[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7AP9PDXGM3EAVFJGN22VR68":3,"skill-same:01M7AP9PDXGM3EAVFJGN22VR68":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7AP9PDXGM3EAVFJGN22VR68","itgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access",null,"Use when working on who can do what: directory services and hybrid identity including the synchronization models and their failure modes, authentication covering factors, MFA, single sign-on and the federation protocols, authorization with RBAC and the models that extend it, and privileged access management including just-in-time elevation, break-glass accounts and session recording.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fit-infrastructure-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fitgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: itgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access\ndescription: \"Use when working on who can do what: directory services and hybrid identity including the synchronization models and their failure modes, authentication covering factors, MFA, single sign-on and the federation protocols, authorization with RBAC and the models that extend it, and privileged access management including just-in-time elevation, break-glass accounts and session recording.\"\n---\n\n# IT Infrastructure and Governance: Directory Services, Authentication, Authorization, and Privileged Access\n\n> **Part 2 of 5** of the *IT Infrastructure and Governance* reference (plugin `it-infrastructure-governance`), covering §5–§8. Sibling skills: `itgov-infrastructure-layers-compute-storage-and-networking` (§0–§4), `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties` (§9–§11), `itgov-endpoints-continuity-itsm-and-vendor-risk` (§12–§19), `itgov-reference` (§20–§26). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** RBAC theory, directory concepts, backup strategy and ITIL process are stable. Two areas moved. See §21 → `itgov-reference` for the phishing-resistant authentication mandate timeline and non-human identity governance.\n\n> **⚠️ Scope.** The enterprise on-prem and hybrid layer. **Complements a Linux server\n> administration reference (host-level operations), a cloud reference (cloud-native\n> patterns), and a security reference (threat modelling and defensive controls).**\n> ⚠️ **The through-line here is access: who and what can do what, how you know, and how\n> you prove it.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the things that cause audit findings and breaches.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this:**\n> 1. **⚠️ Identity is the perimeter.** The network boundary stopped being the control\n>    point years ago. **Every meaningful access decision now happens at authentication and\n>    authorization time** (§5, §6).\n> 2. **⚠️ Access accumulates and never sheds by itself.** People change roles and keep old\n>    permissions; service accounts outlive their systems. **Privilege creep is the default\n>    state of any system without deliberate revocation** (§9 → `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties`, §10 → `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties`).\n> 3. **⚠️ Governance is the ability to answer \"who has access to what, why, and who\n>    approved it\" — with evidence.** If you cannot answer it, you do not have governance,\n>    you have configuration (§10 → `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties`, §17 → `itgov-endpoints-continuity-itsm-and-vendor-risk`).\n\n---\n\n## §5. Directory Services and Hybrid Identity\n\n**⚠️ Active Directory remains the backbone of enterprise identity in most organizations**,\nand it is not going away quickly.\n```\nFOREST \u002F DOMAIN \u002F OU     ⚠️ the FOREST is the security boundary, not the domain —\n                         a common and consequential misunderstanding\nGROUP POLICY (GPO)       configuration management for domain-joined machines\nKERBEROS                 ⚠️ ticket-based; needs time sync and correct SPNs\nLDAP                     directory queries\nSITES AND SERVICES       replication topology\nFSMO ROLES               ⚠️ single-master operations; know where they live\n```\n**⚠️ Tiered administration is the single most important AD security model**: **Tier 0\n(identity infrastructure — domain controllers, AD, PKI), Tier 1 (servers and\napplications), Tier 2 (workstations).** ⚠️ **Credentials must never flow downward: a\nDomain Admin logging into a workstation exposes Tier 0 credentials to a Tier 2 machine,\nand that single practice is how most domain compromises escalate.**\n\n**Hybrid**: **directory synchronization to a cloud IdP**, **federation vs password hash\nsync vs pass-through**, ⚠️ **and the cloud tenant and the on-prem forest are separate trust\ndomains that happen to share user objects.**\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — hybrid means your attack surface is the union, not the intersection.**\n> ⚠️ **Compromise of on-prem AD frequently means compromise of the synced cloud identities,\n> and sync accounts are themselves Tier 0 assets that are routinely under-protected.