comms-reference
Use when correcting a communications misconception, looking up a protocol port, latency, codec, deliverability or adoption figure, finding the sources, or needing a quick-reference picker — plus the current state of cross-platform encrypted RCS and the legal status of message scanning. Companion to the other communication technologies skills.
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- comms-reference
- description
- Use when correcting a communications misconception, looking up a protocol port, latency, codec, deliverability or adoption figure, finding the sources, or needing a quick-reference picker — plus the current state of cross-platform encrypted RCS and the legal status of message scanning. Companion to the other communication technologies skills.
03 SKILL.md 正文
Communication Technologies: What's Live, Misconceptions, Numbers and Dates, and Sources
Part 6 of 6 of the Communication Technologies reference (plugin
communication-technologies), covering §28–§33. Sibling skills:comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability(§0–§7),comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id(§8–§12),comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps(§13–§18),comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push(§19–§22),comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy(§23–§27). Section numbers are shared across the set; a reference written as §N →skillpoints into that sibling skill.Currency: The protocols are old and stable. Two things moved. See §28 for cross-platform encrypted RCS, and the legal status of message scanning.
⚠️ The most-used software category on earth, built on protocols mostly designed before the threats they now face existed.
Builds on a cryptography reference (key exchange, forward secrecy, authentication), a wireless reference (cellular and Bluetooth layers), and a computer-hardware reference (networking). Complements a speaking-and-influence reference for the human side.
⚠️ GOTCHA boxes mark where the security or reliability property people assume is not the one the system actually provides.
The three ideas that organize this document:
- ⚠️ FEDERATED VERSUS PROPRIETARY IS THE DEEPEST DIVIDE (§1 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability). Email, SMS and the phone network are federated — anyone can join, anyone can reach anyone, and nobody can fix them unilaterally. Signal, iMessage and Slack are proprietary — coherent, secure, improvable, and walled. Almost every frustration in this domain traces to that trade.- ⚠️ "ENCRYPTED" IS FOUR DIFFERENT CLAIMS (§23 →
comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy). Transport encryption, encryption at rest, end-to-end encryption, and end-to-end encryption with verified keys are wildly different guarantees, and marketing conflates them constantly.- ⚠️ METADATA IS USUALLY THE POINT (§24 →
comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy). Who talked to whom, when, how often and from where survives content encryption — and for most surveillance purposes it is more valuable than content. A system can be perfectly end-to-end encrypted and still surveillable.
§28. What's Live — checked August 2026
28.1 ⚠️ Cross-platform encrypted RCS finally shipped
⚠️ §15 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps's gap closing, and §1 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability's federated-versus-proprietary trade playing out over eight
years.
- ⚠️ WHAT HAPPENED. ⚠️ The GSMA published RCS Universal Profile 3.0 in March 2025, the
first version to formally define end-to-end encryption for person-to-person RCS, using
MLS (§16 →
comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps). ⚠️ The GSMA's technical director framed it as making RCS the first large-scale messaging service to support interoperable E2EE between client implementations from different providers. - ⚠️ IT WENT LIVE 11 MAY 2026, ⚠️ in beta with iOS 26.5 and current Google Messages — the first time iPhone-to-Android messages could be end-to-end encrypted. ⚠️ Encryption is on by default where supported, with a lock icon indicating coverage.
- ⚠️ THE EFF called it a victory, noting ⚠️ neither Google, Apple, nor the cellular carriers have access to message contents.
- ⚠️ THE STANDARDIZATION LAG IS THE STORY. ⚠️ UP 3.0 was specified in March 2025 and
took roughly a year to reach a first beta — and one industry commentary notes the GSMA
had already reached UP 5.0 by then. ⚠️ That is §1 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability's federated cost, measured.
⚠️ GOTCHA — three separate caveats, and coverage tends to state only the headline. ⚠️ FIRST, CARRIER SUPPORT IS REQUIRED ON BOTH ENDS. ⚠️ Apple has shipped its side, but whether a given conversation is actually encrypted depends on network infrastructure Apple neither controls nor publishes a support list for. ⚠️ SECOND, BUSINESS MESSAGING IS EXCLUDED AND WILL STAY EXCLUDED. ⚠️ A2P RCS uses transport-layer security, not MLS — and this is architectural rather than an oversight: carrier-side compliance filtering, spam detection and regulatory logging require readable content (§15 →
comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, §21 →comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push's same tension). ⚠️ THIRD, METADATA AND BACKUPS REMAIN. ⚠️ The EFF's own assessment notes metadata is likely still collected, and cloud backups may store conversations unencrypted unless Advanced Data Protection is enabled — with Google Messages reportedly encrypting message text but not media in backups. ⚠️ This is §23 →comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy's list, arriving on schedule.
