AGENT SKILL

route53-record-auditor

Audits AWS Route 53 record sets for missing health checks on weighted, failover, latency, geolocation, and multivalue routing policies; dangling ALIAS records pointing to deleted AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3 website, API Gateway); DNSSEC signing gaps on public hosted zones; public hosted-zone exposure of private/internal IP addresses; and TTL inconsistency within routing-policy record groups. Emits a deterministic verdict (NO_HEALTH_CHECK | DNSSEC_GAP | DANGLING | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per record with enumerated findings and specific CLI remediation. Use when reviewing Route 53 records, checking for dangling DNS records, validating failover or weighted health checks, auditing DNSSEC posture, or hardening DNS configuration before production deployment.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-09-24
Stars
★ 4
Forks
0

01 前言 Front Matter

name
route53-record-auditor
license
Apache-2.0
metadata
{ "tags": "route53, dns, networking, health-check, dnssec, dangling-record, ttl, audit", "phase": "2", "author": "Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder", "domain": "aws-cloudops", "family": "Networking", "version": "0.1.0", "keywords": "Route 53, DNS, health check, failover routing, weighted routing, latency routing, geolocation routing, multivalue answer, DNSSEC, dangling record, subdomain takeover, ALIAS record, public hosted zone, TTL consistency, record set audit, DNS hardening, Route 53 misconfiguration", "complexity": "high", "entry_point": "false", "when_to_use": "Reviewing Route 53 record sets before production deployment, auditing DNS failover health-check coverage, detecting dangling ALIAS records pointing to deleted AWS resources, validating DNSSEC signing on public hosted zones, checking public-zone exposure of private IPs, or hardening DNS configuration across an account.", "requires_llm": "true", "verdict_shape": "NO_HEALTH_CHECK | DNSSEC_GAP | DANGLING | CONFIG_GAP | OK", "invocation_schema": "Input: either (a) one or more Route 53 record sets (list-resource-record-sets JSON), optionally paired with hosted-zone metadata (get-dnssec, get-hosted-zone), OR (b) a hosted-zone-id for live-account audit. Output: deterministic RECORD/VERDICT/REASON/RISK/FINDINGS/REMEDIATION block per record, where VERDICT is in {NO_HEALTH_CHECK, DNSSEC_GAP, DANGLING, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.", "supports_pipeline": "true", "activation_triggers": "audit these Route 53 records, is my DNS failover healthy, dangling Route 53 record, missing health check weighted, DNSSEC not enabled, public hosted zone exposure, Route 53 TTL inconsistency, subdomain takeover risk, failover PRIMARY no health check" }
description
Audits AWS Route 53 record sets for missing health checks on weighted, failover, latency, geolocation, and multivalue routing policies; dangling ALIAS records pointing to deleted AWS resources (ELB, CloudFront, S3 website, API Gateway); DNSSEC signing gaps on public hosted zones; public hosted-zone exposure of private/internal IP addresses; and TTL inconsistency within routing-policy record groups. Emits a deterministic verdict (NO_HEALTH_CHECK | DNSSEC_GAP | DANGLING | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per record with enumerated findings and specific CLI remediation. Use when reviewing Route 53 records, checking for dangling DNS records, validating failover or weighted health checks, auditing DNSSEC posture, or hardening DNS configuration before production deployment.
compatibility
Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline record-set classification. Live-account audits use aws route53 list-hosted-zones, list-resource-record-sets, get-hosted-zone, get-dnssec, list-health-checks, and aws ec2 describe-network-interfaces (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).

02 资源文件 19

03 SKILL.md 正文

Route 53 Record Auditor

Mindset

One-line takeaway: a DNS record set is the last hop before a user reaches your infrastructure. Every routing-policy record that distributes traffic without a health check is a promise to route users to a potentially dead endpoint, and every dangling ALIAS to a deleted AWS resource is either an immediate outage or a subdomain-takeover vector.

