[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7AR7EEDFDYMF6XK3RW7NZKX":3,"skill-same:01M7AR7EEDFDYMF6XK3RW7NZKX":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7AR7EEDFDYMF6XK3RW7NZKX","polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions",null,"Use for institutional design questions: constitutional design and the trade-offs each choice locks in, electoral systems in practice and how proportional and majoritarian rules shape party systems, executives and legislatures including presidential versus parliamentary trade-offs, federalism and multi-level government, and courts and judicial review.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpolitical-science-human-systems-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fpolisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions\ndescription: \"Use for institutional design questions: constitutional design and the trade-offs each choice locks in, electoral systems in practice and how proportional and majoritarian rules shape party systems, executives and legislatures including presidential versus parliamentary trade-offs, federalism and multi-level government, and courts and judicial review.\"\n---\n\n# Political Science and Governance: Constitutional Design, Electoral Systems in Practice, Executives and Legislatures, Federalism, and Courts and Judicial Review\n\n> **Part 3 of 6** of the *Political Science, Human Systems and Governance* reference (plugin `political-science-human-systems-governance`), covering §9–§13. Sibling skills: `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory` (§0–§4), `polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting` (§5–§8), `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization` (§14–§18), `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems` (§19–§25), `polisci-reference` (§26–§31). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** The theory is stable. Two areas are live. See §26 → `polisci-reference` for current democracy measurement, and the scholarly dispute about whether those measurements are reliable.\n\n> **⚠️ A note on how this document handles contested questions.** ⚠️ **Political science\n> contains robust empirical findings, contested empirical findings, and normative\n> disputes that evidence cannot settle. This document tries to say which is which** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`),\n> **and where a question is genuinely contested it presents the strongest version of more\n> than one position rather than picking.** ⚠️ **Where I report a finding, I attribute it;\n> where scholars disagree, I say so.**\n>\n> **Complements a civil\u002Findustrial engineering reference (institutions as accumulated\n> failure logs), a pedagogy reference (evidence quality in social science), and an\n> economics-adjacent treatment of collective action.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the results that are counterintuitive or routinely misstated.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this document:**\n> 1. **⚠️ COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS are the discipline's deepest structure** (§5–§6 → `polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting`).\n>    **Individually rational behaviour producing collectively bad outcomes explains\n>    government, taxation, regulation, unions, cartels and treaties — and Ostrom's work\n>    showed the standard remedies are not the only ones.**\n> 2. **⚠️ INSTITUTIONS SHAPE BEHAVIOUR, and the effects are often perverse** (§9–§15 → `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization`).\n>    **Electoral rules, veto points and federal structures produce predictable\n>    consequences that designers frequently did not intend.**\n> 3. **⚠️ MEASUREMENT IS THE FIELD'S BINDING CONSTRAINT** (§25 → `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems`, §26 → `polisci-reference`). **Most interesting\n>    political concepts — democracy, power, legitimacy, polarization — are hard to measure,\n>    and disputes that look substantive are often measurement disputes underneath.**\n\n---\n\n## §9. Constitutional Design\n\n**⚠️ Constitutions do three things: constitute institutions, allocate powers, and entrench\nconstraints against ordinary majorities.**\n**⚠️ Key choices**: ⚠️ **codified vs uncodified; rigid vs flexible amendment rules\n(⚠️ a constitution too hard to amend gets changed by judicial reinterpretation instead);\nenumerated rights and whether they're justiciable; emergency powers (⚠️ historically the\nmost abused provision in any constitution); and the vexed question of unamendable clauses.**\n**⚠️ Separation of powers vs FUSION** — ⚠️ **and note that Westminster systems fuse\nexecutive and legislature deliberately, which produces decisive government and weaker\nlegislative checks.**\n**⚠️ Veto players theory (Tsebelis)** is one of the more useful generalizations: ⚠️ **the\nmore actors whose agreement is required, and the more ideologically distant they are, the\nharder policy change becomes.