[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7AR133VPRMJBN2MTZ4SA302":3,"skill-same:01M7AR133VPRMJBN2MTZ4SA302":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7AR133VPRMJBN2MTZ4SA302","pentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology",null,"Use when planning or scoping an authorized penetration test or red-team engagement, or reasoning about what makes offensive security work lawful and professional. Covers the authorization and legal foundation (CFAA as criminal and civil statute, the UK Computer Misuse Act, the DOJ good-faith-research policy and why not to rely on it, DMCA §1201), the authorization package and get-out-of-jail letter, the third-party trap, bug bounty and VDP scope, professional obligations; the engagement types and the scoping questions that determine whether a test is useful (including regulated testing); and the standard methodologies (PTES, OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-115, MITRE ATT&CK, OSSTMM) and the engagement lifecycle. Includes the router for the whole penetration-testing reference. Authorized, defensive-context work only.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpenetration-testing\u002Fskills\u002Fpentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: pentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology\ndescription: \"Use when planning or scoping an authorized penetration test or red-team engagement, or reasoning about what makes offensive security work lawful and professional. Covers the authorization and legal foundation (CFAA as criminal and civil statute, the UK Computer Misuse Act, the DOJ good-faith-research policy and why not to rely on it, DMCA §1201), the authorization package and get-out-of-jail letter, the third-party trap, bug bounty and VDP scope, professional obligations; the engagement types and the scoping questions that determine whether a test is useful (including regulated testing); and the standard methodologies (PTES, OWASP WSTG, NIST SP 800-115, MITRE ATT&CK, OSSTMM) and the engagement lifecycle. Includes the router for the whole penetration-testing reference. Authorized, defensive-context work only.\"\n---\n\n# Penetration Testing: Authorization and Law, Engagement Types and Scoping, and Methodology\n\n> **Part 1 of 4** of the *Penetration Testing and Offensive Security* reference (plugin `penetration-testing`), covering §0–§3. Sibling skills: `pentest-technical-domains` (§4–§9), `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` (§10–§13), `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` (§14–§20). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** Verified August 2026. See §17 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` for the currency snapshot and what goes stale first.\n\n> **⚠️ THE PREREQUISITE FOR EVERYTHING BELOW.** The entire difference between this\n> profession and a felony is **documented, informed authorization from someone with the\n> authority to grant it, for a defined scope, in a defined window.** Not implied consent.\n> Not a verbal go-ahead. Not \"the client seemed fine with it.\" Not a bug bounty scope you\n> read quickly. **§1 is the section that matters most, and it is first for that reason.**\n>\n> This document is written for people doing authorized work — in-house security teams,\n> consultancies, bug bounty participants operating inside a published scope, and the\n> people who hire and manage them. **It is a methodology, process, and professional\n> practice reference.** It deliberately does not contain exploitation recipes, working\n> exploit code, or techniques for evading specific defensive products; those live in\n> engagement-specific research, and the value of a reference like this is in the parts\n> practitioners actually get wrong — scoping, method, evidence, and communication.\n>\n> **This is not legal advice.** §1 tells you what to ask your counsel, not what your\n> obligations are in your jurisdiction.\n\n> **How to read this.** Three markers:\n> - **[DURABLE]** — professional practice, methodology, or a lesson the field has settled.\n> - **[VERSIONED]** — regulation, tooling, market state. Verify.\n> - **[CONTESTED]** — practitioners genuinely disagree.\n>\n> **The three framings that organize everything below:**\n> 1. **The report is the product.** The client is not buying access to their systems —\n>    they already have that. **They are buying a prioritized, reproducible, actionable\n>    understanding of their risk.** A brilliant compromise written up badly is a failed\n>    engagement (§13 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`).\n> 2. **Your job is to model a threat, not to win.** \"I got domain admin\" is not the goal;\n>    **\"here is how an attacker with these capabilities would reach these assets, here is\n>    what detected them and what didn't, and here is what to fix first\"** is.\n> 3. **You are operating in someone's production environment and you can break it.**\n>    Professional restraint — knowing what *not* to run — is a larger part of competence\n>    than the ability to run anything.