AGENT SKILL

sagemaker-endpoint-auditor

Audits SageMaker real-time and async endpoints for security posture and production readiness — KMS encryption-at-rest and inter-container traffic encryption, execution-role blast radius (wildcard actions, sagemaker:*, iam:PassRole), VPC configuration (internet-facing vs private), data capture and model monitoring schedule coverage, and instance count for high availability. Emits a deterministic verdict (NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | NO_MONITORING | PUBLIC_ENDPOINT | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per endpoint with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing SageMaker endpoints before production deployment, checking endpoint encryption posture, auditing execution-role scope, validating VPC configuration, verifying model monitoring coverage, or checking instance count for high availability.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-09-24
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★ 4
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0

01 前言 Front Matter

name
sagemaker-endpoint-auditor
license
Apache-2.0
metadata
{ "tags": "sagemaker, ai-ml, security, endpoint, encryption, vpc, monitoring, audit", "phase": "2", "author": "Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder", "domain": "aws-cloudops", "family": "AI/ML", "version": "0.1.0", "keywords": "SageMaker, endpoint, KMS encryption, inter-container encryption, execution role, VPC config, data capture, model monitor, instance count, high availability, production readiness, endpoint audit, inference pipeline, network isolation, sagemaker:InvokeEndpoint, blast radius", "complexity": "high", "entry_point": "false", "when_to_use": "Reviewing a SageMaker endpoint before production deployment, checking endpoint encryption (KMS + inter-container), auditing the execution role for wildcard permissions, validating VPC configuration (private vs internet-facing), verifying model monitoring coverage (data capture + monitoring schedule), or checking instance count for high availability.", "requires_llm": "true", "verdict_shape": "NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | NO_MONITORING | PUBLIC_ENDPOINT | CONFIG_GAP | OK", "invocation_schema": "Input: either (a) a SageMaker endpoint configuration bundle (Model + EndpointConfig + Endpoint metadata + optional MonitoringSchedule + optional execution-role policy document), OR (b) an endpoint name/ARN for live-account audit. Output: deterministic ENDPOINT/VERDICT/REASON/FINDINGS/ REMEDIATION block per endpoint, where VERDICT is one of NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, NO_MONITORING, PUBLIC_ENDPOINT, CONFIG_GAP, OK.", "supports_pipeline": "true", "activation_triggers": "audit this SageMaker endpoint, is my endpoint encrypted, check endpoint VPC config, execution role too broad, is model monitoring enabled, endpoint production ready, SageMaker endpoint public, inter-container encryption" }
description
Audits SageMaker real-time and async endpoints for security posture and production readiness — KMS encryption-at-rest and inter-container traffic encryption, execution-role blast radius (wildcard actions, sagemaker:*, iam:PassRole), VPC configuration (internet-facing vs private), data capture and model monitoring schedule coverage, and instance count for high availability. Emits a deterministic verdict (NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | NO_MONITORING | PUBLIC_ENDPOINT | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per endpoint with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing SageMaker endpoints before production deployment, checking endpoint encryption posture, auditing execution-role scope, validating VPC configuration, verifying model monitoring coverage, or checking instance count for high availability.
compatibility
Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline config-document classification. Live-account audits use aws sagemaker describe-endpoint, describe-endpoint-config, describe-model, and list-monitoring-schedules (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).

02 资源文件 19

03 SKILL.md 正文

SageMaker Endpoint Auditor

Mindset

One-line takeaway: a SageMaker endpoint is a running model exposed behind an invocation API. Its security posture is the intersection of three independent resource objects — the Model, the EndpointConfig, and the Endpoint — and the most common audit mistake is checking only one of them.

A SageMaker real-time endpoint is not a single object. The security-relevant fields are split across a resource chain:

  • Model (DescribeModel) — holds ExecutionRoleArn (the IAM role the container assumes), VpcConfig (network placement), EnableNetworkIsolation (container egress control), and the container image spec.
  • EndpointConfig (DescribeEndpointConfig) — holds KmsKeyId (encryption at rest), ProductionVariants (instance type + count), DataCaptureConfig (request/response capture for monitoring), and EnableInterContainerTrafficEncryption.
  • Endpoint (DescribeEndpoint) — holds EndpointStatus (InService / Updating / Failed), FailureReason, and the resolved variant instance counts.
  • MonitoringSchedule (ListMonitoringSchedules) — optionally attached to the endpoint for drift detection (data quality, model quality, bias, explainability).