Route 53 record auditing is not just "does the record resolve." It is:

  • Health-check coverage — failover routing without a health check on the PRIMARY record means Route 53 can never detect failure, so it serves the dead primary forever. This is the single most dangerous Route 53 misconfiguration.
  • Dangling ALIAS targets — an ALIAS to a deleted ELB, CloudFront distribution, or S3 website bucket causes NXDOMAIN (outage) or, for S3 website and API Gateway custom domains, subdomain takeover (another account recreates the deleted resource and intercepts traffic).
  • DNSSEC — a public hosted zone without DNSSEC signing is susceptible to cache-poisoning and DNS-spoofing attacks. A zone with signing enabled but no DS record at the parent provides no resolver-side validation.
  • Public-zone exposure — an A record to 10.50.10.20 in a public hosted zone discloses internal network topology to anyone who queries the zone.
  • TTL consistency — mismatched TTLs within a weighted record group cause inconsistent caching behaviour across resolvers, breaking load distribution assumptions.

Quick reference — severity thresholds

Condition Verdict Risk Step
ALIAS to deleted S3 website / API Gateway custom domain DANGLING CRITICAL 1a
ALIAS to deleted ELB / CloudFront / VPC endpoint DANGLING HIGH 1b
Failover PRIMARY, no HealthCheckId NO_HEALTH_CHECK CRITICAL 2a
Weighted (weight > 0), no HealthCheckId NO_HEALTH_CHECK HIGH 2b
Latency routing, no HealthCheckId NO_HEALTH_CHECK HIGH 2c
Geolocation routing, no HealthCheckId NO_HEALTH_CHECK MEDIUM 2d
Multivalue answer, no HealthCheckId NO_HEALTH_CHECK MEDIUM 2e
Public zone, DNSSEC signing disabled DNSSEC_GAP HIGH 3a
Public zone, DNSSEC signed but no DS at parent DNSSEC_GAP MEDIUM 3b
Private IP (RFC 1918/4193) in a public zone CONFIG_GAP HIGH 4a
TTL variance > 2x within routing group CONFIG_GAP MEDIUM 5a
TTL > 3600 on frequently changing records CONFIG_GAP LOW 5b
All checks pass OK OK 6

Pre-flight: zone and record-set metadata gate

Before evaluating individual record sets, classify the hosted zone. Zone-level attributes short-circuit several audit dimensions — misclassifying them produces false positives.

Pagination note: aws route53 list-resource-record-sets returns up to 300 record sets per call. Use --start-record-name and --start-record-type from the prior NextRecordName to page through all records. Iterating only the first page silently skips the tail of the zone — these are the records most likely to be stale or unmanaged.

Attribute Value Effect on audit
Config.PrivateZone: true Private hosted zone. DNSSEC is N/A (private zones are not publicly resolvable). Public-zone exposure is N/A. Still audit health checks and dangling ALIAS.
Config.PrivateZone: false Public hosted zone. Full audit — DNSSEC, exposure, health checks, dangling, TTL.
DnssecSigning absent or key-signing key inactive DNSSEC not enabled. Jump to Step 3a if public zone.
DnssecSigning present, KSK active DNSSEC signing is on. Check for DS record at parent (Step 3b).

If the record-set JSON is malformed (missing required fields Name, Type, TTL), output:

RECORD: <name>
VERDICT: ERROR
REASON: Record set is malformed or missing required fields — cannot classify.
REMEDIATION: Retrieve the canonical record set with
  aws route53 list-resource-record-sets --hosted-zone-id <id> --output json
  and re-audit.

Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)

Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious Route 53 behaviours

Moved verbatim → references/advanced-patterns.md § "Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious Route 53 behaviours". Load when: classifying any record — these non-obvious behaviours change verdicts if ignored

Step 1: Dangling ALIAS target detection (highest priority — outage or takeover)

For each record with AliasTarget, verify the target resource exists. The detection method depends on the target type:

  • ALIAS to S3 website endpoint (*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com): if the bucket has been deleted or website hosting disabled, the DNS name returns NXDOMAIN. Another AWS account can recreate a bucket with the same name and re-enable website hosting — subdomain takeover. This is DANGLING, RISK: CRITICAL (Step 1a).

