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Companion to the other package-manager-development skills.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpackage-manager-development\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-manager-reference\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: package-manager-reference\ndescription: \"Use when reviewing a package manager or registry design for known anti-patterns, weighing contested questions (MVS vs constraint solving, multiple versions coexisting, hoisted vs isolated vs PnP, lockfiles for libraries, one standard lockfile format, whether SemVer is worth it, package manager as build tool, cooldowns vs patch latency, vendoring), checking whether an ecosystem or tooling claim is still current (snapshot verified August 2026), finding the foundational writing and primary sources, or needing the build-it-in-order checklist, diagnostic first moves, and numbers. Companion to the other package-manager-development skills.\"\n---\n\n# Package Manager Development: Anti-Patterns, Contested Questions, Currency, and Canon\n\n> **Part 5 of 5** of the *Package Manager Development* reference (plugin `package-manager-development`), covering §15–§20. Sibling skills: `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (§0–§4), `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (§5–§7), `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces` (§8–§10), `package-manager-ux-ecosystems-and-governance` (§11–§14). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** Verified August 2026. See §17 below for the currency snapshot and what goes stale first.\n\n> **How to read this.** Reference, not tutorial. Sections are independent. Three markers:\n> - **[DURABLE]** — computer science, or a lesson every ecosystem has independently learned.\n>   Does not expire.\n> - **[ECOSYSTEM]** — specific to npm, PyPI, crates.io, Go, etc. Verify against that\n>   ecosystem's current docs.\n> - **[CONTESTED]** — the ecosystems have made genuinely different, defensible choices, or\n>   the practitioners disagree. Both cases given.\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the design mistakes that produce unreproducible builds, wedged\n> caches, exponential resolutions, or supply-chain compromise.\n>\n> **The framing that organizes everything below: a package manager is a distributed\n> systems problem wearing a CLI.** It is a cache-coherency problem, a constraint-solving\n> problem, a trust-and-identity problem, and a compatibility-contract problem, all of\n> which happen to be invoked by typing `install`. Every serious difficulty in this\n> document is one of those four, and treating it as \"just downloading files\" is the root\n> of most bad designs.\n\n---\n\n## §15. Anti-Patterns\n\n| Anti-pattern | Why | Instead |\n|---|---|---|\n| No lockfile | Unreproducible builds; every install is a new resolution | Lockfile with integrity hashes, from v1 |\n| Lockfile without hashes | Pins versions, not bytes | sha256\u002Fsha512 per artifact |\n| Lockfile that only works on the generating platform | CI breaks | Universal\u002Fmarker-aware lockfiles (§4.2 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`) |\n| Resolving in CI | Non-reproducible, and installs today's malware | `ci`\u002F`--frozen-lockfile`\u002F`--locked` |\n| Running install scripts by default | The primary malware vector (§9 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`) | Default off + allowlist |\n| Mutable published versions | Cache incoherence, hash breakage | Immutable + yank (§5.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`) |\n| Allowing new files on old releases | Retroactive poisoning | Time-bounded (§5.3 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`) |\n| Reusing deleted package names | Repojacking | Never reuse |\n| Long-lived publish tokens | Harvest-now-use-later; worm fuel | Trusted publishing \u002F OIDC (§7.1 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`) |\n| Trusting by org or `*` in trusted publishing | Looks secure, isn't | Full repo + branch\u002Fenvironment |\n| Pinning CI actions by tag | Mutable reference; root cause of 2026 incidents | Pin by commit SHA |\n| Requiring artifact download to learn dependencies | Resolution is now network-bound and slow | Metadata-only endpoints |\n| Resolver that discards its derivation | Unfixably bad error messages | PubGrub-style incompatibility tracking |\n| Unbounded backtracking with no diagnostics | Users experience a hang | Bound, and report what's thrashing |\n| Non-deterministic lockfile serialization | Spurious diffs → unreviewed lockfiles | Sorted, stable output |\n| Entangling resolve \u002F fetch \u002F install | No dry-run, no offline, untestable | Separate the stages (§0.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`) |\n| Non-atomic cache writes | Wedged caches users fix by `rm -rf` | Stage + verify + rename |\n| Flat\u002Fhoisted layout with no strict option | Phantom dependencies | Offer an isolated linker |\n| Letting a public index satisfy a private name | Dependency confusion | Scope-pinned registries |\n| Treating SemVer as a guarantee | It's violated at measurable rates (§1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`) | Lockfile is truth; upgrades are explicit |\n| Hand-editing a lockfile | Always a bug | Provide `overrides` (§10.3 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`) |\n| No `why`\u002F`explain` command | Users cannot debug their own tree | Ship it early |\n| Delete-on-request unpublish | `left-pad` | Yank |\n\n---\n\n## §16. Contested Questions\n\n**16.1 MVS vs. constraint solving.