[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7APWDPZ0SNTSP37T7SDNGTY":3,"skill-same:01M7APWDPZ0SNTSP37T7SDNGTY":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7APWDPZ0SNTSP37T7SDNGTY","mil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles",null,"Use when strategic, operational and tactical claims are getting mixed up: the levels of war and why conflating them is the most common analytical error in commentary, the principles of war and the limits of principle-based reasoning, and manoeuvre versus attrition alongside decision cycles including the OODA loop and what it does and does not explain.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fmilitary-science-and-national-defence\u002Fskills\u002Fmil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: mil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles\ndescription: \"Use when strategic, operational and tactical claims are getting mixed up: the levels of war and why conflating them is the most common analytical error in commentary, the principles of war and the limits of principle-based reasoning, and manoeuvre versus attrition alongside decision cycles including the OODA loop and what it does and does not explain.\"\n---\n\n# Military Science: The Levels of War, Principles and Their Limits, and Manoeuvre, Attrition and Decision Cycles\n\n> **Part 2 of 6** of the *Military Science and National Defence* reference (plugin `military-science-and-national-defence`), covering §5–§7. Sibling skills: `mil-theory-clausewitz-sun-tzu-and-sea-and-air-power` (§0–§4), `mil-deterrence-nuclear-strategy-alliances-and-grand-strategy` (§8–§12), `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement` (§13–§18), `mil-modern-conflict-irregular-warfare-resilience-and-the-law` (§19–§25), `mil-reference` (§26–§31). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** The theory is old and durable. Two areas are moving. See §26 → `mil-reference` for what Ukraine has actually demonstrated, and European rearmament.\n\n> **⚠️ SCOPE. This is pitched where a war college survey course sits — strategy, doctrine,\n> institutions and policy.** ⚠️ **It contains no operational, tactical or technical\n> instruction, no weapons information, and nothing that would assist anyone in causing\n> harm. The material here is what an informed citizen, policy analyst or historian needs\n> to reason about defence — and it is deliberately at the level where the interesting\n> questions actually live.**\n>\n> **Complements a resource-extraction reference (strategic materials), a semiconductor\n> reference (export controls and technology competition), a wireless reference (spectrum\n> and electronic warfare), and a speaking-and-influence reference (§18's persuasion\n> evidence bears directly on §21 → `mil-modern-conflict-irregular-warfare-resilience-and-the-law`).**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark where popular strategic intuition is reliably wrong.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this document:**\n> 1. **⚠️ WAR IS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT OR IT IS NOTHING** (§2 → `mil-theory-clausewitz-sun-tzu-and-sea-and-air-power`). **Clausewitz's central\n>    claim is not a slogan. Military action detached from a political objective it can\n>    actually achieve is the recurring cause of strategic failure, and the pattern repeats\n>    across two centuries.**\n> 2. **⚠️ DEFENCE IS AN ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM BEFORE IT IS A MILITARY ONE**\n>    (§14 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`, §18 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`, §26.2 → `mil-reference`). **Logistics, industrial capacity and the ability to replace losses\n>    decide protracted wars. Amateurs discuss tactics; the professional literature discusses\n>    sustainment.**\n> 3. **⚠️ THE HARDEST CAPABILITY TO COPY IS INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING** (§15 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`, §26.1 → `mil-reference`). **Any\n>    state can buy equipment. What distinguishes effective militaries is the speed at which\n>    they absorb, adapt and redistribute what they learn — and that is organizational, not\n>    technological.**\n\n---\n\n## §5. ⚠️ The Levels of War\n\n```\n⚠️ ⚠️ THE THREE LEVELS, and conflating them is the most common\n   error in public discussion of war\n   ⚠️ STRATEGIC  ⚠️ national objectives, resource allocation,\n      what the war is FOR\n   ⚠️ ⚠️ OPERATIONAL  ⚠️ campaigns — the sequencing of\n      engagements to achieve strategic aims. ⚠️ Formalized as a\n      distinct level by Soviet theorists and adopted in the West\n      only in the 1980s\n   ⚠️ TACTICAL  ⚠️ individual engagements\n⚠️ ⚠️ TACTICAL SUCCESS DOES NOT AGGREGATE INTO STRATEGIC\n   SUCCESS. ⚠️ This is the single most important thing in this\n   section. ⚠️ A military can win every engagement and lose the\n   war, because the war is decided by whether the political\n   objective is achieved (§2)\n   ⚠️ Vietnam is the canonical Western example; the point\n   generalizes\n⚠️ ⚠️ THE CORRESPONDING ERROR RUNS UPWARD TOO  ⚠️ a strategic\n   objective the military instrument cannot deliver — \"defeat\n   an ideology,\" \"create a stable democracy\" — is not made\n   achievable by tactical excellence\n⚠️ ⚠️ THE GRAND STRATEGIC LEVEL sits above all three (§12),\n   integrating diplomatic, informational, military and economic\n   instruments — ⚠️ and military force is usually the least\n   efficient of them\n```\n\n---\n\n## §6. Principles and Their Limits\n\n**⚠️ The classic lists** — ⚠️ **objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity\nof command, security, surprise, simplicity, and national variants — are useful mnemonics.