[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7AR771HHXVGGFWHFFMAT6GQ":3,"skill-same:01M7AR771HHXVGGFWHFFMAT6GQ":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7AR771HHXVGGFWHFFMAT6GQ","polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting",null,"Use for the formal core that generalises well beyond politics: collective action problems and free riding, the commons and Ostrom's correction showing when communities do successfully self-govern, social choice including Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility results and what they actually rule out, and voting systems with their real properties and failure modes.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpolitical-science-human-systems-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fpolisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting\ndescription: \"Use for the formal core that generalises well beyond politics: collective action problems and free riding, the commons and Ostrom's correction showing when communities do successfully self-govern, social choice including Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility results and what they actually rule out, and voting systems with their real properties and failure modes.\"\n---\n\n# Political Science and Governance: Collective Action Problems, the Commons and Ostrom's Correction, Social Choice, and Voting Systems\n\n> **Part 2 of 6** of the *Political Science, Human Systems and Governance* reference (plugin `political-science-human-systems-governance`), covering §5–§8. Sibling skills: `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory` (§0–§4), `polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions` (§9–§13), `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization` (§14–§18), `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems` (§19–§25), `polisci-reference` (§26–§31). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** The theory is stable. Two areas are live. See §26 → `polisci-reference` for current democracy measurement, and the scholarly dispute about whether those measurements are reliable.\n\n> **⚠️ A note on how this document handles contested questions.** ⚠️ **Political science\n> contains robust empirical findings, contested empirical findings, and normative\n> disputes that evidence cannot settle. This document tries to say which is which** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`),\n> **and where a question is genuinely contested it presents the strongest version of more\n> than one position rather than picking.** ⚠️ **Where I report a finding, I attribute it;\n> where scholars disagree, I say so.**\n>\n> **Complements a civil\u002Findustrial engineering reference (institutions as accumulated\n> failure logs), a pedagogy reference (evidence quality in social science), and an\n> economics-adjacent treatment of collective action.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the results that are counterintuitive or routinely misstated.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this document:**\n> 1. **⚠️ COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS are the discipline's deepest structure** (§5–§6).\n>    **Individually rational behaviour producing collectively bad outcomes explains\n>    government, taxation, regulation, unions, cartels and treaties — and Ostrom's work\n>    showed the standard remedies are not the only ones.**\n> 2. **⚠️ INSTITUTIONS SHAPE BEHAVIOUR, and the effects are often perverse** (§9–§15 → `polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions`, `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization`).\n>    **Electoral rules, veto points and federal structures produce predictable\n>    consequences that designers frequently did not intend.**\n> 3. **⚠️ MEASUREMENT IS THE FIELD'S BINDING CONSTRAINT** (§25 → `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems`, §26 → `polisci-reference`). **Most interesting\n>    political concepts — democracy, power, legitimacy, polarization — are hard to measure,\n>    and disputes that look substantive are often measurement disputes underneath.**\n\n---\n\n## §5. ⚠️ Collective Action Problems\n\n> **⚠️ The deepest structure in the discipline: situations where individually rational\n> behaviour produces collectively worse outcomes for everyone.**\n```\n⚠️ PRISONER'S DILEMMA  ⚠️ defection dominates individually,\n   mutual cooperation is better for both. ⚠️ ITERATION changes\n   this — Axelrod showed reciprocal strategies do well in repeated\n   play, so the SHADOW OF THE FUTURE is what sustains cooperation\n⚠️ PUBLIC GOODS  ⚠️ non-rival and non-excludable → free riding →\n   undersupply. ⚠️ The standard justification for taxation\n⚠️ OLSON'S LOGIC  ⚠️ SMALL CONCENTRATED groups organize more\n   easily than large diffuse ones. ⚠️ THEREFORE policy tends to\n   favour concentrated interests over diffuse ones even under\n   perfect democracy — this is the structural explanation for\n   why narrow benefits and dispersed costs are so common\n   ⚠️ Hence SELECTIVE INCENTIVES: unions and professional bodies\n   supply private benefits to fund the collective good\n⚠️ COORDINATION problems (a focal point suffices) are DIFFERENT\n   from cooperation problems (⚠️ enforcement is needed)\n⚠️ PRINCIPAL-AGENT  ⚠️ voters→politicians→bureaucrats→street level.