**\n> **Legacy authentication protocols that bypass modern policy are the other standing\n> hybrid gap** (§6, §21.1 → `itgov-reference`).\n\n---\n\n## §6. Authentication\n\n```\nSOMETHING YOU KNOW    password  ⚠️ the weakest factor\nSOMETHING YOU HAVE    token, key, device\nSOMETHING YOU ARE     biometric\n```\n**⚠️ Not all MFA is equal, and this is the practical point:**\n```\nSMS \u002F VOICE      ⚠️ WEAKEST — SIM swap, and real-time phishing relay\nTOTP \u002F OATH      ⚠️ better, but still phishable — a user can be tricked into\n                 entering the code on a fake login page\nPUSH             ⚠️ MFA fatigue attacks; number matching mitigates\nPHISHING-RESISTANT  ⚠️ FIDO2\u002FWebAuthn, passkeys, platform authenticators,\n                 certificate-based — the credential is CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY BOUND to\n                 the origin, so a relay attack cannot work\n```\n**⚠️ The mechanism is what matters**: **phishing-resistant methods bind the credential to\nthe legitimate site's origin, so an attacker-in-the-middle proxy gets nothing usable.**\n**Every other method can be relayed in real time by a phishing kit, and modern kits do\nexactly this routinely.**\n\n**SSO** (SAML, OIDC\u002FOAuth 2.0), **conditional\u002Frisk-based access** (⚠️ **evaluating device\ncompliance, location, sign-in risk and application sensitivity at each authentication —\nthis is the policy engine that makes identity a real perimeter**), **session management\nand token lifetime**, **break-glass accounts** (⚠️ **excluded from policy, hardware-key\nprotected, monitored, and tested — an untested break-glass account is a bet you haven't\nverified**).\n**⚠️ Certificates and PKI**: **CA hierarchy, expiry (⚠️ a leading cause of self-inflicted\noutages), revocation, and internal CA protection as a Tier 0 asset.**\n\n---\n\n## §7. Authorization: RBAC and Beyond\n\n```\nDAC   discretionary — the owner grants. ⚠️ How file shares become ungovernable\nMAC   mandatory — system-enforced labels; military and SELinux\nRBAC  ⚠️ permissions attach to ROLES, users get roles. The enterprise standard\nABAC  attribute-based — ⚠️ policy evaluated over user, resource, action, environment\nReBAC relationship-based — ⚠️ \"can edit documents in projects they own\" (Zanzibar-style)\nPBAC  policy-based, often externalized to a decision engine\n```\n**⚠️ Core RBAC concepts**: **role hierarchies (inheritance), role assignment vs\nactivation, constraints, and permission aggregation.**\n**⚠️ Least privilege** — grant the minimum required. **Need to know.** **Deny by default.**\n\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — role explosion is the standard failure of RBAC, and it is close to\n> inevitable without design discipline.** ⚠️ **Every genuine exception becomes a new role;\n> you end up with more roles than users, and nobody can say what any of them mean.**\n> **The symptoms: roles named after individuals, roles nobody can define, and roles that\n> exist only because one person needed one extra permission in 2019.**\n>\n> ⚠️ **The mitigations that work**: **separate BUSINESS roles (what a job does — these\n> map to people) from TECHNICAL entitlements (what a system permits)**, so ⚠️ **one\n> business role composes many entitlements and stays comprehensible.** **Add attributes\n> for the dimensions that would otherwise multiply roles** — **department, location,\n> clearance — rather than encoding them into role names.** **Run role mining against\n> actual usage.** **And ⚠️ set an explicit retirement process, because roles are never\n> removed unless someone owns removing them.**\n\n**⚠️ RBAC vs ABAC in practice**: **RBAC is comprehensible, auditable, and coarse; ABAC is\nexpressive, fine-grained, and much harder to reason about or audit.** ⚠️ **The common\nenterprise answer is hybrid — RBAC for the coarse grant, attributes for the conditions —\nand a pure-ABAC deployment often trades role explosion for policy explosion, which is\nworse because it's less visible.**\n**⚠️ Group nesting** is where RBAC decays in Windows environments: **nested groups produce\neffective permissions nobody can compute by inspection**, and ⚠️ **the only reliable\nanswer is tooling that resolves effective access rather than reading the ACL.**\n\n---\n\n## §8. Privileged Access\n\n**⚠️ Privileged accounts are the primary target in essentially every significant breach,\nbecause they are the shortest path from foothold to objective.**\n```\nPAM VAULTING        ⚠️ credentials checked out, rotated after use, never known to humans\nJUST-IN-TIME (JIT)  ⚠️ elevate for a window, then automatically revoke —\n                    this eliminates STANDING privilege, which is the goal\nSESSION RECORDING   privileged sessions recorded and reviewable\nJEA \u002F scoped admin  ⚠️ grant the specific task, not the admin role\nTIERED ADMIN        §5\nBREAK-GLASS         §6\n```\n**⚠️ Standing privilege is the thing to eliminate.** **A permanent Domain Admin is a\npermanent target; a JIT-elevated one is a target for thirty minutes with an audit\ntrail.