\n\n---\n\n## §0. Routing\n\n| Asked about... | Go to |\n|---|---|\n| **Authorization, legality, rules of engagement** | **§1 — start here** |\n| Engagement types and scoping | §2 |\n| Methodology and standards | §3 |\n| Recon and attack surface | §4 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Web application testing | §5 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Network and infrastructure | §6 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Active Directory and identity | §7 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Cloud | §8 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| API, mobile, wireless, OT, hardware | §9 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Social engineering and physical | §10 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` |\n| Red teaming, purple teaming, post-exploitation | §11 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` |\n| AI systems (testing them, and using them) | §12 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` |\n| **Reporting and remediation** | **§13 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`** |\n| Disclosure, bug bounty, career, certifications | §14 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| \"Don't do this\" | §15 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| \"Which approach is better?\" | §16 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| \"Is this still current?\" | §17 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| Books, labs, people | §18 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n\n---\n\n## §1. Authorization and Law\n\n### 1.1 What makes this legal\n\n**[DURABLE] Unauthorized access to a computer system is a crime in essentially every\njurisdiction**, and the technical activity is identical whether or not you have\npermission. **The permission is the entire legal distinction.** In the US the relevant\nstatute is the **Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)** — note that it is **both a criminal\nand a civil statute**, so you can be prosecuted *and* privately sued. The UK has the\nComputer Misuse Act; the EU has national implementations of the Directive on attacks\nagainst information systems; most other jurisdictions have equivalents.\n\n**⚠️ The threat to researchers is more often civil than criminal.** Rapid7's assessment is\nthat the threat of private lawsuits against legitimate researchers for \"loss\" is **much\nmore common than federal criminal prosecution** — which matters, because a civil suit\ndoesn't require a prosecutor to think you did something wrong.\n\n**[VERSIONED] The US DOJ's CFAA charging policy directs federal prosecutors to decline\nprosecution where the evidence shows good-faith security research** — but the policy\nitself states that it is **internal guidance and creates no enforceable legal right or\nbenefit.** It is not a defence you can raise; it is a prosecutorial preference that can\nchange. **Do not build your risk model on it.**\n\nAlso live: **DMCA §1201** (circumventing technical protection measures — the reason\nresearchers sought and won a specific exemption), **US state computer-crime laws** (which\nhave their own scope and have been used against researchers), export controls, and\nsector-specific rules. **[VERSIONED]** Academic work in 2026 continues to argue that\nEuropean protection for security researchers is fragmented, citing high-profile cases in\nthe Netherlands, Malta, and Germany, and noting jurisdictions such as Italy where\nresearchers risk falling within criminal provisions without an available exemption.\n\n### 1.2 The authorization package\n\n**[DURABLE] Never begin technical work without all of these, in writing, signed.**\n\n| Document | What it establishes |\n|---|---|\n| **Master Services Agreement \u002F contract** | Commercial terms, liability, insurance |\n| **Statement of Work** | What you are testing and what you will deliver |\n| **Rules of Engagement (RoE)** | The operational boundaries — the most important document |\n| **Authorization letter (\"get out of jail letter\")** | Signed by someone with actual authority; **carry it during the engagement**, especially for physical work |\n| **NDA** | Both directions |\n| **Third-party authorization** | ⚠️ §1.3 |\n\n**The Rules of Engagement must state**: exact in-scope targets (IPs, domains, apps,\naccounts — **enumerated, not described**), **explicit out-of-scope items**, the testing\nwindow (dates *and* hours), permitted techniques and **prohibited ones** (DoS? social\nengineering? physical? password spraying against production accounts? data exfiltration,\nand if so, of what?), **the stop condition and who can invoke it**, emergency contacts on\nboth sides available during the window, evidence handling and data-retention rules,\nhow findings of unrelated criminal activity are handled, and **whether the blue team\nknows** (§11.2 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`).\n\n**[DURABLE] Get the authorizer's authority verified, not assumed.