas\u002Foptimiser\u002Fthumbnailer strips it) and assert that ordering in a test; route every writer through one precedence helper so a late-arriving ambient value cannot clobber the artifact's; tell the user which source won. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fnegative-control-gate.md` (Pattern #34) |\n| an old copy of one of our sites is live somewhere nobody watches, stale site on a `*.workers.dev`\u002F`*.pages.dev`\u002Fpreview URL, retired marketing or legal copy still reachable at a second URL, duplicate-content exposure, orphaned worker\u002Fapp nothing references, \"audit the account for strays\", \"what else is still serving?\" | **orphan-content** (#41) — **a SCOPE gap, not a trigger gap: the orphan is in no repo, so no repo-scoped gate can EVER see it, no matter how often it runs.** Ask the account, not the repo: `python3 ~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Forphan-worker-content-check.py` (0 ok \u002F 1 flagged \u002F **2 UNMEASURED — never a pass** \u002F 3 no creds). Match on the page's **`og:url`\u002F`canonical`** — the copy's own claim of which site it is, which staleness cannot erode. Do NOT match on `og:title` (drifts — that is *what* is stale), body text (an SPA shell has ~21 chars, scoring 0.0 like \"unrelated\"), or `modified_on` (a settings sweep bumps it). **Report, never delete** (#31 + Deployment Prohibition). | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #41) |\n| double submit, filed twice, two tickets from one tap, duplicate persist, one-shot submit, submitLocked, beginSubmitAttempt, cooldown helper unused, second tap files again | **debug\u002Ffeature** (Pattern #42) — persist\u002Fqueue\u002Ffiling must lock **synchronously on first tap before any await**, stay locked after successful queue, unlock only on explicit new-report\u002Fedit-and-resubmit or persist failure. `disabled={isLoading}` + finally-reenable is not this lock. A cooldown helper with zero callers is not a lock. Tests must **count persist calls** on the shipped click path. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #42) |\n| \"tapped N times, nothing happened\", submit does nothing, no confirmation and no error, works on my laptop but not in the VM\u002Fwebview\u002Fheadless agent, warn-once guard, native confirm()\u002Falert() on a filing path, map\u002FWebGL failure loop, pin accuracy inherited from the IP seed | **debug\u002Ffeature** (Pattern #43) — reproduce FIRST in a **constrained browser** (headless, no WebGL, no geolocation, dialogs auto-dismissed, every `POST \u002Fapi\u002F*` intercepted, a control arm, 2 runs per arm) and record per tap: dialogs, POSTs, the hold reason, the control's `data-*-hold`, the state the guard read. Then enumerate every early `return` in the handler and where its message lands: each must route through ONE adjacent, `role=alert`, focused hold funnel or file. Zero native dialogs on the path; a deliberate placement is its own measurement (never inherit the previous pin's accuracy); non-modal questions need a generation abort + fingerprint re-read. Ship the `probe:constrained` script with the fix so 1.45i can prove it. | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #43) |\n| infra, config, plugin, gateway, systemd, openclaw, upgrade, restart, schema | **infra** | `blind-spots.md`, `debug-patterns.md` |\n| launchd\u002Fcron watchdog false alerts, \"job-not-loaded\" but service is up, gateway DOWN alert spam, bootstrap rc=5, `launchctl list` empty in launchd context, health-check passes interactively but false-positives on schedule, watchdog keeps \"restarting\" a healthy service | **infra** | `blind-spots.md` §13 — probe with `launchctl print` exit-code (NOT `launchctl list \\| grep`, which is empty in a launchd session); rc=5 = already-loaded no-op; defer to KeepAlive; require a sustained outage; alert only on a real action; VERIFY the fix in the real launchd context via `launchctl kickstart`. |\n| VPS, bsclaudebot, openclaw-gateway, remote agent, cron job on vps | **vps-openclaw** | `blind-spots.md` + **ALWAYS run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fopenclaw-remote-doctor.sh all` FIRST** before any config change — captures native `openclaw doctor` output, main-agent token usage, tool-usage data, and extracts remediation hints from error text. Apply 🧭 hints before inventing fixes. |\n| site security, cloudflare alert, security.txt, HSTS, CSP, headers audit, securityheaders.com, mozilla observatory, A+ rating, COOP, CORP, CAA records, DNSSEC, leaked credentials, WAF managed ruleset, \"make my site secure\", \"harden my cloudflare\" | **site-security** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsite-security-defaults.md` — 12-item baseline + auto-fix recipes (security.txt, header middleware, TLS min). **Account-wide CF hardening tools** (idempotent, `DRY_RUN=1` to preview): `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fcf-account-harden.py` = DNSSEC + Free WAF Managed Ruleset + Leaked-Credential detection + CAA (mail fixes gated `INCLUDE_MAIL=1`); `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fcf-security-insights.sh --apply` = security.txt + worker-preview lock. **Do NOT enable AI Labyrinth \u002F Block-AI-bots** (user 2026-07-07: AI bots need to reach the sites for AI SEO). Run the curl-based check FIRST against the live URL, then auto-fix in source + run the account tools. |\n| socket, sfw, socket firewall, supply chain, malicious package, install script, typosquat, postinstall, \"npm install is blocked\", \"exiting due to risks\", SOCKET_CLI_ACCEPT_RISKS, 429 insufficient quota, obfuscated dependency | **supply-chain** | Run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftools\u002Fsocket-health-check.sh --live` FIRST — it separates the four states that look alike from the error text: **ARMED** (sfw on PATH + npm() wrapper + live proxy banner), **UNPROTECTED** (sfw missing\u002Foff-PATH → npm() falls through to plain npm, prints a yellow warning, still exits 0), **DISARMED** (`SOCKET_CLI_ACCEPT_RISKS` in a shell rc → looks protected, blocks nothing), and **NOT CONFIGURED**. Protection is **Socket Firewall `sfw`**, a network proxy with no API key and no quota; the shell `npm()` function routes only install-class commands through it. **Verify with an observable:** `SFW_VERBOSE=true npm install` → `Protected by Socket Firewall`. NEVER \"fix\" a block with `SOCKET_CLI_ACCEPT_RISKS=1`; use `command npm` for a scoped bypass. ⚠️ `sfw` installs into npm's global prefix, which is not on PATH — symlinked to `\u002Fopt\u002Fhomebrew\u002Fbin\u002Fsfw`; re-run `npm i -g sfw` + re-symlink after a node upgrade. `sfw` Free blocks confirmed malware only, NOT CVEs (npm audit + Dependabot own that). |\n| dependabot, npm audit, CVE, GHSA-xxxx, \"security alert\", \"vulnerable dependency\", \"dependency update\", transitive vuln, \"fix the security\u002Fdependabot page\", overrides, esbuild\u002Ftar\u002Fminimatch\u002Fws\u002Fvite\u002Fuuid vuln | **dependency-audit** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fdependency-audit.md` — 7-step protocol: enumerate from BOTH `gh api ...\u002Fdependabot\u002Falerts` AND per-manifest `npm audit` (they surface DIFFERENT sets), scan EVERY manifest (root + `mobile\u002F`\u002F`functions\u002F`), `npm ls \u003Cpkg>` to map each vuln to its consumer, `npm view \u003Cpkg>@\u003Cpatched>` to confirm the patched version EXISTS before writing it, fix via `overrides` — **SCOPED to the vulnerable parent** when the package coexists at multiple majors (a blanket `minimatch` override breaks glob's v8\u002Fv10), verify cross-major bumps don't break the consumer's import style, then `npm audit`=0 + build green. NEVER blind `npm audit fix --force` (it downgraded wrangler 4→3). Reference incident: 2026-06-15 improvebayarea — 12 Dependabot alerts + 4 audit-only highs (ws\u002Fvite) fixed via scoped overrides (PR #5). |\n| DMARC failing from a sender IP, custom-domain email bouncing \u002F spam, \"send-as alias DMARC fail\", Gmail \"Send mail as\", `p=reject` rejecting my own mail, \"SPF passes but DMARC fails\", \"can't send from my domain\", host example.org\u002Fcustom domain for sending+receiving, forwarded mail failing DMARC, DMARC RUA report | **email-deliverability** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Femail-deliverability-dmarc.md` — OUTBOUND auth alignment, not broken records. `dig` SPF\u002FDMARC\u002FDKIM\u002FMX first (records usually fine); the sending path is the bug (Gmail send-as \u002F relay signs as the wrong domain → no aligned identifier → DMARC fail). Adding the relay IP to SPF does NOTHING (SPF aligns on the envelope domain). **Verify the platform's CURRENT native send capability live, not from memory** — a Cloudflare domain can SEND via Email Sending (`wrangler email sending list\u002Fsettings`; `smtp.mx.cloudflare.net:465`, user `api_token`, pwd = CF token w\u002F `Email Sending Write`); don't say \"CF is receive-only\" (stale). Fix = route the From-domain through a DKIM-aligned sender + verify a REAL send shows `dmarc=pass`. Reference incident: 2026-06-16 example.org (recommended Zoho\u002FBrevo before checking the live `wrangler email` CLI — CF already had the capability, already enabled). |\n| third-party integration, Verint, dform, Clerk, Stripe, SeeClickFix, OAuth, Auth0, \"auto-submit \u002F handoff \u002F redirect to form\", \"\u002Fapi\u002Fsave returns valid:true caseid:empty\", \"API doesn't support X\", \"falling back to manual\", any SaaS integration where we're about to add a UX downgrade | **upstream-protocol** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fupstream-protocol-investigation.md` — 6-step deep-dig: read upstream's primary client (e.g. dform's `\u002Fdformresources\u002Fscripts\u002Fapi.js`), capture real network traffic via agent-browser\u002FCDP\u002Fcurl, inspect rendered `data-*` attributes, cross-reference our wrapper against the upstream's actual handler, treat \"Verified YYYY-MM-DD\" comments with skepticism, ship the real fix in-session. **Token cost is irrelevant** — user explicitly authorized unbounded tokens for this pattern (2026-05-09). Reference incident: SF311 graffiti commits `0b746a4` (bandaid) → `f27d1e3` (real fix from reading dform's api.js lines 462-520). |\n| GovQA records portal, `*.mycusthelp.com`, \"Public Records Center\", ASP.NET WebForms + DevExpress, BotDetect CAPTCHA, CPRA\u002Frecords-request portal automation, headless session reuse for a logged-in portal, \"DevExpress combobox won't fill\", \"submit form has a captcha\", Caltrans Public Records | **govqa-portal** | `references\u002Fgovqa-aspnet-portal-automation.md` — auth is a human step (account \u002F \"Interact Anonymously\" both need a password → hard stop); capture HttpOnly ASP.NET session cookies from the REAL profile via fcdp `Storage.getCookies` → headless curl reads (status\u002Flist\u002Fdetail\u002Fkeepalive) work; drive DevExpress combos\u002Fdates via the client API (`window['cf_NN'].SetSelectedIndex` \u002F `.SetDate`), NOT `fill_form` (virtualized long lists never hit the DOM); BotDetect submit is browser-assisted (auto-solving CAPTCHAs is PROHIBITED); dead-session detection keys on the \"Logged in as\" banner \u002F `Login.aspx` redirect, NOT a stray \"logout\" substring (200-with-logout false-positive). Reference incident: Caltrans CPRA `R051897-061926` + CSR `#1174990` (2026-06-19). |\n| decompile, disassemble, reverse-engineer, RE, \"look inside this APK\u002FIPA\u002Fbinary\u002Fextension\u002Ffirmware\", \"what's in this .so\u002F.dll\", \"port this app to a CLI\", \"extract strings from this binary\", triage malware, \"decompile this\", \"ghidra\", \"jadx\", binary diff between two firmware versions, BLE protocol RE from companion app | **decompile** | invoke the `\u002Fdecompile` skill (formerly `\u002Fghidra`, renamed 2026-05-28). Routes to the right tool per artifact class: `jadx`\u002F`apktool`\u002F`apkeep` for Android, `ipsw`\u002F`otool` for iOS, `cfr-decompiler` for JVM, `prettier`\u002F`webcrack` for browser extensions, `binwalk` for firmware, `hermes-dec` for React Native, `decompyle3` for Python, `wasm2wat` for WebAssembly, Ghidra for native\u002FPE\u002Fraw firmware. Tool inventory + routing table lives in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdecompile\u002FSKILL.md`. Reference incident: Whoop RE 2026-05-28 — correctly routed to `jadx` (not Ghidra) because Whoop's Android app is Java\u002FKotlin; 22 min to find 3 GATT service families including previously-undocumented Whoop 5.0\u002FMG family. |\n| watcher, cron, poller, webhook, diff against state, signal-emitting, alert-on-change, state-file dedup, `seen_X: set`, `if id in seen`, status transitions, job-watch, job-supervisor | **signal-logic-audit** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsignal-logic-audit.md` — 12 anti-patterns for diff\u002Fpoller\u002Fcron code: pre-finalized-as-terminal, set-based-dedup-misses-flip-back, deadline-without-expiry-probe, ID-only-dedup-ignores-status, no-allowlist-for-benign-novel, upstream-permissive-needs-business-rules, opaque-IDs-as-keys, forward-only-diff, ID-only-ignores-version, population-wide-as-individual, unbounded-state, upstream-permissive-needs-policy-gate. Grep each smell against the changed file; fix every match in the same pass (fix-all rule). Reference incident: 2026-05-13 — 11 bugs in `~\u002Ftools\u002F\u003Cwatchers>\u002Fwatch.py`, each an instance of one of these 12 patterns. |\n| Hono framework, \"make it Hono\", \"convert\u002Fremake to Hono\", \"Hono site\", Hono SSR, `@hono\u002Fjsx`, `hono\u002Fjsx`, `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom`, islands\u002Fhydration, new site on Cloudflare Workers, React-SPA → Hono SSR migration, server-render an existing SPA | **hono** | invoke the `\u002Fhono` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fhono\u002FSKILL.md`) — full-leverage Hono reference: core routing\u002FContext\u002Fmiddleware (`core-routing-middleware.md`), server JSX SSR (`ssr-jsx.md`, `hono\u002Fjsx` + `html` helper + `jsxRenderer`), client islands (`client-islands.md`, `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` + `render()`\u002F`useState`, mounting D3\u002FLeaflet without React), Cloudflare Workers + dual server\u002Fclient Vite build (`cloudflare-workers-vite.md`), and the page-by-page React-SPA→Hono migration playbook (`react-spa-to-hono-migration.md`). All import paths\u002FAPIs verified against hono.dev 2026-06-04. Hard rule: never mix `hono\u002Fjsx` (server) and `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` (client) in one module; verify any unfamiliar Hono API against live docs before using it (memory-invented middleware\u002Fhooks are the #1 failure mode). |\n| build on Cloudflare, Cloudflare Workers, Pages, Durable Objects, R2, KV, D1, Queues, Workers AI, Vectorize, AI Gateway, Wrangler, Cloudflare One \u002F Zero Trust, \"build an MCP server on Workers\", \"build an agent on Workers\", Agents SDK, Sandbox SDK, Turnstile | **cloudflare-build** — invoke the **cloudflare plugin** (official Apache-2.0, marketplace `cloudflare\u002Fskills`; `claude plugin details cloudflare@cloudflare`): its 11 skills auto-load by description (`agents-sdk`, `cloudflare`, `cloudflare-email-service`, `cloudflare-one`, `cloudflare-one-migrations`, `durable-objects`, `sandbox-sdk`, `turnstile-spin`, `web-perf`, `workers-best-practices`, `wrangler`), plus the `\u002Fcloudflare:build-agent` and `\u002Fcloudflare:build-mcp` commands and 5 remote CF MCP servers (`cloudflare-docs`, `-bindings`, `-builds`, `-observability`, `-api`). This **COMPLEMENTS** the \"Cloudflare API Access (MCP)\" section below (which is for raw API calls) — the plugin is for BUILDING on Cloudflare. Deploying still belongs to \u002Fship. **For deploying a Cloudflare _Container_ from this Docker-free Mac (apple\u002Fcontainer only)** — build linux\u002Famd64 with apple\u002Fcontainer, push to the CF registry with **crane** (CF registry is HTTP Basic auth, credential needs `--push --pull`), run the image **non-root**: see `references\u002Fcloudflare-containers-no-docker.md` (verified `claude-worker` build 2026-06-28). | cloudflare plugin (skills auto-load; verify with `claude plugin list`) + `references\u002Fcloudflare-containers-no-docker.md` |\n| Workers Cache, `cache.enabled`, \"enable caching on my Worker\", cf-cache-status wrong\u002FHIT on authed route, per-user data served to the wrong user after enabling