[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X":3,"skill-same:01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X":147},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":39,"commitSha":40,"skillDirectory":41,"forksCount":42,"repositoryHtmlUrl":43,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":44,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":45,"updatedAt":46,"install":47,"resources":60},"01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X","wafv2-web-acl-auditor",null,"Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.","jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","jhkchan","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F1083902?v=4","01M7A2SVQYP9GQTPTDXP5JKYQ4","Jacky Chan","01M7A2SVS117YWCTZABB75HZR1",4,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: wafv2-web-acl-auditor\ndescription: 'Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.'\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex). No AWS CLI required for offline Web ACL classification — the skill reasons over provided config text. Live-account audits use aws wafv2 describe-web-acl \u002F list-web-acls \u002F get-logging-configuration (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).\nmetadata:\n  domain: aws-cloudops\n  complexity: high\n  requires_llm: 'true'\n  phase: '2'\n  supports_pipeline: 'true'\n  entry_point: 'false'\n  family: Security\n  verdict_shape: MISCONFIGURED | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK\n  when_to_use: Reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL configuration (JSON from describe-web-acl), auditing managed-rule-group coverage, validating rate-based-rule correctness, checking WAF logging and visibility configuration, investigating rule-bypass or shadow-rule patterns, or hardening a WAF before production deployment.\n  version: 0.1.0\n  author: Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder\n  keywords: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, rate-based rule, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, CAPTCHA, Challenge\n  tags: aws, wafv2, cloudops, security, web-acl, managed-rules, rate-limiting, owasp, audit, compliance\n  dependencies: aws-orchestrator\n---\n\n# WAFv2 Web ACL Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\nClassify a WAFv2 Web ACL configuration against effective-protection principles.\nA Web ACL is not \"secure\" just because it exists — a WAF with `DefaultAction:\nAllow` and all rules in COUNT mode is a logging appliance, not a security\ncontrol. The goal is to determine whether the ACL would actually **stop** the\nattacks it claims to defend against: does every critical traffic class pass\nthrough a BLOCK-mode managed rule group before reaching the backend, or does a\nmisplaced Allow rule or a blanket COUNT override silently disable protection?\n\nFour-failure-mode detail moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when explaining why a verdict was reached.\n\n## Quick reference\n\nIf the Web ACL has `DefaultAction: Allow` and zero rules, it is\nMISCONFIGURED. If any managed rule group has `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}`\nand no compensating BLOCK rule covers that threat class, it is\nMISCONFIGURED. If a custom Allow rule sits at a lower priority than all\nmanaged rule groups with a broad match pattern, it is MISCONFIGURED. If\n`AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` is absent entirely, it is MISCONFIGURED.\nIf it has 3+ managed rule groups in BLOCK mode, a rate-based rule,\nlogging, and visibility, it is OK. See the steps below for edge cases\n(scope, forwarded IP, exclusions, transformations, ImmunityTime).\n\n**Output:** Always emit the block below (see Output format for detail):\n`WEBACL: \u003Cname> | VERDICT: \u003CMISCONFIGURED|WEAK|ADEQUATE|OK> | REASON | RISK | GAPS | REMEDIATION`.\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order)\n\n### Step 0: Validate input\n\nIf the Web ACL config is not parseable (malformed JSON, missing `DefaultAction`\nor `Rules` array), output:\n\n```text\nWEBACL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Web ACL config is not valid JSON or is missing required fields (DefaultAction, Rules).\nREMEDIATION: Re-export the ACL with aws wafv2 describe-web-acl --id \u003Cid> --scope \u003CCLOUDFRONT|REGIONAL> --output json.\n```\n\nDo not attempt classification on malformed input. Additionally, verify the\n`Scope` field if present: a `CLOUDFRONT` scope ACL must live in `us-east-1`;\na `REGIONAL` scope ACL in `us-east-1` cannot protect a CloudFront\ndistribution. Flag a scope mismatch but do not fail — the ACL may be valid\nfor a regional resource.\n\n### Step 1: Check for zero-rule open door\n\nIf `DefaultAction` is `Allow` AND the `Rules` array is empty or contains\nonly custom rules with no `ManagedRuleGroupStatement`, classify as\n**MISCONFIGURED** (CRITICAL). The WAF is a pass-through — every request\nreaches the backend uninspected. Cite \"Step 1: zero-protection ACL.\"\n\nThis also covers the case where `DefaultAction` is `Allow` and the only\nrules present are rate-limit or geo-block rules without any content-inspection\nmanaged rule group — a rate limiter is not a web application firewall.\n\n### Step 2: Detect shadow \u002F bypass rules\n\nFor every custom rule (a rule whose `Statement` is NOT a\n`ManagedRuleGroupStatement`), check:\n\n- **Action is `Allow` or `Challenge`** (not `Block`, not `Count`).\n- **Priority is lower than at least one managed rule group's priority.**\n\nIf both are true, the custom rule is evaluated FIRST. If its `Statement`\nmatches a broad pattern, it shadows (bypasses) the managed rule groups for\nthat traffic class. The match pattern determines severity:\n\n- **URIPath `STARTS_WITH` \u002F `CONTAINS` with a common prefix** (e.g.,\n  `\u002Fapi\u002F`, `\u002F`, `\u002F*`) — CRITICAL. Shadows all managed rules for a major\n  traffic class. This is the most common shadow pattern.\n- **HeaderMatch on a specific value** (e.g., `X-Internal: true`) — HIGH.\n  Shadows managed rules for requests carrying that header; an attacker who\n  discovers the header value bypasses all protection.\n- **IPSet match** — MODERATE. Shadows for specific IPs; legitimate for\n  known-good partner IPs but dangerous if the IPSet is stale or broad.\n- **Exact-match URIPath** (e.g., `\u002Fhealth`) — LOW. Intentional exclusion\n  for health checks; acceptable but should be noted.\n\nA shadow rule with a broad match pattern and no managed rule group at a\nlower priority to compensate makes the ACL **MISCONFIGURED**. Cite\n\"Step 2: shadow rule bypasses managed inspection.\"\n\n**Priority semantics note:** WAF evaluates rules in ascending priority\norder (priority 0 is first). The first rule whose `Action` is `Allow`,\n`Block`, or `CAPTCHA` terminates evaluation for that request — subsequent\nrules do not inspect it. `Count` and `Challenge` actions do NOT terminate\nevaluation; the request continues through subsequent rules.\n\n### Step 3: Detect COUNT-mode paralysis\n\nFor each rule with a `ManagedRuleGroupStatement`, check the `OverrideAction`:\n\n- `OverrideAction: {None: {}}` or absent — the group uses its default\n  actions (most rules BLOCK). This is correct.\n- `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}` — the ENTIRE group is in count mode.\n  Every rule in the group logs but does not block. This disables the\n  group's protection.\n\nIf ALL managed rule groups in the ACL have `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}`,\nand no custom BLOCK rule compensates, classify as **MISCONFIGURED**\n(CRITICAL). Cite \"Step 3: all managed rules in COUNT mode — protection\ndisabled.\"\n\nIf SOME but not all managed rule groups are in COUNT mode, downgrade the\nACL by one tier (e.g., OK → ADEQUATE, ADEQUATE → WEAK). The COUNT-mode\ngroups are not providing protection; treat them as absent for coverage\nscoring. Cite \"Step 3: partial COUNT-mode — \u003Cgroup name> not blocking.\"\n\nOverrideAction vs RuleActionOverrides nuance moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when tuning false positives in Step 3.