⚠️ The honest summary: ⚠️ a real and large improvement for personal messaging between
platforms, achieved through standardization rather than regulation (§25 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) — and Signal
remains the stronger choice where metadata matters, which the EFF says explicitly.
28.2 ⚠️ The legal status of message scanning
⚠️ §26 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy's debate moving from principle to statute — and the 2026 position is genuinely
tangled.
- ⚠️ TWO DIFFERENT THINGS SHARE THE NICKNAME, and conflating them is the main source of confusion. ⚠️ "CHAT CONTROL 1.0" is Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 — a temporary derogation from ePrivacy PERMITTING (not requiring) providers to voluntarily scan for CSAM. It applies to unencrypted services. ⚠️ "CHAT CONTROL 2.0" is the permanent CSA Regulation proposed in May 2022, which is where mandatory detection and client-side scanning have been debated.
- ⚠️ THE 2026 SEQUENCE ON 1.0. ⚠️ Parliament rejected a further extension in March 2026 and the derogation lapsed on 4 April 2026. ⚠️ On 9 July 2026 it was reinstated via a fast-tracked Council text, in force until 2028.
- ⚠️ The vote mechanics are worth stating precisely, because the headline "Parliament passed it" is misleading: 314 MEPs voted to reject and 276 in favour with 17 abstentions, but rejection required an ABSOLUTE MAJORITY of 361 — so it passed despite a majority of those voting opposing it. ⚠️ Reporting indicates an exemption for end-to-end encrypted services was adopted.
- ⚠️ Notably, Google, Meta, Microsoft and Snap reportedly continued scanning during the April–July gap when no legal basis existed.
- ⚠️ ON 2.0, the permanent regulation: ⚠️ the Council dropped the original mandatory client-side scanning requirement but retained a permanent voluntary framework, age-verification obligations extending to encrypted services, broad risk-mitigation obligations, and detection orders for known CSAM via hash-matching on unencrypted platforms. ⚠️ Trilogue negotiations began December 2025 and the file returns in September 2026.
⚠️ GOTCHA — the technical point is independent of the politics and worth stating plainly. ⚠️ Client-side scanning does not break end-to-end encryption; it inspects content on the device BEFORE encryption is applied. ⚠️ As the Max Planck Society puts it, the encryption remains in place but is fundamentally circumvented. ⚠️ The corresponding point about email is also worth knowing: most email is NOT end-to-end encrypted (§7 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability), so providers can and already do scan it server-side — which is why the debate is specifically about messaging. ⚠️ The industry objection to "voluntary" framings is that risk-mitigation obligations can become regulatory pressure to scan, and that a detection-order precedent against E2EE services could later be expanded without new primary legislation.
⚠️ Elsewhere: ⚠️ the UK Online Safety Act gives Ofcom powers that reporting describes as demanding scanning no encrypted service can satisfy while remaining encrypted — and the observed provider response has been to WITHDRAW FEATURES from the UK rather than weaken them globally, which is itself evidence about whether "compliant but still encrypted" is achievable. ⚠️ Sourcing warning, and it is significant. ⚠️ Much of the available coverage comes from campaigning organizations on one side and is written accordingly; the Max Planck Society and Euronews are the closest to neutral among my sources, and the vote arithmetic is consistently reported across otherwise-opposed outlets. ⚠️ I have described mechanisms and positions rather than taking one — the technical statement that CSS circumvents rather than breaks E2EE is a factual claim, not a political one, and both sides accept it.