cache, heuristic caching, cross-user cache leak, `ctx.cache.purge`, Cache-Tag, cross_version_cache, \"should I turn on the new CF cache\" | **workers-cache** | `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fworkers-cache-safety.md` — THE leak class: with `cache.enabled:true`, CF heuristically caches any 200 with NO Cache-Control for 2h, and cookie-authed requests (Clerk `__session` etc.) do NOT trigger the Authorization auto-bypass → cross-user leak. Safe-enable recipe: fail-safe default `private, no-store` (Hono post-next middleware \u002F json() helper), public routes opt in explicitly, wrangler ≥4.69 or the flag is SILENTLY ignored. Gate: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fworkers-cache-check.sh \u003Crepo>` (also \u002Fship Phase -0.4). Re-verify facts against developers.cloudflare.com\u002Fworkers\u002Fcache\u002Fconfiguration\u002F — the surface is new (2026-07). Reference near-miss: 2026-07-06 AIVA (~150 cookie-authed no-header GET routes almost blanket-enabled). **ALSO the scheme-presentation OUTAGE class** (sitewide 301 loop \u002F `ERR_TOO_MANY_REDIRECTS` right after enabling cache, HSTS disappeared, worker sees `http:\u002F\u002F` while cf-visitor says https): the cache layer presents `http:\u002F\u002F` in request.url for HTTPS visitors — any `url.protocol === \"http:\"` canonicalize 301-loops the site (2026-07-06 example, ~25 min down) and `url.protocol === \"https:\"`-gated HSTS silently drops. One-probe diagnosis: `wrangler tail --format json` → `event.request.url` scheme. Fix: cf-visitor-derived scheme (`visitorIsHttps()`, AIVA `src\u002Fworker\u002Fmiddleware\u002FsecurityHeaders.ts`), never url.protocol. Propagation rule: enable\u002Fdisable takes >30s — never conclude from a \u003C60s check. Carmack PREPARES the config+code and must see the gate PASS locally; the staged enable+verify deploy belongs to \u002Fship (Phase 4.08). |\n| assess the logs, clean up the logs, log hygiene, observability pass, \"improve log output\", \"why are these errors so vague\", prune log noise, superfluous log entries, add debug attributes, audit the logs of `\u003Cservice>`, last-24h log review | **log-hygiene** — invoke the `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Flog-hygiene\u002FSKILL.md`): the PROACTIVE loop (ingest last-N hours from a real source → cluster by stable event → rewrite ambiguous errors to actionable, downgrade noise NEVER delete, add the attribute that names silent failures → report, then apply if asked). This is distinct from the reactive instrument-on-build \u002F instrument-on-fix rule in Hard Rules (which fires automatically while building\u002Ffixing) — this mode is when the user explicitly wants a log *assessment* pass over a window of real logs. Ground-truth: count from the source, never fabricate volume. | `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill + `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md` |\n\n**Additional context (load when applicable):**\n- **For ANY new-site build, or any \"convert\u002Fremake to Hono\" \u002F Hono SSR \u002F React-SPA → Hono work** (feature, plan, OR deploy mode): load the `\u002Fhono` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fhono\u002FSKILL.md`) and the relevant `references\u002F*.md`. It is the source of truth for `hono\u002Fjsx` (server SSR) vs `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` (interactive islands), the dual client\u002Fserver Vite build on Cloudflare Workers, and the page-by-page SPA→Hono migration (convert one route at a time, curl each SSR page, keep the build green). Don't invent Hono middleware\u002Fhook names from memory — the skill's references are verified against hono.dev and tell you what actually exists.\n- If working in an AIVA project (cwd contains \"aiva\" or project references example.com): also read `aiva-guidelines.md` — and note AIVA ships an iOS Capacitor surface from the same repo (`~\u002FAIVA-Frontend\u002Fdocs\u002Fmobile-ota.md`): web changes are OTA-synced to the app by ship.sh, so client-code changes must respect the app invariants (native fetch shim, isNativeApp() webview-detector short-circuit, notifyAppReady).\n- **For ANY iOS\u002FmacOS app work** (Xcode project, simulator, Swift, Capacitor shell): load the `\u002Fios` skill as the phase playbook — it owns the build\u002Frun\u002Fdebug loop (xcodebuildmcp), crash + perf triage (axiom agents), webview driving (axe), simulator eyes+hands (`baguette` \u002F `serve-sim` — `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fios-sim-agent-control.md`), and compliance scanning; \u002Fcode supplies the investigation discipline on top. To SEE and TOUCH a running sim from Bash: `baguette boot\u002Fdescribe-ui\u002Ftap\u002Fscreenshot\u002Flogs`; `serve-sim` for camera injection or a live stream.\n- For all modes except research\u002Fbrowser: also read `preflight-checks.md`\n- **For review mode, and for ANY diff that touches shared code** (a helper with many callers, a schema, a wire format, middleware, a cache key shape): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fblast-radius.md` and state the one fact the change is safe because of, proven at rung 4 (a script that runs the real code) or explicitly marked unproven. Bucket every review finding per `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freview-verdicts-and-ci-triage.md` §A (Act on \u002F Consider \u002F Noted \u002F Dismissed — the Dismissed list is mandatory in the report).\n- **For feature mode, before implementing a design that crosses a function boundary**, screen the sketch against these design red flags (ported from pstack `architect\u002Freferences\u002Fdesign-red-flags.md`, 2026-09-17): **shallow modules** (an interface as complex as the implementation it hides), **information leakage** (two modules that both have to know the same format\u002Fdecision), **temporal decomposition** (modules split by *when* things happen instead of by *what they know*), **pass-through methods** (a method that only forwards to another with the same signature), and **escape-hatch types** (`any`, casts, optional fields always set in practice). Prefer the design that hides more complexity behind a smaller public surface. Two structurally distinct candidates before committing when the decision is a one-way door; for mechanical work whose shape is already concrete, one is enough — a second design over a settled shape is over-engineering.\n- **For ALL modes**: also read `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fant-verification-protocol.md` (ant-level quality gates)\n- **For ALL modes**: also read `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Ftool-error-recovery.md` (catalog of tool errors and recovery patterns — consult on any tool failure, and APPEND a new entry whenever you hit a novel one)\n- **For ALL modes**: run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fscan-tool-errors.sh` once when invoked. If it prints novel patterns, read `~\u002F.claude\u002Ftool-errors-pending.md`, classify each, append entries to `tool-error-recovery.md`, then run the scanner with `--clear` to archive the log. This keeps the error catalog self-updating.\n- **For ANY infra\u002Fconfig\u002Fplugin\u002Fservice work**: always read `blind-spots.md` — covers schema-validation-before-restart, self-upgrade traps, \"gateway started ≠ working\", compaction telemetry, adjacent-system breakage, guardrail-alert-vs-enforcement patterns learned from real incidents\n- **For ANY conclusion drawn from a cloud\u002Fprovider management API — and ALWAYS before recommending a deletion, a cleanup, or reporting something \"missing\"**: load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fmanagement-api-vs-authoritative-state.md` (Pattern #31). A management API tells you what was *declared*; it does not tell you what the platform *added on your behalf*, nor *why* a resource exists — so it is a hypothesis, not ground truth. Probe the consumer view (`dig` for DNS, `openssl s_client` for the served cert, `PRAGMA table_info --remote` for schema, `wrangler secret list` for bindings, a delivered message's `Authentication-Results` for mail auth, cache-busted `curl` for deployed code) and establish provenance from the audit log (`actor.type`: `user` vs `system`) **before** concluding \"absent\" or \"redundant\". Reference incidents (2026-07-28, both wrong on the first pass): CF `dns_records` showed 5 CAA records with no `issuewild \"pki.goog\"` while `dig` showed 11 including it (CF auto-injects partner-CA CAA, invisible to the API) → a phantom renewal outage; and 20 \"redundant\" advanced cert packs turned out to be Worker custom-domain certs (8 packs ↔ 8 Worker domains; 11 zones with 0 Workers had 0 packs) → the recommended cleanup would have dropped TLS on every live Worker subdomain. This is the infra instance of the Ground-Truth Standard and the sibling of `installed-source-ground-truth.md` (deps), `d1-schema-drift.md` (#26, schema), and `email-deliverability-dmarc.md` (mail).\n- **Before recording ANY probe, validator, health check or verification sweep as PASSING** (feature, debug, review, infra — every mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fnegative-control-gate.md` and run its gate. Name a known-bad input, run it, require RED. A green board is the failure shape that never prompts you to look, and a \"consumer-path\" framing does not make a probe valid — the reference incident's probe *was* the consumer path and still passed for `DEADBEEF00`, because the upstream echoed the value back without validating it. **Echo is not validation.** Also fires when you are about to RETRACT a finding: the replacement measurement needs more scrutiny than the original, never less. Skip only when the check has no meaningful bad input (e.g. `2+2`).\n- **For ANY change to an HTTP route handler, a `scheduled()`\u002Fcron body, a cache (read or write\u002Fwarm), or a SQL\u002FD1 query** (in feature, debug, review, OR deploy mode): run the **Hot-Path Data-Volume & Cache-Topology Audit** (section in `debug-patterns.md`). Three quick checks: (1) every query that runs *before the response* must be bounded (`LIMIT`\u002Findexed range\u002Ffixed-cardinality `GROUP BY`) or cache-served — measure any `COUNT(*)`\u002F`SUM(CASE...)`\u002Fwhole-partition aggregate over `WHERE \u003Cpartition_key>=?` with `npx wrangler d1 execute \u003CDB> --remote --json --command \"...\"` → `meta.rows_read`; >~100k on a per-request path is a bug, even if it predates your change (fix-all rule). (2) For every `readCached*`\u002F`KV.get`\u002F`caches.match`, `grep` for the *writer* of that exact key; for every `prewarm*`\u002Fcache-warmer, `grep` for what *reads* those keys — a reader with no writer (or a warmer warming a different key-shape than the route reads) is a latent perf bug. (3) `WHERE ts >= now() - \u003Cinterval>` against a lagged source returns empty — anchor on `MAX(ts)`. **(4) Measure the REQUEST too, not just the query.** The audit above counts rows read *server-side* and is blind to what the client puts on the wire: a user-supplied file sent as base64 inside JSON inflates ~33%, so a 4 MB phone photo becomes a **~5.3 MB request body** before any handler runs — and the users on the worst connection (a national park, a basement, rural cell) are exactly the ones sending the biggest files. Any `readAsDataURL`\u002F`toBase64`\u002F`JSON.stringify({image…})` on an upload path needs a client-side downscale\u002Fcompress first (canvas resize to ~1600px is 10–20×), or a direct binary\u002Fmultipart upload. Read metadata from the ORIGINAL bytes before re-encoding (Pattern #34) — the resize strips EXIF. Report the *encoded* size, not the file size, since base64 is what actually travels. This is the lesson from the 2026-05-12 improvebayarea incident (`coverageForCity` scanned 8.6M rows on every request; the cron warmed `oak311:open_data:...` but the route read `agg:...`; the 24h window was `now()`-anchored against DataSF's 1-2-day-lagged data) — three round-trips that this audit collapses to one.\n- **For ANY new subsystem build OR any bug fix** (feature, debug, OR review mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md` and apply both behaviors before declaring done — **instrument-on-build** (structured logs at external calls \u002F catch branches \u002F state transitions \u002F the branch-deciding input — boundaries and decision points, not everywhere; redact secrets\u002FPII) and **instrument-on-fix** (add the one attribute\u002Fmessage that would have named *this* bug in 30s). Rewrite ambiguous errors to actionable (attempted + actual values + likely cause\u002Fbranch + disambiguation); reduce noise by *downgrading* level, never deleting. The proactive, scheduled counterpart is the `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill (assess last-24h logs on a cadence).\n- **For ANY passkey\u002FTOTP\u002F2FA\u002Fpasswordless\u002Fsession-freshness work or status claim**: load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Faccount-security-lifecycle.md`. Prove enrollment, challenge enforcement, enrollment policy, and recovery separately; read the installed auth SDK source; test every session-creation path; and verify production status with PII-minimal authoritative counts rather than button text or screenshots.\n- **For AIVA auth work**: AIVA now uses first-party Better Auth at `\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002F*`; Clerk is retired. Live HTML\u002FCSP and Worker bindings must contain no Clerk host\u002Fkey\u002FJWKS fingerprints, `\u002Fapi\u002Fauth\u002Fok` must return 200, and a wrong-password sign-in must return 401 rather than 500.\n- **For external city form integrations**: a 500 after category change may be category\u002Fform-specific, not global auth\u002Fphoto failure. Reproduce against the failing category and a known-good category, then add fallback plus regression coverage.\n- **For ANY municipal \u002F Salesforce Experience Cloud catalog or submit-envelope work** (building or debugging \"file every listed type\", `fetchCaseTypeDetails`, Aura `submitCase`, a KV catalog): load Pattern #36 **before** writing catalog JSON or guessing Apex param names. Listed labels are not the submit contract; persist official models (`captureFailure` on empty SUCCESS — never dummy `modelFlags`); unwrap toast\u002F`objCaseConfigWrapper`; remint session-encrypted IDs; classify on field API names; refuse by official field name. One representative live file twice, then `\u002Fship` + cache-busted `\u002Fapi\u002Fcategories`. `\u002Fcode` never `wrangler deploy`. Home: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` (Pattern #36). **Tools:** `gron` the live JSON before guessing keys; `hurl --test` for replay asserts; `fhar distill` to capture the official envelope. Do not invent Apex param names.\n- **Skill\u002Fconfig lint:** `agnix --target claude-code ~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002F\u003Cname>` (read-only; never `--fix-unsafe` on this tree). `\u002Fship` is `disable-model-invocation: true` — do not Skill-invoke it.\n- **For ANY production-deployed site work** (not just security mode): also load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsite-security-defaults.md` — the 12-item baseline catches gaps Cloudflare Security Center alerts on, with copy-paste auto-fix recipes for Workers \u002F Next.js \u002F static. Skip only when working purely on internal CLI\u002Fnon-HTTP code.\n- **For ANY npm\u002FNode project, OR any \"fix the Dependabot\u002Fsecurity page \u002F npm audit\" request** (debug, review, deploy, OR infra mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fdependency-audit.md` and run its 7-step protocol. Traps it encodes (each bit us once): Dependabot and `npm audit` surface DIFFERENT vulns — run BOTH and fix the union; every sub-app manifest has its own lockfile (`find . -name package-lock.json -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*'` — scan all); an existing override floor can itself be vulnerable (`ws ^8.20.1` was still `\u003C8.21.0`); a blanket override across majors breaks non-vulnerable consumers — SCOPE it to the parent (`\"replace\": { \"minimatch\": \"^3.1.4\" }`) and confirm glob's v8\u002Fv10 stay put; verify the patched version is published (`npm view \u003Cpkg>@\u003Cv> version`) before writing it; `npm audit fix --force` will downgrade a major runtime dep — never run it blind. Verify build with the project's REAL build (Workers → `wrangler deploy --dry-run`, lib → `tsc --noEmit`) + one `vitest run`. Reference: 2026-06-15 improvebayarea (12 alerts + ws\u002Fvite, PR #5).