An audit that checks only the EndpointConfig misses the execution role and VPC placement (both live on the Model). An audit that checks only the Model misses encryption and data capture (both live on the EndpointConfig). Always resolve the full chain.

Quick reference — verdict thresholds

Condition Verdict Step
No VpcConfig on the Model (endpoint is internet-facing) PUBLIC_ENDPOINT 1
VpcConfig present but SecurityGroupIds allow 0.0.0.0/0 inbound PUBLIC_ENDPOINT 1
No KmsKeyId on EndpointConfig NO_ENCRYPTION 2
Inference pipeline (multi-container) + EnableInterContainerTrafficEncryption: false NO_ENCRYPTION 2
Execution role with Action: "*" on Resource: "*" OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE 3
Execution role with sagemaker:* / s3:* / iam:* on "*" OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE 3
Execution role with iam:PassRole on "*" OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE 3
No DataCaptureConfig (or EnableCapture: false) AND no MonitoringSchedule NO_MONITORING 4
EnableCapture: true but InitialSamplingPercentage: 0 NO_MONITORING 4
InitialInstanceCount < 2 (single instance — no HA) CONFIG_GAP 5
All dimensions pass OK 6

Precedence (worst finding wins): PUBLIC_ENDPOINT > NO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE > NO_MONITORING > CONFIG_GAP > OK

Pre-flight: endpoint metadata gate

Before evaluating the endpoint configuration, classify the endpoint state. Several endpoint attributes short-circuit the audit.

Attribute Value Effect on audit
EndpointStatus InService Proceed with full audit.
EndpointStatus Updating Proceed, but note that config may be mid-change. Re-audit after update completes.
EndpointStatus Failed Endpoint deployment failed. Note FailureReason. Still audit the config (the security findings may explain the failure).
EndpointStatus Deleting Endpoint is being torn down. Audit for forensic record only.
Endpoint type Real-time Full audit applies.
Endpoint type Async Full audit + check AsyncInferenceConfig.OutputConfig.S3OutputPath is encrypted (KMS on the bucket).
Endpoint type Serverless No instance count dimension (scale-to-zero). Skip Step 5 instance-count check. VPC config still applies.

If the configuration bundle is incomplete (missing Model, EndpointConfig, or Endpoint metadata), output:

ENDPOINT: <name>
VERDICT: ERROR
REASON: Cannot resolve the full Model -> EndpointConfig -> Endpoint resource chain — <missing object>.
REMEDIATION: Retrieve all three objects: aws sagemaker describe-model --model-name <name>, aws sagemaker describe-endpoint-config --endpoint-config-name <config>, aws sagemaker describe-endpoint --endpoint-name <name>.

Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)

Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious SageMaker behaviors

Non-obvious SageMaker behaviors — VpcConfig lives on the Model, network isolation vs VpcConfig, inter-container encryption only for pipelines, TLS-by-default invocation, execution role on the Model, capture vs monitoring, zero sampling, instance counts, serverless/async exceptions, monitor types, Clarify vs Model Monitor, async S3 output — live in references/advanced-patterns.md. Load that reference before classifying an endpoint.

Step 1: VPC configuration — PUBLIC_ENDPOINT (highest severity)

If the Model has no VpcConfig (absent or empty), the endpoint is deployed on AWS-managed public infrastructure — the invocation API is internet-facing. Any client with the endpoint URL and valid AWS credentials can invoke the model. This is the most exposed posture.

VERDICT: PUBLIC_ENDPOINT
REASON: Model has no VpcConfig — endpoint is deployed on internet-facing
infrastructure. The InvokeEndpoint API is reachable from any network.

Security-group refinement: if VpcConfig IS present, inspect the SecurityGroupIds. A security group with an inbound rule allowing 0.0.0.0/0 on any port makes the endpoint effectively public within the VPC. Flag as PUBLIC_ENDPOINT.

EnableNetworkIsolation note: a Model with no VpcConfig but EnableNetworkIsolation: true prevents the container from making outbound calls, but the endpoint API is STILL internet-reachable for invocation. The PUBLIC_ENDPOINT verdict stands — network isolation restricts egress, not ingress to the endpoint API.