\n\n### Step 4: Verify baseline managed-rule coverage\n\nCheck which managed rule groups are present (in BLOCK mode — COUNT-mode\ngroups from Step 3 do not count). Apply the coverage matrix below. The\n**minimum viable coverage** is `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` plus at least\none input-validation group.\n\nIf `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` is absent entirely (not in COUNT, just\nmissing), classify as **MISCONFIGURED** (CRITICAL) regardless of other\nrules. This group provides the OWASP Top 10 baseline: SQLi, XSS, RFI, LFI,\ntraversal, session fixation, and protocol anomalies. Without it, the ACL\nhas no baseline content inspection. Cite \"Step 4: missing CommonRuleSet —\nno OWASP baseline.\"\n\nCoverage matrix moved verbatim to [managed-rule-group-reference.md](references\u002Fmanaged-rule-group-reference.md).\nLoad on demand when scoring baseline coverage in Step 4.\n\n### Step 5: Check rate-based rule correctness\n\nIf the ACL has no rule with a `RateBasedStatement`, record a gap\n(`GAP: no rate-based rule — vulnerable to volumetric\u002Fbrute-force attacks`).\nThis alone does not determine the verdict but factors into the WEAK tier.\n\nIf a rate-based rule exists, validate:\n\n- **AggregateKeyType.** If `IP` (legacy) and the protected resource is\n  behind CloudFront or an ALB, flag as a gap — the rule rate-limits the\n  proxy's IP, not the client. The correct key behind a proxy is\n  `FORWARDED_IP` with `ForwardedIPConfig.HeaderName` matching the proxy's\n  forwarded-IP header (`X-Forwarded-For` for ALB, `X-Amz-Cf-Id` is NOT an\n  IP — CloudFront forwards client IP in `X-Forwarded-For` as well, but\n  the first value is the client; set `FallbackBehavior: MATCH`).\n- **Limit threshold.** `\u003C100` is aggressive (legitimate traffic at risk);\n  `>5000` is permissive (attackers can operate below it). Reasonable range\n  depends on traffic profile: 100–500 for login\u002FAPI endpoints, 500–2000\n  for general web traffic. Flag extreme values.\n- **EvaluationWindowSec.** Default is 300 (5 minutes). A shorter window\n  (60–120s) catches burst attacks faster but is more sensitive; a longer\n  window (600s) smooths out legitimate spikes. Not a defect — note for\n  context.\n\nA rate-based rule with `AggregateKeyType: IP` behind a proxy is a\n**functional defect** — the rule appears to work but rate-limits the\nwrong entity. Flag as HIGH severity.\n\n### Step 6: Check logging configuration\n\n**Detection rule:** If the Web ACL JSON does NOT contain a top-level\n`LoggingConfiguration` key (with `LogDestinationConfigs` pointing to a\nCloudWatch Logs ARN, Kinesis Data Firehose ARN, or S3 bucket ARN), logging\nis NOT configured. Record a gap (`GAP: no WAF logging — blind to attacks`).\n\nDo NOT confuse `VisibilityConfig` with `LoggingConfiguration` — they are\nindependent settings. `VisibilityConfig` controls CloudWatch metrics and\nsampled-request storage (Step 7). `LoggingConfiguration` controls full\nrequest\u002Fresponse log delivery to a destination. A Web ACL can have\n`VisibilityConfig` enabled but `LoggingConfiguration` absent — that ACL\nhas metrics but no logs.\n\nWithout logging:\n- You cannot tune false positives (no blocked-request samples in the log).\n- You cannot detect bypasses (no count-mode samples in the log).\n- Incident response has no evidence of attack timing or source.\n- PCI-DSS Requirement 10 and SOC 2 CC7.2 require security event logging.\n\nNo logging with `DefaultAction: Allow` and minimal rules compounds the\nrisk — the WAF is both weak and blind. This combination is always a\nHIGH gap.\n\n**Redacted fields:** `LoggingConfiguration` may have `RedactedFields`\nconfigured to strip sensitive data from logs (e.g., passwords, credit\ncard numbers). This is correct — check that `RedactedFields` is not\noverly broad (stripping entire request bodies defeats the purpose of WAF\nlogging for false-positive tuning).\n\n### Step 7: Check visibility configuration\n\nEvery rule AND the Web ACL itself should have `VisibilityConfig` with:\n\n- `CloudWatchMetricsEnabled: true` — emits per-rule metrics to CloudWatch.\n  Without this, the WAF dashboard is blank and you cannot detect when a\n  rule stops firing.\n- `SampledRequestsEnabled: true` — stores a sample of matched requests\n  for inspection in the console. Without this, false-positive tuning\n  requires reproducibility you do not have.\n\nMissing `CloudWatchMetricsEnabled` on the Web ACL-level `VisibilityConfig`\nis a HIGH gap — the entire WAF is invisible to monitoring. Missing it on\nindividual rules is MODERATE — per-rule metrics are unavailable but the\nACL-level metric still fires.\n\n### Step 7b: Check Web ACL associations\n\nAn unassociated Web ACL protects nothing. If the input includes association\ndata (or a note that the ACL is associated with specific resources),\nverify that at least one resource is listed. If the input does NOT include\nassociation data, add a NOTE to the REMEDIATION field:\n\n```text\nNOTE: Verify resource associations with aws wafv2 list-resources-for-web-acl\n--web-acl-arn \u003Carn>. An unassociated ACL protects nothing regardless of\nrule quality.\n```\n\nThis does not change the verdict tier (the audit evaluates rule\nconfiguration quality, not deployment state), but it MUST appear in the\nREMEDIATION field so the operator does not mistake a well-configured but\nunassociated ACL for active protection.\n\n### Step 8: Evaluate rule actions and statement correctness\n\nFor custom rules (non-managed-group), verify the `Action` and `Statement`:\n\n- **`Action: Count` on a custom rule** — the rule logs but does not block.\n  Acceptable for new rules in a testing phase; flag if the rule is intended\n  to block (note in REMEDIATION).\n- **`ByteMatchStatement` with `TextTransformations` containing only\n  `NONE`** — raw inspection without decoding. This is a bypass vector:\n  URL-encoded (`%3Cscript%3E`) or HTML-entity-encoded (`&#x3C;script&#x3E;`)\n  payloads evade detection. See the text-transformation matrix below.\n- **`SizeConstraintStatement` with `ComparisonOperator: GT` and a large\n  `Size`** (e.g., > 1 MB) — the rule inspects only oversized bodies, which\n  is rarely the intent. Likely a misconfiguration.\n- **`GeoMatchStatement` with `CountryCodes` containing only one country\n  AND `Action: Block`** — a deny-all-except-one-country rule. Functional\n  but fragile; legitimate users traveling abroad are blocked. Flag as\n  MODERATE unless the application is explicitly geo-restricted.\n- **`NotStatement` wrapping an `IPSet`** with `Action: Block` — blocks\n  everything not in the IPSet. This is a Default-Block-via-custom-rule\n  pattern. Verify the IPSet is comprehensive.\n\nText-transformation matrix moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when auditing ByteMatchStatement bypass vectors in Step 8.\n\n### Step 9: Check CAPTCHA \u002F Challenge rule configuration\n\nIf the ACL contains CAPTCHA or Challenge actions:\n\n- **`ImmunityTime` not set (null or 0)** — every request is challenged,\n  breaking single-page applications and API flows. The token is single-use.\n  Set `ImmunityTime` to 60–300 seconds for interactive flows.\n- **`ChallengeAction` without a fallback `Block` rule** — if a bot solves\n  the challenge, it proceeds with no further restriction. Layer a Block\n  rule behind the challenge for repeat offenders.\n- **CAPTCHA on an API endpoint** — programmatic clients cannot solve visual\n  CAPTCHAs. Use `Challenge` (silent JS proof-of-work) for APIs; reserve\n  CAPTCHA for browser flows.\n\nMissing `ImmunityTime` is a MODERATE application-compatibility issue, not a\nsecurity gap — but it causes operators to disable CAPTCHA entirely when it\nbreaks their app, which IS a security gap.\n\n### Step 10: Check managed-rule-group exclusions\n\n`ManagedRuleGroupStatement.ExcludedRules` removes specific rules from the\ngroup. Common legitimate exclusions:\n\n- `NoUserAgent_HEADER` from CommonRuleSet — health checkers send no UA.\n- `SizeRestrictions_BODY` from CommonRuleSet — large file uploads blocked.\n\nIf `ExcludedRules` contains more than 3 rules from a single group, or if\nit excludes a rule protecting against a Top-10 OWASP category (SQLi, XSS,\nRCE, LFI\u002FRFI), flag as MODERATE — the exclusion weakens protection for\nthat attack class. Cite the specific excluded rule name and what it blocks.