  • ALIAS to API Gateway custom domain (*.execute-api.*.amazonaws.com): if the custom domain or API mapping has been deleted, the endpoint returns NXDOMAIN. Another account can claim the same custom domain in some configurations. DANGLING, RISK: CRITICAL (Step 1a).

  • ALIAS to ELB / ALB / NLB (*.elb.amazonaws.com): if the load balancer has been deleted, the DNS name does not resolve. ELB DNS names include a random suffix, making direct takeover unlikely, but the record causes NXDOMAIN (immediate outage). DANGLING, RISK: HIGH (Step 1b).

  • ALIAS to CloudFront (*.cloudfront.net): if the distribution has been deleted, the DNS name returns NXDOMAIN. Distribution IDs are globally unique, so takeover is not possible. DANGLING, RISK: HIGH (Step 1b).

  • ALIAS to VPC interface endpoint (*.execute-api.*.amazonaws.com or service-specific): if the endpoint has been deleted, the private DNS name does not resolve. DANGLING, RISK: HIGH (Step 1b).

Detection signal: AliasTarget.DNSName that does not resolve when queried (or the EvaluateTargetHealth: true flag combined with an unreachable target). For offline audits, the operator provides the resolution status.

Step 2: Health check on routing-policy records

For records with a routing policy (Weighted, Failover, Latency, GeoLocation, MultiValueAnswer), check for HealthCheckId:

  • Failover PRIMARY, no HealthCheckId → NO_HEALTH_CHECK, RISK: CRITICAL (Step 2a). Without a health check, Route 53 has no signal to fail over — the PRIMARY is always considered healthy. A failover configuration with a health-check-less PRIMARY is functionally indistinguishable from no failover at all.

  • Weighted, Weight > 0, no HealthCheckId → NO_HEALTH_CHECK, RISK: HIGH (Step 2b). Route 53 distributes the weight proportionally even if the endpoint is dead — dead endpoints receive their full share of traffic.

  • Latency routing, no HealthCheckId → NO_HEALTH_CHECK, RISK: HIGH (Step 2c). Users are routed to the lowest-latency region even if that region's endpoint is down.

  • Geolocation routing, no HealthCheckId → NO_HEALTH_CHECK, RISK: MEDIUM (Step 2d). Users from a mapped region are always routed to that region's endpoint.

  • Multivalue answer, no HealthCheckId → NO_HEALTH_CHECK, RISK: MEDIUM (Step 2e). Route 53 randomises across all records, including dead ones (reduced but not eliminated traffic to dead IPs).

  • Weighted, Weight: 0, no HealthCheckId → no finding. Weight 0 is a deliberate drain — no traffic reaches this record.

  • Failover SECONDARY, no HealthCheckId → no finding (informational note only). The secondary is served when the primary fails. A health check on SECONDARY is recommended for fail-closed behaviour but not required for basic failover.

Step 3: DNSSEC signing gap (public hosted zones only)

Evaluate DNSSEC only for public hosted zones (Config.PrivateZone: false):

  • No active key-signing key (KSK) or zone-signing key (ZSK) → DNSSEC_GAP, RISK: HIGH (Step 3a). The zone is susceptible to cache-poisoning. Enable DNSSEC signing, create a KSK, and publish the DS record at the parent zone (registrar/TLD).

  • KSK active but no DS record at the parent zone → DNSSEC_GAP, RISK: MEDIUM (Step 3b). Route 53 signs the zone, but resolvers cannot validate signatures without the DS chain. Verify the DS record is published by querying the parent zone or checking the registrar.

  • Private hosted zone → skip DNSSEC evaluation entirely. DNSSEC is irrelevant for private DNS — private zones are resolved only within associated VPCs, not by public recursive resolvers.