** §3.4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`. Determinism and simplicity versus automatic\npatch adoption and expressiveness. Note this is genuinely unresolved: Go's ecosystem is\nhappy, and the rest of the world independently chose the other way.\n\n**16.2 Should multiple versions coexist?** §6.3 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`. Compatibility and resolvability versus\nduplication and singleton bugs. Language runtime capability largely decides this for you.\n\n**16.3 Hoisted vs. isolated vs. PnP.** §6.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`. Compatibility versus correctness. The\nphantom-dependency argument is the strongest technical case for strictness; the volume of\npostinstall scripts that assume a hoisted shape is the strongest case against.\n\n**16.4 Lockfiles for libraries.** §4.3 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`.\n\n**16.5 One standard lockfile format vs. per-tool formats.** §4.4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`. The Python experience\nsuggests standard-as-interchange is achievable, standard-as-canonical is not, once\ncompeting formats have shipped.\n\n**16.6 Is SemVer worth it?** §1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`. The empirical violation rates are not in dispute; what's\ndisputed is whether an imperfect declared intent beats no signal at all. (Most people who\nsay \"SemVer doesn't work\" still want maintainers to use it.)\n\n**16.7 Should the package manager also be the build tool?** Cargo and Bun say yes\n(integration, one config, coherent caching). npm\u002Fpip historically say no (separation of\nconcerns, competing build tools can innovate). Integration wins on UX and loses on\nflexibility; both camps ship successful tools.\n\n**16.8 Cooldowns: safety vs. patch latency.** §8.4 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`. The 8-in-10 prevention figure is\nstriking; the counter is that a cooldown also delays the fix for the *next* incident.\nNobody has a clean answer to \"how do you expedite genuine security patches through a\ncooldown\" that doesn't reintroduce the attack surface.\n\n**16.9 Vendoring.** Vendored dependencies give you total control, auditability, and\nimmunity to registry outages and takedowns — at the cost of enormous repos and manual\nsecurity updates. Go supports it first-class; most ecosystems treat it as a last resort.\nBoth positions are held by serious organizations.\n\n---\n\n## §17. Currency Snapshot — verified August 2026\n\n| Thing | Status as of Aug 2026 | Decay risk |\n|---|---|---|\n| **npm supply-chain threat** | **Shai-Hulud worm family, Sept 2025 – Aug 2026.** Latest: **\"ChainDrop\"\u002FMini Shai-Hulud, 4 Aug 2026** — `keyv`, `flat-cache`, `cache-manager`, **400+ packages, 2,234 artifacts, ~2B monthly installs**, obfuscated Bun payload via npm `preinstall`, harvesting npm\u002FGitHub\u002FAWS\u002FKubernetes\u002FVault credentials. Waves in Sept 2025, Nov 2025 (v2, preinstall), Apr 2026 (\"Third Coming\", \"Mini\"), May 2026 (TeamPCP) | **Very high** |\n| **npm remediation** | Mandatory 2FA for publishing, **legacy never-expiring tokens revoked**, granular short-expiry tokens, trusted publishing GA. 500+ packages removed in the Sept 2025 response | Medium |\n| **PyPI incidents** | **LiteLLM 1.82.7\u002F1.82.8 (24 Mar 2026, ~95M monthly downloads) and telnyx 4.87.1\u002F4.87.2 (27 Mar)** — TeamPCP campaign originating from a **compromised Trivy GitHub Action** via a mutable reference. LiteLLM used a `.pth` file for import-time execution. PyPI quarantined the project | Medium |\n| **PyPI release immutability** | ⚠️ **Since 8 July 2026, PyPI rejects new files on releases older than 14 days.** Analysis showed only 56 of the top 15,000 projects would be affected | Low |\n| **PyPI attestations** | **PEP 740** Final since 2024; auto-generated by `pypa\u002Fgh-action-pypi-publish` v1.11.0+ with trusted publishing. **>132,360 packages carried attestations as of March 2026** | Medium |\n| **Trusted publishing** | PyPI (2023), npm (2025), crates.io (GA). **PEP 807** proposes standardizing it for any Python index | Medium |\n| **Cooldowns** | **pip 26.1 (26 April 2026) added `--uploaded-prior-to`**; uv `--exclude-newer`; pnpm `minimum-release-age`. Cited research: a **7-day cooldown would have prevented 8 of 10 analyzed attacks** | Medium |\n| **PEP 751 \u002F pylock.toml** | Accepted March\u002FApril 2025. Producers: uv ≥0.6.15, pip ≥25.1, PDM ≥2.24. **pip 26.1 added experimental `pip install -r pylock.toml`.** Both sides still **experimental**; install side lacks extras\u002Fdependency-group support. **uv keeps `uv.lock` as native; Poetry had not shipped support as of April 2026** | Medium |\n| **pip** | **26.1** (April 2026): cooldowns, pylock install, 2020-resolver fixes, **dropped Python 3.9** | Medium |\n| **PubGrub** | Powers Dart pub, uv, Poetry (Mixology), Bundler; the Rust `pubgrub` crate is the **designated replacement for Cargo's solver** | Medium |\n| **JS package managers** | npm 11.x, Yarn 4.x (Berry), pnpm 10.x, **Bun 1.3**. **Bun added a pnpm-style `--linker isolated`** storing packages under `node_modules\u002F.bun\u002F`; hoisted remains its default and existing projects are unchanged | Medium |\n| **crates.io provenance** | Trusted publishing GA; **Sigstore signing\u002Fprovenance (RFC 3403) still at proposal stage** | Medium |\n| **Go** | MVS unchanged; `proxy.golang.org` + `sum.golang.org` remain the strongest integrity story. ⚠️ Research notes immutability means **malicious module versions persist in the proxy cache even after the source repo is removed** | Low |\n| **Malware volume** | ReversingLabs: **+73% YoY** malicious open-source packages, npm ~90% of open-source malware. Sonatype: 512,847 malicious packages in a year (+156%) | Annual |\n| **EU CRA** | Vulnerability\u002Fincident **reporting obligations begin 11 Sept 2026**; full application 11 Dec 2027. CISA requires machine-readable SBOMs (SPDX\u002FCycloneDX) | **Imminent** |\n\n**Goes stale fastest:** npm attack campaigns (a new wave roughly every two months through\n2026); Python packaging PEP adoption; JS package-manager versions and benchmarks.