\n\n### Step 11: Aggregate to verdict\n\nThe verdict is determined by counting CRITICAL findings and HIGH gaps. The\nprecedence is strict — a single CRITICAL finding overrides everything.\n\n**Gap severity reference (use this to count HIGH gaps):**\n\n| Gap | Severity | Step |\n|---|---|---|\n| Default Allow + zero managed rule groups | CRITICAL | 1 |\n| Shadow Allow rule before managed groups (broad match) | CRITICAL | 2 |\n| All managed groups in COUNT mode | CRITICAL | 3 |\n| Missing CommonRuleSet entirely | CRITICAL | 4 |\n| Only 1 managed group in BLOCK (insufficient coverage) | HIGH | 4 |\n| No rate-based rule | HIGH | 5 |\n| No logging destination configured | HIGH | 6 |\n| Rate rule with `AggregateKeyType: IP` behind proxy | HIGH | 5 |\n| No CloudWatch metrics on Web ACL VisibilityConfig | HIGH | 7 |\n| Missing input-validation group (KnownBadInputs absent) | MODERATE | 4 |\n| Missing Bot Control \u002F ATP (paid add-ons) | LOW | 4 |\n| Missing sampled requests on VisibilityConfig | LOW | 7 |\n| ImmunityTime not set on CAPTCHA rule | LOW | 9 |\n\n| Verdict | Trigger condition | Example |\n|---|---|---|\n| **MISCONFIGURED** | Any CRITICAL finding from Steps 1–4 | Zero-rule ACL; all-COUNT mode; shadow bypass rule; missing CommonRuleSet |\n| **WEAK** | No CRITICAL, but 2+ HIGH gaps | CommonRuleSet-only + no rate rule + no logging (3 HIGH gaps); CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs but no rate rule + no logging (2 HIGH gaps) |\n| **ADEQUATE** | No CRITICAL, exactly 1 HIGH gap (or 0 HIGH + MODERATE gaps) | CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs in BLOCK + rate rule + logging, but rate rule uses IP behind proxy (1 HIGH) |\n| **OK** | No CRITICAL, 0 HIGH gaps (LOW gaps allowed) | 3+ BLOCK-mode managed groups (baseline + input validation + reputation) + FORWARDED_IP rate rule + logging + full visibility + no shadow rules |\n\n**Critical counting examples:**\n\n- **CommonRuleSet-only, no rate rule, no logging:** 3 HIGH gaps → **WEAK**.\n- **CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs, no rate rule, no logging:** 2 HIGH gaps → **WEAK**.\n- **CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs + rate rule + logging, rate rule uses IP behind proxy:** 1 HIGH gap → **ADEQUATE**.\n- **3+ groups + FORWARDED_IP rate rule + logging + full visibility:** 0 HIGH gaps → **OK**.\n\n**Aggregation rule:** A single CRITICAL finding makes the whole ACL\nMISCONFIGURED, regardless of how many other rules are correct. Two or more\nHIGH gaps make it WEAK. Exactly one HIGH gap caps the verdict at ADEQUATE.\nZero HIGH gaps is OK (MODERATE and LOW gaps appear in GAPS and REMEDIATION\nbut do not downgrade the tier).\n\n## Effective protection context (expert note)\n\nFull request-path context moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when assessing real-world effectiveness.\n\n## Output format (per Web ACL)\n\n```text\nWEBACL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: MISCONFIGURED | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-3 sentences citing the specific step, finding, and config>\nRISK: CRITICAL | HIGH | MODERATE | LOW\nGAPS: \u003Ccomma-separated list of gap IDs, or \"None\" if OK>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action(s), or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Multi-rule aggregation example\n\nFull multi-rule aggregation example moved verbatim to [worked-examples.md](references\u002Fworked-examples.md).\nLoad on demand when emitting a multi-gap MISCONFIGURED report.\n\n## Operational edge cases (expert knowledge)\n\nOperational edge-case catalog moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand for production-behavior surprises (COUNT metrics, labels, sliding window, spoofing).\n\n## NEVER (anti-patterns)\n\n- NEVER classify a Web ACL with `DefaultAction: Allow` and zero managed\n  rule groups as OK or ADEQUATE. It is MISCONFIGURED — the WAF is a\n  pass-through that inspects nothing. A rate-limit rule without content\n  inspection does not change this verdict.\n\n- NEVER treat `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}` on a managed rule group as\n  equivalent to BLOCK. COUNT mode explicitly disables blocking — the\n  group logs matches but lets traffic through. If ALL groups are in COUNT,\n  the ACL is MISCONFIGURED regardless of how many groups are configured.\n\n- NEVER ignore a custom Allow rule at a lower priority number than managed\n  rule groups. WAF evaluates in ascending priority order and terminates on\n  the first Allow\u002FBlock\u002FCAPTCHA. A broad-match Allow rule at priority 0\n  means every subsequent managed rule group is dead code for the matched\n  traffic class. This is the single most common WAF bypass in production.\n\n- NEVER classify a Web ACL missing `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` as OK.\n  This group is the OWASP Top 10 baseline — without it, SQLi, XSS, RFI,\n  LFI, traversal, and protocol-anomaly attacks pass uninspected unless\n  every one is covered by a custom rule (which is impractical and fragile).\n\n- NEVER assume `DefaultAction: Block` is inherently safer than `Allow`.\n  Default Block requires every legitimate request path to be explicitly\n  allow-listed by a rule; if the rules are incomplete, legitimate traffic\n  is blocked (application outage). Default Allow with comprehensive BLOCK\n  rules is the standard production posture. Default Block is exceptional\n  and demands careful allow-listing.\n\n- NEVER recommend switching `DefaultAction` from Allow to Block without a\n  COUNT-mode testing period first. Default Block without a complete\n  allow-list will block legitimate traffic immediately. Run all managed\n  rule groups in COUNT for 1–2 weeks, review sampled requests for false\n  positives, add exclusions, THEN switch to Block.\n\n- NEVER recommend enabling all managed rule groups blindly without\n  considering application compatibility. `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet`\n  includes `SizeRestrictions_BODY` (blocks bodies > 8 KB) and\n  `GenericRFI_BODY` which can false-positive on legitimate API payloads.\n  Enable incrementally in COUNT mode, tune exclusions, then switch to BLOCK.\n\n- NEVER treat a rate-based rule with `AggregateKeyType: IP` behind\n  CloudFront or an ALB as correctly configured. The rule rate-limits the\n  proxy IP, not the client. Behind a proxy, the correct key is\n  `FORWARDED_IP` with `HeaderName: X-Forwarded-For` and\n  `FallbackBehavior: MATCH` (use the first IP in the chain).\n\n- NEVER classify an unassociated Web ACL as providing protection. A Web\n  ACL with no resource associations protects nothing — verify with\n  `aws wafv2 list-resources-for-web-acl`. An unassociated ACL with a\n  perfect configuration is still theatre.\n\n- NEVER treat `TextTransformations: [{Type: NONE}]` on a\n  `ByteMatchStatement` as sufficient for XSS\u002FSQLi detection. Raw\n  inspection without `URL_DECODE` or `HTML_ENTITY_DECODE` allows encoded\n  payloads to bypass pattern matching. At minimum, include `URL_DECODE`\n  and `HTML_ENTITY_DECODE` in the transformation list.\n\n- NEVER recommend `Action: Block` as the first remediation for a managed\n  rule group in COUNT mode without first reviewing the sampled requests\n  from the COUNT period. Switching directly to BLOCK without false-positive\n  tuning causes production incidents — legitimate API calls are blocked,\n  and the operations team reverts to COUNT (sometimes permanently).\n\n- NEVER trust the Web ACL name as an indicator of scope. A Web ACL named\n  \"production-cloudfront-acl\" may be REGIONAL scope and protect an ALB.\n  Always read the `Scope` field and verify the associated resources match\n  the intended perimeter.\n\n- NEVER assume a Web ACL with a perfect rule configuration is providing\n  protection without verifying resource associations. An unassociated ACL\n  is dead weight — `aws wafv2 list-resources-for-web-acl` must return at\n  least one ALB, API Gateway, AppSync, CloudFront distribution, or Cognito\n  user pool. Always include an association-check NOTE in the REMEDIATION\n  field, even for OK verdicts.