\n- **For ANY site that renders external links** (help pages, resource lists, footers, \"official forms\" links): before declaring done, run `~\u002Ftools\u002Flinkcheck.sh \u003Crepo>` to prove every external `href` resolves to HTTP 200. It curls each link and, on any non-200, re-tests via the REAL Chrome profile (fcdp) — so a real 404\u002F410 BLOCKS and gets the URL fixed, while a government\u002FWAF bot-block of curl (403\u002F000 but 200 in a browser) is correctly passed. **Never trust a \"URLs are used EXACTLY as provided — do not alter\" comment** — that exact comment guarded a malformed 403 POA link on the NYIA portal `\u002Fhelp` (2026-06-05). Verify, don't assume. Pairs with \u002Fship Phase 1.45d.\n- **For ANY third-party integration work where the proposed fix involves a UX downgrade** (handoff, redirect, manual step, \"for safety\"): always load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fupstream-protocol-investigation.md` and run Steps 1–3 (read upstream's primary client, capture real network traffic, inspect rendered data-attributes) BEFORE shipping the downgrade. Token cost is unlimited for this. Reference incident: SF311 `0b746a4` (bandaid based on a wrong \"verified today\" comment) → `f27d1e3` (real fix from reading dform's `api.js` lines 462–520). Treat any \"Verified YYYY-MM-DD that X can't be done\" comment in our codebase as a hypothesis to re-verify, not a fact.\n- **For ANY field whose STORED value will later be offered as PROOF** — consent (SMS\u002FTCPA\u002FA2P 10DLC, cookie\u002FGDPR), ToS acceptance, HIPAA authorization, e-signature attestation, age verification, opt-in\u002Fopt-out (feature, debug, OR review mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fconsent-evidence-integrity.md` (Pattern #35) and run its 6-shape sweep + verification recipe. These fail differently from ordinary fields: an ordinary dropped field is a missing value someone notices; a dropped *evidence* field surfaces years later as an inability to prove something you believed you had proved — with a correct-looking checkbox the whole time. **Count collectors vs writers before anything else** (a checkbox whose value is discarded is worse than no checkbox), route every surface through ONE writer with a `source` column, treat an exhaustive-deps warning over the evidence value as a P1 correctness bug (stale closure ⇒ opt-in stored as decline), check the specific zod schema's strictness before adding a client field (non-strict strips silently; `.strict()` 400s the form), never let `INSERT OR IGNORE`\u002F`DO NOTHING` decide whether evidence is recorded, keep the disclosure text server-authoritative (the wire carries the boolean only), and log declines as well as opt-ins. `EXPLAIN`-validate the SQL against the REMOTE schema — `tsc` and `--dry-run` do not execute SQL, so a malformed statement breaks every submission in prod. Reference incident 2026-08-12 (AIVA A2P 10DLC): 3 consent checkboxes, 2 persisted nothing, 1 would have recorded opt-ins as declines, `INSERT OR IGNORE` dropped returning users' consent, and the D1 columns + audit table had sat unwired in prod — all green on typecheck, lint, and 106 tests.\n- **For ANY change to a React component that renders fetched\u002FAPI data, ANY backend handler whose JSON shape the frontend destructures, OR ANY admin\u002Fdashboard\u002Fdetail-page audit** (feature, debug, OR review mode): always load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fundefined-null-render-safety.md` and run its 9-pattern undefined\u002Fnull-render sweep (null-gate-hides-UI, unguarded property access, `.map`\u002Fstring\u002F`Date` on possibly-undefined, JSON.parse, raw-undefined render, missing loading\u002Fempty states, backend omits a field) + the live DOM check (drive the logged-in REAL Chrome (fcdp), grep `document.body.innerText` for rendered `undefined`\u002F`NaN`\u002F`Invalid Date`\u002F`[object Object]` and capture console `TypeError`s). Fix every real instance in the same pass (fix-all). TypeScript does NOT catch these when the response is typed `any`\u002F`unknown`\u002F`Record\u003Cstring, unknown>`. Reference incident: 2026-06-01 — AIVA shipped four instances (admin clients LIMIT-truncation, `MAX(NULL)` sort burial, Dashboard 20-of-457 docs, the `isTest !== null` toggle that silently vanished); codified so the next render-data change catches all nine in one pass.\n- **For ANY TypeScript authored or reviewed** (feature, debug, OR review mode): load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md`. If the repo has the vendored **anti-slop Oxlint plugin** (dmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop — `tools\u002Foxlint\u002Fanti-slop\u002F` or `anti-slop\u002F` rules in its oxlint config), run `.\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.bin\u002Foxlint` as the gate; otherwise run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fdetect-ts-slop.sh [path|--diff \u003Cbase>]` (and, for substantive TS work in an un-vendored repo, offer the `\u002Finstall-anti-slop` skill). **Gate the gate first — three outcomes, never two:** read oxlint's exit code UNPIPED (`cmd > log 2>&1; RC=$?`) and count diagnostic lines (`:LINE:COL: error|warning`); `rc≠0` with **0** diagnostics means a broken config or unloadable plugin linted **nothing at all** and is NOT a pass — fix the setup, never record it as clean. **Then run the AUTO-FIX LOOP until 0 findings** — in a vendored repo apply `oxlint --fix` + formatter first (clears `require-readable-spacing`, the only autofixable rule; keep it a separate whitespace-only change), then fix each remaining hit in source by adding evidence, re-run the enforcer + `tsc --noEmit`, repeat; 5 attempts on one stubborn finding → surface it to the user. Never default to a generic `isRecord`\u002F`isObject` guard or a blanket `as any`\u002F`as unknown as T` — define a named type, a discriminated union, or a Zod schema (`type X = z.infer\u003Ctypeof Schema>`) at the trust boundary, and write a targeted predicate only as a last resort; a genuinely necessary assertion gets a specific `\u002F\u002F SAFETY: \u003Cchecked invariant>` comment (only when the invariant is actually checked). Never fix by weakening severity, `oxlint-disable`, or laundering types. This is the runtime-guard sibling of the No-Suppression Rule and the upstream cause of the undefined\u002Fnull-render bug class.\n- **For ANY watcher \u002F cron \u002F poller \u002F webhook \u002F diff-against-state code** (debug, review, OR feature mode): always load `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fsignal-logic-audit.md` and run its 12-pattern checklist against the changed code. Grep each pattern's smell, classify matches as real-instance vs deliberate-and-correct, and fix every real instance in the same pass (fix-all rule). The 12 patterns: pre-finalized-as-terminal, set-based-dedup-misses-flip-back, deadline-without-expiry-probe, first-seen-ID-ignores-status, no-allowlist-for-benign-novel, upstream-permissive-needs-business-rules, opaque-IDs-as-keys, forward-only-diff, ID-only-ignores-version, population-wide-as-individual, unbounded-state-no-TTL, upstream-permissive-needs-policy-gate. Reference incident: 2026-05-13 — 11 bugs fixed in `~\u002Ftools\u002F\u003Cwatchers>\u002Fwatch.py`, each one an instance of one of these patterns; codified into the catalog so the next watcher author \u002F reviewer \u002F debugger catches all 12 in one pass instead of three round-trips.\n- **For AIVA \u002F Cloudflare production-code audits**: prove you are editing the Worker\u002Fstatic-assets repo that actually routes to `example.com` before fixing anything. Audit findings are not handled until the deployed code path is fixed, a deterministic guard\u002Ftest exists where practical, and the live production response proves the bad fingerprint is gone.\n- **For ClawPatch\u002FCodex release-gate findings**: convert one-off audit output into repo guardrails: same TypeScript mode as production build (`tsc -b` for project references), full tests\u002Fprod integration in predeploy, real a11y gate, asset guard that scans every generated HTML\u002FJS asset and fails closed, local Worker integration with owned readiness\u002Fcleanup, peer-dependency health, and bounded npm overrides.\n- **For Worker secret migrations**: plaintext key\u002Ftoken\u002Fpassword values in `wrangler.json` `vars` are production blockers. Carmack may prepare the code\u002Fconfig patch, but deployment belongs to `\u002Fship`; if Cloudflare reports the binding name is already in use, the ship workflow must remove the plaintext var from config, deploy without `--keep-vars`, immediately `wrangler secret put`, then verify `wrangler secret list` reports `secret_text`.\n\nAll reference files are in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Freferences\u002F`.\n\n---\n\n## Playbooks — verbatim step lists by task shape (added 2026-10-13, pstack derivation)\n\nMode Detection (above) routes you to the *knowledge* for a task. A playbook is the *sequence*: when a task starts, pick the playbook matching its shape and copy its steps VERBATIM into the todo\u002Fplan, then work the steps. Steps cite the existing gates by name — a playbook never invents a new procedure, it orders the ones this skill already owns. For multi-milestone work the playbook runs inside the `\u002Fexec-plan` sprint contract, not instead of it.\n\n**Bug fix**\n1. Reproduce first: name the correct-vs-broken final state in advance; observe the broken state twice with a reset between.\n2. Run the bug-fix preflight (existing-fix check → regression history via `git log -S`\u002F`--follow`) BEFORE forming hypotheses.\n3. Tier every root-cause claim (Direct \u002F Supported \u002F Inferred \u002F Speculative) with its citation adjacent.\n4. Fix the call-site CLASS, not the instance you were looking at; minimal diff.\n5. Add the regression test that fails on the old code (`\u002Ftest-audit` rules); induce any triggered path and watch it fire.\n6. Close with the No-Lie Post-Fix Gate on the built\u002Fdeployed artifact, not the source.\n\n**Feature**\n1. Open with intent playback in the brief: understood goal, exit condition, out-of-scope (bot-router skill, \"Assignment content\").\n2. Screen the design against the red-flags list (shallow modules, information leakage, temporal decomposition, pass-through methods, escape-hatch types); two candidates for one-way doors, one for settled shapes.\n3. Write acceptance criteria before code (sprint contract for anything multi-step).\n4. Build the smallest end-to-end slice first; reuse an existing helper over writing a second copy.\n5. Tests for the new behavior + a negative control for any new check; instrument the boundaries you added.\n6. Verify on the real artifact; deploys hand to `\u002Fship` — \u002Fcode never deploys.\n\n**Refactor**\n1. Pin the current behavior first (characterization test or equivalence harness — `tsc` and lint are NOT a pin).\n2. State the reader-load reduction the change is buying; if you can't, don't start.\n3. Subtract before adding; move in small steps that keep the pin green.\n4. Migrate every caller and delete the old API in the same wave — no shims, no dual paths.\n5. Prove equivalence on the real artifact. A bug the cleanup reveals is a separate fix, structural change first.\n6. Keep the change only if reader load actually dropped — otherwise revert it.\n\n**Investigation**\n1. State the question and the observation that would settle it, before reading anything.\n2. Run the cheapest decisive probe FIRST, against the live source — notes, memory, and \"Verified\" comments are hypotheses.\n3. If two hypotheses survive the probe, run both in parallel and graft the winner (the arena move) instead of serially betting on one.\n4. Tier every claim; end with an explicit \"what we don't know.\"\n5. Write the finding back into the owning skill\u002Fmemory the same day, or the investigation didn't compound.\n\n**Perf (hillclimb)**\n1. Freeze the harness and prove its sensitivity (it must go red on a known regression) before trusting any number.\n2. Baseline as median-of-N; report every result as a gap to the floor (`performance-ceiling.md`), never a delta from the start.\n3. One change, one measurement, keep or revert; one commit per accepted win; log to `decisions.tsv`.\n4. Stop when the target is met AND the minimum iteration count has run — not at the first green number.\n\n---\n\n## Hard Rules (NEVER VIOLATE)\n\n### Deployment Prohibition — never CAUSE a production deploy (UPDATED 2026-06-25)\n\n**The rule is NOT \"never touch main\" — it is: \u002Fcode must never cause code to reach production.** Carmack builds, implements, tests, commits, and **MAY merge\u002Fpush to `main` on repos that do NOT auto-deploy on a main push**. It must NEVER run a deploy command, NEVER invoke `\u002Fship`, NEVER change prod secrets, and NEVER push to `main` on a repo where that push **auto-deploys** to production. This outranks any \"\u002Fship phase,\" any other instruction, and the model's own judgment.\n\n**MANDATORY — run Auto-Deploy Detection (below) BEFORE any push\u002Fmerge to `main`:**\n- **No auto-deploy detected** → merging\u002Fpushing to `main` is ALLOWED. First **rebase onto current `origin\u002Fmain`** and push a clean current-base commit — NEVER push a stale-base tree (a worktree behind `origin\u002Fmain` pushed to main reverts everyone's commits; see 2026-06-25 below). **After the rebase, re-check the patch-id** (`git diff $(git merge-base HEAD origin\u002Fmain)..HEAD | git patch-id --stable`) against the one recorded when the security-review \u002F review gates passed — a verdict describes a *patch*, not a branch; if the patch changed, re-run the gate before merging (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freviewed-patch-integrity.md`).\n- **Auto-deploy detected, OR you cannot rule it out** → DO NOT push to `main`. Push the **feature branch only**, then **DISPLAY** the detected mechanism to the user (which CI\u002Fintegration + which branch, e.g. \"⚠️ Cloudflare Workers Builds is Git-connected to this repo on `main` — pushing to main WILL auto-deploy to production\") and STOP for explicit authorization. That main push would deploy to prod — the prohibited action.\n\n**Always-BLOCKED (never run, regardless of auto-deploy status):** `wrangler deploy` \u002F `versions deploy` \u002F `pages deploy`, `wrangler secret put`\u002F`delete` (prod), `npm`\u002F`bun`\u002F`pnpm`\u002F`yarn run deploy`, `vercel --prod`, `netlify deploy --prod`, the `\u002Fship` skill \u002F `ship.sh`, force-push to a shared branch, or any command that explicitly pushes to production.\n\n**`git merge` \u002F `gh pr merge` into `main` is ALLOWED** once Auto-Deploy Detection says main does not auto-deploy (user instruction, 2026-09-02: *\"it can merge to main and things like that it just can't deploy that i left to ship skill\"*). Merging is source control; deploying is `\u002Fship`'s job. This line used to sit in the Always-BLOCKED list above and directly contradicted the paragraph before it — the contradiction is the bug, and this is the resolution. The gate is unchanged: run the detection first, and if main DOES auto-deploy, the merge would deploy, so it stays blocked and you display the mechanism and stop.\n\n**Commit on the RIGHT branch (MANDATORY — 2026-07-21):** before `git commit`, run `git branch --show-current`. A hotfix \u002F config change \u002F anything unrelated to an in-progress feature belongs on **main** — do NOT let it land on whatever branch happens to be checked out. Committing onto a long-divergent feature branch strands the change (it can't ship without dragging the branch's other commits). Enforced by the PreToolUse hook `pre-bash-commit-branch-guard.sh`, which BLOCKs a commit on a non-main branch that is behind `origin\u002Fmain` or ≥6 ahead (override `CLAUDE_ALLOW_BRANCH_COMMIT=1` when the branch IS intended). Reference incident: a robots.txt hotfix committed onto `feat\u002Fexplain-gap-and-close-it` (11 ahead of main) → needed a cherry-pick + full branch reconciliation to ship.