** A CTO can usually\nauthorize testing of systems the company owns. **They usually cannot authorize testing of\ntheir cloud provider's infrastructure, their SaaS vendors, or a shared-hosting neighbour.**\n\n### 1.3 The third-party trap\n\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — scope creep into systems your client doesn't own is the most common way\n> good engagements become legal problems.** Watch for:\n> - **Cloud provider infrastructure.** Major providers publish penetration testing\n>   policies; most permit customer testing of your own resources without prior approval\n>   but **prohibit testing of provider infrastructure and certain service types**, and\n>   **require separate approval for simulated DoS\u002FDDoS.** Read the current policy for the\n>   specific provider — they change.\n> - **SaaS and third-party APIs** your client integrates. Their systems, their permission.\n> - **Shared hosting** where other tenants sit on the same host.\n> - **CDN, WAF, and DNS providers** in front of the target.\n> - **Supply chain** — testing a vendor because your client uses them is not authorized by\n>   your client.\n> - **Employees' personal devices and accounts**, and anything touching their personal data.\n> - **Wireless** — RF doesn't respect property lines, and neighbouring networks are not\n>   yours.\n\n### 1.4 Bug bounty and VDP\n\n**[DURABLE] A published scope is your authorization, and its edges are hard.** Read the\npolicy in full before touching anything: in-scope assets, out-of-scope assets, prohibited\ntechniques (usually automated scanning at volume, DoS, social engineering of staff, and\nanything touching real user data), and disclosure terms.\n\n**Safe harbour language is the load-bearing element.** As one platform puts it, existing\nanti-hacking laws are broad enough that even good-faith researchers doing ethical\ndisclosure could face liability, which makes an **unambiguous statement that the\norganization considers good-faith security research to be authorized activity** essential.\n**⚠️ A program without safe harbour language is a program that has not authorized you** —\nweigh that accordingly. **[VERSIONED]** HackerOne's Gold Standard Safe Harbor was aligned\nas of **1 January 2026** with recent legal and regulatory developments, including the\nNetherlands NCSC's vulnerability disclosure policy.\n\n**A VDP requires four things**: clear scope, safe harbour, a submission channel, and a\nresponse SLA. A bug bounty adds rewards and a platform. **[VERSIONED] CISA BOD 20-01\nrequired all US federal civilian agencies to publish a VDP**, which is why nearly every\n`.gov` has one.\n\n**⚠️ Going out of scope voids your protection entirely**, and no amount of good intent\nrecovers it. If you find something interesting just outside the boundary: **stop, document\nthat you stopped, and ask.**\n\n### 1.5 Professional obligations\n\n**[DURABLE] Minimize impact.** You are in production. Prefer read over write, proof over\nexploitation, and the least invasive demonstration that establishes the finding. **You do\nnot need to exfiltrate the customer database to prove you could** — a row count and a\nredacted sample field is proof; the full dump is a liability you now hold.\n\n**Handle data as if it were the client's most sensitive asset, because it is.** Encrypted\nstorage, minimal retention, documented destruction, and **never on a personal device**.\n\n**Report immediately, outside the normal cycle**: evidence of a **prior or ongoing\ncompromise** (this is the one that stops the engagement and starts an incident response),\nanything that endangers safety, and critical findings on production systems that can't\nwait for the report.\n\n**⚠️ If you break something, say so immediately.** Concealment turns a recoverable\noperational incident into a career-ending professional failure, and clients forgive the\nfirst far more readily than the second.\n\n---\n\n## §2. Engagement Types and Scoping\n\n### 2.1 The types\n\n| Type | Question it answers |\n|---|---|\n| **Vulnerability assessment** | \"What known weaknesses exist?\" — breadth, largely automated. **Not a pentest**, and mislabelling is endemic |\n| **Penetration test** | \"What can an attacker actually do with these weaknesses?\" — depth, verified exploitation |\n| **Red team** | \"Would we detect and respond to a real adversary pursuing a specific objective?\" — tests **people and process**, not just technology |\n| **Purple team** | Collaborative — testers and defenders working together to build and validate detections. **Often the highest value per dollar** (§11.2 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`) |\n| **Threat-Led Penetration Testing (TLPT)** | Regulated, intelligence-driven red teaming against production (§2.3) |\n| **Assumed breach** | \"Given a foothold, what happens next?\" — skips the perimeter, spends the budget on what matters |\n| **Config \u002F architecture review** | Whitebox, often finds more per hour than testing does |\n\n**Knowledge levels**: **black box** (no information — realistic, and you spend the client's\nmoney rediscovering their network diagram), **grey box** (some access\u002Fcredentials — **the\nusual and usually correct choice**), **white box** (full access and source — **the highest\nfindings-per-hour, and the least realistic**).