**\n**⚠️ Service accounts are the perennial gap** — **shared, non-expiring passwords, excessive\nprivilege, no MFA possible, no owner, and nobody dares rotate them because nothing\ndocuments what would break.** ⚠️ **This is §21.2 → `itgov-reference`'s problem in its classical form, and it\npredates AI agents by decades.** **Managed service accounts, workload identities and\nshort-lived credentials are the structural fix.**\n","# IT Infrastructure and Governance: Directory Services, Authentication, Authorization, and Privileged Access\n\n> **Part 2 of 5** of the *IT Infrastructure and Governance* reference (plugin `it-infrastructure-governance`), covering §5–§8. Sibling skills: `itgov-infrastructure-layers-compute-storage-and-networking` (§0–§4), `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties` (§9–§11), `itgov-endpoints-continuity-itsm-and-vendor-risk` (§12–§19), `itgov-reference` (§20–§26). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** RBAC theory, directory concepts, backup strategy and ITIL process are stable. Two areas moved. See §21 → `itgov-reference` for the phishing-resistant authentication mandate timeline and non-human identity governance.\n\n> **⚠️ Scope.** The enterprise on-prem and hybrid layer. **Complements a Linux server\n> administration reference (host-level operations), a cloud reference (cloud-native\n> patterns), and a security reference (threat modelling and defensive controls).**\n> ⚠️ **The through-line here is access: who and what can do what, how you know, and how\n> you prove it.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark the things that cause audit findings and breaches.\n>\n> **The three ideas that organize this:**\n> 1. **⚠️ Identity is the perimeter.** The network boundary stopped being the control\n>    point years ago. **Every meaningful access decision now happens at authentication and\n>    authorization time** (§5, §6).\n> 2. **⚠️ Access accumulates and never sheds by itself.** People change roles and keep old\n>    permissions; service accounts outlive their systems. **Privilege creep is the default\n>    state of any system without deliberate revocation** (§9 → `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties`, §10 → `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties`).\n> 3. **⚠️ Governance is the ability to answer \"who has access to what, why, and who\n>    approved it\" — with evidence.** If you cannot answer it, you do not have governance,\n>    you have configuration (§10 → `itgov-identity-lifecycle-access-review-and-segregation-of-duties`, §17 → `itgov-endpoints-continuity-itsm-and-vendor-risk`).\n\n---\n\n## §5. Directory Services and Hybrid Identity\n\n**⚠️ Active Directory remains the backbone of enterprise identity in most organizations**,\nand it is not going away quickly.\n```\nFOREST \u002F DOMAIN \u002F OU     ⚠️ the FOREST is the security boundary, not the domain —\n                         a common and consequential misunderstanding\nGROUP POLICY (GPO)       configuration management for domain-joined machines\nKERBEROS                 ⚠️ ticket-based; needs time sync and correct SPNs\nLDAP                     directory queries\nSITES AND SERVICES       replication topology\nFSMO ROLES               ⚠️ single-master operations; know where they live\n```\n**⚠️ Tiered administration is the single most important AD security model**: **Tier 0\n(identity infrastructure — domain controllers, AD, PKI), Tier 1 (servers and\napplications), Tier 2 (workstations).** ⚠️ **Credentials must never flow downward: a\nDomain Admin logging into a workstation exposes Tier 0 credentials to a Tier 2 machine,\nand that single practice is how most domain compromises escalate.**\n\n**Hybrid**: **directory synchronization to a cloud IdP**, **federation vs password hash\nsync vs pass-through**, ⚠️ **and the cloud tenant and the on-prem forest are separate trust\ndomains that happen to share user objects.**\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — hybrid means your attack surface is the union, not the intersection.**\n> ⚠️ **Compromise of on-prem AD frequently means compromise of the synced cloud identities,\n> and sync accounts are themselves Tier 0 assets that are routinely under-protected.**\n> **Legacy authentication protocols that bypass modern policy are the other standing\n> hybrid gap** (§6, §21.1 → `itgov-reference`).\n\n---\n\n## §6. Authentication\n\n```\nSOMETHING YOU KNOW    password  ⚠️ the weakest factor\nSOMETHING YOU HAVE    token, key, device\nSOMETHING YOU ARE     biometric\n```\n**⚠️ Not all MFA is equal, and this is the practical point:**\n```\nSMS \u002F VOICE      ⚠️ WEAKEST — SIM swap, and real-time phishing relay\nTOTP \u002F OATH      ⚠️ better, but still phishable — a user can be tricked into\n                 entering the code on a fake login page\nPUSH             ⚠️ MFA fatigue attacks; number matching mitigates\nPHISHING-RESISTANT  ⚠️ FIDO2\u002FWebAuthn, passkeys, platform authenticators,\n                 certificate-based — the credential is CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY BOUND to\n                 the origin, so a relay attack cannot work\n```\n**⚠️ The mechanism is what matters**: **phishing-resistant methods bind the credential to\nthe legitimate site's origin, so an attacker-in-the-middle proxy gets nothing usable.