\n\n- NEVER confuse `VisibilityConfig` with `LoggingConfiguration`. They are\n  independent settings. `VisibilityConfig` controls CloudWatch metrics and\n  sampled-request storage. `LoggingConfiguration` controls full log delivery\n  to CloudWatch Logs, Firehose, or S3. A Web ACL can have metrics enabled\n  but no logging — it is observable but not auditable.\n\n- NEVER trust a custom rule referencing an `IPSet` without verifying the\n  IPSet contents are current. Stale IPSets — containing decommissioned\n  partner IPs, expired allow-list entries, or broad CIDR blocks from a\n  debugging session — are a silent bypass or silent block. An IPSet\n  allow-rule with a `\u002F8` CIDR effectively allows 16 million IPs through\n  managed rule inspection. Always audit IPSet scope alongside the Web ACL.\n\n- NEVER chain custom `LabelMatchStatement` rules on labels from a managed\n  rule group without verifying the source rule is not in `ExcludedRules`.\n  Excluding a rule suppresses its label emission — downstream label-match\n  rules silently stop firing. This is invisible in metrics because the\n  label-match rule simply matches nothing (0 requests), which looks the\n  same as \"no traffic matched the label.\"\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nPre-flight safety checks moved verbatim to [diagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md).\nLoad on demand before recommending or running any remediation CLI.\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nPer-verdict remediation playbooks moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand after a verdict to build the REMEDIATION field.\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent AWS features moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand for 2024-2026 capability checks.\n\n## References\n\nSee `references\u002Fmanaged-rule-group-reference.md` for the full managed rule\ngroup catalog, per-group rule lists, `RuleActionOverrides` syntax, and the\n`put-logging-configuration` \u002F `associate-web-acl` CLI commands.\n\nSection taxonomy moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand to see the canonical CloudOps auditor section order.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [worked-examples.md](references\u002Fworked-examples.md) - secondary worked example: multi-rule aggregation report\n- [diagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) - pre-flight safety checks and backup\u002Fassociation CLI\n- [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - failure modes, edge cases, matrices, remediation playbooks, recent features\n- [managed-rule-group-reference.md](references\u002Fmanaged-rule-group-reference.md) - managed rule group catalog and coverage matrix\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F WAF Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS WAF Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fwaf-chapter.html\n- **WAF Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **WAF API Reference (v2)** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F\n- **AWS CLI — wafv2** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fwafv2\u002F\n- **Bot Control** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Faws-managed-rule-groups-bot.html\n- **ATP managed rule group** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Faws-managed-rule-groups-atp.html\n","# WAFv2 Web ACL Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\nClassify a WAFv2 Web ACL configuration against effective-protection principles.\nA Web ACL is not \"secure\" just because it exists — a WAF with `DefaultAction:\nAllow` and all rules in COUNT mode is a logging appliance, not a security\ncontrol. The goal is to determine whether the ACL would actually **stop** the\nattacks it claims to defend against: does every critical traffic class pass\nthrough a BLOCK-mode managed rule group before reaching the backend, or does a\nmisplaced Allow rule or a blanket COUNT override silently disable protection?\n\nFour-failure-mode detail moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when explaining why a verdict was reached.\n\n## Quick reference\n\nIf the Web ACL has `DefaultAction: Allow` and zero rules, it is\nMISCONFIGURED. If any managed rule group has `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}`\nand no compensating BLOCK rule covers that threat class, it is\nMISCONFIGURED. If a custom Allow rule sits at a lower priority than all\nmanaged rule groups with a broad match pattern, it is MISCONFIGURED. If\n`AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` is absent entirely, it is MISCONFIGURED.\nIf it has 3+ managed rule groups in BLOCK mode, a rate-based rule,\nlogging, and visibility, it is OK. See the steps below for edge cases\n(scope, forwarded IP, exclusions, transformations, ImmunityTime).\n\n**Output:** Always emit the block below (see Output format for detail):\n`WEBACL: \u003Cname> | VERDICT: \u003CMISCONFIGURED|WEAK|ADEQUATE|OK> | REASON | RISK | GAPS | REMEDIATION`.\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order)\n\n### Step 0: Validate input\n\nIf the Web ACL config is not parseable (malformed JSON, missing `DefaultAction`\nor `Rules` array), output:\n\n```text\nWEBACL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Web ACL config is not valid JSON or is missing required fields (DefaultAction, Rules).\nREMEDIATION: Re-export the ACL with aws wafv2 describe-web-acl --id \u003Cid> --scope \u003CCLOUDFRONT|REGIONAL> --output json.\n```\n\nDo not attempt classification on malformed input. Additionally, verify the\n`Scope` field if present: a `CLOUDFRONT` scope ACL must live in `us-east-1`;\na `REGIONAL` scope ACL in `us-east-1` cannot protect a CloudFront\ndistribution. Flag a scope mismatch but do not fail — the ACL may be valid\nfor a regional resource.\n\n### Step 1: Check for zero-rule open door\n\nIf `DefaultAction` is `Allow` AND the `Rules` array is empty or contains\nonly custom rules with no `ManagedRuleGroupStatement`, classify as\n**MISCONFIGURED** (CRITICAL). The WAF is a pass-through — every request\nreaches the backend uninspected. Cite \"Step 1: zero-protection ACL.\"\n\nThis also covers the case where `DefaultAction` is `Allow` and the only\nrules present are rate-limit or geo-block rules without any content-inspection\nmanaged rule group — a rate limiter is not a web application firewall.\n\n### Step 2: Detect shadow \u002F bypass rules\n\nFor every custom rule (a rule whose `Statement` is NOT a\n`ManagedRuleGroupStatement`), check:\n\n- **Action is `Allow` or `Challenge`** (not `Block`, not `Count`).\n- **Priority is lower than at least one managed rule group's priority.**\n\nIf both are true, the custom rule is evaluated FIRST. If its `Statement`\nmatches a broad pattern, it shadows (bypasses) the managed rule groups for\nthat traffic class. The match pattern determines severity:\n\n- **URIPath `STARTS_WITH` \u002F `CONTAINS` with a common prefix** (e.g.,\n  `\u002Fapi\u002F`, `\u002F`, `\u002F*`) — CRITICAL. Shadows all managed rules for a major\n  traffic class. This is the most common shadow pattern.\n- **HeaderMatch on a specific value** (e.g., `X-Internal: true`) — HIGH.\n  Shadows managed rules for requests carrying that header; an attacker who\n  discovers the header value bypasses all protection.\n- **IPSet match** — MODERATE. Shadows for specific IPs; legitimate for\n  known-good partner IPs but dangerous if the IPSet is stale or broad.\n- **Exact-match URIPath** (e.g., `\u002Fhealth`) — LOW. Intentional exclusion\n  for health checks; acceptable but should be noted.\n\nA shadow rule with a broad match pattern and no managed rule group at a\nlower priority to compensate makes the ACL **MISCONFIGURED**. Cite\n\"Step 2: shadow rule bypasses managed inspection.\"\n\n**Priority semantics note:** WAF evaluates rules in ascending priority\norder (priority 0 is first). The first rule whose `Action` is `Allow`,\n`Block`, or `CAPTCHA` terminates evaluation for that request — subsequent\nrules do not inspect it. `Count` and `Challenge` actions do NOT terminate\nevaluation; the request continues through subsequent rules.\n\n### Step 3: Detect COUNT-mode paralysis\n\nFor each rule with a `ManagedRuleGroupStatement`, check the `OverrideAction`:\n\n- `OverrideAction: {None: {}}` or absent — the group uses its default\n  actions (most rules BLOCK). This is correct.