\n\n**[CONTESTED] Black box realism vs. white box coverage.** *For black box*: it tests what an\nexternal attacker faces, including your detection. *Against*: a real attacker has unlimited\ntime and you have two weeks, so you are testing your recon speed rather than their\nsecurity. **The strong practitioner position is that grey\u002Fwhite box finds more real risk\nper dollar, and black box should be reserved for when you're specifically testing\ndetection** — which is a red team objective (§11 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`).\n\n### 2.2 Scoping questions that determine whether the test is useful\n\n**[DURABLE] Bad scoping produces a technically competent test that answers the wrong\nquestion**, and it's the most common failure in commissioning one.\n\n- **What are you actually worried about?** (\"Compliance\" is a valid answer; it just leads\n  to a different test than \"we hold customer PII and want to know if it's reachable.\")\n- **What are the crown jewels?** Test toward them.\n- **What is the threat model?** Opportunistic external attacker, targeted adversary,\n  malicious insider, compromised third party — these need different tests.\n- **Production or staging?** ⚠️ **A staging environment that differs from production tests\n  a system that doesn't exist**, but production carries real risk. Name the trade-off\n  explicitly rather than defaulting.\n- **How much time?** Findings scale with time; a five-day test on a large estate is a\n  sample, and the report should say so.\n- **What happens to the findings?** A test whose output nobody has budget to remediate is\n  an expensive document.\n- **Retest included?** It should be.\n\n### 2.3 Regulated testing\n\n**[VERSIONED] DORA's Threat-Led Penetration Testing is the most consequential regulatory\ndevelopment in this space**, and it has real supply-side consequences.\n\n- **DORA Article 26** requires designated EU financial entities to undergo TLPT **at least\n  every three years**, on **production** systems, following intelligence-driven scenarios.\n  **Article 27** sets a demanding bar for testers.\n- **⚠️ You do not self-select.** Your national TLPT authority notifies you when you are in\n  scope, based on impact and ICT-risk criteria.\n- **The methodology is TIBER-EU**, with a five-phase structure and a defined cast:\n  a **Control Team** inside the entity, a regulator-side **TLPT Cyber Team**, an\n  independent **Threat Intelligence provider**, and a **Red Team** — with the **Blue Team\n  deliberately unaware until the active phase ends**.\n- **⚠️ Capacity is genuinely tight.** A full cycle is reported at **9–14 months from\n  provider selection to attestation**, against a small pool of qualified providers; one\n  2026 analysis cites 200+ designated entities competing for **fewer than 40 qualified red\n  team providers**, and warns that **a competent authority may reject a TLPT conducted by\n  an unqualified provider, forcing a restart.**\n- **UK equivalents**: **CBEST** (Bank of England) and **STAR-FS** (CREST) — CBEST-certified\n  exercises are recognized under DORA given the TIBER-EU alignment.\n- **Note the divergence**: DORA permits internal testers under strict conditions and\n  mandates outsourcing every third test; **TIBER-EU currently prohibits internal testers.**\n\n**Other regimes**: **PCI DSS** requires annual penetration testing and after significant\nchange, with segmentation testing; **HIPAA**, **SOC 2**, **ISO 27001**, **FedRAMP**, and\n**NIS2** all drive testing demand with differing specificity.\n\n---\n\n## §3. Methodology\n\n### 3.1 The standards\n\n**[DURABLE] Use a published methodology. It is what makes your work defensible, repeatable,\nand comparable** — and \"we poked at it until we found something\" is not a methodology.\n\n| Standard | Use |\n|---|---|\n| **PTES** (Penetration Testing Execution Standard) | The seven-phase engagement structure |\n| **OWASP Web Security Testing Guide (WSTG)** | **The reference for web app testing.** Exhaustive, free |\n| **OWASP MASTG \u002F MASVS** | Mobile |\n| **OWASP API Security Top 10** | APIs (§9.1 → `pentest-technical-domains`) |\n| **NIST SP 800-115** | The US government technical testing guide |\n| **OSSTMM** | Older, rigorous, metrics-oriented |\n| **MITRE ATT&CK** | **The shared vocabulary for adversary behaviour** — map findings to it so defenders can act |\n| **TIBER-EU \u002F CBEST \u002F STAR-FS** | Regulated red teaming (§2.3) |\n| **CWE \u002F CVSS \u002F EPSS** | Classification and severity (§13.2 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`) |\n\n### 3.2 The engagement lifecycle\n\n```\n1. PRE-ENGAGEMENT      scope, RoE, authorization, contacts, logistics   ← §1, §2\n2. INTELLIGENCE        passive then active recon, attack surface        ← §4\n3. THREAT MODELLING    what would an adversary want, and how\n4. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS   identify and verify candidate weaknesses\n5. EXPLOITATION        verify impact, with restraint                    ← §1.5\n6. POST-EXPLOITATION   pivot, escalate, demonstrate business impact     ← §11\n7. REPORTING           the actual product                              ← §13\n   → remediation support → RETEST\n```\n\n**[DURABLE] Two disciplines that separate professionals from enthusiasts:**\n- **Contemporaneous notes.** Every command, timestamp, target, and result — because you\n  will be asked \"was that you?\" months later, and because your report's reproduction steps\n  come from here. Timestamps in **UTC**, and record your source IPs so the client can\n  correlate their logs.\n- **Deconfliction.** The client must be able to distinguish your traffic from a real\n  attacker's. Provide source IPs in advance, use identifiable user-agents where\n  appropriate, and be reachable.\n","# Penetration Testing: Authorization and Law, Engagement Types and Scoping, and Methodology\n\n> **Part 1 of 4** of the *Penetration Testing and Offensive Security* reference (plugin `penetration-testing`), covering §0–§3. Sibling skills: `pentest-technical-domains` (§4–§9), `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` (§10–§13), `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` (§14–§20). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** Verified August 2026. See §17 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` for the currency snapshot and what goes stale first.\n\n> **⚠️ THE PREREQUISITE FOR EVERYTHING BELOW.** The entire difference between this\n> profession and a felony is **documented, informed authorization from someone with the\n> authority to grant it, for a defined scope, in a defined window.** Not implied consent.\n> Not a verbal go-ahead. Not \"the client seemed fine with it.\" Not a bug bounty scope you\n> read quickly. **§1 is the section that matters most, and it is first for that reason.**\n>\n> This document is written for people doing authorized work — in-house security teams,\n> consultancies, bug bounty participants operating inside a published scope, and the\n> people who hire and manage them. **It is a methodology, process, and professional\n> practice reference.** It deliberately does not contain exploitation recipes, working\n> exploit code, or techniques for evading specific defensive products; those live in\n> engagement-specific research, and the value of a reference like this is in the parts\n> practitioners actually get wrong — scoping, method, evidence, and communication.\n>\n> **This is not legal advice.** §1 tells you what to ask your counsel, not what your\n> obligations are in your jurisdiction.\n\n> **How to read this.** Three markers:\n> - **[DURABLE]** — professional practice, methodology, or a lesson the field has settled.\n> - **[VERSIONED]** — regulation, tooling, market state. Verify.\n> - **[CONTESTED]** — practitioners genuinely disagree.\n>\n> **The three framings that organize everything below:**\n> 1. **The report is the product.** The client is not buying access to their systems —\n>    they already have that. **They are buying a prioritized, reproducible, actionable\n>    understanding of their risk.** A brilliant compromise written up badly is a failed\n>    engagement (§13 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`).\n> 2. **Your job is to model a threat, not to win.** \"I got domain admin\" is not the goal;\n>    **\"here is how an attacker with these capabilities would reach these assets, here is\n>    what detected them and what didn't, and here is what to fix first\"** is.\n> 3. **You are operating in someone's production environment and you can break it.**\n>    Professional restraint — knowing what *not* to run — is a larger part of competence\n>    than the ability to run anything.\n\n---\n\n## §0. Routing\n\n| Asked about... | Go to |\n|---|---|\n| **Authorization, legality, rules of engagement** | **§1 — start here** |\n| Engagement types and scoping | §2 |\n| Methodology and standards | §3 |\n| Recon and attack surface | §4 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Web application testing | §5 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Network and infrastructure | §6 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Active Directory and identity | §7 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Cloud | §8 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| API, mobile, wireless, OT, hardware | §9 → `pentest-technical-domains` |\n| Social engineering and physical | §10 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` |\n| Red teaming, purple teaming, post-exploitation | §11 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` |\n| AI systems (testing them, and using them) | §12 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting` |\n| **Reporting and remediation** | **§13 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`** |\n| Disclosure, bug bounty, career, certifications | §14 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| \"Don't do this\" | §15 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| \"Which approach is better?