[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7ANS9WC4V0YBR7EPWRFGP11":3,"skill-same:01M7ANS9WC4V0YBR7EPWRFGP11":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M7ANS9WC4V0YBR7EPWRFGP11","gametheory-reference",null,"Use when correcting a game-theory misconception, looking up a solution concept, formula or standard result, finding the canon, or needing a picker and a modelling checklist to run before claiming a strategic situation is a particular game. Companion to the other game-theory skills.","the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","the-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F329298758?v=4","01M7AJHGZ9722CTJ4JNQZVRH0Q","the vibey project","01M7AJHGZVMG2K7TGXQ6XFHVG3",5,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fgame-theory\u002Fskills\u002Fgametheory-reference\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: gametheory-reference\ndescription: \"Use when correcting a game-theory misconception, looking up a solution concept, formula or standard result, finding the canon, or needing a picker and a modelling checklist to run before claiming a strategic situation is a particular game. Companion to the other game-theory skills.\"\n---\n\n# Game Theory: Misconceptions, Formulas, and Canon\n\n> **Part 5 of 5** of the *Game Theory* reference (plugin `game-theory`), covering §17–§21. Sibling skills: `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games` (§0–§5), `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information` (§6–§9), `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` (§10–§13), `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation` (§14–§16). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** Settled mathematics — von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Nash 1950, Gale-Shapley 1962, Selten 1965, Harsanyi 1967, Maynard Smith 1973, Myerson-Satterthwaite 1983.\n\n> **Scope.** The mathematics of strategic interaction — situations where your best action\n> depends on what others do, and theirs on what you do. ⚠️ **That circularity is the whole\n> subject; everything else is machinery for resolving it.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark misconceptions, and game theory attracts a lot of them — §18\n> consolidates.\n>\n> **The three ideas that matter most:**\n> 1. **⚠️ \"Rational\" means consistent, not selfish.** A player maximizes their own utility\n>    function — **and that function can include other people's welfare, fairness, or\n>    spite.** Most criticism of game theory as \"assuming people are selfish\" attacks\n>    something the theory doesn't claim (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`).\n> 2. **⚠️ Equilibrium is a consistency condition, not a prediction and not a\n>    recommendation.** Nash equilibrium says no one can gain by unilateral deviation.\n>    **It does not say the outcome is good, or that players will find it** (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`).\n> 3. **⚠️ The interesting results are mostly impossibility theorems.** Arrow,\n>    Gibbard-Satterthwaite, Myerson-Satterthwaite, the folk theorem's\n>    anything-goes conclusion. **Game theory's deepest contribution is telling you what\n>    cannot be achieved** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`).\n\n---\n\n## §17. Misconceptions\n\n| Misconception | Correction |\n|---|---|\n| Rational means selfish | ⚠️ **Means consistent. Utility can include anyone's welfare** (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Game theory assumes people are cold calculators | ⚠️ **It assumes consistency; the failing assumptions are computational** (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`, §15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Nash equilibrium is the optimal outcome | ⚠️ **The PD's equilibrium is Pareto-dominated** (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Nash equilibrium is unique | Most games have many; selection is unsolved (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Nash equilibrium predicts behaviour | ⚠️ **It's a consistency condition, not a dynamic theory** (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| In a mixed equilibrium you optimize your own payoff | ⚠️ **Your mix makes your OPPONENT indifferent** (§4.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Most situations are prisoner's dilemmas | ⚠️ **Usually Stag Hunt or Chicken. Check T>R>P>S and 2R>T+S** (§5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Most competition is zero-sum | ⚠️ **Rarely. Zero-sum thinking is a named bias** (§6 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| More options are always better | ⚠️ **Commitment — removing options — can win** (§5.