\n   Information asymmetry at every link (§14)\n⚠️ TIME INCONSISTENCY  ⚠️ today's government cannot bind tomorrow's,\n   which is why independent central banks and constitutional\n   entrenchment exist\n```\n\n---\n\n## §6. ⚠️ The Commons, and Ostrom's Correction\n\n**⚠️ Hardin's \"Tragedy of the Commons\" (1968) argued shared resources are inevitably\noverexploited, and that the remedies are privatization or state control.**\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — Ostrom's Nobel-winning work substantially overturned the \"inevitably\"\n> part, and this is one of the field's genuinely important empirical corrections.**\n> ⚠️ **Ostrom documented many real, durable common-pool resource regimes — irrigation\n> systems, fisheries, alpine pastures, forests — governed successfully for centuries by\n> the users themselves, with neither privatization nor state control.**\n> **⚠️ She also noted Hardin's example was an OPEN ACCESS resource, not a managed commons,\n> and the two are different things.**\n\n**⚠️ Ostrom's design principles for enduring commons institutions** (⚠️ empirically derived,\nnot deduced): ⚠️ **clearly defined boundaries; rules matched to local conditions;\ncollective-choice arrangements letting users modify their own rules; monitoring by\naccountable monitors; GRADUATED sanctions; accessible conflict resolution; recognized\nrights to organize; and nested enterprises for larger systems.**\n**⚠️ The general lesson is broader than commons**: ⚠️ **there is frequently a third option\nbetween market and state, and institutional solutions that emerge locally can outperform\nimposed ones — while also being vulnerable to scale, mobility and outside pressure.**\n\n---\n\n## §7. ⚠️ Social Choice\n\n```\n⚠️ CONDORCET PARADOX  ⚠️ majority preferences can CYCLE: a majority\n   prefers A to B, B to C, and C to A. ⚠️ \"The will of the majority\"\n   may not exist as a coherent object\n⚠️ ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM  ⚠️ a PROOF, not an empirical\n   finding. No ranked voting rule over three or more options can\n   simultaneously satisfy a short list of reasonable conditions\n   (unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto,\n   independence of irrelevant alternatives)\n   ⚠️ WHAT IT DOES NOT MEAN: it does NOT show voting is pointless\n   or that all systems are equally bad. ⚠️ It shows no system is\n   perfect on those axioms — which is a claim about trade-offs\n⚠️ GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE  ⚠️ every reasonable voting system is\n   manipulable in principle. ⚠️ Strategic voting cannot be\n   designed away\n⚠️ MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM  ⚠️ under restrictive assumptions\n   (one dimension, single-peaked preferences, two competitors),\n   both converge on the median. ⚠️ Real politics is\n   multidimensional, so treat it as a tendency, not a law\n⚠️ MCKELVEY CHAOS THEOREM  ⚠️ in multiple dimensions, agenda\n   control can lead majority rule almost anywhere. ⚠️ Which\n   makes §2's second face of power a formal result\n```\n\n---\n\n## §8. ⚠️ Voting Systems\n\n**⚠️ There is no neutral voting system. Every rule embeds a judgement about what\nrepresentation means.**\n```\n⚠️ FPTP \u002F plurality  ⚠️ simple, produces single-party majorities,\n   strong local link. ⚠️ Disproportionate; wasted votes; rewards\n   geographic concentration; ⚠️ can elect a legislature whose\n   majority won a minority of votes\n⚠️ TWO-ROUND  majority for the winner; ⚠️ costly, and can produce\n   perverse first-round eliminations\n⚠️ RANKED CHOICE \u002F IRV \u002F AV  ⚠️ eliminates the spoiler problem\n   partially; ⚠️ NOT monotonic in all cases (⚠️ ranking a candidate\n   HIGHER can in principle hurt them — a real theoretical defect)\n⚠️ LIST PR  proportional, ⚠️ coalition government the norm,\n   thresholds exclude small parties; ⚠️ weaker constituency link\n⚠️ MMP  ⚠️ combines local members with a proportional correction\nSTV  proportional with ranked ballots in multi-member seats\nAPPROVAL and SCORE  ⚠️ escape Arrow's framing by not being\n   ranked systems — which is why advocates favour them, and\n   they face Gibbard-Satterthwaite regardless\n```\n**⚠️ DUVERGER'S LAW is among the more robust findings** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`): ⚠️ **plurality single-member\ndistricts TEND toward two-party competition, through the mechanical effect (seats punish\nsmall parties) and the psychological effect (voters abandon them).