**\n**Every other method can be relayed in real time by a phishing kit, and modern kits do\nexactly this routinely.**\n\n**SSO** (SAML, OIDC\u002FOAuth 2.0), **conditional\u002Frisk-based access** (⚠️ **evaluating device\ncompliance, location, sign-in risk and application sensitivity at each authentication —\nthis is the policy engine that makes identity a real perimeter**), **session management\nand token lifetime**, **break-glass accounts** (⚠️ **excluded from policy, hardware-key\nprotected, monitored, and tested — an untested break-glass account is a bet you haven't\nverified**).\n**⚠️ Certificates and PKI**: **CA hierarchy, expiry (⚠️ a leading cause of self-inflicted\noutages), revocation, and internal CA protection as a Tier 0 asset.**\n\n---\n\n## §7. Authorization: RBAC and Beyond\n\n```\nDAC   discretionary — the owner grants. ⚠️ How file shares become ungovernable\nMAC   mandatory — system-enforced labels; military and SELinux\nRBAC  ⚠️ permissions attach to ROLES, users get roles. The enterprise standard\nABAC  attribute-based — ⚠️ policy evaluated over user, resource, action, environment\nReBAC relationship-based — ⚠️ \"can edit documents in projects they own\" (Zanzibar-style)\nPBAC  policy-based, often externalized to a decision engine\n```\n**⚠️ Core RBAC concepts**: **role hierarchies (inheritance), role assignment vs\nactivation, constraints, and permission aggregation.**\n**⚠️ Least privilege** — grant the minimum required. **Need to know.** **Deny by default.**\n\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA — role explosion is the standard failure of RBAC, and it is close to\n> inevitable without design discipline.** ⚠️ **Every genuine exception becomes a new role;\n> you end up with more roles than users, and nobody can say what any of them mean.**\n> **The symptoms: roles named after individuals, roles nobody can define, and roles that\n> exist only because one person needed one extra permission in 2019.**\n>\n> ⚠️ **The mitigations that work**: **separate BUSINESS roles (what a job does — these\n> map to people) from TECHNICAL entitlements (what a system permits)**, so ⚠️ **one\n> business role composes many entitlements and stays comprehensible.** **Add attributes\n> for the dimensions that would otherwise multiply roles** — **department, location,\n> clearance — rather than encoding them into role names.** **Run role mining against\n> actual usage.** **And ⚠️ set an explicit retirement process, because roles are never\n> removed unless someone owns removing them.**\n\n**⚠️ RBAC vs ABAC in practice**: **RBAC is comprehensible, auditable, and coarse; ABAC is\nexpressive, fine-grained, and much harder to reason about or audit.** ⚠️ **The common\nenterprise answer is hybrid — RBAC for the coarse grant, attributes for the conditions —\nand a pure-ABAC deployment often trades role explosion for policy explosion, which is\nworse because it's less visible.**\n**⚠️ Group nesting** is where RBAC decays in Windows environments: **nested groups produce\neffective permissions nobody can compute by inspection**, and ⚠️ **the only reliable\nanswer is tooling that resolves effective access rather than reading the ACL.**\n\n---\n\n## §8. Privileged Access\n\n**⚠️ Privileged accounts are the primary target in essentially every significant breach,\nbecause they are the shortest path from foothold to objective.**\n```\nPAM VAULTING        ⚠️ credentials checked out, rotated after use, never known to humans\nJUST-IN-TIME (JIT)  ⚠️ elevate for a window, then automatically revoke —\n                    this eliminates STANDING privilege, which is the goal\nSESSION RECORDING   privileged sessions recorded and reviewable\nJEA \u002F scoped admin  ⚠️ grant the specific task, not the admin role\nTIERED ADMIN        §5\nBREAK-GLASS         §6\n```\n**⚠️ Standing privilege is the thing to eliminate.** **A permanent Domain Admin is a\npermanent target; a JIT-elevated one is a target for thirty minutes with an audit\ntrail.**\n**⚠️ Service accounts are the perennial gap** — **shared, non-expiring passwords, excessive\nprivilege, no MFA possible, no owner, and nobody dares rotate them because nothing\ndocuments what would break.** ⚠️ **This is §21.2 → `itgov-reference`'s problem in its classical form, and it\npredates AI agents by decades.** **Managed service accounts, workload identities and\nshort-lived credentials are the structural fix.**\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fit-infrastructure-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fitgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill itgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill itgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill itgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fit-infrastructure-governance\u002Fskills\u002Fitgov-directory-authentication-authorization-and-privileged-access\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]