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| A threat in a Nash equilibrium is credible | ⚠️ **Subgame perfection exists to exclude these** (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Cooperation is impossible among self-interested agents | ⚠️ **Repetition, reputation, structure all sustain it** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`, §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| The folk theorem shows cooperation emerges | ⚠️ **It shows ANYTHING can be an equilibrium — that's weak, not strong** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Tit-for-tat is the best strategy | ⚠️ **Fragile to noise; no strategy is universally best** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Second-price auctions are always truthful in practice | ⚠️ **Requires private values and a trusted auctioneer** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| A better voting system could be non-manipulable | ⚠️ **Gibbard-Satterthwaite says no** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Efficient trade can always be arranged | ⚠️ **Myerson-Satterthwaite says no** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Which side proposes in matching is a detail | ⚠️ **It determines who gets their best stable match** (§13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Adding capacity to a network helps | ⚠️ **Braess's paradox** (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Equilibria are what players will compute | ⚠️ **General Nash is PPAD-complete** (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Evolutionary game theory needs rational agents | ⚠️ **It needs none. Selection replaces reasoning** (§14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n\n---\n\n## §18. Formulas and Facts\n\n```\nNASH EQUILIBRIUM\nsᵢ* ∈ argmax uᵢ(sᵢ, s₋ᵢ*)  for all i\n⚠️ Every finite game has a mixed equilibrium (Nash 1950, via fixed point)\n⚠️ Mixed equilibrium: you are indifferent over your support\n\nZERO-SUM\n⚠️ max min = min max (von Neumann 1928); solvable by LP\n\nREPEATED GAMES\nCooperation sustainable when δ ≥ (T−R)\u002F(T−P)   [grim trigger, PD]\n⚠️ Folk theorem: any individually rational feasible payoff, for δ high enough\n\nBARGAINING\nNash solution: max (u₁−d₁)(u₂−d₂)\n⚠️ Rubinstein: more patient player gets more\n\nCOOPERATIVE\nShapley: φᵢ = Σ_S [|S|!(n−|S|−1)!\u002Fn!] · [v(S∪{i}) − v(S)]\n⚠️ = average marginal contribution over arrival orders\n\nAUCTIONS\n⚠️ Second-price: bid your true value (dominant)\nFirst-price: shade below value\n⚠️ Revenue equivalence under private\u002Findependent values, risk neutrality, symmetry\n\nCOMPLEXITY ⚠️\nZero-sum Nash: P · General Nash: PPAD-complete\nCorrelated equilibrium: P · Shapley value: #P-hard\nPrice of Anarchy, selfish routing with linear latency: 4\u002F3\n\nEVOLUTIONARY\nReplicator: ẋᵢ = xᵢ(fᵢ − f̄)\n⚠️ ESS ⟹ Nash, but not conversely\n\nEXPERIMENTAL ⚠️\nUltimatum: modal offers ~40–50%; offers \u003C20% often rejected\np-beauty contest: equilibrium 0; observed 1–3 levels of reasoning\n```\n\n---\n\n## §19. Books\n\n| Author | Work | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Osborne & Rubinstein** | ***A Course in Game Theory*** | ⚠️ **The rigorous standard. Free from Osborne's site** |\n| **Fudenberg & Tirole** | ***Game Theory*** | The graduate reference |\n| **Osborne** | *An Introduction to Game Theory* | ⚠️ **The accessible entry point** |\n| **Schelling** | ***The Strategy of Conflict*** | ⚠️ **Commitment, focal points, credibility. Almost no mathematics and one of the most influential books in the field** |\n| **von Neumann & Morgenstern** | *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944) | The founding text |\n| **Camerer** | ***Behavioral Game Theory*** | ⚠️ **§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, definitively** |\n| **Roth** | ***Who Gets What — and Why*** | ⚠️ **§13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` from the person who built the markets; Nobel work, readable** |\n| **Krishna** | *Auction Theory* | §12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` |\n| **Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, Vazirani** | ***Algorithmic Game Theory*** | ⚠️ **§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`. Free online** |\n| **Maynard Smith** | *Evolution and the Theory of Games* | §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, foundational |\n| **Nowak** | *Evolutionary Dynamics* | §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, modern |\n| **Dixit & Nalebuff** | *The Art of Strategy* | ⚠️ **Popular, genuinely good on intuition** |\n| **Axelrod** | *The Evolution of Cooperation* | §8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`, and read the noise critiques alongside |\n\n---\n\n## §20. Quick Reference\n\n### 20.1 Picker\n| Situation | Tool |\n|---|---|\n| Simultaneous, complete information | **Nash equilibrium; check dominance first** (§3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`, §4 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Strictly