\n**Essentially never stale:** §1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (SemVer's empirical reality), §3.1–§3.3 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (resolution\ntheory), §4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (lockfile design), §5.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (immutability), §6.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (layout trade-offs), §9.1 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`\n(install-time execution), §15 (anti-patterns).\n\n---\n\n## §18. The Canon\n\n### 18.1 Foundational writing\n\n| Author | Work | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Natalie Weizenbaum** | *PubGrub: Next-Generation Version Solving* (2018) | The algorithm now in Dart, uv, Poetry, Bundler, and slated for Cargo. Read the blog post *and* `dart-lang\u002Fpub\u002Fdoc\u002Fsolver.md` |\n| **Russ Cox** | *Go & Versioning* series — esp. *Minimal Version Selection*, *The Principles of Versioning in Go*, ***Version SAT*** | The best-argued minority position in the field, plus the clearest statement of why the problem is NP-complete |\n| **Di Cosmo, Mancinelli, Vouillon et al.** | The **EDOS** work; *Dependency solving: a separate concern in component evolution management* | The original NP-completeness proof and the \"dependency solving is a separate concern\" framing |\n| **Hynek Schlawack** | *Semantic Versioning Will Not Save You* | The strongest, most-cited critique of SemVer-as-guarantee |\n| **Hyrum Wright** | Hyrum's Law | One sentence that explains why every compatibility scheme leaks |\n| **Winters, Manshreck, Wright** | *Software Engineering at Google* (the versioning chapter) | The extended argument against SemVer, and the \"live at HEAD\" alternative |\n| **Andrew Nesbitt** | `nesbitt.io` — *Dependency Resolution Methods*, package-management reading lists; **ecosyste.ms** | The best single index of how each ecosystem actually resolves, and cross-ecosystem data |\n| **Eelco Dolstra** | The Nix thesis, *The Purely Functional Software Deployment Model* | The most rigorous rethinking of what a package manager is |\n| **Pinckney et al.** | *PacSolve* \u002F *MaxNPM* | Research on customizable resolution objectives beyond \"any valid solution\" |\n\n### 18.2 Primary sources\n\n- **Specs**: `semver.org`; **PEP 440** (versions), **PEP 508** (dependency specifiers),\n  **PEP 517\u002F518\u002F621** (build\u002Fmetadata), **PEP 658\u002F714** (metadata-only fetches),\n  **PEP 700** (upload timestamps), **PEP 740** (attestations), **PEP 751** (pylock),\n  **PEP 807** (trusted publishing), and the canonical `pylock.toml` spec on the **PyPA\n  specs page** (the PEP is explicitly a historical document).\n- **Ecosystem docs**: `go.dev\u002Fref\u002Fmod` (the best-written package-manager reference in\n  existence, full stop); the **Cargo Book**; **npm docs** on provenance and trusted\n  publishing; the **pnpm** docs on the store and linker; `docs.rs\u002Fpubgrub`.\n- **Security**: **SLSA** (`slsa.dev`), **Sigstore** (`sigstore.dev` and its blog),\n  **in-toto**, **OSV** (`osv.dev` — the interoperable advisory format), **OpenSSF\n  Scorecard**, and the OpenSSF **Securing Software Repositories WG**\n  (`repos.openssf.org`) — whose *Build Provenance for All Package Registries* guide is the\n  implementation manual if you're adding provenance to a registry.\n- **Incident reporting** (for how attacks actually work): Microsoft Threat Intelligence,\n  Unit 42, JFrog Security Research, Socket, ReversingLabs, Datadog Security Labs,\n  Sonatype, Aikido. These are vendor blogs with commercial incentives — cross-read them,\n  but they are where the technical detail lives.\n- **PyPI blog** (`blog.pypi.org`) and **discuss.python.org\u002Fc\u002Fpackaging** — packaging policy\n  is decided in public there; **GitHub Changelog** and the **npm blog** for the JS side.\n\n---\n\n## §19. Quick Reference\n\n### 19.1 If you're building one, in order\n1. **Version type + comparison + range semantics.** Test the prerelease edge cases first.\n2. **Manifest format**, with a format-version field.\n3. **Resolver** — pure function, PubGrub unless you have a reason, derivation retained for\n   errors.\n4. **Lockfile** — hashes, deterministic serialization, marker-aware, manifest-linked.\n5. **Content-addressed cache** with atomic writes.\n6. **Linker**, with a strict mode.\n7. **`--frozen`\u002F`ci` mode.** Before you ship anything else.\n8. **Registry API**: metadata separate from artifacts, immutable, timestamped, paginated.\n9. **Publishing**: trusted publishing from day one; never ship long-lived tokens.\n10. **Provenance** generated by default.\n11. **No install scripts by default.**\n12. **`why`, `--dry-run`, `--json`, and good errors.