Step 2: Encryption — NO_ENCRYPTION

Evaluate two encryption dimensions:

2a. KMS encryption at rest. Check KmsKeyId on the EndpointConfig. If absent, the EBS volumes attached to the endpoint instances and the model artifact storage are unencrypted at rest. A compromised instance or snapshot exposes model weights and artifacts.

  • No KmsKeyId on EndpointConfig → NO_ENCRYPTION.

2b. Inter-container traffic encryption (inference pipelines only). If the Model has multiple containers (a SerialInferencePipeline — check Containers array length > 1 or PrimaryContainer + the inference pipeline config), check EnableInterContainerTrafficEncryption on the EndpointConfig.

  • Multi-container endpoint + EnableInterContainerTrafficEncryption: false → NO_ENCRYPTION (plaintext traffic between containers on the same host).
  • Single-container endpoint → this flag is a no-op. Do NOT flag.

2c. Async output S3 encryption (additive). For async endpoints, if AsyncInferenceConfig.OutputConfig.S3OutputPath points to an S3 bucket without SSE-KMS encryption, append an additive NO_ENCRYPTION finding.

Step 3: Execution role blast radius — OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE

Evaluate the Model's ExecutionRoleArn trust policy (the identity-based policy attached to the role). The execution role determines what AWS resources the model container can access at runtime. Apply the same classification as the iam-least-privilege-advisor:

  • Action: "*" on Resource: "*" → OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE (admin-equivalent — the container can do anything in the account).
  • Service wildcard on "*" (sagemaker:*, s3:*, iam:*, kms:*, secretsmanager:*) → OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE. The execution role only needs narrow permissions (InvokeEndpoint, S3 GetObject on model artifacts, KMS Decrypt on the endpoint key). Service wildcards are always over-scoped.
  • iam:PassRole on "*" → OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE (privilege escalation — the container can pass any role to any service).
  • NotAction / NotResource → OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE (inverse wildcards).
  • Named actions on specific ARNs → pass this step.

The SageMaker execution-role minimum-viable permission set: sagemaker:InvokeEndpoint (self), s3:GetObject on the model artifact bucket/prefix, kms:Decrypt on the endpoint KMS key, and optionally logs:CreateLogStream / logs:PutLogEvents on the CloudWatch log group. Anything beyond this scope should be justified by the model's runtime behaviour (e.g., calling a downstream API, reading a feature store).

If no execution-role policy document is provided, note: "Execution-role policy not provided — cannot evaluate IAM blast radius. Retrieve with aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name <name> and aws iam get-role-policy --role-name <name> --policy-name <name>."

Step 4: Monitoring coverage — NO_MONITORING

Evaluate two monitoring dimensions:

4a. Data capture. Check DataCaptureConfig on the EndpointConfig.

  • No DataCaptureConfig → data capture is disabled.
  • EnableCapture: false → data capture is disabled.
  • EnableCapture: true but InitialSamplingPercentage: 0 → effectively disabled (zero requests captured).

4b. Monitoring schedule. Check for a MonitoringSchedule referencing the endpoint name.

  • No monitoring schedule → no drift detection.
  • Monitoring schedule with Status: Stopped → schedule exists but is inactive.

Classification:

  • No data capture AND no monitoring schedule → NO_MONITORING.
  • Data capture enabled but no monitoring schedule → NO_MONITORING (capture alone provides no alerts; the data sits idle without a schedule to analyse it).
  • Monitoring schedule exists but data capture disabled → NO_MONITORING (the schedule has no data to analyse — Model Monitor cannot function without captured request/response payloads).
  • Both data capture (with sampling > 0) AND an active monitoring schedule → pass this step.

Step 5: Instance count / HA — CONFIG_GAP

Check InitialInstanceCount (or CurrentInstanceCount if available) on the endpoint's ProductionVariants.

  • InitialInstanceCount < 2 → CONFIG_GAP (single instance — no high availability. If the instance fails, the endpoint goes down with no fallback. Production endpoints should have at least 2 instances across different Availability Zones).
  • Serverless endpoint → skip this step (scale-to-zero by design).
  • Async endpoint with InitialInstanceCount: 1 → note as CONFIG_GAP but acknowledge the cost-optimisation trade-off (async endpoints can scale to zero; flag only if the endpoint serves latency-sensitive production traffic).

Step 6: All dimensions pass — OK

If all of the following hold:

  • Model has VpcConfig with restrictive security groups.
  • EndpointConfig has KmsKeyId.
  • (Multi-container endpoints have EnableInterContainerTrafficEncryption: true).
  • Execution role has named actions on specific ARNs (no wildcards).
  • Data capture is enabled with sampling > 0 AND an active monitoring schedule exists.
  • InitialInstanceCount >= 2 (or serverless/async with justification).