competitive | ⚠️ **Minimax — you get a genuine guarantee** (§6 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Sequential, perfect information | **Backward induction → SPNE** (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Non-credible threats in the solution | ⚠️ **Apply subgame perfection** (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Ongoing relationship | ⚠️ **Repeated game; check the discount factor** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Asymmetric information about types | **Bayesian game; signalling or screening** (§9 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Splitting a surplus | **Nash bargaining or Rubinstein; ⚠️ improve your BATNA** (§10 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Allocating joint costs or credit | ⚠️ **Shapley value** (§11 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Designing rules for self-interested agents | **Mechanism design; ⚠️ check the impossibility theorems first** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Selling a single item | **Second-price for truthfulness; ⚠️ check revenue-equivalence assumptions** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Two-sided allocation without prices | ⚠️ **Deferred acceptance; decide who proposes** (§13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Populations without deliberation | **Replicator dynamics, ESS** (§14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Predicting real human play | ⚠️ **QRE, level-k — not plain Nash** (§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Solving a large game computationally | ⚠️ **No-regret learning (CFR), not equilibrium solvers** (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n\n### 20.2 Modelling checklist\n- [ ] Who are the players, and is the relevant set actually larger? (§1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Are strategies complete contingent plans, or am I listing moves? (§1.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Are payoffs *utilities*, including non-monetary concerns? (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Perfect vs complete information — which am I assuming? (§2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Is this genuinely a PD, or a coordination game? ⚠️ **Check the inequalities** (§5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] One-shot or repeated, and is the horizon known? (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`)\n- [ ] Does my solution rely on a non-credible threat? (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`)\n- [ ] Is the equilibrium unique — and if not, what selects among them? (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Would real people play this way? (§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`)\n- [ ] Could the players actually compute this? (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`)\n\n---\n\n## §21. Method\n\n**No searches were run; none would have helped.** ⚠️ **This is settled mathematics.**\n**von Neumann's minimax theorem (1928)**, **von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944)**, **Nash\n(1950)**, **Arrow (1951)**, **Gale-Shapley (1962)**, **Selten (1965)**, **Harsanyi\n(1967)**, **Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973)**, **Maynard Smith & Price (1973)**, **Rubinstein\n(1982)**, **Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983)**. ⚠️ **The theorems have not changed.**\n\n**Sources** are the references in §19 — chiefly **Osborne & Rubinstein** and **Fudenberg &\nTirole** for §1–§12 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`, `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`, `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`, **Roth** for §13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`, **Nowak** and **Maynard Smith** for §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`,\n**Camerer** for §15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, and **Nisan et al.** for §16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`.\n\n**Confidence: high on the mathematics**, and ⚠️ **I have stated theorems with their\nhypotheses throughout, because in this field the hypotheses are where the content is** —\n**revenue equivalence, the folk theorem, and second-price truthfulness are all routinely\ninvoked outside the conditions under which they hold, and §12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` and §17 flag each case.**\n\n⚠️ **Three places I've taken a position rather than reporting neutrally.**\n\n**§5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`'s warning about the Prisoner's Dilemma is deliberate and I'd defend it strongly.**\n⚠️ **The PD is the most over-applied model in social science, and the misdiagnosis has\npractical consequences**: **a Stag Hunt is a trust problem where the good outcome is\nalready an equilibrium and communication may suffice; a true PD requires enforcement or\nrepetition.