**\n\n### 19.2 Diagnostic first moves\n| Symptom | Look at |\n|---|---|\n| \"Works locally, fails in CI\" | Is CI resolving instead of using the lockfile? Platform markers? |\n| Resolution hangs | Which package is being backtracked; add a constraint; check metadata endpoint |\n| Integrity hash mismatch | Registry served different bytes, a mirror, or a mutable release |\n| \"Cannot find module X\" but it's installed | Phantom dependency, or hoisting\u002Flinker mismatch |\n| Two versions of the same type | Semver-incompatible duplicate in the graph (`cargo tree -d`, `npm ls`) |\n| Install suddenly slow | Cache invalidated, metadata endpoint changed, or a new sdist-only dependency |\n| Unexpected package in the tree | `why`\u002F`ls`\u002F`mod why` |\n| Compromise suspected | Check upload timestamps, provenance\u002Fattestation, and whether it published outside normal CI |\n\n### 19.3 Numbers worth knowing\n- Dependency resolution is **NP-complete** (Di Cosmo et al., 2005).\n- **~20%** of non-major Maven upgrades contained breaking changes; **~43%** of yanked\n  crates.io releases were yanked for SemVer breakage.\n- A **7-day cooldown** would reportedly have blocked **8 of 10** analyzed supply-chain\n  attacks.\n- Malicious open-source packages: **+73% YoY**; npm ≈ **90%** of open-source malware.\n- August 2026 ChainDrop wave: **400+ packages, ~2B monthly installs, hours to spread**,\n  ~5 min average detection latency.\n- **>132,000** PyPI packages carried PEP 740 attestations by March 2026.\n- PyPI's 14-day file rule affected only **56 of the top 15,000** projects.\n\n---\n\n## §20. Sources and Method\n\n**Method.** Narrative (not systematic) review. Durable material — §1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (SemVer's empirical\nrecord), §3 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (resolution theory), §4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (lockfile design), §5.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (immutability), §6 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (layout),\n§9 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces` (install-time execution), §15 (anti-patterns) — is synthesized from the primary\nliterature, ecosystem specifications, and the canonical writing in §18. Every\n**time-sensitive** claim (incidents, versions, dates, adoption figures) was verified\nagainst a primary or near-primary source in **August 2026** and is flagged in §17 with a\ndecay-risk rating. Where ecosystems have made different defensible choices, §16 presents\nboth cases rather than adjudicating.\n\n**Search log** (August 2026): npm supply-chain attacks and Shai-Hulud\u002FChainDrop timeline ·\nPEP 751 \u002F pylock.toml adoption and pip 26.1 · PubGrub, SAT, and dependency-resolution\ntheory · Sigstore \u002F SLSA \u002F provenance adoption across registries · npm vs pnpm vs Yarn vs\nBun layouts and linkers · Go modules, MVS, and the checksum database · PyPI security\nposture, PEP 740, trusted publishing, and the 14-day rule · SemVer compliance research and\nHyrum's Law.\n\n**Primary and near-primary sources consulted (selected):**\n- **PEPs and PyPA specs** — PEP 740, 751, 807; the `pylock.toml` specification on\n  packaging.python.org; pip 26.1 release notes (Richard Si) and changelog\n- **Microsoft Security Blog** — \"ChainDrop supply chain compromise: anatomy of a\n  self-propagating worm\" (4 Aug 2026); **JFrog Security Research**; **Unit 42**;\n  **Datadog Security Labs** (LiteLLM\u002Ftelnyx TeamPCP campaign); **ReversingLabs**;\n  **Socket**; **Sygnia**\n- **GitHub Blog** — \"Our plan for a more secure npm supply chain\"; \"Introducing npm package\n  provenance\"; **npm docs** on generating provenance statements\n- **Sigstore** — project blog (npm provenance GA; cosign verification), community roadmap;\n  **SLSA** specification (distributing provenance); **OpenSSF** Securing Software\n  Repositories WG\n- **PyPI Blog** — 2025 year in review; Help Net Security and contemporaneous reporting on\n  the 14-day upload restriction (Seth Larson, Mike Fiedler)\n- **go.dev\u002Fref\u002Fmod**; **research.swtch.com** (Version SAT, vgo principles)\n- **dart-lang\u002Fpub** solver documentation; **pubgrub-rs**; **DeepWiki** on uv's resolver\n- **Bun documentation** (isolated installs); pnpm documentation\n- **Andrew Nesbitt** (`nesbitt.io`) — dependency resolution methods; **ecosyste.ms**\n  package-manager-resolvers reference\n- Academic: Di Cosmo et al. (EDOS), Maven and Go SemVer-compliance studies, the crates.io\n  yanked-releases study, arXiv work on hypergraph dependency resolution\n\n**Confidence statement.** **High confidence** in §1–§7 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`, `package-manager-registries-and-installation`, §9–§12 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`, `package-manager-ux-ecosystems-and-governance`, §15, §18–§19 — these rest\non specifications, primary ecosystem documentation, and peer-reviewed or widely-replicated\nresearch. **High confidence** in §17's verified items as of the stated date.\n**Moderate confidence** in §8 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`'s incident specifics and §11 → `package-manager-ux-ecosystems-and-governance`'s performance figures: the\nattack narratives come from security-vendor research with commercial incentives and were\ncross-read across multiple independent vendors (Microsoft, JFrog, Unit 42, Datadog, Socket,\nReversingLabs) where possible, but package counts and detection latencies are\nvendor-measured and vary between reports; the package-manager benchmark figures are\nsingle-machine and single-project and are flagged in place as directional only. The\n\"7-day cooldown would have prevented 8 of 10 attacks\" figure is reported alongside the pip\n26.1 release and is repeated here with its source named — it is a compelling result from a\nsingle analysis, not an established measurement.