§29. Misconceptions
| Misconception | Correction |
|---|---|
| Email From: is verified | ⚠️ Envelope and header differ. That gap IS spoofing (§2 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability, §5 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| SPF stops spoofing | ⚠️ It checks the envelope, not what you see. DMARC aligns them (§5 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| STARTTLS secures email | ⚠️ Opportunistic and strippable without MTA-STS/DANE (§2 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| Set DMARC to p=reject immediately | ⚠️ Read reports first or you'll drop real mail (§5 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| Deliverability is about content | ⚠️ Reputation, engagement, complaint rate (§6 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| PGP encrypts your email | ⚠️ Not the subject line, not the metadata (§7 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| SS7 is a legacy curiosity | ⚠️ Still routes roaming and SMS. No authentication (§9 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id) |
| Caller ID shows who's calling | ⚠️ Asserted by the originator. Trivially forged (§12 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id) |
| STIR/SHAKEN proves a call is legitimate | ⚠️ It attests a carrier's claim about the number (§12 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id) |
| 160 characters was a design decision | ⚠️ It's what fitted in spare signalling capacity (§13 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| SMS 2FA is fine | ⚠️ Weakest common factor — SS7, SIM swap. Still beats none (§9 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id, §13 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| Non-Latin SMS costs the same | ⚠️ UCS-2 cuts the limit to 70 chars per segment (§13 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| MMS is SMS with pictures | ⚠️ Different system — needs mobile data, recompresses hard (§14 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| RCS is a carrier standard | ⚠️ Substantially operated by Google via Jibe (§15 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| RCS was already encrypted | ⚠️ Google-to-Google only. The standard had none until UP 3.0 (§15 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, §28.1) |
| Telegram is an encrypted messenger | ⚠️ NOT E2EE by default. Only Secret Chats (§17 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| WhatsApp backups are encrypted | ⚠️ Only if you enable it (§17 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, §23 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| E2EE protects your conversation | ⚠️ Not endpoints, backups, metadata or the other party (§23 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Zoom was end-to-end encrypted | ⚠️ The 2020 claim described transport encryption. FTC settlement (§20 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) |
| Conferencing could easily be E2EE | ⚠️ Recording, transcription and effects need the content (§20 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) |
| Slack and Teams are private | ⚠️ Search, retention and eDiscovery require readable content (§21 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) |
| Push notifications are private | ⚠️ APNs/FCM see the metadata for every app (§22 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) |
| Metadata is less sensitive | ⚠️ Often more revealing, and usually less legally protected (§24 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Interop mandates improve security | ⚠️ Bridging can mean the weakest party sets the level (§25 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Client-side scanning breaks encryption | ⚠️ It circumvents it — reads before the envelope closes (§26 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy, §28.2) |
| VoIP phones work in a blackout | ⚠️ Copper powered the handset. IP doesn't (§27 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Encrypted RCS works everywhere now | ⚠️ Both carriers must support UP 3.0 (§28.1) |
| The EU banned/mandated scanning | ⚠️ Two separate files. Check which is meant (§28.2) |
§30. Numbers and Dates
⚠️ SMTP RFC 821 (1982) · ports 25 / 587 / 465
⚠️ SMS ⚠️ 160 chars GSM-7 · ⚠️ 70 chars UCS-2
⚠️ PSTN voice ⚠️ 8 kHz, 8-bit companded = 64 kbit/s · 300-3400 Hz
⚠️ VoIP one-way latency ⚠️ interactivity degrades above ~150 ms
⚠️ Complaint rate threshold ⚠️ order of 0.1% (bulk sender rules)
⚠️ STIR/SHAKEN attestation ⚠️ A (full) · B (partial) · C (gateway)
⚠️ SFU ⚠️ forwards without decoding — the standard topology
⚠️ MLS ⚠️ RFC 9420 — designed for large groups AND interop
⚠️ ⚠️ RCS UP 3.0 published ⚠️ March 2025 (GSMA)
⚠️ ⚠️ Cross-platform E2EE RCS live ⚠️ 11 May 2026, iOS 26.5 beta
⚠️ Standardization lag ⚠️ ~1 year spec → first beta; GSMA at UP 5.0
⚠️ ⚠️ Chat Control 1.0 ⚠️ Reg (EU) 2021/1232 — VOLUNTARY,
unencrypted services · lapsed 4 Apr 2026 ·
⚠️ reinstated 9 Jul 2026, in force to 2028
⚠️ ⚠️ The 9 July vote ⚠️ 314 to reject, 276 for, 17 abstain —
⚠️ needed 361 (absolute majority) to reject
⚠️ CSA Regulation (2.0) ⚠️ proposed May 2022 · trilogue from
Dec 2025 · ⚠️ returns September 2026
§31. Sources
| Source | Why |
|---|---|
| RFCs — 5321/5322 (email), 3261 (SIP), 9420 (MLS) | ⚠️ Primary, free, authoritative |
| M3AAWG best practice documents | ⚠️ §5–§6 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability, the operational reality of email |
| Signal protocol documentation and specifications | ⚠️ §16 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps — unusually well documented |
| GSMA RCS Universal Profile specifications | ⚠️ §15 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, §28.1, primary |
| EFF Deeplinks and Surveillance Self-Defense | ⚠️ §23–§26 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy — advocacy, but technically careful |
| webrtcforthecurious.com | ⚠️ §19 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push, free and excellent |