Step 4: Public hosted-zone exposure

For records in public hosted zones, check for private/internal targets:

  • A/AAAA record pointing to RFC 1918 private IP (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) or ULA (fc00::/7) → CONFIG_GAP, RISK: HIGH (Step 4a). Internal network topology is disclosed to anyone who queries the zone publicly. While not directly exploitable (the IPs are not routable from the internet), the information leak aids reconnaissance.

  • CNAME to an internal hostname (e.g., db.internal.corp) → CONFIG_GAP, RISK: MEDIUM. Leaks internal naming conventions.

  • Private hosted zone → skip exposure evaluation. Private zones are not publicly queryable.

Step 5: TTL consistency

For records grouped under the same routing policy (same Name + Type, different SetIdentifier):

  • TTL variance > 2x within a routing group → CONFIG_GAP, RISK: MEDIUM (Step 5a). Resolvers cache the records for different durations, breaking the traffic-distribution assumptions. Example: a weighted group with TTL 60 and TTL 3600 means one endpoint is cached 60x longer.

  • TTL > 3600 on records whose values change frequently (A records to ELB/autoscaling, weighted records during canary deploys) → CONFIG_GAP, RISK: LOW (Step 5b). Stale cache delays propagation of value changes.

  • ALIAS records → do NOT flag TTL. Route 53 ignores the ALIAS TTL and uses the target's TTL (Step 0 expert knowledge).

Step 6: Aggregation — worst finding wins

The final verdict is the category of the highest-risk finding across all steps. When two findings have the same risk level, use category priority: DANGLING > NO_HEALTH_CHECK > DNSSEC_GAP > CONFIG_GAP.

If no findings are produced (all checks pass), the verdict is OK.

Output format (per record set)

RECORD: <name> (<type>, <routing-policy>)
VERDICT: NO_HEALTH_CHECK | DNSSEC_GAP | DANGLING | CONFIG_GAP | OK
REASON: <1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and step number>
RISK: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | OK
FINDINGS:
  - [CRITICAL] <finding description (Step Na)>
  - [HIGH] <finding description (Step Nb)>
  - [OK] <dimension that passed>
REMEDIATION: <specific action per finding, or "None required" if OK>

Worked example — failover PRIMARY without health check

RECORD: api.example.com (A, failover)
VERDICT: NO_HEALTH_CHECK
REASON: Failover PRIMARY record has no HealthCheckId — Route 53 cannot
detect primary failure and will never serve the secondary (Step 2a).
RISK: CRITICAL
FINDINGS:
  - [CRITICAL] Failover PRIMARY with no HealthCheckId (Step 2a) — failover
    is functionally disabled; traffic goes to dead primary forever
  - [OK] DNSSEC signing is enabled on the public hosted zone (Step 3)
  - [OK] No dangling ALIAS detected (Step 1)
REMEDIATION:
  1. Create or attach a health check:
     aws route53 create-health-check --caller-reference <ref>
     --health-check-config Type=HTTPS,FullyQualifiedDomainName=api.example.com
     ,ResourcePath=/health,RequestInterval=30,FailureThreshold=3
  2. Associate the health check:
     aws route53 change-resource-record-sets --hosted-zone-id <id>
     --change-batch file://update-record.json  (add HealthCheckId)

Edge-case handling

Moved verbatim → references/advanced-patterns.md § "Edge-case handling". Load when: auditing records that hit an unusual edge case (conflicting policies, stale HC refs, ETH false)

Anti-Patterns — NEVER

  • NEVER flag missing health checks on simple-routing records (Type: A/AAAA/CNAME with no routing policy). Simple routing has a single target — there is nothing to fail over to. Health checks are optional and add cost without routing benefit.

  • NEVER require a health check on a failover SECONDARY record. The secondary is served when the primary health check fails. A health check on the secondary changes the behaviour from fail-open to fail-closed — both are valid patterns depending on the SLO. Flag as informational, not as NO_HEALTH_CHECK.