\n","# Package Manager Development: Anti-Patterns, Contested Questions, Currency, and Canon\n\n> **Part 5 of 5** of the *Package Manager Development* reference (plugin `package-manager-development`), covering §15–§20. Sibling skills: `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (§0–§4), `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (§5–§7), `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces` (§8–§10), `package-manager-ux-ecosystems-and-governance` (§11–§14). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** Verified August 2026. See §17 below for the currency snapshot and what goes stale first.\n\n> **How to read this.** Reference, not tutorial. Sections are independent. Three markers:\n> - **[DURABLE]** — computer science, or a lesson every ecosystem has independently learned.\n>   Does not expire.\n> - **[ECOSYSTEM]** — specific to npm, PyPI, crates.io, Go, etc. Verify against that\n>   ecosystem's current docs.\n> - **[CONTESTED]** — the ecosystems have made genuinely different, defensible choices, or\n>   the practitioners disagree. Both cases given.\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the design mistakes that produce unreproducible builds, wedged\n> caches, exponential resolutions, or supply-chain compromise.\n>\n> **The framing that organizes everything below: a package manager is a distributed\n> systems problem wearing a CLI.** It is a cache-coherency problem, a constraint-solving\n> problem, a trust-and-identity problem, and a compatibility-contract problem, all of\n> which happen to be invoked by typing `install`. Every serious difficulty in this\n> document is one of those four, and treating it as \"just downloading files\" is the root\n> of most bad designs.\n\n---\n\n## §15. Anti-Patterns\n\n| Anti-pattern | Why | Instead |\n|---|---|---|\n| No lockfile | Unreproducible builds; every install is a new resolution | Lockfile with integrity hashes, from v1 |\n| Lockfile without hashes | Pins versions, not bytes | sha256\u002Fsha512 per artifact |\n| Lockfile that only works on the generating platform | CI breaks | Universal\u002Fmarker-aware lockfiles (§4.2 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`) |\n| Resolving in CI | Non-reproducible, and installs today's malware | `ci`\u002F`--frozen-lockfile`\u002F`--locked` |\n| Running install scripts by default | The primary malware vector (§9 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`) | Default off + allowlist |\n| Mutable published versions | Cache incoherence, hash breakage | Immutable + yank (§5.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`) |\n| Allowing new files on old releases | Retroactive poisoning | Time-bounded (§5.3 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`) |\n| Reusing deleted package names | Repojacking | Never reuse |\n| Long-lived publish tokens | Harvest-now-use-later; worm fuel | Trusted publishing \u002F OIDC (§7.1 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`) |\n| Trusting by org or `*` in trusted publishing | Looks secure, isn't | Full repo + branch\u002Fenvironment |\n| Pinning CI actions by tag | Mutable reference; root cause of 2026 incidents | Pin by commit SHA |\n| Requiring artifact download to learn dependencies | Resolution is now network-bound and slow | Metadata-only endpoints |\n| Resolver that discards its derivation | Unfixably bad error messages | PubGrub-style incompatibility tracking |\n| Unbounded backtracking with no diagnostics | Users experience a hang | Bound, and report what's thrashing |\n| Non-deterministic lockfile serialization | Spurious diffs → unreviewed lockfiles | Sorted, stable output |\n| Entangling resolve \u002F fetch \u002F install | No dry-run, no offline, untestable | Separate the stages (§0.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`) |\n| Non-atomic cache writes | Wedged caches users fix by `rm -rf` | Stage + verify + rename |\n| Flat\u002Fhoisted layout with no strict option | Phantom dependencies | Offer an isolated linker |\n| Letting a public index satisfy a private name | Dependency confusion | Scope-pinned registries |\n| Treating SemVer as a guarantee | It's violated at measurable rates (§1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`) | Lockfile is truth; upgrades are explicit |\n| Hand-editing a lockfile | Always a bug | Provide `overrides` (§10.3 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`) |\n| No `why`\u002F`explain` command | Users cannot debug their own tree | Ship it early |\n| Delete-on-request unpublish | `left-pad` | Yank |\n\n---\n\n## §16. Contested Questions\n\n**16.1 MVS vs. constraint solving.** §3.4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`. Determinism and simplicity versus automatic\npatch adoption and expressiveness. Note this is genuinely unresolved: Go's ecosystem is\nhappy, and the rest of the world independently chose the other way.\n\n**16.2 Should multiple versions coexist?** §6.3 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`. Compatibility and resolvability versus\nduplication and singleton bugs. Language runtime capability largely decides this for you.\n\n**16.3 Hoisted vs. isolated vs. PnP.** §6.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation`. Compatibility versus correctness. The\nphantom-dependency argument is the strongest technical case for strictness; the volume of\npostinstall scripts that assume a hoisted shape is the strongest case against.