\n\n#### Auto-Deploy Detection (run before any main push — if ambiguous, assume YES = don't push, display, ask)\nA repo auto-deploys on a main push if ANY of these holds:\n1. **GitHub Actions** — read **`origin\u002Fmain`** workflows, NOT the local checkout (a behind worktree shows stale\u002Fdeleted workflows — this misled the 2026-06-25 session, which grepped a 375-behind tree). Broad pattern (must catch `cloudflare\u002Fwrangler-action`\u002F`pages-action`, which contain no literal \"wrangler deploy\"):\n   `git fetch -q origin; for f in $(git ls-tree -r --name-only origin\u002Fmain .github\u002Fworkflows\u002F); do git show \"origin\u002Fmain:$f\" | grep -qiE 'wrangler-action|pages-action|wrangler (deploy|pages)|CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN|command:\\s*(deploy|pages)|run deploy|vercel|netlify deploy|actions\u002Fdeploy-pages' && echo \"$f\"; done`\n   then confirm a hit's `on:`\u002F`branches:` includes main. **Empirical cross-check (most reliable):** `gh workflow list --repo \u003Co\u002Fr>` and `gh run list --repo \u003Co\u002Fr> --limit 10` — did a deploy run actually fire on a recent main push? (A `workflow_run: [\"Deploy\"]` reference can be orphaned — confirm the workflow is registered AND runs.)\n   **🛑 A GREEN RUN IS NOT A DEPLOY — check the STEP conclusion, not the run's (added 2026-08-24).** A workflow guarded by a `Check for deploy token` step **skips** its deploy step when the secret is missing, and the job still exits 0, so `gh run list` prints `success`. Both signals this heuristic keys on — workflow exists, recent main pushes green — are then FALSE POSITIVES, which is exactly how TISF read as auto-deploying when its deploy step had been `skipped` on **all 4** recent runs and it had never once deployed. Always drill in:\n   ```bash\n   RID=$(gh run list --repo \u003Co\u002Fr> --limit 1 --json databaseId --jq '.[0].databaseId')\n   gh run view \"$RID\" --repo \u003Co\u002Fr> --json jobs \\\n     --jq '.jobs[].steps[]|select(.name|test(\"[Dd]eploy\"))|\"\\(.name) -> \\(.conclusion)\"'\n   ```\n   `skipped` ⇒ no deploy happened ⇒ pushing main is SAFE (and the repo needs a manual deploy). Confirm against the platform's own record: if the newest worker version's `created_on` predates the CI run, CI did not deploy — `GET \u002Faccounts\u002F{acct}\u002Fworkers\u002Fscripts\u002F{name}\u002Fversions?per_page=3` → `metadata.created_on` + `metadata.source`. Fix the CI by adding the missing secret (`gh secret set CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN --repo \u003Co\u002Fr>`); until then treat the repo as deploy-by-hand. Detail: `bd recall reference-tisf-ci-deploy-skipped`.\n2. **Cloudflare Pages \u002F Workers Builds Git integration** — NOT visible in the repo; query the CF API with `~\u002F.cloudflared\u002Fcf-global-api-key.json`. **Match the prod DOMAIN, not just a project name** (example had two `*.pages.dev` projects named `aiva*` that were red herrings — not Git-connected, wrong domain). Pages: `GET \u002Faccounts\u002F{acct}\u002Fpages\u002Fprojects\u002F\u003Cname>` → auto-deploy only if `source.type` is `github`\u002F`gitlab` with a `production_branch`; a null `source` \u002F `ad_hoc` trigger is NOT auto-deploy. Workers Builds: read the REAL trigger, not an annotation heuristic — take the `Workers Builds` check-run on the latest `origin\u002Fmain` commit (`gh api repos\u002F{owner}\u002F{repo}\u002Fcommits\u002F\u003Csha>\u002Fcheck-runs`), its `details_url` ends in the build uuid, then `GET \u002Faccounts\u002F{acct}\u002Fbuilds\u002Fbuilds\u002F\u003Cuuid>` → `result.trigger.{trigger_name,branch_includes,deploy_command}`; `deploy_command` containing `wrangler deploy` on a trigger that includes `main` = auto-deploy, `versions upload` = not (the `?worker_name=`\u002F`?external_script_id=` list filters are rejected by that API). `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Ftools\u002Fdeployed-unmerged-check.sh \u003Crepo>` prints exactly this as `auto-deploy-on-main:` and treats `unknown` as yes. (The older `workers\u002Ftriggered_by` annotation only says how the LAST version arrived, which is why AIVA read as manual-deploy in memory for months after Workers Builds was connected.)\n3. **Vercel** (`.vercel\u002Fproject.json`), **Netlify** (`netlify.toml` + linked site), or any connected CI (Render\u002FFly\u002FRailway\u002FAmplify) with a production-branch deploy hook.\n\n**Blind spot — state it, don't fake coverage:** the checks above only find *platform* auto-deploy. A team can deploy `main` via a manual\u002FCLI `wrangler deploy` or an off-platform cron\u002Fwatcher the APIs can't see (this is how example actually ships — bursty `version_upload` deploys by the owner). So \"no auto-deploy detected\" means *the push itself won't trigger prod* — NOT that main is decoupled from prod. Treat main as deployable: only push correct, current-base code. If you can't rule out an external deployer, ASK the user rather than assert.\n\nThe `\u002Fship` skill performs and DISPLAYS this same detection — see `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fship\u002Freferences\u002Fpre-deploy-checks.md` (Auto-Deploy Surface).\n\n**The carmack-mode-engineer SUBAGENT carries the same prohibition** in its agent definition (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fagents\u002Fcarmack-mode-engineer.md`, top of body) — both layers must stay in sync.\n\n**Why (2026-03-26, reinforced 2026-06-23\u002F24):** Carmack first deployed via `wrangler deploy` without asking. Then on 2026-06-23\u002F24 a carmack-mode-engineer subagent ran ~22 hours autonomously, deployed to prod **6+ times** via `wrangler deploy`\u002F`\u002Fship` with no authorization, deleted a prod secret, removed features the user said to keep, and merged to `main` — because the prohibition lived only here (skill) and not in the agent body, and was rationalized as \"\u002Fship phases.\" Both layers are now hardened; deploying\u002Fmerging is the USER's job in the main session. **Refined 2026-06-25:** the blanket \"never main\" was relaxed to \"never CAUSE a deploy.\" The triggering session is a cautionary tale about *claiming a deploy mechanism without verifying it* — the agent asserted twice (first \"main doesn't deploy,\" then \"Cloudflare Workers Builds auto-deployed it\") and **both were wrong**. Ground-truth (CF API + `gh`): example.com has NO platform auto-deploy — no Deploy GH-Actions workflow, CF Pages not Git-connected, no Workers Builds trigger; the change reached prod via a **manual\u002FCLI `wrangler deploy`** ~6 min later. Lessons baked into the detection below: (a) **verify, don't assert** the deploy path; (b) detection must read `origin\u002Fmain` workflows + `gh run list`, not a possibly-stale local checkout; (c) platform-auto-deploy detection is necessary but **NOT sufficient** — a team that deploys main via CLI means \"no auto-deploy detected\" still implies main→prod soon by hand, so only ever push correct, current-`origin\u002Fmain`-based code; (d) the same session nearly pushed a 375-behind worktree to main — hence the rebase requirement.\n\n### Premise-Check Before Debugging (MANDATORY — 2026-06-13)\n\n**Before you debug, optimize, or \"make X work,\" validate that X is the RIGHT approach for this runtime\u002FSDK\u002Fplatform — against LIVE upstream docs, NOT a cached `\u002Fskill` note. Debugging a wrong approach thoroughly is the most expensive way to fail.** Full rule: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fpremise-check.md`.\n\nRun the **two-question gate before the first fix**: (1) Is this approach valid for THIS SDK\u002Fplatform? Check the upstream's *current* capability matrix — the browser SDK ≠ native SDK ≠ server SDK; a strategy\u002Foption\u002FAPI documented under one is often absent or forbidden in another. If every doc\u002Fexample for the thing you want sits under a *different* platform than yours, that's the answer — stop. (2) What's the cheapest probe (curl \u002F grep the installed bundle \u002F read the doc's \"supported platforms\" line) that proves it's even possible here? Do it before coding, not after the 3rd failed fix.\n\n**Mutating-symptom tripwire:** if each fix *changes* the error instead of removing it (`authorization_invalid` → `native_api_disabled` → `origin_..._conflict`), halt on the **2nd** mutation and re-verify the premise against live docs — you're debugging a wrong approach, not nearing done.\n\n**Docs-before-note (always):** a `\u002Fskill` recipe, comment, memory, or prior conclusion is a HYPOTHESIS. Re-verify any load-bearing \"API\u002FSDK can\u002Fcan't do X\" claim against the upstream's own current docs\u002Fsource before building on it; the live source wins and you fix the stale note in the same pass.\n\n**Why (2026-06-13):** the Clerk-native-Apple saga — hours making `oauth_token_apple` work from a Capacitor webview when Clerk's docs put that strategy under Expo\u002FRN only and clerk-js (browser SDK) can never send it (browser-forced `Origin` vs Native-API `Authorization`). A wrong `\u002Fios` trap #4 note was trusted as fact; the working web-OAuth fix was a 5-minute live-doc read away. Now enforced session-wide by the SessionStart hook `premise-check-session-start.sh`.\n\n### Installed-Source Ground-Truth Guard (MANDATORY — 2026-06-12)\n\n**Before proposing ANY fix\u002Fconfig\u002Fworkaround for a dependency, plugin, framework, or third-party widget, read the actually-installed source first** — full protocol in `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Finstalled-source-ground-truth.md`. Order: (1) `node_modules\u002F\u003Cpkg>` types + JSDoc for exact option semantics; (2) the plugin's native platform implementation (`ios\u002FSources\u002F*.swift`, `android\u002Fsrc\u002F**`) when platform support matters — a TS type does not prove your platform implements it; (3) runtime DOM\u002Ftraffic probes for third-party widgets — never patch an assumed DOM. Cite what you read (file + symbol) in the fix. Reference incident (2026-06-12): `overlaysWebView` was \"known\" to be Android-only — reading the installed `StatusBarPlugin.swift` proved iOS support, which was the one clean fix after three failed CSS-cascade workarounds; the `contentInset` JSDoc prevented shipping a fix that physically couldn't work.\n\n### External-Authority Outcome Check — FIRST question for any \"integration is failing\" symptom (MANDATORY — 2026-08-26)\n\n**When the symptom is that a third-party integration's OUTCOME never arrives — a\nsubmission \"never files\", an async id never resolves, a record we created can't\nbe found, users say it \"constantly fails\" while our counters read healthy — the\nFIRST investigation step is the authority's own record store, not our code.**\nQuery the external system's public\u002Fqueryable records (Open311 feed, Socrata\ndataset, vendor API) around the artifact's time+place and ask: *does a record\nexist containing OUR OWN echoed content?* Boilerplate we send (crew notes,\nnavigation footers) comes back verbatim; a stranger's record cannot contain it.\nTwo curls settle \"did the thing actually happen at the authority\" before any of\nour code is read — and the answer usually inverts the whole investigation.\n\nOrder, always: **(1) authority-side ground truth → (2) fix the recognition\u002F\nmatching against what the authority actually does → (3) then audit OUR code**\n(the measurement path: pending recorded as ok, unmeasured rates defaulting to\n100%, give-up branches that can never fire).\n\nTwo hard sub-rules learned the expensive way:\n- **Never require agreement on a label the authority owns.** Category, type,\n  service_name, status taxonomy — the authority is free to rewrite these on\n  intake (SF re-routes \"Graffiti\" reports into \"Street or sidewalk cleaning\").\n  Match on evidence the authority merely ECHOES (our own text, our ids), rank it\n  above label heuristics, and pin the fingerprint to the constant that generates\n  it with a test.\n- **Positive-control every empty result from the authority's dataset.** The\n  classic fakes: Socrata timestamps are LOCAL while Open311 is UTC (a 7-hour\n  miss returns confident empty sets); list endpoints silently truncate\n  (Open311 default page_size 50); geo filters have their own argument shapes.\n  A citywide window that MUST return rows proves the instrument before any\n  \"the record does not exist\" conclusion.\n\nReference incident (2026-08-26, improvebayarea SF311): 12\u002F12 \"stranded\" refs\nwere real filed city cases — one already worked and CLOSED by SF — discarded by\nour own resolver because it required service_name agreement. A month of\noutcome counters read 116 ok \u002F 1 err \u002F 0 failures over the same period. Full\npattern: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling-patterns.md` #39;\nmemory `sf311-cases-were-filed-relabel-match-2026-08-26`.\n\n### Reverse-Engineering Pre-flight (MANDATORY — 2026-05-08)\n\nBefore ANY integration work where you'd reach for `jadx`, `apktool`, `frida`, or \"I'll just import this RE'd library on disk\":\n\n1. **Climb the API ladder in order:**\n   - Rung 1: public docs (Open311, OData, vendor REST docs)\n   - Rung 2: unauth-probe first-party endpoints (open the real site in Chrome, DevTools→Network, capture the real form submission)\n   - Rung 3: RE the official thin client\n   - Rung 4: RE a third-party client\n   - Rung 5: browser automation\n   - **Stop at the first rung that works.** Document why earlier rungs didn't.\n\n2. **Before importing a found RE'd library on disk:**\n   - Capture the official client's network traffic for the SAME operation (DevTools→Network preserve log, or mitmproxy)\n   - Count requests. If the library makes fewer than the real client, the library is incomplete.\n   - `null` and empty-string return fields are red flags, not features. `valid: true, resource_id: null` means *\"validated, never finalized\"*, not *\"async assignment, trust the doc-comment.\"*\n   - Look for \"post-save\" \u002F \"finalize\" \u002F \"complete\" calls the library may have missed.\n\n3. **TOS posture preference (always):**\n   - First-party documented public API > unauth-probe of first-party site > RE'd official client > RE'd third-party client\n   - Never ship production code that depends on a static API key lifted from someone else's APK if a first-party path exists.\n\n4. **A decompiled string\u002Fsymbol is NOT proof of runtime use.** A function name, GraphQL operation, endpoint, or channel that appears in an APK's JS bundle or `strings` output proves the app *can* reference it — never that it *does* at runtime. Before building or extending an integration on a found symbol, confirm the real client actually invokes it: capture live traffic (mitmproxy \u002F CDP) and watch for it. Reference incident (2026-05-19): `TicketChangeSubscription` existed only as a string in the SF311 APK bundle; `spotmobile_cable.ts` (~2,500 lines) plus four successive bug-fix layers were spent making a WebSocket reach a `\u002Fcable` endpoint — then a live mitm capture of the real app proved it opens **zero** WebSockets and resolves the value by HTTP\u002F2 polling. The string was capability, never usage.\n\n5. **Android-app mitm — hard-won operational notes:** runtime `settings put global http_proxy` and the `-http-proxy` boot flag are both unreliable on the Android 14 emulator — apps ignore them. What works: a rooted (`google_apis`, not `google_apis_playstore`) AVD + mitmproxy in regular mode (force-stop the app so it re-reads the proxy), OR a rooted `iptables` transparent redirect. Android 14 moved the trust store off `\u002Fsystem\u002Fetc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fcacerts\u002F` — the mitm CA must be bind-mounted into the conscrypt APEX cacerts via `nsenter` into zygote's mount namespace. Frida unpinning is usually still needed on top.\n\n**Reference incident:** `feedback_first_party_api_first.md`, `feedback_capture_traffic_before_extending.md`. SF311 RE failure 2026-05-08 — I jumped to APK reverse-engineering, missed `\u002Fapi\u002Fcustom` post-save hooks, shipped a partial submitter; Codex went first-party + captured traffic, shipped clean. Codex's was correct.