| Rosenberg/Johnston on SIP; WebRTC (Loreto & Romano) | §10 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id, §19 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push |
| Karsten Nohl's SS7 research | ⚠️ §9 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id — the work that made it public |
| NIST SP 800-63B on authenticators | ⚠️ §13 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, on SMS as a factor |
| "Bugs in our Pockets" (Abelson, Anderson, Rivest et al.) | ⚠️ §26 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy — the technical case against CSS |
| Euronews, Max Planck Society on Chat Control | ⚠️ §28.2 — nearest to neutral available |
§32. Quick Reference
32.1 Picker
| Question | Where |
|---|---|
| Why does my mail go to spam? | ⚠️ Authentication, then reputation and complaints (§5 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability, §6 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| Someone is spoofing my domain | ⚠️ DMARC with reporting. Read before enforcing (§5 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) |
| Is this messenger actually secure? | ⚠️ Ask the new-device test (§23 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Is SMS 2FA good enough? | ⚠️ Better than nothing, worse than TOTP or a key (§13 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) |
| Why do spam calls look local? | ⚠️ Neighbour spoofing. Caller ID isn't authenticated (§12 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id) |
| Why is my video call bad? | ⚠️ Latency, jitter, loss — and echo means get a headset (§10 → comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id, §20 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) |
| Can my employer read my Slack? | ⚠️ Yes. It's a product feature (§21 → comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) |
| Is my group chat end-to-end encrypted? | ⚠️ Check the platform, and check backups separately (§23 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Does encryption hide who I talk to? | ⚠️ No. Metadata survives (§24 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
| Is iPhone-to-Android encrypted now? | ⚠️ If both carriers support UP 3.0 (§28.1) |
| Are business RCS messages encrypted? | ⚠️ Transport only, and by design (§15 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, §28.1) |
| Will my phone work in a power cut? | ⚠️ Not on all-IP without battery backup (§27 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) |
32.2 Choosing a channel
- [ ] ⚠️ What must be confidential — content, or the fact of contact? (§23 →
comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy, §24 →comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) - [ ] ⚠️ Who must be able to reach you? Reach vs security is the trade (§1 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) - [ ] ⚠️ Are backups covered, or is the archive the weak point? (§23 →
comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) - [ ] Is the other party's endpoint trustworthy? (§23 →
comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) - [ ] ⚠️ Does the org need search, retention or eDiscovery? Then not E2EE (§21 →
comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push) - [ ] Does it need to work with no internet or no app? (§13 →
comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps) - [ ] ⚠️ Emergency and accessibility requirements met? (§27 →
comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy) - [ ] If sending bulk email, additionally:
- [ ] ⚠️ SPF, DKIM and DMARC aligned; reports monitored (§5 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) - [ ] ⚠️ One-click unsubscribe, and complaint rate watched (§6 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability) - [ ] Transactional separated from marketing by subdomain (§6 →
comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability)
§33. Method
§1–§27 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability, comms-telephony-pstn-ss7-voip-and-caller-id, comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps, comms-webrtc-video-conferencing-team-platforms-and-push, comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy rests on published protocols and long-documented practice — SMTP, SIP, the
Signal protocol, MLS, SFU architecture, the SS7 vulnerability literature, and the four-way
distinction in what "encrypted" means. ⚠️ None needed verification; RFC 821 is from 1982
and the Signal double ratchet has been publicly specified and independently analyzed for a
decade.
Two searches were run in August 2026, on encrypted RCS and message-scanning law
— ⚠️ the first because §15 → comms-sms-rcs-signal-protocol-and-messaging-apps's gap was the largest open hole in mainstream messaging
security and it just closed, the second because §26 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy's debate has moved from principle into
statute and the current position is widely misreported in both directions.
Confidence. High in §23 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy and §1 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability, which are the sections I'd most want read.
⚠️ The four-way distinction between transport encryption, encryption at rest, E2EE and
E2EE-with-verified-keys is the thing that makes marketing claims readable — and the
practical test is worth memorizing: if a provider can show you old messages on a new device
with only a password, it is not end-to-end encrypted.
⚠️ §1 → comms-email-smtp-authentication-and-deliverability's federated-versus-proprietary trade is the frame that explains why email and SMS
are insecure and why fixing them takes decades: it is the price of universal reach, not
incompetence. ⚠️ §24 → comms-encryption-metadata-interoperability-and-policy's point that metadata is often more revealing and less legally
protected than content is the one most people have not internalized.