\n\n**16.4 Lockfiles for libraries.** §4.3 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`.\n\n**16.5 One standard lockfile format vs. per-tool formats.** §4.4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`. The Python experience\nsuggests standard-as-interchange is achievable, standard-as-canonical is not, once\ncompeting formats have shipped.\n\n**16.6 Is SemVer worth it?** §1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`. The empirical violation rates are not in dispute; what's\ndisputed is whether an imperfect declared intent beats no signal at all. (Most people who\nsay \"SemVer doesn't work\" still want maintainers to use it.)\n\n**16.7 Should the package manager also be the build tool?** Cargo and Bun say yes\n(integration, one config, coherent caching). npm\u002Fpip historically say no (separation of\nconcerns, competing build tools can innovate). Integration wins on UX and loses on\nflexibility; both camps ship successful tools.\n\n**16.8 Cooldowns: safety vs. patch latency.** §8.4 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`. The 8-in-10 prevention figure is\nstriking; the counter is that a cooldown also delays the fix for the *next* incident.\nNobody has a clean answer to \"how do you expedite genuine security patches through a\ncooldown\" that doesn't reintroduce the attack surface.\n\n**16.9 Vendoring.** Vendored dependencies give you total control, auditability, and\nimmunity to registry outages and takedowns — at the cost of enormous repos and manual\nsecurity updates. Go supports it first-class; most ecosystems treat it as a last resort.\nBoth positions are held by serious organizations.\n\n---\n\n## §17. Currency Snapshot — verified August 2026\n\n| Thing | Status as of Aug 2026 | Decay risk |\n|---|---|---|\n| **npm supply-chain threat** | **Shai-Hulud worm family, Sept 2025 – Aug 2026.** Latest: **\"ChainDrop\"\u002FMini Shai-Hulud, 4 Aug 2026** — `keyv`, `flat-cache`, `cache-manager`, **400+ packages, 2,234 artifacts, ~2B monthly installs**, obfuscated Bun payload via npm `preinstall`, harvesting npm\u002FGitHub\u002FAWS\u002FKubernetes\u002FVault credentials. Waves in Sept 2025, Nov 2025 (v2, preinstall), Apr 2026 (\"Third Coming\", \"Mini\"), May 2026 (TeamPCP) | **Very high** |\n| **npm remediation** | Mandatory 2FA for publishing, **legacy never-expiring tokens revoked**, granular short-expiry tokens, trusted publishing GA. 500+ packages removed in the Sept 2025 response | Medium |\n| **PyPI incidents** | **LiteLLM 1.82.7\u002F1.82.8 (24 Mar 2026, ~95M monthly downloads) and telnyx 4.87.1\u002F4.87.2 (27 Mar)** — TeamPCP campaign originating from a **compromised Trivy GitHub Action** via a mutable reference. LiteLLM used a `.pth` file for import-time execution. PyPI quarantined the project | Medium |\n| **PyPI release immutability** | ⚠️ **Since 8 July 2026, PyPI rejects new files on releases older than 14 days.** Analysis showed only 56 of the top 15,000 projects would be affected | Low |\n| **PyPI attestations** | **PEP 740** Final since 2024; auto-generated by `pypa\u002Fgh-action-pypi-publish` v1.11.0+ with trusted publishing. **>132,360 packages carried attestations as of March 2026** | Medium |\n| **Trusted publishing** | PyPI (2023), npm (2025), crates.io (GA). **PEP 807** proposes standardizing it for any Python index | Medium |\n| **Cooldowns** | **pip 26.1 (26 April 2026) added `--uploaded-prior-to`**; uv `--exclude-newer`; pnpm `minimum-release-age`. Cited research: a **7-day cooldown would have prevented 8 of 10 analyzed attacks** | Medium |\n| **PEP 751 \u002F pylock.toml** | Accepted March\u002FApril 2025. Producers: uv ≥0.6.15, pip ≥25.1, PDM ≥2.24. **pip 26.1 added experimental `pip install -r pylock.toml`.** Both sides still **experimental**; install side lacks extras\u002Fdependency-group support. **uv keeps `uv.lock` as native; Poetry had not shipped support as of April 2026** | Medium |\n| **pip** | **26.1** (April 2026): cooldowns, pylock install, 2020-resolver fixes, **dropped Python 3.9** | Medium |\n| **PubGrub** | Powers Dart pub, uv, Poetry (Mixology), Bundler; the Rust `pubgrub` crate is the **designated replacement for Cargo's solver** | Medium |\n| **JS package managers** | npm 11.x, Yarn 4.x (Berry), pnpm 10.x, **Bun 1.3**. **Bun added a pnpm-style `--linker isolated`** storing packages under `node_modules\u002F.bun\u002F`; hoisted remains its default and existing projects are unchanged | Medium |\n| **crates.io provenance** | Trusted publishing GA; **Sigstore signing\u002Fprovenance (RFC 3403) still at proposal stage** | Medium |\n| **Go** | MVS unchanged; `proxy.golang.org` + `sum.golang.org` remain the strongest integrity story. ⚠️ Research notes immutability means **malicious module versions persist in the proxy cache even after the source repo is removed** | Low |\n| **Malware volume** | ReversingLabs: **+73% YoY** malicious open-source packages, npm ~90% of open-source malware. Sonatype: 512,847 malicious packages in a year (+156%) | Annual |\n| **EU CRA** | Vulnerability\u002Fincident **reporting obligations begin 11 Sept 2026**; full application 11 Dec 2027. CISA requires machine-readable SBOMs (SPDX\u002FCycloneDX) | **Imminent** |\n\n**Goes stale fastest:** npm attack campaigns (a new wave roughly every two months through\n2026); Python packaging PEP adoption; JS package-manager versions and benchmarks.