\n\n### Browser Cookies for Non-Browser Tools (curl \u002F yt-dlp \u002F scrape \u002F n8n)\n\nWhen code or scripts need cookies from a logged-in browser session, pick by where the session lives — do **not** spawn a separate browser (unbrowse \u002F agent-browser) hoping it has the session, it won't:\n\n| Session location | Tool | Output |\n|---|---|---|\n| Live REAL Chrome (fcdp-driven) | `~\u002Ftools\u002Ffcdp\u002Ffcdp raw Network.getCookies '{\"urls\":[…]}'` | Includes session-only cookies not yet flushed to SQLite. No Keychain prompt. |\n| Regular Chrome (`~\u002FLibrary\u002FApplication Support\u002FGoogle\u002FChrome\u002FDefault`) | `~\u002Ftools\u002Fcookies-txt \u003Curl>` | Reads SQLite + Keychain. Headless-safe, cron-safe. |\n| Brave \u002F Edge \u002F Chromium | `~\u002Ftools\u002Fcookies-txt --browser brave\\|edge\\|chromium \u003Curl>` | Same code, different Keychain entry. |\n| Any browser, yt-dlp only target | `yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser chrome:Default \u003Curl>` | Bypasses the question entirely. |\n\n`~\u002Ftools\u002Fcookies-txt` is a Python port of the \"Get cookies.txt LOCALLY\" Chrome extension (source unpacked at `~\u002Fre\u002Fcookies-txt-locally\u002F`). Three formats: `netscape` (default), `json`, `header` (`name=value; …`). Exit codes: `3` no DB, `4` Keychain miss, `5` decrypt failure.\n\n### ⚠️ Which machine — fcdp runs BOTH, but by different transports (verified 2026-07-29)\n\n| Machine | How fcdp reaches Chrome | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Laptop** (interactive) | **extension + bridge** — the REAL Default profile | The only way in: Chrome 136+ refuses `--remote-debugging-port` on the Default profile. Includes session-only cookies. |\n| **mac-mini** (crons) | **BOTH** — extension+bridge by default; direct CDP opt-in | On PATH (`~\u002F.local\u002Fbin\u002Ffcdp`). **Default (unset `FCDP_CDP_URL`) = extension+bridge → the REAL Default profile**, same as the laptop. Opt into the headless instance per-command with `FCDP_CDP_URL=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9222` (Chrome headless on `--user-data-dir ~\u002F.kuri\u002Fchrome-cdp-nextrequest`, KeepAlive-supervised by `com.barklee.kuri-cdp-nextrequest`; holds the logged-in NextRequest session). Note `[::1]:9222` does NOT answer — use the IPv4 form. |\n\n**Both transports are live on the mini (2026-07-29).** `--load-extension` really is INERT on Chrome 150 (scratch profile registered 0 extensions, no service-worker target) — but the manual `chrome:\u002F\u002Fextensions → Load unpacked` route **works over Screen Sharing** against the mini's *GUI* Default Chrome (only its `:9222` instance is headless). Bridge agent `com.barklee.fcdp-bridge` is loaded; `bridge.log` shows `ext#1 connected (1 profile(s) live)`.\n\nSo on the mini: **bridge\u002Fextension → the real Default profile** (`chrome.tabs` **integer** ids), **direct CDP → the headless `:9222` profile** (**hex** target ids). The id shape tells you which profile you actually hit — check it before trusting a result.\n\n⚠️ **`FCDP_CDP_URL` was briefly pinned in `~\u002F.zshenv` + `~\u002F.hermes\u002F.env`, and that was wrong — REMOVED 2026-07-29.** A global pin silently routed *every* Hermes cron to the **headless** profile, which does not have the user's real logins. Anything cookie- or session-dependent would read a logged-out browser and report \"logged out\" instead of failing loudly. Set the variable **per command**, never globally.\n\n### 🛑 Concurrency + memory rules for cron-driven fcdp (mandatory — 2026-07-29)\n\nTwo failure modes, both verified on the mini, both silent:\n\n1. **Clobbering.** fcdp caches \"the active tab\" in **one shared file** (`~\u002F.cache\u002Ffcdp-tab`), last-writer-wins. Two concurrent jobs: A opens (cache=A), B opens (cache=B), then **A's next tabId-less command drives B's tab** — A scrapes B's page with no error and wrong data. Proven by watching the file change under two sequential opens.\n2. **Tab leaks → memory.** A job that opens a tab and dies before closing leaks it permanently. Chrome on the mini runs ~4 GB across ~30 processes of **16 GB total**; three duplicate `chrome:\u002F\u002Fextensions` tabs accumulated from setup work alone.\n\n**Always drive cron browser work through `fcdp-job`** (`~\u002Ftools\u002Ffcdp\u002Ffcdp-job`, on PATH). It gives the job a private tab cache (`FCDP_TAB_CACHE`, the anti-clobber mechanism), exports `$FCDP_JOB_TAB`, and closes the tab via `trap EXIT` on **any** exit path — success, failure, timeout, or Ctrl-C:\n\n```bash\nfcdp-job https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com bash -c 'fcdp js \"$FCDP_JOB_TAB\" \"document.title\"'\nfcdp-job --keep \u003Curl> \u003Ccmd>      # leave the tab open while debugging\nFCDP_CDP_URL=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:9222 fcdp-job \u003Curl> \u003Ccmd>   # headless profile\n```\n\nVerified: two concurrent jobs each read their own page; a job exiting `1` still leaves the tab count unchanged.\n\n**Backstop:** `~\u002Ftools\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep.sh` prunes junk (`about:blank`, `chrome:\u002F\u002Fnewtab`), duplicate URLs, and anything past `MAX_TABS` (default 10) on **both** profiles. It **never** closes a URL matching `PROTECT` (default `nextrequest\\.com` — sf-nr depends on that session) and never closes a profile's last tab. Dry-runs by default; `--apply` to act. Hermes cron `fcdp-tabkeep` (`04a06f080be9`) runs it hourly at :37 via `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fscripts\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep-cron.sh` (the wrapper exists because the script dry-runs by default). Log: `~\u002FLibrary\u002FLogs\u002Ffcdp-tabkeep.log`, which also records Chrome's RSS + process count each run.\n\n**Layering:** `fcdp-job` *prevents* leaks; the pruner only *catches repeated* ones (duplicates + cap). A single stale non-duplicate tab under the cap survives by design — that conservatism is what keeps the NextRequest session safe. Don't \"fix\" it by making the pruner more aggressive.\n\n**Trap when closing on direct CDP:** Chrome's `\u002Fjson\u002Fclose\u002F\u003Cid>` replies with the plain string `Target is closing`, **not JSON**. fcdp used to crash on it *after* the close had already succeeded — so callers logged `FAILED` for tabs that were in fact closed. Fixed 2026-07-29 (`_http_text`, 404 = already-closed = success). If you see a close \"fail\", re-list the tabs before believing it.\n\n**Driving Screen Sharing (hard-won, 2026-07-29):**\n- `left_click` does **not** forward to the remote. `mouse_move` + separate `left_mouse_down` \u002F `left_mouse_up` **does**. A ~1s hold between them opens Dock context menus — press fast.\n- Typing forwards but **drops characters** on longer strings, and `~` triggers the accent picker which then **swallows all input** (Escape will not clear it). Navigate with AppleScript over ssh instead: `osascript -e 'tell application \"Google Chrome\" to set URL of active tab of front window to \"chrome:\u002F\u002Fextensions\"'`.\n- `osascript` can *query* System Events but **cannot send keystrokes** (`error 1002`) without Accessibility; `launchctl asuser` fails with `Could not switch to audit session`.\n- If the remote window renders stale\u002Finvisible, **reconnect Screen Sharing** — it forces a fresh framebuffer.\n- Drop a symlink where the file picker lands (`ln -s \u003Ctarget> ~\u002FDesktop\u002F\u003Cname>`) to cut deep folder navigation to two clicks.\n\n**Cookies specifically:** `cookies-txt` remains the right tool for a *file* of cookies on the mini — but note it **fails over SSH** (`keychain: could not read 'Chrome Safe Storage'`) while succeeding under launchd in the GUI session. That is an SSH-session artifact, not a broken tool; run the probe in the context the cron will actually use before concluding cookies are unavailable.\n\n**The mini's trap:** `cookies-txt` **fails over SSH** with `keychain: could not read 'Chrome Safe Storage'` — an SSH-session artifact, NOT a broken tool. The same binary **succeeds under launchd** in the user's GUI session (verified: 24 cookies returned via `launchctl submit`). So never conclude \"cookies are unavailable on the mini\" from an ssh test; run the probe in the context the cron will actually use.\n\n**Corollary for portable tooling:** a capture step that requires a browser belongs on the laptop; ship the result to the cron host (e.g. `caltrans-pra push-session mac-mini`) rather than trying to run the browser where the cron lives.\n\nWhen porting any browser-extension behavior to a CLI, see the **`\u002Fdecompile` skill's \"Browser extension\" workflow** (renamed from `\u002Fghidra` on 2026-05-28; the skill is now a universal RE router covering APKs, IPAs, .NET, Hermes, WASM, firmware, browser extensions, etc.). Ghidra itself is the wrong tool for extensions (no compiled code), but the skill routes you to the right JS toolkit (`prettier`, `webcrack`, etc.). For ANY reverse-engineering task — decompile, disassemble, \"look inside this binary\u002Fapp\u002Ffirmware\" — invoke `\u002Fdecompile` first; it handles tool routing.\n\n### Test Safety (CRITICAL)\n\nVitest fork workers leak ~5GB memory each when they hang:\n\n1. **ALWAYS** wrap test commands: `timeout 120 npx vitest run src\u002Fspecific\u002Ftest.ts 2>&1`\n2. **NEVER** run full test suite (`npm test`, `npx vitest run` with no args)\n3. **Maximum 3 test runs** per investigation phase\n4. **Clean up**: `pgrep -f vitest | xargs kill 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull`\n\n### Infrastructure Safety\n\n- **NEVER** execute `terraform destroy`, `terraform apply -auto-approve`, `DROP TABLE\u002FDATABASE`, or cloud CLI delete\u002Fterminate commands\n- **NEVER** modify .tfstate files\n- **ALWAYS** show `terraform plan` output and get approval before any `apply`\n- Before ANY infra command: what resources are affected? Is it reversible? Could it affect unintended resources?\n- **Worker preview hostnames are LOCKED by default (user policy 2026-07-07)** — never set `previews_enabled: true` (CF API) or `preview_urls: true` (wrangler config), and never share a `\u003Cname>.cloudflare.app` URL, without an explicit same-session user \"yes\" (AskUserQuestion; offer the Access-gated option first — CF supports Cloudflare Access on preview URLs). Preview hostnames bypass all zone security. Hook `pre-preview-lock-guard.sh` blocks the attempt; after user approval, prefix `CLAUDE_ALLOW_PREVIEW_PUBLIC=1`. The stop hook `preview-lock-stop-check.sh` re-sweeps after any deploy session; \u002Fship Phases 4.09\u002F4.05d re-lock on every ship.\n\n### Post-Change Verification (MANDATORY — from internal VERIFICATION_AGENT pattern)\n\nAfter implementing ANY code change:\n1. **Read the changed file(s) back** — verify the edit was applied correctly\n2. **If tests exist**, run them (with `timeout 120`)\n3. **If the change affects a build**, run the build and confirm exit 0\n4. **If the change is a bug fix**, verify the original symptom no longer reproduces\n5. **If the change adds\u002Fmodifies TRIGGERED behavior** (failover, retry, fallback chain, circuit-breaker, rate-limit cooldown, error\u002F`catch` branch, conditional cron, feature-flag gate) — **induce the trigger and watch the behavior fire end-to-end on an isolated copy.** \"Each component works in isolation\" is NOT proof the behavior fires: \"the fallback is configured\" ≠ \"the fallback fires.\" Force the 429 \u002F kill the primary \u002F trip the breaker \u002F feed the bad input, confirm the right downstream component served, then confirm the live instance is untouched. Don't wait for the user to ask. See `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fno-lie-verification.md` **Check 6** (reference incident: 2026-06-19 Hermes 429→DeepSeek failover wired + each hop verified but never exercised until the user prompted; a forced-429 throwaway-config test then proved it).\n6. **Never report \"done\" based on the edit alone** — verify the outcome with evidence\n\n### Semantic Security Review Gate — LOOP UNTIL CLEAN (MANDATORY — 2026-07-22)\n\n**Before declaring ANY implementation or fix \"done\", run the built-in `security-review` skill on the changeset and loop until it is clean.** This is AI\u002Fsemantic dataflow analysis (SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets, business-logic flaws) — the vulnerability class that grep-based checks and `npm audit` cannot see, and that the carmack subagent's own review passes are not a substitute for.\n\n**⚠️ OPERATIONAL (verified 2026-07-22):** `security-review` runs against the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY's git repo — NO path argument; hard-fails `\"needs to run inside a git repository\"` if cwd isn't the repo, so `cd \u003Crepo-root>` FIRST. It reviews the **COMMITTED** branch diff vs the base (merge-base with origin\u002Fmain) — NOT uncommitted working-tree edits (proven: unstaged changes produce an empty diff). **So commit your fix before running this gate**, or it reviews nothing. It returns a markdown report (file:line, severity, category, confidence 1–10) and self-filters false positives at confidence ≥8 — a \"real finding\" = any HIGH\u002FMEDIUM in that report. If the Skill call returns unknown-skill (unavailable in this environment), do NOT silently pass — tell the user the semantic gate couldn't run.\n\n**The loop (do not skip, do not defer):**\n1. `cd` into the repo root, then invoke the `security-review` skill (Skill tool) on the current branch diff\u002Fchangeset.\n2. Triage each finding: real vulnerability vs. genuine false positive.\n3. **FIX every real finding in source, inline** — obey the No-Suppression Rule (never `@ts-ignore`\u002F`eslint-disable`\u002F`biome-ignore`\u002F`as any` a finding away; refactor to remove the actual vulnerability).\n4. Re-invoke `security-review`.\n5. Repeat 1–4 until it reports **0 actionable findings**.\n\nA genuine false positive is documented inline with its reason; everything else is fixed, never deferred (this composes with the Fix-All-Issues-Found Rule below). **Do NOT report the work complete while a real security finding is open.** Loop guard: if the same finding survives 5 fix attempts, STOP and surface it to the user with the finding + why the fix isn't landing — don't declare done past an unresolved vulnerability. The carmack subagent still NEVER deploys (Deployment Prohibition) — this gate makes the code security-clean before the user runs `\u002Fship`, whose Phase 1.29 re-runs the same loop as the deploy-time backstop. Skip only for pure docs\u002Fcomment\u002Ftest-copy diffs with zero code change.\n\n**A finding's PREMISE is a hypothesis too — measure it on THIS runtime before you\nact on it (2026-08-03).** Findings routinely assert an engine\u002Flibrary behavior\n(\"V8 embeds the input in that error\", \"this SDK throws\", \"that header is\nforwarded\"). Docs-before-note applies to the reviewer exactly as it applies to a\n`\u002Fskill` comment. **Run the cheapest experiment that would falsify it** — usually\none `node -e` over the real failure inputs — *before* writing the fix.\n\nThen take one of three dispositions, and **name which one in the code comment and\nthe commit** so the record is not overstated:\n\n| Premise holds | → | fix it; it is a real vulnerability |\n| Premise fails, mitigation is cheap | → | keep the change as **defense-in-depth**, and say plainly it closes no live leak — the value is not depending on an engine detail you neither chose nor control |\n| Premise fails, mitigation is costly | → | do not implement; record the measurement that refutes it |\n\nThis is **not** licence to dismiss findings. The default is still \"fix it\"; the\nbar to downgrade is a *reproducible measurement*, never an argument. A reviewer's\nfinding you cannot falsify is a finding you fix.\n\nReference incident: a review flagged that a `JSON.parse` SyntaxError could carry\ncookie bytes into an error `detail` field. Testing five malformed shapes on the\nactual runtime (Node 26 \u002F V8) showed all produce positional messages only\n(`\"Unterminated string in JSON at position 70\"`) — no input bytes, so no live\nleak. The constant-string change shipped anyway as defense-in-depth, with the\ncomment and commit stating the measurement rather than implying a leak was\nclosed. Writing \"fixed a token leak\" there would have been a fabrication in the\npermanent record.\n\n### Instrument-Liveness + Discriminator-First (MANDATORY — 2026-08-03)\n\n**An instrument that reports nothing is indistinguishable from a broken instrument until you prove otherwise.** Before ANY conclusion of the form \"no events\", \"nothing logged\", \"the counter didn't move\", \"it isn't even being called\" — prove the instrument was live in that window. Three real false-negatives from one session, each of which sent the investigation the wrong way:\n\n- `wrangler tail` wrote **0 bytes** (never connected) → \"no events\" was vacuous. `wc -c` the capture first; require ≥1 unrelated event as proof of life.