**\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — they are heuristics, not laws, and several contradict each other.**\n> ⚠️ **Mass conflicts with economy of force; surprise conflicts with security; simplicity\n> conflicts with sophistication.** **⚠️ Judgement lies in knowing which principle governs in\n> a given situation, which is exactly what the list cannot tell you — and treating them as a\n> checklist is a recognized failure mode.**\n\n**⚠️ Lanchester's laws** model attrition mathematically — ⚠️ **the square law suggesting that\nfor aimed fire, combat power scales with the SQUARE of numbers, which is the formal argument\nfor concentration.** ⚠️ **Their empirical validity is contested and they are best treated as\nan illustration of why numbers matter more than linearly, not as a predictive tool.**\n**⚠️ Force ratios** — ⚠️ **rules of thumb about attacker-to-defender advantage are widely\ncited, weakly grounded, and highly dependent on terrain, preparation and quality.**\n\n---\n\n## §7. Manoeuvre, Attrition and Decision Cycles\n\n**⚠️ The manoeuvre-versus-attrition distinction**: ⚠️ **attrition seeks to destroy the\nopponent's forces; manoeuvre seeks to break their cohesion and decision-making so that\ntheir remaining strength becomes irrelevant.**\n**⚠️ Boyd's OODA loop** — ⚠️ **observe, orient, decide, act — with the argument that operating\ninside an opponent's decision cycle causes disorientation and collapse.** ⚠️ **Note that\nORIENT is the part Boyd considered decisive and the part popular versions omit; the loop is\nusually reduced to \"be fast,\" which loses the point.**\n**⚠️ Mission command (Auftragstaktik)** — ⚠️ **specify the intent and the task, delegate the\nmethod.** ⚠️ **It requires trust, shared doctrine and tolerance of subordinate error, which\nis why it is easy to declare and hard to practise** (§17 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`).\n**⚠️ The honest caveat**: ⚠️ **the manoeuvrist school became somewhat doctrinaire in\nWestern militaries, and §26.1 → `mil-reference` shows attrition returning to prominence — the two are\ncomplementary rather than opposed.**\n\n---\n\n# PART II — DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY\n","# Military Science: The Levels of War, Principles and Their Limits, and Manoeuvre, Attrition and Decision Cycles\n\n> **Part 2 of 6** of the *Military Science and National Defence* reference (plugin `military-science-and-national-defence`), covering §5–§7. Sibling skills: `mil-theory-clausewitz-sun-tzu-and-sea-and-air-power` (§0–§4), `mil-deterrence-nuclear-strategy-alliances-and-grand-strategy` (§8–§12), `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement` (§13–§18), `mil-modern-conflict-irregular-warfare-resilience-and-the-law` (§19–§25), `mil-reference` (§26–§31). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** The theory is old and durable. Two areas are moving. See §26 → `mil-reference` for what Ukraine has actually demonstrated, and European rearmament.\n\n> **⚠️ SCOPE. This is pitched where a war college survey course sits — strategy, doctrine,\n> institutions and policy.** ⚠️ **It contains no operational, tactical or technical\n> instruction, no weapons information, and nothing that would assist anyone in causing\n> harm. The material here is what an informed citizen, policy analyst or historian needs\n> to reason about defence — and it is deliberately at the level where the interesting\n> questions actually live.**\n>\n> **Complements a resource-extraction reference (strategic materials), a semiconductor\n> reference (export controls and technology competition), a wireless reference (spectrum\n> and electronic warfare), and a speaking-and-influence reference (§18's persuasion\n> evidence bears directly on §21 → `mil-modern-conflict-irregular-warfare-resilience-and-the-law`).**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark where popular strategic intuition is reliably wrong.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this document:**\n> 1. **⚠️ WAR IS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT OR IT IS NOTHING** (§2 → `mil-theory-clausewitz-sun-tzu-and-sea-and-air-power`). **Clausewitz's central\n>    claim is not a slogan. Military action detached from a political objective it can\n>    actually achieve is the recurring cause of strategic failure, and the pattern repeats\n>    across two centuries.