\n- `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}` — the ENTIRE group is in count mode.\n  Every rule in the group logs but does not block. This disables the\n  group's protection.\n\nIf ALL managed rule groups in the ACL have `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}`,\nand no custom BLOCK rule compensates, classify as **MISCONFIGURED**\n(CRITICAL). Cite \"Step 3: all managed rules in COUNT mode — protection\ndisabled.\"\n\nIf SOME but not all managed rule groups are in COUNT mode, downgrade the\nACL by one tier (e.g., OK → ADEQUATE, ADEQUATE → WEAK). The COUNT-mode\ngroups are not providing protection; treat them as absent for coverage\nscoring. Cite \"Step 3: partial COUNT-mode — \u003Cgroup name> not blocking.\"\n\nOverrideAction vs RuleActionOverrides nuance moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when tuning false positives in Step 3.\n\n### Step 4: Verify baseline managed-rule coverage\n\nCheck which managed rule groups are present (in BLOCK mode — COUNT-mode\ngroups from Step 3 do not count). Apply the coverage matrix below. The\n**minimum viable coverage** is `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` plus at least\none input-validation group.\n\nIf `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` is absent entirely (not in COUNT, just\nmissing), classify as **MISCONFIGURED** (CRITICAL) regardless of other\nrules. This group provides the OWASP Top 10 baseline: SQLi, XSS, RFI, LFI,\ntraversal, session fixation, and protocol anomalies. Without it, the ACL\nhas no baseline content inspection. Cite \"Step 4: missing CommonRuleSet —\nno OWASP baseline.\"\n\nCoverage matrix moved verbatim to [managed-rule-group-reference.md](references\u002Fmanaged-rule-group-reference.md).\nLoad on demand when scoring baseline coverage in Step 4.\n\n### Step 5: Check rate-based rule correctness\n\nIf the ACL has no rule with a `RateBasedStatement`, record a gap\n(`GAP: no rate-based rule — vulnerable to volumetric\u002Fbrute-force attacks`).\nThis alone does not determine the verdict but factors into the WEAK tier.\n\nIf a rate-based rule exists, validate:\n\n- **AggregateKeyType.** If `IP` (legacy) and the protected resource is\n  behind CloudFront or an ALB, flag as a gap — the rule rate-limits the\n  proxy's IP, not the client. The correct key behind a proxy is\n  `FORWARDED_IP` with `ForwardedIPConfig.HeaderName` matching the proxy's\n  forwarded-IP header (`X-Forwarded-For` for ALB, `X-Amz-Cf-Id` is NOT an\n  IP — CloudFront forwards client IP in `X-Forwarded-For` as well, but\n  the first value is the client; set `FallbackBehavior: MATCH`).\n- **Limit threshold.** `\u003C100` is aggressive (legitimate traffic at risk);\n  `>5000` is permissive (attackers can operate below it). Reasonable range\n  depends on traffic profile: 100–500 for login\u002FAPI endpoints, 500–2000\n  for general web traffic. Flag extreme values.\n- **EvaluationWindowSec.** Default is 300 (5 minutes). A shorter window\n  (60–120s) catches burst attacks faster but is more sensitive; a longer\n  window (600s) smooths out legitimate spikes. Not a defect — note for\n  context.\n\nA rate-based rule with `AggregateKeyType: IP` behind a proxy is a\n**functional defect** — the rule appears to work but rate-limits the\nwrong entity. Flag as HIGH severity.\n\n### Step 6: Check logging configuration\n\n**Detection rule:** If the Web ACL JSON does NOT contain a top-level\n`LoggingConfiguration` key (with `LogDestinationConfigs` pointing to a\nCloudWatch Logs ARN, Kinesis Data Firehose ARN, or S3 bucket ARN), logging\nis NOT configured. Record a gap (`GAP: no WAF logging — blind to attacks`).\n\nDo NOT confuse `VisibilityConfig` with `LoggingConfiguration` — they are\nindependent settings. `VisibilityConfig` controls CloudWatch metrics and\nsampled-request storage (Step 7). `LoggingConfiguration` controls full\nrequest\u002Fresponse log delivery to a destination. A Web ACL can have\n`VisibilityConfig` enabled but `LoggingConfiguration` absent — that ACL\nhas metrics but no logs.\n\nWithout logging:\n- You cannot tune false positives (no blocked-request samples in the log).\n- You cannot detect bypasses (no count-mode samples in the log).\n- Incident response has no evidence of attack timing or source.\n- PCI-DSS Requirement 10 and SOC 2 CC7.2 require security event logging.\n\nNo logging with `DefaultAction: Allow` and minimal rules compounds the\nrisk — the WAF is both weak and blind. This combination is always a\nHIGH gap.\n\n**Redacted fields:** `LoggingConfiguration` may have `RedactedFields`\nconfigured to strip sensitive data from logs (e.g., passwords, credit\ncard numbers). This is correct — check that `RedactedFields` is not\noverly broad (stripping entire request bodies defeats the purpose of WAF\nlogging for false-positive tuning).\n\n### Step 7: Check visibility configuration\n\nEvery rule AND the Web ACL itself should have `VisibilityConfig` with:\n\n- `CloudWatchMetricsEnabled: true` — emits per-rule metrics to CloudWatch.\n  Without this, the WAF dashboard is blank and you cannot detect when a\n  rule stops firing.\n- `SampledRequestsEnabled: true` — stores a sample of matched requests\n  for inspection in the console. Without this, false-positive tuning\n  requires reproducibility you do not have.\n\nMissing `CloudWatchMetricsEnabled` on the Web ACL-level `VisibilityConfig`\nis a HIGH gap — the entire WAF is invisible to monitoring. Missing it on\nindividual rules is MODERATE — per-rule metrics are unavailable but the\nACL-level metric still fires.\n\n### Step 7b: Check Web ACL associations\n\nAn unassociated Web ACL protects nothing. If the input includes association\ndata (or a note that the ACL is associated with specific resources),\nverify that at least one resource is listed. If the input does NOT include\nassociation data, add a NOTE to the REMEDIATION field:\n\n```text\nNOTE: Verify resource associations with aws wafv2 list-resources-for-web-acl\n--web-acl-arn \u003Carn>. An unassociated ACL protects nothing regardless of\nrule quality.\n```\n\nThis does not change the verdict tier (the audit evaluates rule\nconfiguration quality, not deployment state), but it MUST appear in the\nREMEDIATION field so the operator does not mistake a well-configured but\nunassociated ACL for active protection.\n\n### Step 8: Evaluate rule actions and statement correctness\n\nFor custom rules (non-managed-group), verify the `Action` and `Statement`:\n\n- **`Action: Count` on a custom rule** — the rule logs but does not block.\n  Acceptable for new rules in a testing phase; flag if the rule is intended\n  to block (note in REMEDIATION).\n- **`ByteMatchStatement` with `TextTransformations` containing only\n  `NONE`** — raw inspection without decoding. This is a bypass vector:\n  URL-encoded (`%3Cscript%3E`) or HTML-entity-encoded (`&#x3C;script&#x3E;`)\n  payloads evade detection. See the text-transformation matrix below.\n- **`SizeConstraintStatement` with `ComparisonOperator: GT` and a large\n  `Size`** (e.g., > 1 MB) — the rule inspects only oversized bodies, which\n  is rarely the intent. Likely a misconfiguration.\n- **`GeoMatchStatement` with `CountryCodes` containing only one country\n  AND `Action: Block`** — a deny-all-except-one-country rule. Functional\n  but fragile; legitimate users traveling abroad are blocked. Flag as\n  MODERATE unless the application is explicitly geo-restricted.\n- **`NotStatement` wrapping an `IPSet`** with `Action: Block` — blocks\n  everything not in the IPSet. This is a Default-Block-via-custom-rule\n  pattern. Verify the IPSet is comprehensive.\n\nText-transformation matrix moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when auditing ByteMatchStatement bypass vectors in Step 8.\n\n### Step 9: Check CAPTCHA \u002F Challenge rule configuration\n\nIf the ACL contains CAPTCHA or Challenge actions:\n\n- **`ImmunityTime` not set (null or 0)** — every request is challenged,\n  breaking single-page applications and API flows. The token is single-use.\n  Set `ImmunityTime` to 60–300 seconds for interactive flows.\n- **`ChallengeAction` without a fallback `Block` rule** — if a bot solves\n  the challenge, it proceeds with no further restriction. Layer a Block\n  rule behind the challenge for repeat offenders.