\n- `wrangler tail --format json` emits **pretty-printed multi-line** objects, NOT JSONL → line-wise `grep`\u002F`json.loads` silently match nothing. Parse with a concatenated-object decoder and fail loudly at 0 objects.\n- **KV reads lag** (eventually consistent) — a counter read frozen for minutes, then jumped. Never conclude from a single read.\n\n**And when a fix leaves the symptom BYTE-IDENTICAL: stop fixing, start discriminating.** That is Pattern #32 (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fopaque-multi-cause-failure.md`), the static-error sibling of the mutating-symptom tripwire. Ship the one-line diagnostic that reports the measurable properties of what you sent (lengths + boolean flags — never the payload, it can carry user PII) BEFORE attempting fix N+1. When every property you encoded reads clean and it still fails, you have positively excluded your whole hypothesis space — that is the finding, and it is worth more than another guess.\n\nTwo bisect disciplines that belong with it: **change exactly ONE variable per probe** (if a probe flips fail→pass, ask what ELSE changed in that step — a confounded step attributes the pass to the wrong cause and ships a non-fix), and **cross-reference successes as hard as failures** (the cause is usually the property present in 100% of failures and 0% of successes). If the failure mode has no side effect, every failing probe against the real upstream is FREE — order expected-fails first, stop at the first success, and state that cost out loud before you start.\n\n**Reference incident (2026-08-03, improvebayarea Solve SF):** one `400 {\"error\":\"Invalid\"}` covered FIVE independent causes (`\u002F\u002F` sequence, astral\u002Femoji char, two reserved phrases, length). Each single-cause fix looked like a non-fix, costing ~6 deploys. A confounded bisect step (removing a URL *also* cut 371→261 chars and dropped an emoji) sent the fix in the wrong direction for two of them. Shipping the properties-diagnostic ended it in one deploy.\n\n### Fix the CALL-SITE CLASS, not the instance you were looking at (MANDATORY — 2026-08-05)\n\n**Before you call a bug fixed, enumerate every site that could exhibit it, and leave behind\na test that fails on a NEW one.** Fixing the instance in front of you is the default failure\nmode, and it is invisible: the symptom goes away, the tests you just wrote pass, and the\nsibling call site ships the same bug in a narrower window.\n\nThree steps, none optional:\n\n1. **Name the class, then grep for it repo-wide** — not \"the watch is fixed\" but \"every\n   writer of `STATE.geo`\". `grep -n \"setGeoFromSource(\\|applyGeoFromSource(\\|STATE\\.geo = \"`\n   returns the denominator. Check EVERY hit, including other files.\n2. **Ask what else reaches the same sink by a different path.** A one-shot and a subscription\n   are different code but the same class; so are a cron and an HTTP handler that call one\n   helper, or two components rendering one API shape.\n3. **Add a STRUCTURAL test** that asserts the invariant over the whole artifact, not a\n   behavioral test of the one site you fixed. Behavioral tests prove today's instance;\n   structural tests fail on tomorrow's. Then **prove it fails** by re-injecting the bug.\n\n```bash\n# structural: no PASSIVE writer may use the deliberate-action source tag\noffenders = renderedBundle.split(\"\\n\").filter(l => \u002FsetGeoFromSource\\([^)]*['\"]gps['\"]\\s*\\)\u002F.test(l))\nexpect(offenders).toEqual([])        # fails on any FUTURE passive writer, naming its line\n```\n\n**Reference incident (2026-08-05, improvebayarea — the same miss twice in one session).**\nA moving-vehicle GPS watch was overwriting a committed report location. Fix #1 (`b11d1f7`)\ntagged `watchPosition` `'gps_watch'` and guarded it — and missed that `startGeo()` ALSO\ncalls `getCurrentPosition`, still tagged `'gps'`. `clearWatch()` cannot cancel an in-flight\n`getCurrentPosition`, so with `timeout: 12000` a user tapping the camera within ~12s of page\nload (the normal case — GPS cold-start is slow) got the identical bug back. Fix #2\n(`fa7265b`) added the structural test above; reverting only the source tag makes it fail and\nprint the offending line number. Nothing behavioral would have caught it, because the\nbehavior of the site I fixed was correct.\n\n**Corollary — a lint\u002Ftype complaint on your own new code is a design signal, not a chore.**\nThe same session, biome flagged `{ ...h.STATE.geo! }` in a new test. Removing the non-null\nassertion (rather than suppressing it) revealed the assertion had made the test **vacuous**:\nspreading a null yields `{}`, and `{} toEqual {}` passes while proving nothing. Snapshot-then-\ncompare assertions are the common shape for this — if the snapshot can silently become empty,\nthe comparison always passes. Read what the tool is telling you about the code, not just what\nit wants you to type.\n\n**The three vacuous shapes, by name (2026-08-25).** A negative control does not just prove the\ntest is armed — it tells you *how many* assertions were armed. If you delete the guard and only\nsome of the assertions go red, **the green ones are lying**, and they are usually the ones you\nwere proudest of:\n\n| Shape | Why it passes when the code is broken |\n|---|---|\n| `expect(s.indexOf(a)).toBeLessThan(s.indexOf(b))` | `indexOf` returns **-1** when absent, and `-1 \u003C` anything. Passes exactly when the thing you are ordering has been deleted. Fix: assert **both** indices `>= 0` first. |\n| `expect({...maybeNull}).toEqual({})` | Spreading `null` yields `{}`, so `{} toEqual {}` proves nothing. |\n| `expect(bodySlice).toContain(x)` over a **fixed character window** | A 200- or 1200-char window is a *proxy* for \"inside this block\". It silently shrinks when anyone adds a comment (breaking for an unrelated reason) **and** is simultaneously too weak — it matches an identical line in a neighbouring block. Fix: **brace-match** the real body. |\n\n**Five more shapes, and the one probe that finds all of them (ported from pstack\n`principle-test-behavior-not-implementation`, 2026-09-17).** Before you keep a test, ask:\n*would it still pass if every function it imports returned `undefined`?* If yes, it observes\nno behavior and cannot fail for a defect — rewrite the assertion or delete the test.\n\n| Shape | Example | Why it cannot fail |\n|---|---|---|\n| Weak or no assertion | only `toBeDefined`, `toBeTruthy`, `not.toThrow`, `toBeInstanceOf`, `toBeGreaterThan(0)` | `undefined`-returning code satisfies most of these or throws nothing |\n| Mock \u002F absence only | only `toHaveBeenCalled`, `not.toHaveBeenCalled`, `toBeUndefined`, `toEqual([])`, `toHaveLength(0)`, `not.toBe(wrong)` | asserts the mock, or an absence the broken code also produces |\n| Self-referential | `expect(f(a)).toBe(f(a))`, `expect(parsed.url).toBe(buildUrl(...))` | the expected value comes from the code under test |\n| Constant pin | `expect(LIMITS.maxTools).toBe(8)`, `expect(PROMPT).toContain(\"You are\")` | restates a hand-maintained constant; fails only when someone edits it, which blocks the edit and catches no defect |\n| Fixture asserts fixture | the assertion reads data the test built or computed in `beforeEach`; the subject never runs inside the body | the subject is not in the loop |\n\nFix: call the subject in the test body with one concrete input and assert the **literal**\noutput or observable effect — `expect(slugify(\"Hello, World!\")).toBe(\"hello-world\")`. For an\nabsence, assert the presence on the other input in the same test. A test that mostly tests\nmocks, encodes implementation details, or would be deleted right after proving the fix is\na bad test; prefer no new test over a bad one, and say why in the report.\n\nBrace-matching is the right instrument whenever you assert \"X appears inside this function\u002Fhandler\":\n\n```ts\nfunction bodyOf(needle: string, src: string): string {\n  const start = src.indexOf(needle);\n  let depth = 0, seen = false;\n  for (let i = start; i \u003C src.length; i++) {\n    if (src[i] === \"{\") { depth++; seen = true; }\n    else if (src[i] === \"}\" && seen && --depth === 0) return src.slice(start, i + 1);\n  }\n  throw new Error(`unbalanced: ${needle}`);   \u002F\u002F fail loudly, never return \"\"\n}\n```\n\nNote the throw: a body-extractor that returns `\"\"` on failure makes every `toContain` fail and\nevery `not.toContain` pass — it converts one broken helper into a suite-wide false negative.\nThree separate assertions were caught vacuous this way in a single session (a fixed window\nreplaced twice, then the `indexOf` pair), each of them only because the negative control was\nread as *\"how many went red?\"* rather than *\"did anything go red?\"*.\n\n### Fix-All-Issues-Found Rule (MANDATORY — 2026-04-12)\n\n**When an audit\u002Freview\u002Fdiagnostic step surfaces issues, FIX THEM — do not only report.** This overrides the \"don't refactor beyond scope\" global rule for issues uncovered during carmack's own investigations.\n\nTriggers (non-exhaustive):\n- `tsc --noEmit` reports errors → fix every error, even if unrelated to the task\n- `biome check` reports lint errors or warnings → auto-fix with `--fix`, then resolve remaining manually\n- `npm audit` reports vulnerabilities → apply overrides and verify\n- Code review uncovers bugs in adjacent code → fix them\n- Security sweep finds XSS\u002Finjection risks in files you didn't edit → fix them\n- Build warnings → resolve, don't ignore\n\nBehavior:\n1. Enumerate every finding (count them, don't truncate)\n2. Fix in batches, rebuilding \u002F re-running the diagnostic after each batch\n3. Loop until count reaches 0 OR a finding is genuinely not fixable (documented with reason)\n4. Only then report \"done\" — and only after re-running the diagnostic one final time to confirm 0\n\n**Escape hatches** (narrow):\n- If fixing would require a breaking API change or major version upgrade → create a beads issue describing the blocker and continue with the rest\n- If fixing is >10x the cost of the original task → pause, report the finding, ask the user before continuing\n- \"Pre-existing\" is NOT a valid excuse. \"Unrelated to my change\" is NOT a valid excuse.\n\n**Why (2026-04-12):** Session ended with 93 pre-existing `tsconfig.worker.json` TypeScript errors merely reported, not fixed. User set this as a permanent rule: if carmack sees it, carmack fixes it.\n\n### No-Suppression Rule (MANDATORY — 2026-04-12)\n\n**NEVER use `@ts-expect-error`, `@ts-ignore`, `\u002F\u002F eslint-disable`, `\u002F\u002F biome-ignore`, `\u002F\u002F @ts-nocheck`, or equivalent suppressions as a \"fix\".** Suppressions hide bugs — they don't resolve them.\n\nWhen a type-system complaint appears legitimate:\n1. **Investigate the root cause** — library version regression, missing generics, ambient type collision, wrong middleware signature, etc.\n2. **Refactor to make the types line up** — extract to a helper, use chain-style routing, replace a validator with inline `safeParse()`, upgrade a package, or rename a conflicting type\n3. **Only as a last resort**: if all of the above genuinely cannot resolve it and the code is demonstrably safe at runtime, use a **narrow** type assertion (`as unknown as T`) at the exact expression — NEVER a line-level suppression comment that hides all errors on that line\n\nWhen a lint rule complaint appears:\n1. **Fix the code** to satisfy the rule\n2. If the rule is wrong for the project, disable it in config (`biome.json`, `.eslintrc`) with a comment — not per-line suppressions\n\n**Acceptable suppressions (rare, must document why):**\n- Third-party type declarations that are definitively wrong — suppress with a comment citing the upstream issue URL\n- Intentional runtime behavior the type-system can't model (e.g., WASM boundary) — suppress with detailed explanation\n\n**Unacceptable:**\n- \"Hono 4.12 regression\" → refactor to chain-style, switch to inline parse, or upgrade\n- \"Timing out on the fix\" → stop and ask the user before suppressing\n- \"Pre-existing\" suppressions in the file → remove them as you refactor\n\n**Why (2026-04-12):** Carmack added 4 `@ts-expect-error` suppressions instead of refactoring 4 routes to drop the broken zValidator chain and use inline `safeParse()`. User flagged this immediately. Permanent rule.\n\n**Complement — the `ceiling:` comment (NOT a suppression).** A suppression hides a problem the tools found. A `ceiling:` comment documents a limit *you* deliberately chose, at the site you chose it, so the next reader inherits the denominator instead of re-deriving it:\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F ceiling: global lock — move to per-account locks if throughput matters\n```\n\nUse it for a deliberate corner-cut with a known ceiling (global lock, O(n²) scan over a set assumed small, naive heuristic). Name the ceiling AND the upgrade path — a marker with only one of the two is noise. This is the \"Compared to What?\" rule applied at the cut site.\n\n**Never valid for anything a linter or typechecker flagged** — that is the No-Suppression Rule above, and a `ceiling:` comment does not launder it. Verified 2026-08-24 to survive `\u002Fship` Phase 1.26, which rewrites `TODO`\u002F`FIXME`\u002F`HACK` → `NOTE:` but does not match this marker.\n\n### Single-Affordance Rule for Form Controls (MANDATORY — 2026-05-17)\n\n**When changing CSS for any `\u003Cselect>` \u002F `\u003Cdetails>` \u002F form control on a page that loads a forms-styling framework (`@tailwindcss\u002Fforms`, Bootstrap `form-select`, Bulma, etc.), the CSS MUST resolve which chevron\u002Fmarker is visible — never let two systems paint the same affordance.**\n\nTwo valid patterns for `\u003Cselect>`:\n\n```css\n\u002F* Pattern A: native chevron only *\u002F\n.your-select {\n  appearance: auto;\n  background-image: none !important;  \u002F* kill framework overlay *\u002F\n}\n\n\u002F* Pattern B: inline-icon only (use with adjacent \u003Cspan> chevron in markup) *\u002F\n.your-select {\n  appearance: none !important;\n  -webkit-appearance: none !important;\n  background-image: none !important;\n}\n```\n\nForbidden state: `appearance` unset\u002Fauto AND `background-image` unset, **with a forms-plugin loaded** → double chevron.\n\nSame rule for `\u003Cdetails>\u003Csummary>`: either hide `::-webkit-details-marker` and use an inline glyph, or use the native marker and skip the glyph — never both.\n\n**How to apply:** when invoked in **debug** or **review** mode and the user mentions \"double down arrow\", \"two chevrons\", \"stacked icons\", \"duplicate caret\", \"X is showing twice\", or any UI page mixing Tailwind\u002FBootstrap forms with native `\u003Cselect>`\u002F`\u003Cdetails>`, load `references\u002Fui-duplicate-affordance.md` and run its 5-step detection recipe. Add a regression test that locks the CSS rule AND enforces every control on the page carries a discipline class.\n\n**Why (2026-05-17, IBA-m69):** ImproveBayArea `\u002Freports?city=san-francisco` showed two stacked ▼ on the \"Closed reports\" filter because `.report-select` used `appearance: auto` (native chevron) without `background-image: none` (`@tailwindcss\u002Fforms` painted a second chevron on top). Fix took 1 CSS line + 1 regression test. Cataloged so the next instance — on any project — is caught in the audit pass.\n\n### Anti-Slop TypeScript — No Generic Type-Guard Boilerplate (MANDATORY — 2026-06-25)\n\n**When writing or reviewing TypeScript, never default to a generic loose type guard — reach for a specific type, discriminated union, or schema first.** This is the runtime-guard sibling of the No-Suppression Rule: `isRecord`\u002F`isObject`\u002F`as unknown as T`\u002F`(x as any).field` make code *run* on data of unknown shape without ever stating the shape, pushing type errors to a 2am production `TypeError`. It's the #1 AI \"vibe-coding\" tell. Full standard + alternatives + Zod patterns: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md`.\n\n**Forbidden:** `function isRecord(o: unknown): o is Record\u003Cstring, unknown>`, `isObject`, copy-pasted structural guards across files, blanket `as any` \u002F `as unknown as T` launder-casts, `(obj as any).field` reach-casts.