\" | §16 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| \"Is this still current?\" | §17 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n| Books, labs, people | §18 → `pentest-disclosure-career-and-reference` |\n\n---\n\n## §1. Authorization and Law\n\n### 1.1 What makes this legal\n\n**[DURABLE] Unauthorized access to a computer system is a crime in essentially every\njurisdiction**, and the technical activity is identical whether or not you have\npermission. **The permission is the entire legal distinction.** In the US the relevant\nstatute is the **Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)** — note that it is **both a criminal\nand a civil statute**, so you can be prosecuted *and* privately sued. The UK has the\nComputer Misuse Act; the EU has national implementations of the Directive on attacks\nagainst information systems; most other jurisdictions have equivalents.\n\n**⚠️ The threat to researchers is more often civil than criminal.** Rapid7's assessment is\nthat the threat of private lawsuits against legitimate researchers for \"loss\" is **much\nmore common than federal criminal prosecution** — which matters, because a civil suit\ndoesn't require a prosecutor to think you did something wrong.\n\n**[VERSIONED] The US DOJ's CFAA charging policy directs federal prosecutors to decline\nprosecution where the evidence shows good-faith security research** — but the policy\nitself states that it is **internal guidance and creates no enforceable legal right or\nbenefit.** It is not a defence you can raise; it is a prosecutorial preference that can\nchange. **Do not build your risk model on it.**\n\nAlso live: **DMCA §1201** (circumventing technical protection measures — the reason\nresearchers sought and won a specific exemption), **US state computer-crime laws** (which\nhave their own scope and have been used against researchers), export controls, and\nsector-specific rules. **[VERSIONED]** Academic work in 2026 continues to argue that\nEuropean protection for security researchers is fragmented, citing high-profile cases in\nthe Netherlands, Malta, and Germany, and noting jurisdictions such as Italy where\nresearchers risk falling within criminal provisions without an available exemption.\n\n### 1.2 The authorization package\n\n**[DURABLE] Never begin technical work without all of these, in writing, signed.**\n\n| Document | What it establishes |\n|---|---|\n| **Master Services Agreement \u002F contract** | Commercial terms, liability, insurance |\n| **Statement of Work** | What you are testing and what you will deliver |\n| **Rules of Engagement (RoE)** | The operational boundaries — the most important document |\n| **Authorization letter (\"get out of jail letter\")** | Signed by someone with actual authority; **carry it during the engagement**, especially for physical work |\n| **NDA** | Both directions |\n| **Third-party authorization** | ⚠️ §1.3 |\n\n**The Rules of Engagement must state**: exact in-scope targets (IPs, domains, apps,\naccounts — **enumerated, not described**), **explicit out-of-scope items**, the testing\nwindow (dates *and* hours), permitted techniques and **prohibited ones** (DoS? social\nengineering? physical? password spraying against production accounts? data exfiltration,\nand if so, of what?), **the stop condition and who can invoke it**, emergency contacts on\nboth sides available during the window, evidence handling and data-retention rules,\nhow findings of unrelated criminal activity are handled, and **whether the blue team\nknows** (§11.2 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`).\n\n**[DURABLE] Get the authorizer's authority verified, not assumed.** A CTO can usually\nauthorize testing of systems the company owns. **They usually cannot authorize testing of\ntheir cloud provider's infrastructure, their SaaS vendors, or a shared-hosting neighbour.**\n\n### 1.3 The third-party trap\n\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — scope creep into systems your client doesn't own is the most common way\n> good engagements become legal problems.** Watch for:\n> - **Cloud provider infrastructure.** Major providers publish penetration testing\n>   policies; most permit customer testing of your own resources without prior approval\n>   but **prohibit testing of provider infrastructure and certain service types**, and\n>   **require separate approval for simulated DoS\u002FDDoS.** Read the current policy for the\n>   specific provider — they change.\n> - **SaaS and third-party APIs** your client integrates. Their systems, their permission.\n> - **Shared hosting** where other tenants sit on the same host.\n> - **CDN, WAF, and DNS providers** in front of the target.\n> - **Supply chain** — testing a vendor because your client uses them is not authorized by\n>   your client.\n> - **Employees' personal devices and accounts**, and anything touching their personal data.\n> - **Wireless** — RF doesn't respect property lines, and neighbouring networks are not\n>   yours.