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Use when SOC teams need early warning of lateral movement, credential abuse, or internal reconnaissance by deploying convincing traps across the network.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: performing-deception-technology-deployment\ndescription: 'Deploys deception technology including honeypots, honeytokens, and decoy\n  systems to detect attackers who have bypassed perimeter defenses, providing high-fidelity\n  alerts with near-zero false positive rates. Use when SOC teams need early warning\n  of lateral movement, credential abuse, or internal reconnaissance by deploying convincing\n  traps across the network.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: soc-operations\ntags:\n- soc\n- deception\n- honeypot\n- honeytoken\n- canary\n- lateral-movement\n- detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- RS.MA-01\n- DE.AE-06\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078\n- T1685.002\n- T1685.005\n- T1566\n- T1021\n---\n# Performing Deception Technology Deployment\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC teams need high-fidelity detection of post-compromise lateral movement with near-zero false positives\n- Existing detection tools miss advanced attackers who avoid triggering threshold-based alerts\n- The organization wants to detect credential abuse by planting fake credentials as honeytokens\n- Network segmentation gaps need compensating detection controls\n\n**Do not use** as a replacement for fundamental security controls (patching, EDR, network segmentation) — deception is a detection layer, not a prevention mechanism.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Network segments identified for honeypot\u002Fdecoy deployment (server VLANs, DMZ, OT networks)\n- Deception platform (Thinkst Canary, Attivo\u002FSentinelOne Hologram, or open-source alternatives)\n- SIEM integration for deception alerts (any interaction with deception assets is suspicious)\n- Active Directory access for honeytoken account and credential creation\n- Network team coordination for IP allocation and traffic routing\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map Attack Surface for Deception Placement\n\nIdentify high-value network segments where attackers would traverse:\n\n```\nDECEPTION DEPLOYMENT MAP\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nSegment              Decoy Type          Rationale\nServer VLAN          Fake file server    Attackers enumerate SMB shares during recon\nDatabase VLAN        Fake DB server      SQL scanning detected in past incidents\nAD\u002FDC Segment        Honeytoken account  Credential theft detection\nExecutive Subnet     Fake workstation    Targeted attacks pivot through exec systems\nDMZ                  Honeypot web app    External attacker detection\nOT Network           Fake PLC\u002FHMI        Industrial threat detection\nCloud (AWS VPC)      Canary EC2 + S3     Cloud lateral movement detection\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Thinkst Canary Devices\n\nConfigure Canary devices mimicking real infrastructure:\n\n**Windows File Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n  \"personality\": \"windows-server-2019\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"smb\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"shares\": [\"Finance_Backup\", \"HR_Archive\", \"IT_Docs\"],\n      \"files\": [\n        {\"name\": \"Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"employee_ssn_export.csv\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"admin_passwords.kdbx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"}\n      ]\n    },\n    \"rdp\": {\"enabled\": true},\n    \"http\": {\"enabled\": false}\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.5.200\",\n    \"hostname\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n    \"domain\": \"company.local\"\n  },\n  \"alert_webhook\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fsoar.company.com\u002Fapi\u002Fwebhook\u002Fcanary\"\n}\n```\n\n**Database Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"DB-ARCHIVE-02\",\n  \"personality\": \"linux-mysql\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"mysql\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 3306,\n      \"databases\": [\"customer_pii\", \"payment_archive\"],\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    },\n    \"ssh\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 22,\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    }\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.10.50\",\n    \"hostname\": \"db-archive-02\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy Honeytokens in Active Directory\n\nCreate fake privileged accounts that should never be used:\n\n```powershell\n# Create honeytoken service account\nNew-ADUser -Name \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -UserPrincipalName \"svc_sql_backup@company.local\" `\n    -Description \"SQL Backup Service Account - DO NOT DELETE\" `\n    -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString \"FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\" -AsPlainText -Force) `\n    -Enabled $true `\n    -PasswordNeverExpires $true `\n    -CannotChangePassword $true\n\n# Add to a group that looks attractive (but monitor