High on §28.1, anchored on the GSMA's own specification announcement and the EFF's assessment: ⚠️ UP 3.0 published March 2025 defining MLS-based E2EE, cross-platform encrypted RCS live 11 May 2026 in beta. ⚠️ The three caveats are the part worth carrying — carrier support required on both ends, business messaging excluded architecturally, and metadata and backups untouched — because coverage reliably states the headline and omits them.
Moderate on §28.2, and deliberately careful. ⚠️ The vote arithmetic on 9 July 2026 — 314 to reject against a required absolute majority of 361 — is consistently reported across outlets with opposed editorial positions, which is why I state it precisely: describing this as "Parliament passed it" is technically true and substantively misleading. ⚠️ Much of the available coverage is from campaigning organizations, and I have leaned on Euronews and the Max Planck Society where possible and flagged the rest. ⚠️ I have described mechanisms and positions rather than adopting one. ⚠️ The single technical claim I state flatly — that client-side scanning circumvents rather than breaks end-to-end encryption — is accepted by advocates on both sides and is the distinction that makes the rest of the argument legible.
04 同仓库更多 Skills
white-paper-writing
Use when writing white papers, technical reports, policy documents, thought leadership pieces, or any long-form authoritative document. Triggers on requests to write, structure, outline, or review white papers, technical reports, position papers, policy briefs, or evidence-driven arguments. Also use for B2B content marketing strategy, technical documentation requiring authority, academic-style reports, or any document that must educate while persuading. Use when someone asks "how should I structure this" for a long-form document.
prose-technical-mechanics
Use when editing or writing prose at a technical/mechanical level: choosing between Anglo-Saxon and Latinate diction, placing information in topic vs stress positions, writing periodic vs cumulative sentences, handling sentence rhythm, punctuation as logic, transitions, paragraph structure, or phonesthetics. Use when someone wants to understand WHY prose works or doesn't, not just surface-level style advice. Triggers on word choice, sentence structure, emphasis, rhythm, diction, or any deep writing mechanics question.
prose-mechanics
Use when writing, editing, or analyzing prose style; when trying to avoid generic AI-sounding writing; when applying specific prose styles such as journalistic, academic, narrative, KJV biblical, Hemingway plain, Latinate/Jamesian, Orwellian, Augustan, Victorian, Early Modern (Bacon, Browne, Milton), or free indirect discourse; or when coaching someone on writing voice and mechanics. Triggers on any request to improve, analyze, or write in a specific prose style, to fix "AI-sounding" writing, to make prose more vivid or concrete, to vary sentence rhythm, or to understand how a particular writer achieves their effects.
narrative-structure
Use when structuring stories, pitches, presentations, white papers, or any persuasive narrative; analyzing the hero's journey in fiction or non-fiction; applying StoryBrand for business communication; designing narrative arcs for thought leadership; or understanding Vogler, Snyder, Propp, or Campbell frameworks. Triggers on any narrative structure, storytelling, pitch structure, StoryBrand, hero's journey, three-act structure, Freytag, Save the Cat, narrative arc, or "how should I structure this story/pitch/presentation" request.
legal-brief-writing
Use when writing legal briefs, motions, or any court filing; when analyzing judicial cognition and persuasion; when applying elite brief-writing techniques from Roberts, Clement, Kagan, Garner; or when structuring legal arguments for maximum persuasion. Also use for autistic/neurodivergent advocates who need to understand how their natural communication style maps to elite legal advocacy. Triggers on any legal writing, brief drafting, motion preparation, or legal argument structuring request.
journal-publishability-criteria
Use whenever a research paper, article or preprint is being written, revised, reviewed or published, and specifically before every publication of docs/paper.md. Covers what legitimate journals actually gate on, in order of gating — the editor's desk screen (scope, novelty, package problems), what reviewers judge (methodological soundness, claims the evidence can carry, statistical and qualitative reporting), EQUATOR reporting guidelines, the ICMJE authorship criteria, COPE's view of text recycling, the near-universal generative-AI policy (no AI author, disclosure, author responsibility), TOP 2025 transparency standards, how to verify a journal is legitimate, submitting without an institution, and a pre-submission checklist. Triggers on requests to evaluate, review, prepare or submit a paper, to judge publishability, to write a declarations or data-availability section, to disclose AI use, or to check a journal.