** **Prescribing the wrong remedy follows directly from naming the wrong game**,\nand the inequality test in §5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games` takes thirty seconds.\n\n**§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`'s framing of the folk theorem as bad news** is the standard view among theorists and\nthe opposite of how it's usually popularized. ⚠️ **\"Anything can be sustained in\nequilibrium\" is a statement that the concept has lost its predictive content in that\nsetting**, and presenting it as \"game theory explains cooperation\" overstates it.\n\n**§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`'s complexity concern I treat as substantive rather than technical.** ⚠️ **If\ncomputing an equilibrium is PPAD-complete, the claim that players locate it needs\ndefending**, and **correlated equilibrium's tractability plus its reachability by simple\nno-regret learning is a genuine argument for preferring it.** **The practical successes in\n§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation` are no-regret learning methods, not equilibrium solvers** — ⚠️ **which I'd read as the\nfield's computational results being vindicated in practice rather than worked around.**\n\n**§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation` I've tried to state fairly in both directions**: the experimental failures are real\nand large, ⚠️ **and they mostly indict the auxiliary assumptions rather than the\nframework** — which is why the behavioural variants fit inside it.\n","# Game Theory: Misconceptions, Formulas, and Canon\n\n> **Part 5 of 5** of the *Game Theory* reference (plugin `game-theory`), covering §17–§21. Sibling skills: `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games` (§0–§5), `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information` (§6–§9), `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` (§10–§13), `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation` (§14–§16). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N → `skill` points into that sibling skill.\n>\n> **Currency:** Settled mathematics — von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Nash 1950, Gale-Shapley 1962, Selten 1965, Harsanyi 1967, Maynard Smith 1973, Myerson-Satterthwaite 1983.\n\n> **Scope.** The mathematics of strategic interaction — situations where your best action\n> depends on what others do, and theirs on what you do. ⚠️ **That circularity is the whole\n> subject; everything else is machinery for resolving it.**\n>\n> **⚠️ GOTCHA** boxes mark misconceptions, and game theory attracts a lot of them — §18\n> consolidates.\n>\n> **The three ideas that matter most:**\n> 1. **⚠️ \"Rational\" means consistent, not selfish.** A player maximizes their own utility\n>    function — **and that function can include other people's welfare, fairness, or\n>    spite.** Most criticism of game theory as \"assuming people are selfish\" attacks\n>    something the theory doesn't claim (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`).\n> 2. **⚠️ Equilibrium is a consistency condition, not a prediction and not a\n>    recommendation.** Nash equilibrium says no one can gain by unilateral deviation.\n>    **It does not say the outcome is good, or that players will find it** (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`).\n> 3. **⚠️ The interesting results are mostly impossibility theorems.** Arrow,\n>    Gibbard-Satterthwaite, Myerson-Satterthwaite, the folk theorem's\n>    anything-goes conclusion. **Game theory's deepest contribution is telling you what\n>    cannot be achieved** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`).\n\n---\n\n## §17. Misconceptions\n\n| Misconception | Correction |\n|---|---|\n| Rational means selfish | ⚠️ **Means consistent. Utility can include anyone's welfare** (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Game theory assumes people are cold calculators | ⚠️ **It assumes consistency; the failing assumptions are computational** (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`, §15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Nash equilibrium is the optimal outcome | ⚠️ **The PD's equilibrium is Pareto-dominated** (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Nash equilibrium is unique | Most games have many; selection is unsolved (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Nash equilibrium predicts behaviour | ⚠️ **It's a consistency condition, not a dynamic theory** (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| In a mixed equilibrium you optimize your own payoff | ⚠️ **Your mix makes your OPPONENT indifferent** (§4.