\n**Essentially never stale:** §1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (SemVer's empirical reality), §3.1–§3.3 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (resolution\ntheory), §4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (lockfile design), §5.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (immutability), §6.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (layout trade-offs), §9.1 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`\n(install-time execution), §15 (anti-patterns).\n\n---\n\n## §18. The Canon\n\n### 18.1 Foundational writing\n\n| Author | Work | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Natalie Weizenbaum** | *PubGrub: Next-Generation Version Solving* (2018) | The algorithm now in Dart, uv, Poetry, Bundler, and slated for Cargo. Read the blog post *and* `dart-lang\u002Fpub\u002Fdoc\u002Fsolver.md` |\n| **Russ Cox** | *Go & Versioning* series — esp. *Minimal Version Selection*, *The Principles of Versioning in Go*, ***Version SAT*** | The best-argued minority position in the field, plus the clearest statement of why the problem is NP-complete |\n| **Di Cosmo, Mancinelli, Vouillon et al.** | The **EDOS** work; *Dependency solving: a separate concern in component evolution management* | The original NP-completeness proof and the \"dependency solving is a separate concern\" framing |\n| **Hynek Schlawack** | *Semantic Versioning Will Not Save You* | The strongest, most-cited critique of SemVer-as-guarantee |\n| **Hyrum Wright** | Hyrum's Law | One sentence that explains why every compatibility scheme leaks |\n| **Winters, Manshreck, Wright** | *Software Engineering at Google* (the versioning chapter) | The extended argument against SemVer, and the \"live at HEAD\" alternative |\n| **Andrew Nesbitt** | `nesbitt.io` — *Dependency Resolution Methods*, package-management reading lists; **ecosyste.ms** | The best single index of how each ecosystem actually resolves, and cross-ecosystem data |\n| **Eelco Dolstra** | The Nix thesis, *The Purely Functional Software Deployment Model* | The most rigorous rethinking of what a package manager is |\n| **Pinckney et al.** | *PacSolve* \u002F *MaxNPM* | Research on customizable resolution objectives beyond \"any valid solution\" |\n\n### 18.2 Primary sources\n\n- **Specs**: `semver.org`; **PEP 440** (versions), **PEP 508** (dependency specifiers),\n  **PEP 517\u002F518\u002F621** (build\u002Fmetadata), **PEP 658\u002F714** (metadata-only fetches),\n  **PEP 700** (upload timestamps), **PEP 740** (attestations), **PEP 751** (pylock),\n  **PEP 807** (trusted publishing), and the canonical `pylock.toml` spec on the **PyPA\n  specs page** (the PEP is explicitly a historical document).\n- **Ecosystem docs**: `go.dev\u002Fref\u002Fmod` (the best-written package-manager reference in\n  existence, full stop); the **Cargo Book**; **npm docs** on provenance and trusted\n  publishing; the **pnpm** docs on the store and linker; `docs.rs\u002Fpubgrub`.\n- **Security**: **SLSA** (`slsa.dev`), **Sigstore** (`sigstore.dev` and its blog),\n  **in-toto**, **OSV** (`osv.dev` — the interoperable advisory format), **OpenSSF\n  Scorecard**, and the OpenSSF **Securing Software Repositories WG**\n  (`repos.openssf.org`) — whose *Build Provenance for All Package Registries* guide is the\n  implementation manual if you're adding provenance to a registry.\n- **Incident reporting** (for how attacks actually work): Microsoft Threat Intelligence,\n  Unit 42, JFrog Security Research, Socket, ReversingLabs, Datadog Security Labs,\n  Sonatype, Aikido. These are vendor blogs with commercial incentives — cross-read them,\n  but they are where the technical detail lives.\n- **PyPI blog** (`blog.pypi.org`) and **discuss.python.org\u002Fc\u002Fpackaging** — packaging policy\n  is decided in public there; **GitHub Changelog** and the **npm blog** for the JS side.\n\n---\n\n## §19. Quick Reference\n\n### 19.1 If you're building one, in order\n1. **Version type + comparison + range semantics.** Test the prerelease edge cases first.\n2. **Manifest format**, with a format-version field.\n3. **Resolver** — pure function, PubGrub unless you have a reason, derivation retained for\n   errors.\n4. **Lockfile** — hashes, deterministic serialization, marker-aware, manifest-linked.\n5. **Content-addressed cache** with atomic writes.\n6. **Linker**, with a strict mode.\n7. **`--frozen`\u002F`ci` mode.** Before you ship anything else.\n8. **Registry API**: metadata separate from artifacts, immutable, timestamped, paginated.\n9. **Publishing**: trusted publishing from day one; never ship long-lived tokens.\n10. **Provenance** generated by default.\n11. **No install scripts by default.**\n12. **`why`, `--dry-run`, `--json`, and good errors.**\n\n### 19.2 Diagnostic first moves\n| Symptom | Look at |\n|---|---|\n| \"Works locally, fails in CI\" | Is CI resolving instead of using the lockfile? Platform markers? |\n| Resolution hangs | Which package is being backtracked; add a constraint; check metadata endpoint |\n| Integrity hash mismatch | Registry served different bytes, a mirror, or a mutable release |\n| \"Cannot find module X\" but it's installed | Phantom dependency, or hoisting\u002Flinker mismatch |\n| Two versions of the same type | Semver-incompatible duplicate in the graph (`cargo tree -d`, `npm ls`) |\n| Install suddenly slow | Cache invalidated, metadata endpoint changed, or a new sdist-only dependency |\n| Unexpected package in the tree | `why`\u002F`ls`\u002F`mod why` |\n| Compromise suspected | Check upload timestamps, provenance\u002Fattestation, and whether it published outside normal CI |\n\n### 19.3 Numbers worth knowing\n- Dependency resolution is **NP-complete** (Di Cosmo et al., 2005).