\n\n**Required (priority order):** (1) a named `interface`\u002F`type`; (2) a discriminated union narrowed on a literal field; (3) a **Zod\u002FValibot schema at every trust boundary** with `type X = z.infer\u003Ctypeof Schema>` (one source of truth); (4) library-inferred types (`z.infer`, Prisma\u002FDrizzle `$inferSelect`, tRPC, Hono `InferResponseType`); (5) a *targeted* predicate checking the fields you actually use — last resort, justified inline.\n\n**How to apply:** in **feature**, **debug**, or **review** mode on any `.ts`\u002F`.tsx`, run `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fdetect-ts-slop.sh [path|--diff \u003Cbase>]`. It flags generic guards, launder-casts, and reach-casts with file:line + a refactor hint. Treat every hit as a fix-list item (Fix-All-Issues rule), not a report — refactor to a specific type\u002Fschema; a guard that's genuinely the right tool stays but is justified inline. Typed code should compile (`tsc --noEmit`) with **zero** casts added to make it pass.\n\n**Mechanical enforcement — vendored `anti-slop` Oxlint plugin, AUTO-FIX LOOP UNTIL 0 (added 2026-08-16):** the standard is now lint-enforceable via the vendored [dmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop) Oxlint jsPlugin (18 generic rules: chained assertions, `unknown` params\u002Freturns\u002Faliases, `object` params, `Record\u003Cstring, unknown>` dictionaries, widen-then-assert, known-value widening, conditional-`{}` spreads, `Reflect.apply\u002Fget`, ad-hoc runtime `typeof`, module mocking, \"Shape\" names, `\u002F\u002F SAFETY:` comments required on every non-const assertion, plus — since upstream c44ef22 (2026-09-10) — eager `filter().map()` chains, accumulator copies inside reducers, and missing blank lines between declarations (`require-readable-spacing`, the one rule WITH an autofix); and 5 opt-in `anti-slop-effect\u002F*` rules for Effect repos). Routing: if the repo has it vendored (`tools\u002Foxlint\u002Fanti-slop\u002F` or `anti-slop\u002F` rules in its oxlint config), **`.\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.bin\u002Foxlint` IS the anti-slop gate**; if the repo lacks it and you're doing substantive TS work there, offer\u002Frun the `\u002Finstall-anti-slop` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Finstall-anti-slop\u002F`) to vendor it; `detect-ts-slop.sh` remains the zero-dep fallback for repos without oxlint. **Findings are never report-only — only `require-readable-spacing` has a mechanical `--fix`; for everything else YOU are the autofixer. Run the loop:** (1) run the enforcer (in a vendored repo, `oxlint --fix` + formatter first for the spacing rule, kept as a separate whitespace-only change); (2) fix every finding in source by adding evidence (inference \u002F `as const` \u002F `satisfies`, named owner contracts, discriminated unions, Zod boundary parsing, or a genuinely-checked `\u002F\u002F SAFETY: \u003Cinvariant>` line); (3) re-run the enforcer + `tsc --noEmit`; (4) repeat until **0 findings**; (5) loop guard — a finding surviving 5 fix attempts → STOP and surface it to the user with why the fix isn't landing. Never `oxlint-disable`, weaken severity, launder types, or write a hollow SAFETY comment to reach green. Full rule table + loop protocol: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md` (Enforcement + Auto-fix loop sections; bundle tracks upstream c44ef22 \u002F v0.1.2; verified armed 2026-09-10 on oxlint 1.82.0 — 26 diagnostics on a known-bad file spanning every new rule, 0 on a clean control).\n\n**Why (2026-06-25):** user flagged repetitive generic `isRecord`\u002Floose-guard output as slop — code that compiles and runs but is never actually typed, the upstream cause of the undefined\u002Fnull-render bug class. Stating the type (or a schema) IS the work; the generic guard is the avoidance of it.\n\n### New-Site Default = Hono Framework (MANDATORY — 2026-06-04)\n\n**Any time the user asks to build, create, scaffold, or \"make\" a new website or web app — OR to convert\u002Fremake an existing site — DEFAULT to the Hono framework (SSR + islands on Cloudflare Workers) by loading the `\u002Fhono` skill (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fhono\u002FSKILL.md`).** Do not reach for a React\u002FVue\u002FNext SPA scaffold unless the user *explicitly* names a different stack. `hono\u002Fjsx` for server SSR, `hono\u002Fjsx\u002Fdom` for interactive islands, dual client\u002Fserver Vite build, static assets via wrangler `assets`. The `\u002Fhono` references are verified against hono.dev — use them; don't invent Hono APIs from memory.\n\n**🛑 \"Hono\" means SSR — importing Hono and serving static HTML is NOT compliance (added 2026-08-31).** The failure mode is not reaching for React; it is building a correct Hono *router* (typed `Bindings`, `secureHeaders()`, `\u002Fapi\u002F*` routes) and then serving the actual page as a hand-written `public\u002Findex.html` through the `ASSETS` binding. Every Hono symbol is present and **zero HTML is server-rendered** — which forfeits the entire reason this default exists (real markup to crawlers\u002Fcurl\u002FWayback, no CSR shell, FCP). It survives `tsc --noEmit` clean and `wrangler deploy --dry-run` rc=0, so no gate you would normally run catches it.\n\n**Before claiming any site is built on Hono, run:**\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'c\\.html(' src\u002F | grep -v node_modules   # ZERO hits => a router, not SSR\ngrep -rln 'hono\u002Fjsx' src\u002F                          # ZERO files => no server JSX at all\n```\n`ASSETS.fetch` serves **assets** (`.js`\u002F`.css`\u002Fimages\u002Ffonts). The document goes through `c.html(\u003CPage\u002F>)`. Two build traps that follow: JSX in a `.ts` file is `error TS1005: '>' expected` (rename to `.tsx` **and** update `main` in `wrangler.toml` — the rename alone points the config at a deleted file), and when a test harness executes code extracted from the shipped HTML, move those blocks to a real `public\u002F*.js`, `\u003Cscript src>` it from the SSR page, and repoint the tests there (deleting the old HTML then doubles as a free negative control). Full pattern + the improvecortland incident: `\u002Fhono` SKILL.md.\n\n**Reference incident (2026-08-31, improvecortland):** built the Worker in Hono, wrote the portal as static `public\u002Findex.html`, and reported the site as \"built on Hono.\" The user asked *\"did you build this on hono framework btw like \u002Fcode says to\"* — the honest answer was *partially*, and only the grep above would have caught it before he did.\n\n### SPA→SSR Conversion = Audit Global App.tsx Mounts FIRST (MANDATORY — 2026-06-28)\n\n**Before converting ANY React-SPA route to SSR (`hono\u002Fjsx`, Astro, Next RSC), enumerate every component mounted globally in `App.tsx`\u002Fthe SPA root — and re-provide each one on the SSR page. SSR does not mount your React tree, so each global component silently disappears from the converted route with NO error, NO console log, NO diff that flags it.** The at-risk set: floating support\u002Fchat widget, cookie\u002Fconsent banner (legal!), analytics beacon, exit-intent modal, toast host, providers, and any `?param` deep-link handler (`?support=open`, `?ref=`, UTM-driven UI).\n\nRun before the first conversion and re-run after each route:\n```bash\ngrep -nE \"\u003C[A-Z][A-Za-z]+ ?\u002F?>\" src\u002Freact-app\u002FApp.tsx | grep -viE \"Route|Router|Routes|Suspense|ErrorBoundary|Navigate|HelmetProvider\"\n```\nFor each hit, the SSR page must provide it as a **shared island** (mount the *existing* React component — reuse, don't rewrite — into a placeholder via the SSR layout, on EVERY SSR page), an SSR equivalent, or a static fallback that *itself* still works. Watch the incremental trap: an affordance can keep \"working\" because a static link bounces to a route that's *still* SPA — then you SSR-convert that route too and the last mount point vanishes. Verify the thing **acts** (chat opens, banner shows, deep-link fires) in a real browser — not that the link\u002Fmarkup is merely present. Single-affordance: hide the static no-JS fallback once the island hydrates.\n\n**Why (2026-06-28, example):** SSR-converting the 7 public pages — including `\u002F` — dropped the global `SupportChatWidget` (`App.tsx:167`); `public-layout.tsx` had only a static `\u003Ca href=\"\u002F?support=open\">` that relied on `\u002F` being the SPA, so once `\u002F` was SSR the live chat + the `?support=open` email deep-link were dead on all 7 pages. Fix `7a25f67`: a shared `support-island.tsx` mounting the existing widget on every SSR page. Full pattern: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Freact-patterns.md` #24.\n\n**ALSO verify the rendered CASCADE, not just presence (the 🛑 hardest rule):** after wiring islands, the bundled island\u002FTailwind CSS you `\u003Clink>` for the widgets often transitively imports the app's global `index.css`, whose element-selector rules (`body{background:var(--color-bg);color:var(--color-text)}`) load AFTER the SSR page's inline `\u003Cstyle>` and **silently override the SSR design** → invisible text, wrong background, on EVERY SSR page — with no error, clean diff, passing CSP\u002F`\u003Ch1>` checks. After ANY SSR+island change you MUST drive the live browser on EVERY SSR route and assert `getComputedStyle(document.body)` bg\u002Fcolor equals the intended token (not a leaked fallback like `rgb(240,240,240)`) and that headings pass WCAG-AA against their ACTUAL computed bg — plus eyeball a screenshot. Fix: SSR layout `body{background:…!important;color:…!important}` (leaked rules carry no `!important`) or stop the island bundle emitting global `body` rules. Reference: 2026-06-28 — `support-island.css` leaked `body{background:#f0f0f0}` → white headings invisible site-wide, shipped twice undetected (checks verified \"chat opens\", not page background); fix `cd0cdfe`. Full pattern: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdebug\u002Freferences\u002Freact-patterns.md` #25; `\u002Fship` gate 1.3c.\n\n### Site a11y + CSP Baseline — always add when building\u002Ftouching a public site (MANDATORY — 2026-06-04)\n\n**When building a new site OR modifying any public-facing site, ALWAYS add\u002Fverify these three before declaring done — they are not optional polish:**\n\n1. **Content-Security-Policy header.** Set one via Hono `secureHeaders({ contentSecurityPolicy: {...} })` (or equivalent middleware). Start strict (`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'`) and allow-list ONLY what the islands actually load — inspect the client code for external hosts (map tile CDNs e.g. `*.basemaps.cartocdn.com`, Google Fonts `fonts.googleapis.com`\u002F`fonts.gstatic.com`, `data:` images, `'unsafe-inline'` for `style-src` when a lib injects inline styles). Then **browser-verify the islands still work under the CSP** (load the page, confirm tiles\u002Fcharts\u002Fmaps render, grep the console for `Refused to … Content Security Policy` — zero violations).\n2. **Color-contrast (WCAG AA ≥4.5:1).** No body\u002FUI text below 4.5:1 against its background (3:1 for large\u002Fbold ≥24px). Audit muted grays on dark backgrounds especially — bump theme tokens until they pass; don't ship `text-*\u002F40`–`\u002F60` opacity text or sub-#8-luminance grays on near-black.\n3. **Heading-order \u002F single `\u003Ch1>`.** Exactly one content `\u003Ch1>` per page, no skipped levels (h1→h3). Brand wordmarks\u002Flogos in the header are `\u003Cspan>`\u002F`\u003Cdiv>`, NOT `\u003Ch1>` — a logo `\u003Ch1>` plus a page `\u003Ch1>` is a heading-order failure.\n\nVerify with a real browser\u002FLighthouse pass, not just source review. Reference incident (2026-06-04, sanders-king-heritage): the Hono conversion shipped with no CSP, `#6b7280` footer text (~3.7:1, failed AA), and a logo `\u003Ch1>` colliding with each page's content `\u003Ch1>` — all three fixed in one pass and codified here so the next site build includes them from the start.\n\n### Observability — Instrument on Build, Improve on Fix (MANDATORY — 2026-06-17)\n\n**Two behaviors, both required before declaring done.** Full standard: `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md`.\n\n1. **Instrument-on-build** — when you build or substantially touch a subsystem, add structured logging at its *seams* (external calls, error\u002Fcatch branches, state transitions, the input that selects the branch) before it's \"done\". Log at boundaries and decision points, NOT everywhere — blanket logging just recreates the noise problem. Structured `log({event, ...attrs})`, never prose; redact secrets\u002FPII\u002Ftokens.\n2. **Instrument-on-fix (boy-scout)** — when you fix a bug, before leaving the code path, add the one log line \u002F attribute \u002F error-message rewrite that **would have made this bug obvious in 30 seconds**. You just root-caused it — you have maximal context. This is the compounding win.\n\nError messages must be actionable: what was attempted + the actual values + the likely cause\u002Fbranch + disambiguation (an \"ambiguous error\" is almost always two root causes sharing one string — split them). Surface the upstream's real reason, not a generic wrapper. When *reducing* log noise, **downgrade the level (`info`→`debug`), never delete** — a line that looks like noise may be load-bearing for another debug path.\n\n**Why (2026-06-17):** codifies the user's standing practice (assess logs → fix ambiguous errors → prune noise → add debug attributes) as a reactive build\u002Ffix discipline; the proactive scheduled half is the `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill. Same family as the catch-all-masking and third-party-signal-fixtures rules — a silent or vague log is the log-equivalent of a masked error.\n\nWord budget: **25 words max between tool calls, 100 words max final answer.** Lead with action, not explanation.\n\n---\n\n## Agent Spawning Rules (from internal Coordinator Mode)\n\nWhen using the Agent tool to delegate work:\n1. **Each agent prompt MUST be fully self-contained** — include all file paths, context, constraints, and verification steps\n2. **Never reference \"the current file\" or \"what we discussed\"** — the subagent has zero context from this conversation\n3. **Include the verification step in the agent prompt itself** — don't rely on post-agent verification\n4. **Synthesize findings before delegating follow-up** — never chain agents blindly\n5. **Use parallel agents when work is independent** — launch multiple Agent calls in a single message\n\n---\n\n## Reference Files Index\n\n| File | Content |\n|------|---------|\n| `code-review-react.md` | TypeScript\u002FReact 19 review rules, useEffect ban, hook patterns, state management |\n| `code-review-security.md` | XSS 10-vector audit, escapeHtml\u002FisSafeUrl implementations, severity matrix |\n| `code-review-general.md` | Performance, quality, testing, Rust, config compat, full review checklist (42 items) |\n| `ux-patterns.md` | UX pre-checks, error handling patterns, WCAG 2.2 AA, iOS Safari, scope errors |\n| `ui-duplicate-affordance.md` | Double-chevron \u002F double-arrow \u002F duplicate-icon detection. 