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Most situations are prisoner's dilemmas | ⚠️ **Usually Stag Hunt or Chicken. Check T>R>P>S and 2R>T+S** (§5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Most competition is zero-sum | ⚠️ **Rarely. Zero-sum thinking is a named bias** (§6 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| More options are always better | ⚠️ **Commitment — removing options — can win** (§5.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| A threat in a Nash equilibrium is credible | ⚠️ **Subgame perfection exists to exclude these** (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Cooperation is impossible among self-interested agents | ⚠️ **Repetition, reputation, structure all sustain it** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`, §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| The folk theorem shows cooperation emerges | ⚠️ **It shows ANYTHING can be an equilibrium — that's weak, not strong** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Tit-for-tat is the best strategy | ⚠️ **Fragile to noise; no strategy is universally best** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Second-price auctions are always truthful in practice | ⚠️ **Requires private values and a trusted auctioneer** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| A better voting system could be non-manipulable | ⚠️ **Gibbard-Satterthwaite says no** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Efficient trade can always be arranged | ⚠️ **Myerson-Satterthwaite says no** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Which side proposes in matching is a detail | ⚠️ **It determines who gets their best stable match** (§13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Adding capacity to a network helps | ⚠️ **Braess's paradox** (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Equilibria are what players will compute | ⚠️ **General Nash is PPAD-complete** (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Evolutionary game theory needs rational agents | ⚠️ **It needs none. Selection replaces reasoning** (§14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n\n---\n\n## §18. Formulas and Facts\n\n```\nNASH EQUILIBRIUM\nsᵢ* ∈ argmax uᵢ(sᵢ, s₋ᵢ*)  for all i\n⚠️ Every finite game has a mixed equilibrium (Nash 1950, via fixed point)\n⚠️ Mixed equilibrium: you are indifferent over your support\n\nZERO-SUM\n⚠️ max min = min max (von Neumann 1928); solvable by LP\n\nREPEATED GAMES\nCooperation sustainable when δ ≥ (T−R)\u002F(T−P)   [grim trigger, PD]\n⚠️ Folk theorem: any individually rational feasible payoff, for δ high enough\n\nBARGAINING\nNash solution: max (u₁−d₁)(u₂−d₂)\n⚠️ Rubinstein: more patient player gets more\n\nCOOPERATIVE\nShapley: φᵢ = Σ_S [|S|!(n−|S|−1)!\u002Fn!] · [v(S∪{i}) − v(S)]\n⚠️ = average marginal contribution over arrival orders\n\nAUCTIONS\n⚠️ Second-price: bid your true value (dominant)\nFirst-price: shade below value\n⚠️ Revenue equivalence under private\u002Findependent values, risk neutrality, symmetry\n\nCOMPLEXITY ⚠️\nZero-sum Nash: P · General Nash: PPAD-complete\nCorrelated equilibrium: P · Shapley value: #P-hard\nPrice of Anarchy, selfish routing with linear latency: 4\u002F3\n\nEVOLUTIONARY\nReplicator: ẋᵢ = xᵢ(fᵢ − f̄)\n⚠️ ESS ⟹ Nash, but not conversely\n\nEXPERIMENTAL ⚠️\nUltimatum: modal offers ~40–50%; offers \u003C20% often rejected\np-beauty contest: equilibrium 0; observed 1–3 levels of reasoning\n```\n\n---\n\n## §19. Books\n\n| Author | Work | Why |\n|---|---|---|\n| **Osborne & Rubinstein** | ***A Course in Game Theory*** | ⚠️ **The rigorous standard. Free from Osborne's site** |\n| **Fudenberg & Tirole** | ***Game Theory*** | The graduate reference |\n| **Osborne** | *An Introduction to Game Theory* | ⚠️ **The accessible entry point** |\n| **Schelling** | ***The Strategy of Conflict*** | ⚠️ **Commitment, focal points, credibility. Almost no mathematics and one of the most influential books in the field** |\n| **von Neumann & Morgenstern** | *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944) | The founding text |\n| **Camerer** | ***Behavioral Game Theory*** | ⚠️ **§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, definitively** |\n| **Roth** | ***Who Gets What — and Why*** | ⚠️ **§13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` from the person who built the markets; Nobel work, readable** |\n| **Krishna** | *Auction Theory* | §12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` |\n| **Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardos, Vazirani** | ***Algorithmic Game Theory*** | ⚠️ **§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`. Free online** |\n| **Maynard Smith** | *Evolution and the Theory of Games* | §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, foundational |\n| **Nowak** | *Evolutionary Dynamics* | §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, modern |\n| **Dixit & Nalebuff** | *The Art of Strategy* | ⚠️ **Popular, genuinely good on intuition** |\n| **Axelrod** | *The