**\n> 2. **⚠️ DEFENCE IS AN ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM BEFORE IT IS A MILITARY ONE**\n>    (§14 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`, §18 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`, §26.2 → `mil-reference`). **Logistics, industrial capacity and the ability to replace losses\n>    decide protracted wars. Amateurs discuss tactics; the professional literature discusses\n>    sustainment.**\n> 3. **⚠️ THE HARDEST CAPABILITY TO COPY IS INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING** (§15 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`, §26.1 → `mil-reference`). **Any\n>    state can buy equipment. What distinguishes effective militaries is the speed at which\n>    they absorb, adapt and redistribute what they learn — and that is organizational, not\n>    technological.**\n\n---\n\n## §5. ⚠️ The Levels of War\n\n```\n⚠️ ⚠️ THE THREE LEVELS, and conflating them is the most common\n   error in public discussion of war\n   ⚠️ STRATEGIC  ⚠️ national objectives, resource allocation,\n      what the war is FOR\n   ⚠️ ⚠️ OPERATIONAL  ⚠️ campaigns — the sequencing of\n      engagements to achieve strategic aims. ⚠️ Formalized as a\n      distinct level by Soviet theorists and adopted in the West\n      only in the 1980s\n   ⚠️ TACTICAL  ⚠️ individual engagements\n⚠️ ⚠️ TACTICAL SUCCESS DOES NOT AGGREGATE INTO STRATEGIC\n   SUCCESS. ⚠️ This is the single most important thing in this\n   section. ⚠️ A military can win every engagement and lose the\n   war, because the war is decided by whether the political\n   objective is achieved (§2)\n   ⚠️ Vietnam is the canonical Western example; the point\n   generalizes\n⚠️ ⚠️ THE CORRESPONDING ERROR RUNS UPWARD TOO  ⚠️ a strategic\n   objective the military instrument cannot deliver — \"defeat\n   an ideology,\" \"create a stable democracy\" — is not made\n   achievable by tactical excellence\n⚠️ ⚠️ THE GRAND STRATEGIC LEVEL sits above all three (§12),\n   integrating diplomatic, informational, military and economic\n   instruments — ⚠️ and military force is usually the least\n   efficient of them\n```\n\n---\n\n## §6. Principles and Their Limits\n\n**⚠️ The classic lists** — ⚠️ **objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity\nof command, security, surprise, simplicity, and national variants — are useful mnemonics.**\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — they are heuristics, not laws, and several contradict each other.**\n> ⚠️ **Mass conflicts with economy of force; surprise conflicts with security; simplicity\n> conflicts with sophistication.** **⚠️ Judgement lies in knowing which principle governs in\n> a given situation, which is exactly what the list cannot tell you — and treating them as a\n> checklist is a recognized failure mode.**\n\n**⚠️ Lanchester's laws** model attrition mathematically — ⚠️ **the square law suggesting that\nfor aimed fire, combat power scales with the SQUARE of numbers, which is the formal argument\nfor concentration.** ⚠️ **Their empirical validity is contested and they are best treated as\nan illustration of why numbers matter more than linearly, not as a predictive tool.**\n**⚠️ Force ratios** — ⚠️ **rules of thumb about attacker-to-defender advantage are widely\ncited, weakly grounded, and highly dependent on terrain, preparation and quality.**\n\n---\n\n## §7. Manoeuvre, Attrition and Decision Cycles\n\n**⚠️ The manoeuvre-versus-attrition distinction**: ⚠️ **attrition seeks to destroy the\nopponent's forces; manoeuvre seeks to break their cohesion and decision-making so that\ntheir remaining strength becomes irrelevant.**\n**⚠️ Boyd's OODA loop** — ⚠️ **observe, orient, decide, act — with the argument that operating\ninside an opponent's decision cycle causes disorientation and collapse.** ⚠️ **Note that\nORIENT is the part Boyd considered decisive and the part popular versions omit; the loop is\nusually reduced to \"be fast,\" which loses the point.**\n**⚠️ Mission command (Auftragstaktik)** — ⚠️ **specify the intent and the task, delegate the\nmethod.** ⚠️ **It requires trust, shared doctrine and tolerance of subordinate error, which\nis why it is easy to declare and hard to practise** (§17 → `mil-force-structure-logistics-doctrine-intelligence-and-procurement`).\n**⚠️ The honest caveat**: ⚠️ **the manoeuvrist school became somewhat doctrinaire in\nWestern militaries, and §26.1 → `mil-reference` shows attrition returning to prominence — the two are\ncomplementary rather than opposed.**\n\n---\n\n# PART II — DETERRENCE AND STRATEGY\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fmilitary-science-and-national-defence\u002Fskills\u002Fmil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill mil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill mil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill mil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fmilitary-science-and-national-defence\u002Fskills\u002Fmil-levels-of-war-principles-and-decision-cycles\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]