** **⚠️ This is a trade-off, not a defect — stability and\nadaptability pull against each other.**\n**⚠️ Constitutional design in divided societies**: ⚠️ **CONSOCIATIONALISM (Lijphart —\ngrand coalitions, group autonomy, proportionality, mutual veto) versus CENTRIPETALISM\n(Horowitz — electoral incentives for cross-group appeals).** **⚠️ Both have real cases and\nreal failures, and the dispute is unresolved.**\n\n---\n\n## §10. Electoral Systems in Practice\n\n**⚠️ The consequences of the choices in §8 → `polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting`, empirically:**\n⚠️ **PR systems produce more parties, more coalition governments, higher women's\nrepresentation on average, and broader ideological range; majoritarian systems produce\nclearer accountability, more decisive government, and more disproportionality.**\n**⚠️ District magnitude is the single most important variable** — ⚠️ **more seats per\ndistrict means more proportionality, regardless of formula.**\n**⚠️ Thresholds** trade fragmentation against inclusion.\n**⚠️ Which is BETTER is a normative question** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`): ⚠️ **it depends whether you value\naccountability and decisiveness or representativeness and inclusion, and reasonable people\nweigh these differently.**\n\n---\n\n## §11. Executives and Legislatures\n\n```\n⚠️ PARLIAMENTARY  executive drawn from and accountable to the\n   legislature; ⚠️ can be removed by confidence vote — flexible\n⚠️ PRESIDENTIAL  ⚠️ separate origin and survival; fixed terms\n⚠️ SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL  ⚠️ dual executive; cohabitation problems\n```\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — LINZ'S \"PERILS OF PRESIDENTIALISM\" is influential and CONTESTED, and it is\n> worth knowing both halves.** ⚠️ **Linz argued presidentialism is more prone to breakdown:\n> dual democratic legitimacy creates irresolvable deadlock, fixed terms are rigid, and\n> winner-take-all raises the stakes.**\n> **⚠️ The counterarguments are substantive: the correlation may be confounded (⚠️ most\n> presidential systems are in Latin America, sharing other risk factors), the United States\n> is a long-lived counterexample, and later work argues the electoral and party system\n> matters more than the executive type.** ⚠️ **Treat it as a live debate, not a settled\n> result.**\n\n**⚠️ Legislature functions**: **representation, legislation, oversight, budget, and\nlegitimation.**\n**⚠️ Bicameralism** — ⚠️ **and the real question is whether the second chamber is\n\"congruent\" (same basis of representation, adding delay) or \"incongruent\" (different\nbasis, adding a genuine veto player).**\n**⚠️ Committee systems** distinguish strong legislatures from weak ones far more reliably\nthan formal powers do.\n\n---\n\n## §12. Federalism\n\n**⚠️ Divided sovereignty by territory, and the design questions are: what's allocated to\nwhom, how fiscal resources are split, and who arbitrates.**\n**⚠️ The standard arguments FOR**: ⚠️ **accommodating diversity, bringing government closer\nto the governed, policy experimentation (\"laboratories\"), and an additional check on\ncentral power.**\n**⚠️ The standard arguments AGAINST**: ⚠️ **inequality between units, coordination failure\nand races to the bottom, duplication, and — historically significant — federalism as a\ndevice for entrenching local domination against national reform.**\n**⚠️ FISCAL FEDERALISM is where it bites**: ⚠️ **vertical fiscal imbalance (the level that\nspends is not the level that raises), equalization transfers, and the accountability\nproblem when responsibility is shared.**\n**⚠️ Subsidiarity** as the organizing principle: ⚠️ **decide at the lowest level capable of\nhandling it — easy to state, contested in every application.**\n\n---\n\n## §13. Courts and Judicial Review\n\n**⚠️ The COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY is the central problem**: ⚠️ **why should\nunelected judges overturn the decisions of elected bodies?**\n**⚠️ The main answers, presented as positions:**\n```\n⚠️ RIGHTS PROTECTION  some things should be beyond majority reach\n⚠️ PRECOMMITMENT  the people bind themselves in advance,\n   Ulysses-and-the-mast\n⚠️ REPRESENTATION-REINFORCING (Ely)  ⚠️ courts should intervene\n   where the democratic process itself is blocked\n⚠️ POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM  ⚠️ the objection: rights disputes\n   are reasonable disagreements, and legislatures are the\n   legitimate forum (Waldron). ⚠️ A serious position, not a\n   fringe one\n```\n**⚠️ Institutional variants**: **strong-form review (US), weak-form or dialogue models\n(⚠️ the Canadian notwithstanding clause, the UK declaration of incompatibility), and\ncentralized constitutional courts (the European model) versus diffuse review.