→ VERDICT: OK

Step 7: Aggregation

The final verdict is the worst finding across all steps, where: PUBLIC_ENDPOINT > NO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE > NO_MONITORING > CONFIG_GAP > OK

All individual findings are listed in the FINDINGS section regardless of the aggregate verdict.

Output format (per endpoint)

ENDPOINT: <endpoint-name>
VERDICT: PUBLIC_ENDPOINT | NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | NO_MONITORING | CONFIG_GAP | OK
REASON: <1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>
FINDINGS:
  - [PUBLIC_ENDPOINT] <finding description (Step N)>
  - [NO_MONITORING] <finding description (Step N)>
  - [OK] <dimension that passed>
REMEDIATION: <specific CLI action per finding, or "None required" if OK>

Worked example — public endpoint with no monitoring

ENDPOINT: public-endpoint-no-vpc
VERDICT: PUBLIC_ENDPOINT
REASON: Model has no VpcConfig — the endpoint is deployed on internet-facing
infrastructure (Step 1). Data capture is also disabled with no monitoring
schedule (Step 4).
FINDINGS:
  - [PUBLIC_ENDPOINT] No VpcConfig on Model — InvokeEndpoint API reachable
    from any network (Step 1)
  - [NO_MONITORING] No DataCaptureConfig and no MonitoringSchedule — drift
    undetectable (Step 4)
  - [OK] KmsKeyId present on EndpointConfig (Step 2)
  - [OK] Execution role scoped to named actions (Step 3)
REMEDIATION:
  1. Attach a VpcConfig to the Model:
     aws sagemaker create-model --model-name <name> --containers <spec>
       --vpc-config Subnets=<subnet-ids>,SecurityGroupIds=<sg-ids>
  2. Enable data capture on the EndpointConfig and create a monitoring
     schedule (see Remediation guidance below).

Anti-Patterns — NEVER

  • NEVER conclude an endpoint is "private" or "VPC-attached" by checking only the EndpointConfig. VpcConfig lives on the Model — the EndpointConfig has no VPC fields. Checking the wrong object is the most common false negative in SageMaker endpoint audits.

  • NEVER flag EnableInterContainerTrafficEncryption: false on a single-container endpoint. There is no inter-container traffic to encrypt. The flag is a no-op. Flagging it is a false positive that erodes trust.

  • NEVER classify an endpoint without VpcConfig but with EnableNetworkIsolation: true as "private." Network isolation blocks container egress; it does not prevent inbound invocation. The InvokeEndpoint API is still internet-reachable. The verdict is PUBLIC_ENDPOINT.

  • NEVER assume the execution role is on the EndpointConfig or Endpoint. It is on the Model (ExecutionRoleArn). Scanning the wrong object yields no role and a silent pass on the IAM dimension.

  • NEVER treat EnableCapture: true as "monitoring enabled." Data capture stores request/response payloads to S3 — it provides no alerts. A MonitoringSchedule is required to analyse the captured data and emit drift findings. Both must be present.

  • NEVER accept InitialSamplingPercentage: 0 as valid data capture. Zero percent sampling captures zero requests. The operator may believe monitoring is active when it is silently inert.

  • NEVER flag a serverless endpoint for InitialInstanceCount being absent or below 2. Serverless endpoints use ServerlessConfig (memory size + max concurrency), not instance count. The HA dimension does not apply.

  • NEVER assume EndpointStatus: Failed means the endpoint has no security findings. A failed deployment often fails BECAUSE of a security misconfiguration (e.g., execution role missing sagemaker:CreateModel, VPC lacking S3 VPC endpoint for model artifacts). Audit the config — the security finding may explain the failure.

  • NEVER recommend sagemaker:* as a remediation for the execution role. The execution role needs sagemaker:InvokeEndpoint at most — sagemaker:* grants model/endpoint creation and deletion, which the container never needs at runtime. This reintroduces the exact blast radius being constrained.

  • NEVER overlook the async OutputConfig S3 path for async endpoints. Async inference outputs are written to the configured S3 path. If the bucket lacks SSE-KMS, outputs are unencrypted at rest — a silent data-exposure gap.