Evolution of Cooperation* | §8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`, and read the noise critiques alongside |\n\n---\n\n## §20. Quick Reference\n\n### 20.1 Picker\n| Situation | Tool |\n|---|---|\n| Simultaneous, complete information | **Nash equilibrium; check dominance first** (§3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`, §4 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`) |\n| Strictly competitive | ⚠️ **Minimax — you get a genuine guarantee** (§6 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Sequential, perfect information | **Backward induction → SPNE** (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Non-credible threats in the solution | ⚠️ **Apply subgame perfection** (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Ongoing relationship | ⚠️ **Repeated game; check the discount factor** (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Asymmetric information about types | **Bayesian game; signalling or screening** (§9 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`) |\n| Splitting a surplus | **Nash bargaining or Rubinstein; ⚠️ improve your BATNA** (§10 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Allocating joint costs or credit | ⚠️ **Shapley value** (§11 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Designing rules for self-interested agents | **Mechanism design; ⚠️ check the impossibility theorems first** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Selling a single item | **Second-price for truthfulness; ⚠️ check revenue-equivalence assumptions** (§12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Two-sided allocation without prices | ⚠️ **Deferred acceptance; decide who proposes** (§13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`) |\n| Populations without deliberation | **Replicator dynamics, ESS** (§14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Predicting real human play | ⚠️ **QRE, level-k — not plain Nash** (§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n| Solving a large game computationally | ⚠️ **No-regret learning (CFR), not equilibrium solvers** (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`) |\n\n### 20.2 Modelling checklist\n- [ ] Who are the players, and is the relevant set actually larger? (§1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Are strategies complete contingent plans, or am I listing moves? (§1.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Are payoffs *utilities*, including non-monetary concerns? (§1.2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Perfect vs complete information — which am I assuming? (§2 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Is this genuinely a PD, or a coordination game? ⚠️ **Check the inequalities** (§5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] One-shot or repeated, and is the horizon known? (§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`)\n- [ ] Does my solution rely on a non-credible threat? (§7 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`)\n- [ ] Is the equilibrium unique — and if not, what selects among them? (§4.3 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`)\n- [ ] Would real people play this way? (§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`)\n- [ ] Could the players actually compute this? (§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`)\n\n---\n\n## §21. Method\n\n**No searches were run; none would have helped.** ⚠️ **This is settled mathematics.**\n**von Neumann's minimax theorem (1928)**, **von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944)**, **Nash\n(1950)**, **Arrow (1951)**, **Gale-Shapley (1962)**, **Selten (1965)**, **Harsanyi\n(1967)**, **Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973)**, **Maynard Smith & Price (1973)**, **Rubinstein\n(1982)**, **Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983)**. ⚠️ **The theorems have not changed.**\n\n**Sources** are the references in §19 — chiefly **Osborne & Rubinstein** and **Fudenberg &\nTirole** for §1–§12 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`, `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`, `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`, **Roth** for §13 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching`, **Nowak** and **Maynard Smith** for §14 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`,\n**Camerer** for §15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`, and **Nisan et al.** for §16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`.\n\n**Confidence: high on the mathematics**, and ⚠️ **I have stated theorems with their\nhypotheses throughout, because in this field the hypotheses are where the content is** —\n**revenue equivalence, the folk theorem, and second-price truthfulness are all routinely\ninvoked outside the conditions under which they hold, and §12 → `gametheory-bargaining-cooperative-mechanism-design-and-matching` and §17 flag each case.