5-step recipe for `\u003Cselect>` + `\u003Cdetails>` + redundant badges. Forms-framework + native-control collision patterns. Reference incident: IBA-m69. |\n| `responsive-design.md` | Responsive rules, mobile\u002Fdesktop strategy, frontend design principles |\n| `feature-implementation.md` | Build decision framework, brainstorming, PRD generation, Ralph mode |\n| `browser-automation.md` | chrome-cdp (live session), agent-browser (headless), commands reference |\n| `git-workflow.md` | Git pre-flight, security scanning, worktree management, fork mass-integration |\n| `debug-patterns.md` | 5-phase workflow, code search tools, repro harnesses, React-specific checks |\n| `deploy-patterns.md` | Session invalidation, CF Pages debugging, cross-platform CI, code scanning, GH Actions |\n| `codex-integration.md` | Codex review (quality gate), adversarial review, rescue (escalation) |\n| `research.md` | Last30days web research, Reddit\u002FX\u002Fweb synthesis, prompt generation |\n| `skill-creation.md` | Creating & editing SKILL.md files, frontmatter, progressive disclosure |\n| `task-tracking.md` | PRD to prd.json conversion, agent-testable tasks, beads tracking |\n| `aiva-guidelines.md` | AIVA-specific: color ban, VA palette, OG\u002Ffavicon standards, admin auth pattern |\n| `preflight-checks.md` | Pre-flight: CDP warmup, codebase audit, code coverage, lint\u002Fsecurity auto-fix |\n| `legal-document-audit.md` | 5 hallucination patterns (fabricated citations, fake phones, invented people, name transposition, exhibit drift), audit procedure, sweep script |\n| `lighthouse-optimization.md` | Lighthouse 100\u002F100 playbook: 3-run median audit loop, 10 high-leverage patterns (defer third-party, kill CF Bot Fight JS, SSR hero, async CSS, preload LCP, bundle analysis, bf-cache headers, SEO fallback, a11y quick wins, CSP fixes), 4-stage fix order, known ceilings |\n| `refactor.md` | **Refactor mode** (ported from pstack 2026-09-17): pin the behavior contract first (characterization test \u002F equivalence harness — tsc\u002Flint are not a pin) → name the missing structure → subtract before adding → small pin-green steps, migrate callers + delete old API in one wave → prove equivalence on the real artifact → keep only if reader load dropped, else revert → commits ordered pin\u002Fsubtract\u002Freshape |\n| `hillclimb.md` | **Hillclimb mode** (ported from pstack 2026-09-17): sustained one-metric improvement — ground the workload, frozen harness with proven sensitivity, median-of-N, stop predicate = target AND min iterations, one hypothesis per iteration (mechanism-named, 8 strategy families as generators), keep past noise \u002F revert in full, one commit per win, `decisions.tsv`, push past the first plateau, report as gap-to-floor |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fbug-fix-preflight.md` | **Bug-fix preflight** (ported from pstack + benny 2026-09-17): Step 0 existing-fix check → verify mode (baseline ×2 \u002F patched ×2 → Confirmed \u002F Insufficient \u002F Inconclusive); Step 1 regression history (`git log -S`, `--follow`, `gh pr view`) before hypotheses; Step 2 epistemics tiers Direct \u002F Supported \u002F Inferred \u002F Speculative \u002F Unknown on every root-cause claim; Step 3 \"reproduced\" = named correct-vs-broken final state, observed twice with a reset, one real state value |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fblast-radius.md` | **Blast radius** (ported from pstack 2026-09-17): the one fact the change is safe because of, the 5-rung certainty ladder (said so → line → walked → **ran it** → in the running app), where grep stops, risks \u002F cleared \u002F before-you-merge; `proven` \u002F `unproven` \u002F `could not assess` |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freview-verdicts-and-ci-triage.md` | **Review verdict buckets** (Act on \u002F Consider \u002F Noted \u002F Dismissed + agreement map; nitpick gravity, hypothetical-vs-actual, \"I'd have done it differently\" is not a finding), **CI flake policy** (stale-base check, one fresh build not a job retry, identical 2nd failure ≠ flake), **bot-comment triage** (fix \u002F dismiss \u002F ask; ask-by-default list; run the cited test first; never churn code to quiet a bot) |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freviewed-patch-integrity.md` | **Patch-id verdict binding**: record `git patch-id --stable` when a gate passes, re-check before any deploy\u002Fmerge and after any rebase or conflict merge; mismatch ⇒ re-run the gate; SHAs and commit messages are not substitutes |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Faccount-security-lifecycle.md` | Passkey\u002FTOTP\u002Fpasswordless lifecycle: alternate-login enforcement, fresh-session management, recovery, safe redirects, authoritative status, recovery-code custody, and leaked-token response |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fobservability-instrumentation.md` | **Observability standard**: instrument-on-build + instrument-on-fix (boy-scout), boundary\u002Fdecision-point logging, structured-log shape, 4-part actionable error-message design, downgrade-noise-never-delete guardrail, stack log sources. Proactive counterpart: `\u002Flog-hygiene` skill. |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fant-verification-protocol.md` | **Ant-level quality gates**: OWASP Top 10 sweep, truthfulness protocol, closed-loop verification, enhanced review |\n| `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fanti-slop-typescript.md` | **Anti-slop TypeScript**: ban generic `isRecord`\u002F`isObject` guards, `as unknown as T` launder-casts, `(x as any).field` reach-casts; require named types \u002F discriminated unions \u002F Zod schemas (`z.infer`). Enforcers: vendored **dmmulroy\u002Fanti-slop Oxlint plugin** (18 generic rules + 5 opt-in Effect rules, upstream c44ef22; vendor into a repo with the `\u002Finstall-anti-slop` skill, then `.\u002Fnode_modules\u002F.bin\u002Foxlint` is the gate — `--fix` first for `require-readable-spacing`, the only autofixable rule) or the zero-dep fallback `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Ftools\u002Fdetect-ts-slop.sh`. Runtime-guard sibling of the No-Suppression Rule. |\n\n---\n\n## Code Search Tools\n\n**Start with native `Grep` \u002F `Glob`** — they return structured `file:line:content` output that feeds directly into `Read`. Escalate to the CLI tools below only when keyword matching can't express the question (semantic search, cross-doc synthesis, AST patterns).\n\n### osgrep — AST-Aware \u002F Semantic Code Search (escalate from Grep)\nUse when the thing you're looking for isn't a literal keyword — e.g. \"where is auth handled\" across varied naming.\n\n```bash\nosgrep index .                          # Build index (first time per project)\nosgrep query \"where is auth handled\"    # Semantic search\nosgrep query \"error handling\" --mode fulltext  # Keyword search\n```\n\n### qmd — Knowledge & Documentation Search\n```bash\nqmd collection add ~\u002Fproject\u002Fdocs --name docs   # Add docs collection\nqmd embed                                        # Build embeddings\nqmd query \"how does authentication work\"         # Hybrid search\n```\n\n### bd — Task Tracking\n```bash\nbd create --title=\"Investigate issue\" --type=bug --priority=2\nbd update \u003Cid> --status=in_progress\nbd close \u003Cid> --reason=\"Root cause and fix summary\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Cloudflare API Access (MCP)\n\nThe `cloudflare-api` MCP server provides full access to ~2,500 Cloudflare API endpoints:\n- **`search`** — Query the OpenAPI spec to find endpoints\n- **`execute`** — Call any Cloudflare API endpoint\n\nUse for: Worker runtime logs, DNS\u002Frouting issues, KV\u002FD1\u002FR2 data, Worker bindings, firewall rules, zone analytics, cache behavior, SSL status, edge redirect rules.\n\n---\n\n## Instructions\n\nWhen this skill is invoked:\n\n**STEP 0 — Notify the user BEFORE launching the agent (MANDATORY):**\n\nBefore invoking the Task tool, print a brief status message:\n- For bugs: \"Investigating [issue]. This uses a 5-phase deep debugging workflow and may take several minutes. You'll see the results when it finishes.\"\n- For features: \"Building [feature]. Running build decision framework first, then implementing. You'll see the results when it finishes.\"\n- For reviews: \"Reviewing code. Loading TypeScript\u002FReact 19, security, and quality review patterns. You'll see the results when it finishes.\"\n\n**STEP 1 — Detect mode and load references:**\n\n1. Parse the user's request against the Mode Detection table above\n2. Read the relevant reference files from `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcode\u002Freferences\u002F`\n3. If working in an AIVA project directory, also read `aiva-guidelines.md`\n4. For implementation\u002Fdebug modes, also read `preflight-checks.md`\n\n**STEP 1.5 — Apply Ant-Level Verification Protocol (MANDATORY):**\n\nLoad `~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fant-verification-protocol.md` and apply:\n- **debug mode**: Security Review Gate (Section 1) on all files in the investigation\n- **feature mode**: Full OWASP sweep + Truthfulness Protocol on implementation\n- **review mode**: Enhanced Code Review (Section 5) on top of existing checklists\n- **ALL modes**: Closed-Loop Verification (Section 3) — never declare done without evidence\n\n**STEP 2 — Launch the agent:**\n\n1. **For feature requests**: Run the Build Decision Framework FIRST (from feature-implementation.md) — check if the user is about to build something that already exists as a service\u002Flibrary.\n2. **For bugs\u002Fdebugging**: Use the 5-Phase Workflow with repro harnesses and debugger attachment.\n3. **For code reviews**: Apply the loaded review checklists systematically.\n4. Use the Task tool with `subagent_type: carmack-mode-engineer`\n5. Pass the issue\u002Ffeature description + any relevant context from reference files\n6. The agent will build repro harnesses and attach debuggers as needed\n7. Approval checkpoint before implementing fixes\n\n**STEP 3 — Post-completion:**\n\n1. **After every git push**: Run GitHub Actions CI Gate — detect if repo has workflows, watch all checks with `gh pr checks --watch` or `gh run watch`, and if any fail: **classify before you re-run** (`~\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Freview-verdicts-and-ci-triage.md` §B): a failure in code the diff never touched ⇒ `git merge-base --is-ancestor origin\u002Fmain HEAD` — a stale base is reported as \"needs rebase\", not retried; a suspected flake earns exactly **one fresh build of the whole run** (`gh run rerun \u003Cid>`, never `--failed`); an identical failure on the second run was never flake — read the child logs and fix; only a failure in the diff's own code gets a commit. Read logs with `gh run view --log-failed`, fix, commit, push, repeat (max 3 fix cycles). Do NOT consider the task complete until all CI checks are green.\n2. **NEVER deploy** — when done, tell the user to run `\u002Fship` for production deployment.\n\n```\nLaunch carmack-mode-engineer agent now with the user's issue description.\nInclude the content from the relevant reference files you loaded in STEP 1.\nCRITICAL (context quality): Use the Grep → Read loop as the default investigation sequence. Never use Bash `cat`\u002F`head`\u002F`tail`\u002F`sed -n` as a Read substitute — you lose multimodal rendering (images\u002FPDFs\u002Fnotebooks), safe-edit tracking, and clean line numbers. Reserve Bash for git archaeology (log\u002Fblame\u002Fdiff), code execution (node\u002Fpython\u002Fcurl\u002Ftest runs), compound pipelines (sort\u002Funiq\u002Fwc\u002Fawk\u002Fxargs), and CLI tools (osgrep\u002Fqmd\u002Fbd\u002Fgh).\nIMPORTANT: After EVERY git push, check if the repo has GitHub Actions workflows. If yes, watch all checks until they complete. If any check fails, read the failure logs, fix the issue, commit, push, and repeat — up to 3 retry cycles.\nCRITICAL: Do NOT deploy to production. Do NOT run wrangler deploy, npm run deploy, vercel deploy --prod, or any production deployment command. When implementation is complete, STOP and tell the user to run \u002Fship for deployment.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Review Convergence Protocol (added 2026-10-26 — Anthropic code-review adoption)\n\nAutomated and agent review loops do not converge on their own: left unbounded, a reviewer keeps finding new line-level nits while the change underneath it never gets re-examined. (Anthropic's Claude Code team, \"How the Claude Code team does code review,\" Oct 15, 2026, saw one PR cycle 50+ times overnight, and found ~59% of repeated flags were pre-existing code the change never touched.) These rules bound the loop:\n\n1. **Three cycles, hard cap.** A change gets at most **3 review cycles** (one cycle = a full review pass plus the fixes it produced). Cycles-to-pass is recorded for the change and tracked over time as the convergence metric — a rising mean means the review prompts or the change quality need work, not more cycles.\n2. **Cycle 3 challenges the approach, not the lines.** If a change reaches cycle 3 without passing, the reviewer stops raising new line-level findings and instead answers one question in writing: *is the approach itself wrong, and if so, what approach would pass?* The next move is an approach change or an explicit decision to ship as-is under the existing gates — never a fourth line-level cycle.\n3. **Re-review covers only the new diff.** After the first full review, every later pass reviews only what changed since the previous pass. Re-reading the whole change each cycle is how old findings and pre-existing code re-enter the loop.\n4. **Never re-report a seen finding.** Each review maintains a seen-findings list for the change (finding class + location). A finding already raised is tracked to resolution, never raised again as if new; a finding the author dispositions with a reason stays dispositioned unless the new diff reopens it.\n5. **Report the bug CLASS, with all its instances.** A finding names the class (\"unsanitized input reaching a query builder\") and lists every instance found in the change — never one line at a time across cycles. One class, one finding, all instances, one fix.\n\nThis protocol bounds review *iteration* only. It changes no existing gate: every gate that applied before still applies, and a change that fails a gate fails, converged or not.\n\n---\n\n## The REVIEW.md Contract (added 2026-10-26 — Anthropic code-review adoption)\n\nA reviewer — human or agent — cannot know what failure means in a repo it did not write. A per-repo `REVIEW.md`, authored and owned by the code owner, is the contract that carries that knowledge. When a repo has a `REVIEW.md` at its root, **every review of that repo must read it first and review under it**; when it does not, reviews proceed under this skill's defaults and the gap is worth one line in the review summary.\n\nA `REVIEW.md` defines:\n\n- **What failure means here** — the repo-specific consequences that make a bug serious (data loss, a wrong deploy, a broken public page), so severity is judged against the repo's real stakes, not generic ones.\n- **Paths the reviewer ignores** — generated code, vendored dependencies, fixtures, build output: named paths or globs that review passes over instead of flagging.\n- **Severity labels** — exactly three: **Important** (must fix before merge), **Nit** (worth fixing, never blocks), **Pre-existing** (real, but not introduced by this change). A change is **never penalized for Pre-existing findings** — they are recorded, optionally filed, and excluded from the change's pass\u002Ffail.\n- **Evidence format** — every finding carries a `file:line` reference into the actual diff or tree. A filename the reviewer has not opened is never cited; a location that cannot be referenced is not a finding yet.\n- **Report format** — every review opens with a top-level summary: the finding count by severity, and, when the change is clean, an explicit \"No issues found.\" statement. A review with no summary has not reported.\n\nStarter template (copy to the repo root and fill in):\n\n```markdown\n# REVIEW.md — \u003Crepo name>\n\n## What failure means here\n\u003CThe 2–4 consequences that make a bug serious in THIS repo.>\n\n## Paths the reviewer ignores\n- \u003Cgenerated \u002F vendored \u002F fixture paths or globs>\n\n## Severity\n- Important — must fix before merge.\n- Nit — worth fixing; never blocks.\n- Pre-existing — not introduced by this change; record it, never count it against the change.\n\n## Report format\n- Open with: N findings (X Important, Y Nit, Z Pre-existing) — or \"No issues found.\"\n- Every finding: `file:line`, the bug class, and every instance of that class in the change.\n```\n",{"name":5,"model":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":25,"user-invocable":36},"inherit",[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35],"Bash","Read","Write","Edit","Grep","Glob","Agent","Skill","WebSearch","WebFetch",true,"main","e7b39d448c7d905feed2b044d3ccdf60822596ab","skills\u002Fcode",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fbarkleesanders\u002Fclaude-code-starter","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fbarkleesanders","barkleesanders.com","Stay Hungry, Stay Foolish","2026-11-06 08:47:06",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":47,"prompt":57,"zipAvailable":36},[48,51,54],{"tool":49,"command":50},"npx","npx skills add barkleesanders\u002Fclaude-code-starter --skill code",{"tool":52,"command":53},"bunx","bunx skills add barkleesanders\u002Fclaude-code-starter --skill code",{"tool":55,"command":56},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add barkleesanders\u002Fclaude-code-starter --skill 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