  • NEVER treat SageMaker Clarify enablement as a substitute for Model Monitor. Clarify runs at build time (pre-training bias, explainability baselines). Model Monitor runs at inference time (runtime drift detection). They are different services with different triggers.

  • NEVER conflate InitialInstanceCount (EndpointConfig) with CurrentInstanceCount (DescribeEndpoint runtime). Auto-scaling can change the count after deployment. For HA auditing, prefer the runtime value when available.

Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)

The full pre-flight safety checklist — confirm gate, Model/EndpointConfig immutability, snapshot for rollback, caller permission check, VPC endpoint prerequisites — lives in references/diagnostic-commands.md. Run these before any remediation CLI.

Remediation guidance

For PUBLIC_ENDPOINT — no VpcConfig

  1. Create a new Model version with VpcConfig:
    aws sagemaker create-model --model-name <name>-vpc \
      --execution-role-arn <role-arn> --primary-container <container-spec> \
      --vpc-config Subnets=subnet-abc,subnet-def,SecurityGroupIds=sg-xyz \
      --enable-network-isolation
    
  2. Create a new EndpointConfig referencing the new model.
  3. Update the endpoint (blue/green):
    aws sagemaker update-endpoint --endpoint-name <name> \
      --endpoint-config-name <new-config>
    
  4. Verify the endpoint is now VPC-attached:
    aws sagemaker describe-model --model-name <name>-vpc --query 'VpcConfig'
    

For NO_ENCRYPTION — no KMS key

  1. Create a new EndpointConfig with a customer-managed KMS key:
    aws sagemaker create-endpoint-config --endpoint-config-name <name>-enc \
      --production-variants <variants> \
      --kms-key-id arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:<acct>:key/<key-id>
    
  2. For inference pipelines, add --enable-inter-container-traffic-encryption.
  3. Update the endpoint to the new config.
  4. For async endpoints, ensure the OutputConfig S3 bucket has SSE-KMS enabled.

For OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE — wildcard execution role

  1. Replace wildcard actions with the minimum-viable permission set:
    {
      "Version": "2012-10-17",
      "Statement": [{
        "Effect": "Allow",
        "Action": [
          "sagemaker:InvokeEndpoint",
          "s3:GetObject"
        ],
        "Resource": [
          "arn:aws:sagemaker:us-east-1:<acct>:endpoint/<name>",
          "arn:aws:s3:::<model-bucket>/<prefix>/*"
        ]
      }]
    }
    
  2. Add KMS decrypt scoped to the endpoint key if the endpoint uses SSE-KMS.
  3. Derive the exact action set from CloudTrail (90-day window of userIdentity.arn matching the execution role).

For NO_MONITORING — no data capture or schedule

  1. Create a new EndpointConfig with DataCaptureConfig:
    aws sagemaker create-endpoint-config --endpoint-config-name <name>-cap \
      --production-variants <variants> \
      --data-capture-config EnableCapture=true,InitialSamplingPercentage=100,DestinationS3Uri=s3://<bucket>/capture/,CaptureOptions=[{CaptureMode=Input},{CaptureMode=Output}]
    
  2. Update the endpoint to the new config.
  3. Create a monitoring schedule:
    aws sagemaker create-monitoring-schedule \
      --monitoring-schedule-name <name>-dq-monitor \
      --endpoint-name <name> \
      --monitoring-type DataQuality \
      --monitoring-job-definition <job-def>
    

For CONFIG_GAP — single instance

  1. Update the endpoint weights and capacities:
    aws sagemaker update-endpoint-weights-and-capacities \
      --endpoint-name <name> \
      --desired-weights-and-capacities variantName=<variant>,DesiredInstanceCount=2
    
  2. For async endpoints with justified scale-to-zero, document the cost-optimisation trade-off and suppress the finding.

For OK

  1. No remediation required.
  2. Recommend verifying the monitoring schedule is producing results: aws sagemaker describe-monitoring-schedule --monitoring-schedule-name <name>.
  3. Recommend reviewing captured data quarterly to confirm sampling is representative.

Recent AWS features (2024-2026)

Recent AWS features 2024-2026 — Inference Components, zero-downtime updates, HyperPod, Unified Studio, EKS-based inference — live in references/advanced-patterns.md. Load when auditing endpoints built on these features.

References (load on demand)

Domain

AWS CloudOps / SageMaker AI/ML Security & Production Readiness.

AWS documentation

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