  • NEVER flag a weight-0 weighted record for missing health checks. Weight 0 means no traffic reaches this endpoint — it is a deliberate drain. A health check is irrelevant when no traffic is served.

  • NEVER flag DNSSEC on a private hosted zone. DNSSEC is irrelevant for private DNS — the zone is not publicly resolvable, so there is no cache-poisoning surface. Flagging it is a false positive.

  • NEVER flag ALIAS TTL as inconsistent. Route 53 ignores the TTL on ALIAS records and uses the target resource's TTL. The ALIAS TTL field exists in the API but has no runtime effect.

  • NEVER recommend CNAME at the zone apex. Route 53 rejects CNAME at the apex — always use ALIAS. If a CNAME-at-apex is detected, recommend converting to ALIAS.

  • NEVER confuse DNS resolution failure with a dangling alias. An ALIAS to an ELB may temporarily fail to resolve during a deployment or configuration change. Confirm the target resource is deleted (not just temporarily unreachable) before flagging as DANGLING. Use aws elbv2 describe-load-balancers --query 'LoadBalancers[?DNSName==<dns>]' to verify existence.

  • NEVER recommend deleting a dangling record without first confirming the target resource is truly gone. Cross-region or cross-account resources may still exist. Deleting the record before confirming the target is permanently removed can mask a configuration issue.

  • NEVER flag a private hosted zone for public-zone exposure. Private zones are only resolvable from associated VPCs — a private IP in a private zone is correct and expected.

  • NEVER assume DNSSEC signing is active just because a KSK exists. The KSK must be in ACTIVE key state. A KSK in INACTIVE or ACTION_PENDING means signing is not yet effective. Check KeySigningKeyTMPL.Status in the get-dnssec output.

  • NEVER flag multivalue answer records as equivalent to failover. Multivalue answer is randomised distribution, not failover. A dead IP in a multivalue set still receives some traffic — but the severity is MEDIUM (reduced traffic), not CRITICAL (all traffic).

Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)

  • MANDATORY CONFIRMATION GATE. Before any state-changing operation (change-resource-record-sets, delete-health-check, enable-hosted-zone-dnssec), the auditor MUST emit: CONFIRM: About to <action> on record <name> in zone <id>. This affects DNS resolution for <domain>. Proceed? (yes/no) Do NOT execute the CLI command until the operator confirms. DNS changes propagate globally and cannot be instantaneously rolled back.

  • Capture current state for rollback: `aws route53 list-resource-record-sets --hosted-zone-id <id> --output json

    /tmp/<zone-id>-records-backup-$(date +%s).json` BEFORE any record change. Route 53 does not version record sets — there is no undo without a backup.

  • Verify the health check exists before associating: aws route53 get-health-check --health-check-id <id>. A stale or deleted health-check ID silently disables the health-check signal.

  • For DNSSEC enablement: verify the parent zone supports DNSSEC and obtain the DS record from the Route 53 console (get-dnssec returns the DS record value to publish at the registrar). Enabling DNSSEC without publishing the DS record provides no resolver validation (Step 3b).

  • For dangling-record remediation: confirm the target resource is deleted before removing the record. If the target still exists (cross- region, different account), the record is not dangling — investigate the DNS resolution path instead.

  • Prefer UPSERT over CREATE/DELETE in change-resource-record-sets batches. UPSERT is idempotent — it creates if absent and updates if present, reducing the risk of duplicate records or accidental deletion.

Remediation guidance

Moved verbatim → references/diagnostic-commands.md § "Remediation guidance (per verdict)". Load when: emitting REMEDIATION for any verdict — verify-then-delete/create-HC/enable-DNSSEC CLI sequences

Recent AWS features (2024-2026)

Moved verbatim → references/advanced-patterns.md § "Recent AWS features (2024-2026)". Load when: checking whether a newer Route 53 feature changes the audit surface

References (load on demand)

Domain

AWS CloudOps / Route 53 DNS Security & Reliability.

AWS documentation

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