** **⚠️ Stated as a\ntendency, not a law — India and Canada are standing qualifications.**\n**⚠️ Malapportionment and gerrymandering** — ⚠️ **and note that the requirement of\nproportionality, compactness, competitiveness, and respect for communities of interest\nCANNOT all be satisfied simultaneously, which is why redistricting is genuinely hard and\nnot merely corrupt.**\n\n---\n\n# PART III — INSTITUTIONS\n","# Political Science and Governance: Collective Action Problems, the Commons and Ostrom's Correction, Social Choice, and Voting Systems\n\n> **Part 2 of 6** of the *Political Science, Human Systems and Governance* reference (plugin `political-science-human-systems-governance`), covering §5–§8. Sibling skills: `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory` (§0–§4), `polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions` (§9–§13), `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization` (§14–§18), `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems` (§19–§25), `polisci-reference` (§26–§31). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** The theory is stable. Two areas are live. See §26 → `polisci-reference` for current democracy measurement, and the scholarly dispute about whether those measurements are reliable.\n\n> **⚠️ A note on how this document handles contested questions.** ⚠️ **Political science\n> contains robust empirical findings, contested empirical findings, and normative\n> disputes that evidence cannot settle. This document tries to say which is which** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`),\n> **and where a question is genuinely contested it presents the strongest version of more\n> than one position rather than picking.** ⚠️ **Where I report a finding, I attribute it;\n> where scholars disagree, I say so.**\n>\n> **Complements a civil\u002Findustrial engineering reference (institutions as accumulated\n> failure logs), a pedagogy reference (evidence quality in social science), and an\n> economics-adjacent treatment of collective action.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the results that are counterintuitive or routinely misstated.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this document:**\n> 1. **⚠️ COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS are the discipline's deepest structure** (§5–§6).\n>    **Individually rational behaviour producing collectively bad outcomes explains\n>    government, taxation, regulation, unions, cartels and treaties — and Ostrom's work\n>    showed the standard remedies are not the only ones.**\n> 2. **⚠️ INSTITUTIONS SHAPE BEHAVIOUR, and the effects are often perverse** (§9–§15 → `polisci-constitutional-design-electoral-systems-and-institutions`, `polisci-bureaucracy-parties-voter-behaviour-and-polarization`).\n>    **Electoral rules, veto points and federal structures produce predictable\n>    consequences that designers frequently did not intend.**\n> 3. **⚠️ MEASUREMENT IS THE FIELD'S BINDING CONSTRAINT** (§25 → `polisci-regimes-state-capacity-corruption-ir-and-field-problems`, §26 → `polisci-reference`). **Most interesting\n>    political concepts — democracy, power, legitimacy, polarization — are hard to measure,\n>    and disputes that look substantive are often measurement disputes underneath.**\n\n---\n\n## §5. ⚠️ Collective Action Problems\n\n> **⚠️ The deepest structure in the discipline: situations where individually rational\n> behaviour produces collectively worse outcomes for everyone.**\n```\n⚠️ PRISONER'S DILEMMA  ⚠️ defection dominates individually,\n   mutual cooperation is better for both. ⚠️ ITERATION changes\n   this — Axelrod showed reciprocal strategies do well in repeated\n   play, so the SHADOW OF THE FUTURE is what sustains cooperation\n⚠️ PUBLIC GOODS  ⚠️ non-rival and non-excludable → free riding →\n   undersupply. ⚠️ The standard justification for taxation\n⚠️ OLSON'S LOGIC  ⚠️ SMALL CONCENTRATED groups organize more\n   easily than large diffuse ones. ⚠️ THEREFORE policy tends to\n   favour concentrated interests over diffuse ones even under\n   perfect democracy — this is the structural explanation for\n   why narrow benefits and dispersed costs are so common\n   ⚠️ Hence SELECTIVE INCENTIVES: unions and professional bodies\n   supply private benefits to fund the collective good\n⚠️ COORDINATION problems (a focal point suffices) are DIFFERENT\n   from cooperation problems (⚠️ enforcement is needed)\n⚠️ PRINCIPAL-AGENT  ⚠️ voters→politicians→bureaucrats→street level.\n   Information asymmetry at every link (§14)\n⚠️ TIME INCONSISTENCY  ⚠️ today's government cannot bind tomorrow's,\n   which is why independent central banks and constitutional\n   entrenchment exist\n```\n\n---\n\n## §6. ⚠️ The Commons, and Ostrom's Correction\n\n**⚠️ Hardin's \"Tragedy of the Commons\" (1968) argued shared resources are inevitably\noverexploited, and that the remedies are privatization or state control.