\n- **CAPTCHA on an API endpoint** — programmatic clients cannot solve visual\n  CAPTCHAs. Use `Challenge` (silent JS proof-of-work) for APIs; reserve\n  CAPTCHA for browser flows.\n\nMissing `ImmunityTime` is a MODERATE application-compatibility issue, not a\nsecurity gap — but it causes operators to disable CAPTCHA entirely when it\nbreaks their app, which IS a security gap.\n\n### Step 10: Check managed-rule-group exclusions\n\n`ManagedRuleGroupStatement.ExcludedRules` removes specific rules from the\ngroup. Common legitimate exclusions:\n\n- `NoUserAgent_HEADER` from CommonRuleSet — health checkers send no UA.\n- `SizeRestrictions_BODY` from CommonRuleSet — large file uploads blocked.\n\nIf `ExcludedRules` contains more than 3 rules from a single group, or if\nit excludes a rule protecting against a Top-10 OWASP category (SQLi, XSS,\nRCE, LFI\u002FRFI), flag as MODERATE — the exclusion weakens protection for\nthat attack class. Cite the specific excluded rule name and what it blocks.\n\n### Step 11: Aggregate to verdict\n\nThe verdict is determined by counting CRITICAL findings and HIGH gaps. The\nprecedence is strict — a single CRITICAL finding overrides everything.\n\n**Gap severity reference (use this to count HIGH gaps):**\n\n| Gap | Severity | Step |\n|---|---|---|\n| Default Allow + zero managed rule groups | CRITICAL | 1 |\n| Shadow Allow rule before managed groups (broad match) | CRITICAL | 2 |\n| All managed groups in COUNT mode | CRITICAL | 3 |\n| Missing CommonRuleSet entirely | CRITICAL | 4 |\n| Only 1 managed group in BLOCK (insufficient coverage) | HIGH | 4 |\n| No rate-based rule | HIGH | 5 |\n| No logging destination configured | HIGH | 6 |\n| Rate rule with `AggregateKeyType: IP` behind proxy | HIGH | 5 |\n| No CloudWatch metrics on Web ACL VisibilityConfig | HIGH | 7 |\n| Missing input-validation group (KnownBadInputs absent) | MODERATE | 4 |\n| Missing Bot Control \u002F ATP (paid add-ons) | LOW | 4 |\n| Missing sampled requests on VisibilityConfig | LOW | 7 |\n| ImmunityTime not set on CAPTCHA rule | LOW | 9 |\n\n| Verdict | Trigger condition | Example |\n|---|---|---|\n| **MISCONFIGURED** | Any CRITICAL finding from Steps 1–4 | Zero-rule ACL; all-COUNT mode; shadow bypass rule; missing CommonRuleSet |\n| **WEAK** | No CRITICAL, but 2+ HIGH gaps | CommonRuleSet-only + no rate rule + no logging (3 HIGH gaps); CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs but no rate rule + no logging (2 HIGH gaps) |\n| **ADEQUATE** | No CRITICAL, exactly 1 HIGH gap (or 0 HIGH + MODERATE gaps) | CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs in BLOCK + rate rule + logging, but rate rule uses IP behind proxy (1 HIGH) |\n| **OK** | No CRITICAL, 0 HIGH gaps (LOW gaps allowed) | 3+ BLOCK-mode managed groups (baseline + input validation + reputation) + FORWARDED_IP rate rule + logging + full visibility + no shadow rules |\n\n**Critical counting examples:**\n\n- **CommonRuleSet-only, no rate rule, no logging:** 3 HIGH gaps → **WEAK**.\n- **CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs, no rate rule, no logging:** 2 HIGH gaps → **WEAK**.\n- **CommonRuleSet + KnownBadInputs + rate rule + logging, rate rule uses IP behind proxy:** 1 HIGH gap → **ADEQUATE**.\n- **3+ groups + FORWARDED_IP rate rule + logging + full visibility:** 0 HIGH gaps → **OK**.\n\n**Aggregation rule:** A single CRITICAL finding makes the whole ACL\nMISCONFIGURED, regardless of how many other rules are correct. Two or more\nHIGH gaps make it WEAK. Exactly one HIGH gap caps the verdict at ADEQUATE.\nZero HIGH gaps is OK (MODERATE and LOW gaps appear in GAPS and REMEDIATION\nbut do not downgrade the tier).\n\n## Effective protection context (expert note)\n\nFull request-path context moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when assessing real-world effectiveness.\n\n## Output format (per Web ACL)\n\n```text\nWEBACL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: MISCONFIGURED | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-3 sentences citing the specific step, finding, and config>\nRISK: CRITICAL | HIGH | MODERATE | LOW\nGAPS: \u003Ccomma-separated list of gap IDs, or \"None\" if OK>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action(s), or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Multi-rule aggregation example\n\nFull multi-rule aggregation example moved verbatim to [worked-examples.md](references\u002Fworked-examples.md).\nLoad on demand when emitting a multi-gap MISCONFIGURED report.\n\n## Operational edge cases (expert knowledge)\n\nOperational edge-case catalog moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand for production-behavior surprises (COUNT metrics, labels, sliding window, spoofing).\n\n## NEVER (anti-patterns)\n\n- NEVER classify a Web ACL with `DefaultAction: Allow` and zero managed\n  rule groups as OK or ADEQUATE. It is MISCONFIGURED — the WAF is a\n  pass-through that inspects nothing. A rate-limit rule without content\n  inspection does not change this verdict.\n\n- NEVER treat `OverrideAction: {Count: {}}` on a managed rule group as\n  equivalent to BLOCK. COUNT mode explicitly disables blocking — the\n  group logs matches but lets traffic through. If ALL groups are in COUNT,\n  the ACL is MISCONFIGURED regardless of how many groups are configured.\n\n- NEVER ignore a custom Allow rule at a lower priority number than managed\n  rule groups. WAF evaluates in ascending priority order and terminates on\n  the first Allow\u002FBlock\u002FCAPTCHA. A broad-match Allow rule at priority 0\n  means every subsequent managed rule group is dead code for the matched\n  traffic class. This is the single most common WAF bypass in production.\n\n- NEVER classify a Web ACL missing `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet` as OK.\n  This group is the OWASP Top 10 baseline — without it, SQLi, XSS, RFI,\n  LFI, traversal, and protocol-anomaly attacks pass uninspected unless\n  every one is covered by a custom rule (which is impractical and fragile).\n\n- NEVER assume `DefaultAction: Block` is inherently safer than `Allow`.\n  Default Block requires every legitimate request path to be explicitly\n  allow-listed by a rule; if the rules are incomplete, legitimate traffic\n  is blocked (application outage). Default Allow with comprehensive BLOCK\n  rules is the standard production posture. Default Block is exceptional\n  and demands careful allow-listing.\n\n- NEVER recommend switching `DefaultAction` from Allow to Block without a\n  COUNT-mode testing period first. Default Block without a complete\n  allow-list will block legitimate traffic immediately. Run all managed\n  rule groups in COUNT for 1–2 weeks, review sampled requests for false\n  positives, add exclusions, THEN switch to Block.\n\n- NEVER recommend enabling all managed rule groups blindly without\n  considering application compatibility. `AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet`\n  includes `SizeRestrictions_BODY` (blocks bodies > 8 KB) and\n  `GenericRFI_BODY` which can false-positive on legitimate API payloads.\n  Enable incrementally in COUNT mode, tune exclusions, then switch to BLOCK.\n\n- NEVER treat a rate-based rule with `AggregateKeyType: IP` behind\n  CloudFront or an ALB as correctly configured. The rule rate-limits the\n  proxy IP, not the client. Behind a proxy, the correct key is\n  `FORWARDED_IP` with `HeaderName: X-Forwarded-For` and\n  `FallbackBehavior: MATCH` (use the first IP in the chain).\n\n- NEVER classify an unassociated Web ACL as providing protection. A Web\n  ACL with no resource associations protects nothing — verify with\n  `aws wafv2 list-resources-for-web-acl`. An unassociated ACL with a\n  perfect configuration is still theatre.\n\n- NEVER treat `TextTransformations: [{Type: NONE}]` on a\n  `ByteMatchStatement` as sufficient for XSS\u002FSQLi detection. Raw\n  inspection without `URL_DECODE` or `HTML_ENTITY_DECODE` allows encoded\n  payloads to bypass pattern matching. At minimum, include `URL_DECODE`\n  and `HTML_ENTITY_DECODE` in the transformation list.