**\n\n⚠️ **Three places I've taken a position rather than reporting neutrally.**\n\n**§5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games`'s warning about the Prisoner's Dilemma is deliberate and I'd defend it strongly.**\n⚠️ **The PD is the most over-applied model in social science, and the misdiagnosis has\npractical consequences**: **a Stag Hunt is a trust problem where the good outcome is\nalready an equilibrium and communication may suffice; a true PD requires enforcement or\nrepetition.** **Prescribing the wrong remedy follows directly from naming the wrong game**,\nand the inequality test in §5.1 → `gametheory-framework-nash-and-classic-games` takes thirty seconds.\n\n**§8 → `gametheory-zero-sum-sequential-repeated-and-information`'s framing of the folk theorem as bad news** is the standard view among theorists and\nthe opposite of how it's usually popularized. ⚠️ **\"Anything can be sustained in\nequilibrium\" is a statement that the concept has lost its predictive content in that\nsetting**, and presenting it as \"game theory explains cooperation\" overstates it.\n\n**§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation`'s complexity concern I treat as substantive rather than technical.** ⚠️ **If\ncomputing an equilibrium is PPAD-complete, the claim that players locate it needs\ndefending**, and **correlated equilibrium's tractability plus its reachability by simple\nno-regret learning is a genuine argument for preferring it.** **The practical successes in\n§16 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation` are no-regret learning methods, not equilibrium solvers** — ⚠️ **which I'd read as the\nfield's computational results being vindicated in practice rather than worked around.**\n\n**§15 → `gametheory-evolutionary-empirical-limits-and-computation` I've tried to state fairly in both directions**: the experimental failures are real\nand large, ⚠️ **and they mostly indict the auxiliary assumptions rather than the\nframework** — which is why the behavioural variants fit inside it.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"develop","ae32736a1aabddabca5d2c96d665aa0ebc7d8700","src\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fgame-theory\u002Fskills\u002Fgametheory-reference",3,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey","https:\u002F\u002Fthe-vibey-project.github.io\u002Fvibey\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project","https:\u002F\u002Fvibewithadam.matthewsteinberger.com","freedom for software engineers","2026-11-15 05:47:42",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill gametheory-reference",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill gametheory-reference",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add the-vibey-project\u002Fvibey --skill gametheory-reference","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fgame-theory\u002Fskills\u002Fgametheory-reference\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,56,63,70,77,84],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT1FQJAE1FQYAMDTF490Y4","white-paper-writing","Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks \"how should I structure this\" for a long-form document.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fwhite-paper-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT16BJRJJKK2MASXRZS76G","prose-technical-mechanics","Use when editing or writing prose at a technical\u002Fmechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-technical-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0W9HT0ZZ9Y287NW99MR3","prose-mechanics","Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate\u002FJamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix \"AI-sounding\" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fprose-mechanics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0KR635JX66X2X6F3E2CP","narrative-structure","Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or \"how should I structure this story\u002Fpitch\u002Fpresentation\" request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fnarrative-structure\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT0AKGW09NKKZDYBT8VRDE","legal-brief-writing","Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic\u002Fneurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Flegal-brief-writing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M7AT00VWPS4Q8B5VEMXX9NQT","journal-publishability-criteria","Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs\u002Fpaper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthe-vibey-project\u002Fvibey\u002Fblob\u002Fdevelop\u002Fsrc\u002Fvibey_tools\u002Fskills\u002Fplugins\u002Fwriting-craft\u002Fskills\u002Fjournal-publishability-criteria\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]