\n\n### 1.4 Bug bounty and VDP\n\n**[DURABLE] A published scope is your authorization, and its edges are hard.** Read the\npolicy in full before touching anything: in-scope assets, out-of-scope assets, prohibited\ntechniques (usually automated scanning at volume, DoS, social engineering of staff, and\nanything touching real user data), and disclosure terms.\n\n**Safe harbour language is the load-bearing element.** As one platform puts it, existing\nanti-hacking laws are broad enough that even good-faith researchers doing ethical\ndisclosure could face liability, which makes an **unambiguous statement that the\norganization considers good-faith security research to be authorized activity** essential.\n**⚠️ A program without safe harbour language is a program that has not authorized you** —\nweigh that accordingly. **[VERSIONED]** HackerOne's Gold Standard Safe Harbor was aligned\nas of **1 January 2026** with recent legal and regulatory developments, including the\nNetherlands NCSC's vulnerability disclosure policy.\n\n**A VDP requires four things**: clear scope, safe harbour, a submission channel, and a\nresponse SLA. A bug bounty adds rewards and a platform. **[VERSIONED] CISA BOD 20-01\nrequired all US federal civilian agencies to publish a VDP**, which is why nearly every\n`.gov` has one.\n\n**⚠️ Going out of scope voids your protection entirely**, and no amount of good intent\nrecovers it. If you find something interesting just outside the boundary: **stop, document\nthat you stopped, and ask.**\n\n### 1.5 Professional obligations\n\n**[DURABLE] Minimize impact.** You are in production. Prefer read over write, proof over\nexploitation, and the least invasive demonstration that establishes the finding. **You do\nnot need to exfiltrate the customer database to prove you could** — a row count and a\nredacted sample field is proof; the full dump is a liability you now hold.\n\n**Handle data as if it were the client's most sensitive asset, because it is.** Encrypted\nstorage, minimal retention, documented destruction, and **never on a personal device**.\n\n**Report immediately, outside the normal cycle**: evidence of a **prior or ongoing\ncompromise** (this is the one that stops the engagement and starts an incident response),\nanything that endangers safety, and critical findings on production systems that can't\nwait for the report.\n\n**⚠️ If you break something, say so immediately.** Concealment turns a recoverable\noperational incident into a career-ending professional failure, and clients forgive the\nfirst far more readily than the second.\n\n---\n\n## §2. Engagement Types and Scoping\n\n### 2.1 The types\n\n| Type | Question it answers |\n|---|---|\n| **Vulnerability assessment** | \"What known weaknesses exist?\" — breadth, largely automated. **Not a pentest**, and mislabelling is endemic |\n| **Penetration test** | \"What can an attacker actually do with these weaknesses?\" — depth, verified exploitation |\n| **Red team** | \"Would we detect and respond to a real adversary pursuing a specific objective?\" — tests **people and process**, not just technology |\n| **Purple team** | Collaborative — testers and defenders working together to build and validate detections. **Often the highest value per dollar** (§11.2 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`) |\n| **Threat-Led Penetration Testing (TLPT)** | Regulated, intelligence-driven red teaming against production (§2.3) |\n| **Assumed breach** | \"Given a foothold, what happens next?\" — skips the perimeter, spends the budget on what matters |\n| **Config \u002F architecture review** | Whitebox, often finds more per hour than testing does |\n\n**Knowledge levels**: **black box** (no information — realistic, and you spend the client's\nmoney rediscovering their network diagram), **grey box** (some access\u002Fcredentials — **the\nusual and usually correct choice**), **white box** (full access and source — **the highest\nfindings-per-hour, and the least realistic**).\n\n**[CONTESTED] Black box realism vs. white box coverage.** *For black box*: it tests what an\nexternal attacker faces, including your detection. *Against*: a real attacker has unlimited\ntime and you have two weeks, so you are testing your recon speed rather than their\nsecurity. **The strong practitioner position is that grey\u002Fwhite box finds more real risk\nper dollar, and black box should be reserved for when you're specifically testing\ndetection** — which is a red team objective (§11 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`).\n\n### 2.2 Scoping questions that determine whether the test is useful\n\n**[DURABLE] Bad scoping produces a technically competent test that answers the wrong\nquestion**, and it's the most common failure in commissioning one.\n\n- **What are you actually worried about?** (\"Compliance\" is a valid answer; it just leads\n  to a different test than \"we hold customer PII and want to know if it's reachable.\")\n- **What are the crown jewels?** Test toward them.\n- **What is the threat model?** Opportunistic external attacker, targeted adversary,\n  malicious insider, compromised third party — these need different tests.