\n- **~20%** of non-major Maven upgrades contained breaking changes; **~43%** of yanked\n  crates.io releases were yanked for SemVer breakage.\n- A **7-day cooldown** would reportedly have blocked **8 of 10** analyzed supply-chain\n  attacks.\n- Malicious open-source packages: **+73% YoY**; npm ≈ **90%** of open-source malware.\n- August 2026 ChainDrop wave: **400+ packages, ~2B monthly installs, hours to spread**,\n  ~5 min average detection latency.\n- **>132,000** PyPI packages carried PEP 740 attestations by March 2026.\n- PyPI's 14-day file rule affected only **56 of the top 15,000** projects.\n\n---\n\n## §20. Sources and Method\n\n**Method.** Narrative (not systematic) review. Durable material — §1.1 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (SemVer's empirical\nrecord), §3 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (resolution theory), §4 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution` (lockfile design), §5.2 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (immutability), §6 → `package-manager-registries-and-installation` (layout),\n§9 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces` (install-time execution), §15 (anti-patterns) — is synthesized from the primary\nliterature, ecosystem specifications, and the canonical writing in §18. Every\n**time-sensitive** claim (incidents, versions, dates, adoption figures) was verified\nagainst a primary or near-primary source in **August 2026** and is flagged in §17 with a\ndecay-risk rating. Where ecosystems have made different defensible choices, §16 presents\nboth cases rather than adjudicating.\n\n**Search log** (August 2026): npm supply-chain attacks and Shai-Hulud\u002FChainDrop timeline ·\nPEP 751 \u002F pylock.toml adoption and pip 26.1 · PubGrub, SAT, and dependency-resolution\ntheory · Sigstore \u002F SLSA \u002F provenance adoption across registries · npm vs pnpm vs Yarn vs\nBun layouts and linkers · Go modules, MVS, and the checksum database · PyPI security\nposture, PEP 740, trusted publishing, and the 14-day rule · SemVer compliance research and\nHyrum's Law.\n\n**Primary and near-primary sources consulted (selected):**\n- **PEPs and PyPA specs** — PEP 740, 751, 807; the `pylock.toml` specification on\n  packaging.python.org; pip 26.1 release notes (Richard Si) and changelog\n- **Microsoft Security Blog** — \"ChainDrop supply chain compromise: anatomy of a\n  self-propagating worm\" (4 Aug 2026); **JFrog Security Research**; **Unit 42**;\n  **Datadog Security Labs** (LiteLLM\u002Ftelnyx TeamPCP campaign); **ReversingLabs**;\n  **Socket**; **Sygnia**\n- **GitHub Blog** — \"Our plan for a more secure npm supply chain\"; \"Introducing npm package\n  provenance\"; **npm docs** on generating provenance statements\n- **Sigstore** — project blog (npm provenance GA; cosign verification), community roadmap;\n  **SLSA** specification (distributing provenance); **OpenSSF** Securing Software\n  Repositories WG\n- **PyPI Blog** — 2025 year in review; Help Net Security and contemporaneous reporting on\n  the 14-day upload restriction (Seth Larson, Mike Fiedler)\n- **go.dev\u002Fref\u002Fmod**; **research.swtch.com** (Version SAT, vgo principles)\n- **dart-lang\u002Fpub** solver documentation; **pubgrub-rs**; **DeepWiki** on uv's resolver\n- **Bun documentation** (isolated installs); pnpm documentation\n- **Andrew Nesbitt** (`nesbitt.io`) — dependency resolution methods; **ecosyste.ms**\n  package-manager-resolvers reference\n- Academic: Di Cosmo et al. (EDOS), Maven and Go SemVer-compliance studies, the crates.io\n  yanked-releases study, arXiv work on hypergraph dependency resolution\n\n**Confidence statement.** **High confidence** in §1–§7 → `package-manager-versioning-and-resolution`, `package-manager-registries-and-installation`, §9–§12 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`, `package-manager-ux-ecosystems-and-governance`, §15, §18–§19 — these rest\non specifications, primary ecosystem documentation, and peer-reviewed or widely-replicated\nresearch. **High confidence** in §17's verified items as of the stated date.\n**Moderate confidence** in §8 → `package-manager-supply-chain-and-workspaces`'s incident specifics and §11 → `package-manager-ux-ecosystems-and-governance`'s performance figures: the\nattack narratives come from security-vendor research with commercial incentives and were\ncross-read across multiple independent vendors (Microsoft, JFrog, Unit 42, Datadog, Socket,\nReversingLabs) where possible, but package counts and detection latencies are\nvendor-measured and vary between reports; the package-manager benchmark figures are\nsingle-machine and single-project and are flagged in place as directional only. The\n\"7-day cooldown would have prevented 8 of 10 attacks\" figure is reported alongside the pip\n26.1 release and is repeated here with its source named — it is a compelling result from a\nsingle analysis, not an established measurement.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpackage-manager-development\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-manager-reference",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill package-manager-reference",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill package-manager-reference",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill package-manager-reference","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fpackage-manager-development\u002Fskills\u002Fpackage-manager-reference\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]