**\n**⚠️ Judicial independence** depends on appointment method, tenure, budget control and\ncompliance norms — ⚠️ **and court-packing, jurisdiction-stripping and non-compliance are\nthe standard levers used against it.**\n**⚠️ Interpretive methods** (⚠️ textualism, originalism, purposive, living constitution)\n⚠️ **are themselves contested along lines that track political disagreement, which is part\nof why judicial appointments became politically salient.**\n","# Political Science and Governance: Constitutional Design, Electoral Systems in Practice, Executives and Legislatures, Federalism, and Courts and Judicial Review\n\n> **Part 3 of 6** of the *Political Science, Human Systems and Governance* reference (plugin `political-science-human-systems-governance`), covering §9–§13. Sibling skills: `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory` (§0–§4), `polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting` (§5–§8), `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization` (§14–§18), `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems` (§19–§25), `polisci-reference` (§26–§31). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** The theory is stable. Two areas are live. See §26 → `polisci-reference` for current democracy measurement, and the scholarly dispute about whether those measurements are reliable.\n\n> **⚠️ A note on how this document handles contested questions.** ⚠️ **Political science\n> contains robust empirical findings, contested empirical findings, and normative\n> disputes that evidence cannot settle. This document tries to say which is which** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`),\n> **and where a question is genuinely contested it presents the strongest version of more\n> than one position rather than picking.** ⚠️ **Where I report a finding, I attribute it;\n> where scholars disagree, I say so.**\n>\n> **Complements a civil\u002Findustrial engineering reference (institutions as accumulated\n> failure logs), a pedagogy reference (evidence quality in social science), and an\n> economics-adjacent treatment of collective action.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the results that are counterintuitive or routinely misstated.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this document:**\n> 1. **⚠️ COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS are the discipline's deepest structure** (§5–§6 → `polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting`).\n>    **Individually rational behaviour producing collectively bad outcomes explains\n>    government, taxation, regulation, unions, cartels and treaties — and Ostrom's work\n>    showed the standard remedies are not the only ones.**\n> 2. **⚠️ INSTITUTIONS SHAPE BEHAVIOUR, and the effects are often perverse** (§9–§15 → `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization`).\n>    **Electoral rules, veto points and federal structures produce predictable\n>    consequences that designers frequently did not intend.**\n> 3. **⚠️ MEASUREMENT IS THE FIELD'S BINDING CONSTRAINT** (§25 → `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems`, §26 → `polisci-reference`). **Most interesting\n>    political concepts — democracy, power, legitimacy, polarization — are hard to measure,\n>    and disputes that look substantive are often measurement disputes underneath.**\n\n---\n\n## §9. Constitutional Design\n\n**⚠️ Constitutions do three things: constitute institutions, allocate powers, and entrench\nconstraints against ordinary majorities.**\n**⚠️ Key choices**: ⚠️ **codified vs uncodified; rigid vs flexible amendment rules\n(⚠️ a constitution too hard to amend gets changed by judicial reinterpretation instead);\nenumerated rights and whether they're justiciable; emergency powers (⚠️ historically the\nmost abused provision in any constitution); and the vexed question of unamendable clauses.**\n**⚠️ Separation of powers vs FUSION** — ⚠️ **and note that Westminster systems fuse\nexecutive and legislature deliberately, which produces decisive government and weaker\nlegislative checks.**\n**⚠️ Veto players theory (Tsebelis)** is one of the more useful generalizations: ⚠️ **the\nmore actors whose agreement is required, and the more ideologically distant they are, the\nharder policy change becomes.** **⚠️ This is a trade-off, not a defect — stability and\nadaptability pull against each other.**\n**⚠️ Constitutional design in divided societies**: ⚠️ **CONSOCIATIONALISM (Lijphart —\ngrand coalitions, group autonomy, proportionality, mutual veto) versus CENTRIPETALISM\n(Horowitz — electoral incentives for cross-group appeals).** **⚠️ Both have real cases and\nreal failures, and the dispute is unresolved.**\n\n---\n\n## §10. Electoral Systems in Practice\n\n**⚠️ The consequences of the choices in §8 → `polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting`, empirically:**\n⚠️ **PR systems produce more parties, more coalition governments, higher women's\nrepresentation on average, and broader ideological range; majoritarian systems produce\nclearer accountability, more decisive government, and more disproportionality.