**\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — Ostrom's Nobel-winning work substantially overturned the \"inevitably\"\n> part, and this is one of the field's genuinely important empirical corrections.**\n> ⚠️ **Ostrom documented many real, durable common-pool resource regimes — irrigation\n> systems, fisheries, alpine pastures, forests — governed successfully for centuries by\n> the users themselves, with neither privatization nor state control.**\n> **⚠️ She also noted Hardin's example was an OPEN ACCESS resource, not a managed commons,\n> and the two are different things.**\n\n**⚠️ Ostrom's design principles for enduring commons institutions** (⚠️ empirically derived,\nnot deduced): ⚠️ **clearly defined boundaries; rules matched to local conditions;\ncollective-choice arrangements letting users modify their own rules; monitoring by\naccountable monitors; GRADUATED sanctions; accessible conflict resolution; recognized\nrights to organize; and nested enterprises for larger systems.**\n**⚠️ The general lesson is broader than commons**: ⚠️ **there is frequently a third option\nbetween market and state, and institutional solutions that emerge locally can outperform\nimposed ones — while also being vulnerable to scale, mobility and outside pressure.**\n\n---\n\n## §7. ⚠️ Social Choice\n\n```\n⚠️ CONDORCET PARADOX  ⚠️ majority preferences can CYCLE: a majority\n   prefers A to B, B to C, and C to A. ⚠️ \"The will of the majority\"\n   may not exist as a coherent object\n⚠️ ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM  ⚠️ a PROOF, not an empirical\n   finding. No ranked voting rule over three or more options can\n   simultaneously satisfy a short list of reasonable conditions\n   (unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto,\n   independence of irrelevant alternatives)\n   ⚠️ WHAT IT DOES NOT MEAN: it does NOT show voting is pointless\n   or that all systems are equally bad. ⚠️ It shows no system is\n   perfect on those axioms — which is a claim about trade-offs\n⚠️ GIBBARD-SATTERTHWAITE  ⚠️ every reasonable voting system is\n   manipulable in principle. ⚠️ Strategic voting cannot be\n   designed away\n⚠️ MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM  ⚠️ under restrictive assumptions\n   (one dimension, single-peaked preferences, two competitors),\n   both converge on the median. ⚠️ Real politics is\n   multidimensional, so treat it as a tendency, not a law\n⚠️ MCKELVEY CHAOS THEOREM  ⚠️ in multiple dimensions, agenda\n   control can lead majority rule almost anywhere. ⚠️ Which\n   makes §2's second face of power a formal result\n```\n\n---\n\n## §8. ⚠️ Voting Systems\n\n**⚠️ There is no neutral voting system. Every rule embeds a judgement about what\nrepresentation means.**\n```\n⚠️ FPTP \u002F plurality  ⚠️ simple, produces single-party majorities,\n   strong local link. ⚠️ Disproportionate; wasted votes; rewards\n   geographic concentration; ⚠️ can elect a legislature whose\n   majority won a minority of votes\n⚠️ TWO-ROUND  majority for the winner; ⚠️ costly, and can produce\n   perverse first-round eliminations\n⚠️ RANKED CHOICE \u002F IRV \u002F AV  ⚠️ eliminates the spoiler problem\n   partially; ⚠️ NOT monotonic in all cases (⚠️ ranking a candidate\n   HIGHER can in principle hurt them — a real theoretical defect)\n⚠️ LIST PR  proportional, ⚠️ coalition government the norm,\n   thresholds exclude small parties; ⚠️ weaker constituency link\n⚠️ MMP  ⚠️ combines local members with a proportional correction\nSTV  proportional with ranked ballots in multi-member seats\nAPPROVAL and SCORE  ⚠️ escape Arrow's framing by not being\n   ranked systems — which is why advocates favour them, and\n   they face Gibbard-Satterthwaite regardless\n```\n**⚠️ DUVERGER'S LAW is among the more robust findings** (§1 → `polisci-what-the-field-establishes-power-the-state-and-theory`): ⚠️ **plurality single-member\ndistricts TEND toward two-party competition, through the mechanical effect (seats punish\nsmall parties) and the psychological effect (voters abandon them).** **⚠️ Stated as a\ntendency, not a law — India and Canada are standing qualifications.**\n**⚠️ Malapportionment and gerrymandering** — ⚠️ **and note that the requirement of\nproportionality, compactness, competitiveness, and respect for communities of interest\nCANNOT all be satisfied simultaneously, which is why redistricting is genuinely hard and\nnot merely corrupt.**\n\n---\n\n# PART III — INSTITUTIONS\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpolitical-science-human-systems-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fpolisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill polisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpolitical-science-human-systems-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fpolisci-collective-action-commons-social-choice-and-voting\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]