\n\n- NEVER recommend `Action: Block` as the first remediation for a managed\n  rule group in COUNT mode without first reviewing the sampled requests\n  from the COUNT period. Switching directly to BLOCK without false-positive\n  tuning causes production incidents — legitimate API calls are blocked,\n  and the operations team reverts to COUNT (sometimes permanently).\n\n- NEVER trust the Web ACL name as an indicator of scope. A Web ACL named\n  \"production-cloudfront-acl\" may be REGIONAL scope and protect an ALB.\n  Always read the `Scope` field and verify the associated resources match\n  the intended perimeter.\n\n- NEVER assume a Web ACL with a perfect rule configuration is providing\n  protection without verifying resource associations. An unassociated ACL\n  is dead weight — `aws wafv2 list-resources-for-web-acl` must return at\n  least one ALB, API Gateway, AppSync, CloudFront distribution, or Cognito\n  user pool. Always include an association-check NOTE in the REMEDIATION\n  field, even for OK verdicts.\n\n- NEVER confuse `VisibilityConfig` with `LoggingConfiguration`. They are\n  independent settings. `VisibilityConfig` controls CloudWatch metrics and\n  sampled-request storage. `LoggingConfiguration` controls full log delivery\n  to CloudWatch Logs, Firehose, or S3. A Web ACL can have metrics enabled\n  but no logging — it is observable but not auditable.\n\n- NEVER trust a custom rule referencing an `IPSet` without verifying the\n  IPSet contents are current. Stale IPSets — containing decommissioned\n  partner IPs, expired allow-list entries, or broad CIDR blocks from a\n  debugging session — are a silent bypass or silent block. An IPSet\n  allow-rule with a `\u002F8` CIDR effectively allows 16 million IPs through\n  managed rule inspection. Always audit IPSet scope alongside the Web ACL.\n\n- NEVER chain custom `LabelMatchStatement` rules on labels from a managed\n  rule group without verifying the source rule is not in `ExcludedRules`.\n  Excluding a rule suppresses its label emission — downstream label-match\n  rules silently stop firing. This is invisible in metrics because the\n  label-match rule simply matches nothing (0 requests), which looks the\n  same as \"no traffic matched the label.\"\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nPre-flight safety checks moved verbatim to [diagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md).\nLoad on demand before recommending or running any remediation CLI.\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nPer-verdict remediation playbooks moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand after a verdict to build the REMEDIATION field.\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent AWS features moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand for 2024-2026 capability checks.\n\n## References\n\nSee `references\u002Fmanaged-rule-group-reference.md` for the full managed rule\ngroup catalog, per-group rule lists, `RuleActionOverrides` syntax, and the\n`put-logging-configuration` \u002F `associate-web-acl` CLI commands.\n\nSection taxonomy moved verbatim to [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand to see the canonical CloudOps auditor section order.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [worked-examples.md](references\u002Fworked-examples.md) - secondary worked example: multi-rule aggregation report\n- [diagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) - pre-flight safety checks and backup\u002Fassociation CLI\n- [advanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - failure modes, edge cases, matrices, remediation playbooks, recent features\n- [managed-rule-group-reference.md](references\u002Fmanaged-rule-group-reference.md) - managed rule group catalog and coverage matrix\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F WAF Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS WAF Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fwaf-chapter.html\n- **WAF Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **WAF API Reference (v2)** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F\n- **AWS CLI — wafv2** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fwafv2\u002F\n- **Bot Control** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Faws-managed-rule-groups-bot.html\n- **ATP managed rule group** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fwaf\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Faws-managed-rule-groups-atp.html\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":38},{"tags":25,"phase":26,"author":27,"domain":28,"family":29,"version":30,"keywords":31,"complexity":32,"entry_point":33,"when_to_use":34,"dependencies":35,"requires_llm":36,"verdict_shape":37,"supports_pipeline":36},"aws, wafv2, cloudops, security, web-acl, managed-rules, rate-limiting, owasp, audit, compliance","2","Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder","aws-cloudops","Security","0.1.0","WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, rate-based rule, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, CAPTCHA, Challenge","high","false","Reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL configuration (JSON from describe-web-acl), auditing managed-rule-group coverage, validating rate-based-rule correctness, checking WAF logging and visibility configuration, investigating rule-bypass or shadow-rule patterns, or hardening a WAF before production deployment.","aws-orchestrator","true","MISCONFIGURED | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK","Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex). No AWS CLI required for offline Web ACL classification — the skill reasons over provided config text. Live-account audits use aws wafv2 describe-web-acl \u002F list-web-acls \u002F get-logging-configuration (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).","main","eeace51bd5dd1db2030729d83eeab988861553aa","skills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan","CTO & Co-Founder @Beever-AI  & @votee. CAISP. AWS Community Builder. Organizer@GDGCloudHK. MongoDB Champion. Technopreneur + Infornographer.","2026-09-24 08:54:10",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":48,"prompt":58,"zipAvailable":59},[49,52,55],{"tool":50,"command":51},"npx","npx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill wafv2-web-acl-auditor",{"tool":53,"command":54},"bunx","bunx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill wafv2-web-acl-auditor",{"tool":56,"command":57},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill wafv2-web-acl-auditor","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",true,[61,67,71,75,79,83,87,91,95,99,103,107,111,115,119,123,127,131,135,139,143],{"path":62,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":65,"sourceHtmlUrl":66},"eval\u002Ftest-cases.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",13396,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Feval\u002Ftest-cases.yaml",{"path":68,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":69,"sourceHtmlUrl":70},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fadequate-good-baseline.md",1016,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fadequate-good-baseline.md",{"path":72,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":73,"sourceHtmlUrl":74},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fmisconfigured-count-mode.md",1025,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fmisconfigured-count-mode.md",{"path":76,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":77,"sourceHtmlUrl":78},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fmisconfigured-zero-rule-allow.md",1012,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fmisconfigured-zero-rule-allow.md",{"path":80,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fok-comprehensive.md",1129,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fok-comprehensive.md",{"path":84,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":85,"sourceHtmlUrl":86},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fweak-minimal-no-logging.md",1065,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fweak-minimal-no-logging.md",{"path":88,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fweak-shadow-bypass-rule.md",1154,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fweak-shadow-bypass-rule.md",{"path":92,