\n- **Production or staging?** ⚠️ **A staging environment that differs from production tests\n  a system that doesn't exist**, but production carries real risk. Name the trade-off\n  explicitly rather than defaulting.\n- **How much time?** Findings scale with time; a five-day test on a large estate is a\n  sample, and the report should say so.\n- **What happens to the findings?** A test whose output nobody has budget to remediate is\n  an expensive document.\n- **Retest included?** It should be.\n\n### 2.3 Regulated testing\n\n**[VERSIONED] DORA's Threat-Led Penetration Testing is the most consequential regulatory\ndevelopment in this space**, and it has real supply-side consequences.\n\n- **DORA Article 26** requires designated EU financial entities to undergo TLPT **at least\n  every three years**, on **production** systems, following intelligence-driven scenarios.\n  **Article 27** sets a demanding bar for testers.\n- **⚠️ You do not self-select.** Your national TLPT authority notifies you when you are in\n  scope, based on impact and ICT-risk criteria.\n- **The methodology is TIBER-EU**, with a five-phase structure and a defined cast:\n  a **Control Team** inside the entity, a regulator-side **TLPT Cyber Team**, an\n  independent **Threat Intelligence provider**, and a **Red Team** — with the **Blue Team\n  deliberately unaware until the active phase ends**.\n- **⚠️ Capacity is genuinely tight.** A full cycle is reported at **9–14 months from\n  provider selection to attestation**, against a small pool of qualified providers; one\n  2026 analysis cites 200+ designated entities competing for **fewer than 40 qualified red\n  team providers**, and warns that **a competent authority may reject a TLPT conducted by\n  an unqualified provider, forcing a restart.**\n- **UK equivalents**: **CBEST** (Bank of England) and **STAR-FS** (CREST) — CBEST-certified\n  exercises are recognized under DORA given the TIBER-EU alignment.\n- **Note the divergence**: DORA permits internal testers under strict conditions and\n  mandates outsourcing every third test; **TIBER-EU currently prohibits internal testers.**\n\n**Other regimes**: **PCI DSS** requires annual penetration testing and after significant\nchange, with segmentation testing; **HIPAA**, **SOC 2**, **ISO 27001**, **FedRAMP**, and\n**NIS2** all drive testing demand with differing specificity.\n\n---\n\n## §3. Methodology\n\n### 3.1 The standards\n\n**[DURABLE] Use a published methodology. It is what makes your work defensible, repeatable,\nand comparable** — and \"we poked at it until we found something\" is not a methodology.\n\n| Standard | Use |\n|---|---|\n| **PTES** (Penetration Testing Execution Standard) | The seven-phase engagement structure |\n| **OWASP Web Security Testing Guide (WSTG)** | **The reference for web app testing.** Exhaustive, free |\n| **OWASP MASTG \u002F MASVS** | Mobile |\n| **OWASP API Security Top 10** | APIs (§9.1 → `pentest-technical-domains`) |\n| **NIST SP 800-115** | The US government technical testing guide |\n| **OSSTMM** | Older, rigorous, metrics-oriented |\n| **MITRE ATT&CK** | **The shared vocabulary for adversary behaviour** — map findings to it so defenders can act |\n| **TIBER-EU \u002F CBEST \u002F STAR-FS** | Regulated red teaming (§2.3) |\n| **CWE \u002F CVSS \u002F EPSS** | Classification and severity (§13.2 → `pentest-red-team-ai-and-reporting`) |\n\n### 3.2 The engagement lifecycle\n\n```\n1. PRE-ENGAGEMENT      scope, RoE, authorization, contacts, logistics   ← §1, §2\n2. INTELLIGENCE        passive then active recon, attack surface        ← §4\n3. THREAT MODELLING    what would an adversary want, and how\n4. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS   identify and verify candidate weaknesses\n5. EXPLOITATION        verify impact, with restraint                    ← §1.5\n6. POST-EXPLOITATION   pivot, escalate, demonstrate business impact     ← §11\n7. REPORTING           the actual product                              ← §13\n   → remediation support → RETEST\n```\n\n**[DURABLE] Two disciplines that separate professionals from enthusiasts:**\n- **Contemporaneous notes.** Every command, timestamp, target, and result — because you\n  will be asked \"was that you?\" months later, and because your report's reproduction steps\n  come from here. Timestamps in **UTC**, and record your source IPs so the client can\n  correlate their logs.\n- **Deconfliction.** The client must be able to distinguish your traffic from a real\n  attacker's. Provide source IPs in advance, use identifiable user-agents where\n  appropriate, and be reachable.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpenetration-testing\u002Fskills\u002Fpentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill pentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill pentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill pentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpenetration-testing\u002Fskills\u002Fpentest-authorization-scoping-and-methodology\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]