**\n**⚠️ District magnitude is the single most important variable** — ⚠️ **more seats per\ndistrict means more proportionality, regardless of formula.**\n**⚠️ Thresholds** trade fragmentation against inclusion.\n**⚠️ Which is BETTER is a normative question** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`): ⚠️ **it depends whether you value\naccountability and decisiveness or representativeness and inclusion, and reasonable people\nweigh these differently.**\n\n---\n\n## §11. Executives and Legislatures\n\n```\n⚠️ PARLIAMENTARY  executive drawn from and accountable to the\n   legislature; ⚠️ can be removed by confidence vote — flexible\n⚠️ PRESIDENTIAL  ⚠️ separate origin and survival; fixed terms\n⚠️ SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL  ⚠️ dual executive; cohabitation problems\n```\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — LINZ'S \"PERILS OF PRESIDENTIALISM\" is influential and CONTESTED, and it is\n> worth knowing both halves.** ⚠️ **Linz argued presidentialism is more prone to breakdown:\n> dual democratic legitimacy creates irresolvable deadlock, fixed terms are rigid, and\n> winner-take-all raises the stakes.**\n> **⚠️ The counterarguments are substantive: the correlation may be confounded (⚠️ most\n> presidential systems are in Latin America, sharing other risk factors), the United States\n> is a long-lived counterexample, and later work argues the electoral and party system\n> matters more than the executive type.** ⚠️ **Treat it as a live debate, not a settled\n> result.**\n\n**⚠️ Legislature functions**: **representation, legislation, oversight, budget, and\nlegitimation.**\n**⚠️ Bicameralism** — ⚠️ **and the real question is whether the second chamber is\n\"congruent\" (same basis of representation, adding delay) or \"incongruent\" (different\nbasis, adding a genuine veto player).**\n**⚠️ Committee systems** distinguish strong legislatures from weak ones far more reliably\nthan formal powers do.\n\n---\n\n## §12. Federalism\n\n**⚠️ Divided sovereignty by territory, and the design questions are: what's allocated to\nwhom, how fiscal resources are split, and who arbitrates.**\n**⚠️ The standard arguments FOR**: ⚠️ **accommodating diversity, bringing government closer\nto the governed, policy experimentation (\"laboratories\"), and an additional check on\ncentral power.**\n**⚠️ The standard arguments AGAINST**: ⚠️ **inequality between units, coordination failure\nand races to the bottom, duplication, and — historically significant — federalism as a\ndevice for entrenching local domination against national reform.**\n**⚠️ FISCAL FEDERALISM is where it bites**: ⚠️ **vertical fiscal imbalance (the level that\nspends is not the level that raises), equalization transfers, and the accountability\nproblem when responsibility is shared.**\n**⚠️ Subsidiarity** as the organizing principle: ⚠️ **decide at the lowest level capable of\nhandling it — easy to state, contested in every application.**\n\n---\n\n## §13. Courts and Judicial Review\n\n**⚠️ The COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY is the central problem**: ⚠️ **why should\nunelected judges overturn the decisions of elected bodies?**\n**⚠️ The main answers, presented as positions:**\n```\n⚠️ RIGHTS PROTECTION  some things should be beyond majority reach\n⚠️ PRECOMMITMENT  the people bind themselves in advance,\n   Ulysses-and-the-mast\n⚠️ REPRESENTATION-REINFORCING (Ely)  ⚠️ courts should intervene\n   where the democratic process itself is blocked\n⚠️ POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM  ⚠️ the objection: rights disputes\n   are reasonable disagreements, and legislatures are the\n   legitimate forum (Waldron). ⚠️ A serious position, not a\n   fringe one\n```\n**⚠️ Institutional variants**: **strong-form review (US), weak-form or dialogue models\n(⚠️ the Canadian notwithstanding clause, the UK declaration of incompatibility), and\ncentralized constitutional courts (the European model) versus diffuse review.**\n**⚠️ Judicial independence** depends on appointment method, tenure, budget control and\ncompliance norms — ⚠️ **and court-packing, jurisdiction-stripping and non-compliance are\nthe standard levers used against it.**\n**⚠️ Interpretive methods** (⚠️ textualism, originalism, purposive, living constitution)\n⚠️ **are themselves contested along lines that track political disagreement, which is part\nof why judicial appointments became politically salient.**\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpolitical-science-human-systems-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fpolisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpolitical-science-human-systems-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fpolisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]