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":93,"sourceHtmlUrl":94},"evals\u002Feval_config.yaml",2032,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Feval_config.yaml",{"path":96,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98},"evals\u002Fevals.json",4969,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fevals.json",{"path":100,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":101,"sourceHtmlUrl":102},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fadequate-good-baseline.md",2140,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fadequate-good-baseline.md",{"path":104,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fmisconfigured-count-mode.md",1488,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fmisconfigured-count-mode.md",{"path":108,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":109,"sourceHtmlUrl":110},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fmisconfigured-zero-rule-allow.md",546,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fmisconfigured-zero-rule-allow.md",{"path":112,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":113,"sourceHtmlUrl":114},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fok-comprehensive.md",2791,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fok-comprehensive.md",{"path":116,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":117,"sourceHtmlUrl":118},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fweak-minimal-no-logging.md",1053,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fweak-minimal-no-logging.md",{"path":120,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":121,"sourceHtmlUrl":122},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fweak-shadow-bypass-rule.md",2125,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u0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AWS X-Ray distributed tracing with production-grade configuration: X-Ray daemon deployment (EC2 systemd, ECS sidecar, EKS DaemonSet, Lambda built-in), SDK instrumentation (Java, Python, Node.js, Go, .NET) with annotations and metadata, sampling rules (default reservoir + rate vs custom rules with URL \u002F method \u002F service-name predicates), service map generation, trace query and retrieval, groups and insights, CloudWatch ServiceLens integration, IAM permissions (PutTraceSegments, GetSamplingRules), and latest features (Lambda Powertools tracing, OpenTelemetry \u002F ADOT Collector support, W3C trace context). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when enabling X-Ray on a new application, adding tracing to ECS \u002F EKS \u002F Lambda, validating a sampling configuration, or generating daemon deployment CLI and IaC templates. Triggers: X-Ray, distributed tracing, X-Ray daemon, sampling rules, service map, X-Ray SDK, OpenTelemetry, ADOT, Lambda Powertools, CloudWatch ServiceLens.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxray-tracing-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":156,"name":157,"nameZh":6,"description":158,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":159,"categories":160,"keywords":161,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADTVJ7DCBM9CB1FY51GH7J","wellarchitected-workload-auditor","Audits AWS Well-Architected Tool workloads for review staleness, per-pillar high-risk issue counts, milestone tracking gaps, and remediation plan completeness. Emits a deterministic verdict (STALE_REVIEW | HIGH_RISK | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per workload with per-pillar risk breakdown, milestone trend analysis, and specific remediation. Use when reviewing Well-Architected workloads, checking WA review freshness, auditing high-risk issues per pillar, validating milestone coverage, or tracking remediation plans.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-workload-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":163,"name":164,"nameZh":6,"description":165,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":166,"categories":167,"keywords":168,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADT59G6FTTNZYHT2QRPNNP","wellarchitected-review-operator","Operates AWS Well-Architected Tool reviews end-to-end — creates workloads, runs pillar reviews (operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, Prosperity), answers questions with risk-tier rationale, generates reports and improvement plans, creates milestones, and integrates with Trusted Advisor and Well-Architected Labs. Runs deterministic pre-checks (workload existence, lens availability, pillar coverage), emits the exact update-answer \u002F get-consolidated-report CLI behind a CONFIRM gate, and verifies risk-tier transitions. Emits READY | BLOCKED | COMPLETED. Use when creating a workload, answering pillar questions, generating an improvement plan, creating a milestone, or integrating with Trusted Advisor. Triggers: well-architected tool, well architected review, workload review, pillar, operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, prosperity, improvement plan, milestone, trusted advisor.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-review-operator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":170,"name":171,"nameZh":6,"description":172,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":173,"categories":174,"keywords":175,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADSH5JA9QHNPPHQCD7EVA7","wafv2-web-acl-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 Web ACLs with correct production defaults: scope selection (CLOUDFRONT vs REGIONAL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, SQLiRuleSet, LinuxRuleSet, WindowsRuleSet, IPReputationList, BotControlRuleSet, AmazonIpReputationList, ATP), custom rules (byte match, IP set, regex pattern, geo match, size constraint, rate-based), rule priority ordering, logging destinations (Kinesis Firehose, CloudWatch Logs, S3), resource association (ALB, API Gateway, CloudFront), rate-based rules with aggregate keys (IP, forwarded IP), Challenge and CAPTCHA actions, and account takeover prevention. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist. Use when creating a Web ACL, attaching managed rules, configuring rate limiting, enabling WAF logging, associating a Web ACL with an ALB\u002FAPI Gateway\u002FCloudFront, or configuring CAPTCHA\u002FChallenge actions. Triggers: create WAF Web ACL, WAFv2, managed rule groups, WAF rate limiting, WAF logging, WAF CAPTCHA, WAF Challenge action, bot control, ATP managed rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":177,"name":178,"nameZh":6,"description":179,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":180,"categories":181,"keywords":182,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADR8W7G72JX4KFGN03QK8Q","waf-rule-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwaf-rule-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":184,"name":185,"nameZh":6,"description":186,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":187,"categories":188,"keywords":189,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADQJJE352085XH6KMVHZTN","vpn-connection-deployer","Provisions AWS Site-to-Site VPN connections with production defaults: customer gateway (CGW), virtual private gateway (VPG) vs transit gateway (TGW) VPN attachment, VPN connection (IPSec), routing (static vs dynamic\u002FBGP), tunnel options (IKE versions, encryption algorithms, Phase 1\u002F2 SA lifetimes, dead peer detection), dual-tunnel redundancy, CloudWatch monitoring (TunnelState, TunnelDataIn\u002FOut), acceleration via Global Accelerator, redundant VPN connections, IPv6 support, and outside IP address types (public vs private NAT). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with verification commands. Use when creating a Site-to-Site VPN, connecting an on-premises network to AWS, configuring BGP over VPN, setting up dual-tunnel redundancy, or attaching a VPN to a transit gateway. Triggers: create site-to-site vpn, customer gateway, virtual private gateway, vpn connection ipsec, bgp over vpn, dual tunnel redundancy, transit gateway vpn attachment, vpn cloudwatch monitoring, global accelerator vpn, vpn ipv6.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fvpn-connection-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]