for any use)\nAdd-ADGroupMember -Identity \"Domain Admins\" -Members \"svc_sql_backup\"\n\n# Place cached credentials on decoy workstation\n# (Mimikatz\u002Fcredential dumping will find these)\ncmdkey \u002Fadd:fileserver-bk04.company.local \u002Fuser:company\\svc_sql_backup \u002Fpass:FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\n```\n\n**Monitor honeytoken usage in Splunk:**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\"\n(EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4648 OR EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\nTargetUserName=\"svc_sql_backup\"\n| eval alert_severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval alert_message = \"HONEYTOKEN ACCOUNT USED — Likely credential theft detected\"\n| table _time, EventCode, src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName, Logon_Type, alert_message\n```\n\n### Step 4: Deploy Canary Files and Documents\n\nPlant tracked documents that beacon when opened:\n\n**Canary Document (Word doc with tracking):**\n```python\n# Using Thinkst Canary API to create a canary token document\nimport requests\n\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"doc-msword\",\n        \"memo\": \"Finance backup folder canary document\",\n        \"flock_id\": \"flock:default\"\n    }\n)\ntoken = response.json()\ndownload_url = token[\"canarytoken\"][\"canarytoken_url\"]\nprint(f\"Download canary doc: {download_url}\")\n# Place this document in honeypot SMB shares and sensitive directories\n```\n\n**AWS Canary Token (S3 access key):**\n```python\n# Create AWS canary token — alerts when access key is used\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"aws-id\",\n        \"memo\": \"Canary AWS key in developer laptop .aws\u002Fcredentials\"\n    }\n)\naws_keys = response.json()\nprint(f\"Access Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['access_key_id']}\")\nprint(f\"Secret Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['secret_access_key']}\")\n# Plant in .aws\u002Fcredentials on developer workstations\n```\n\n### Step 5: Integrate Deception Alerts with SIEM\u002FSOAR\n\nAll deception alerts are high-fidelity — any interaction is suspicious:\n\n**Splunk Alert for Canary Triggers:**\n```spl\nindex=canary sourcetype=\"canary:alerts\"\n| eval severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval confidence = \"HIGH — Deception asset triggered, zero false positive expected\"\n| table _time, canary_name, alert_type, source_ip, service, details\n| sendalert create_notable param.rule_title=\"Deception Alert — Canary Triggered\"\n  param.severity=\"critical\" param.drilldown_search=\"index=canary source_ip=$source_ip$\"\n```\n\n**SOAR Automated Response:**\n```python\ndef canary_triggered(container):\n    \"\"\"Auto-response for deception alerts — high confidence, no approval needed\"\"\"\n    source_ip = container[\"artifacts\"][0][\"cef\"][\"sourceAddress\"]\n\n    # Immediately isolate the source\n    phantom.act(\"quarantine device\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip_hostname\": source_ip}],\n                assets=[\"crowdstrike_prod\"],\n                name=\"isolate_attacker_host\")\n\n    # Block at firewall\n    phantom.act(\"block ip\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip\": source_ip, \"direction\": \"both\"}],\n                assets=[\"palo_alto_prod\"],\n                name=\"block_attacker_ip\")\n\n    # Create high-priority incident\n    phantom.act(\"create ticket\",\n                parameters=[{\n                    \"short_description\": f\"DECEPTION ALERT: Canary triggered from {source_ip}\",\n                    \"urgency\": \"1\",\n                    \"impact\": \"1\"\n                }],\n                assets=[\"servicenow_prod\"])\n\n    phantom.set_severity(container, \"critical\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Maintain Deception Realism\n\nRegularly update decoys to maintain believability:\n\n- Rotate honeytoken passwords quarterly (update cached credentials on decoy workstations)\n- Update canary file modification dates to appear recently accessed\n- Add realistic network traffic to honeypots (scheduled SMB enumeration, DNS lookups)\n- Register honeypot hostnames in DNS and Active Directory to appear in network scans\n- Update canary document contents to match current business context\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Honeypot** | Decoy system mimicking real infrastructure to attract and detect attackers in the network |\n| **Honeytoken** | Fake credential, file, or data record that triggers an alert when accessed or used |\n| **Canary** | Lightweight deception device or token that alerts on any interaction (Thinkst Canary platform) |\n| **Breadcrumb** | Planted artifact (cached credential, bookmark, config file) leading attackers to deception assets |\n| **High-Fidelity Alert** | Detection signal with near-zero false positive rate because no legitimate user should interact with deception assets |\n| **Decoy Network** | Set of interconnected honeypots simulating a realistic network segment to observe attacker TTPs |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Thinkst Canary**: Commercial deception platform offering hardware\u002Fvirtual canaries and canary tokens\n- **Canarytokens.org**: Free honeytoken generation service (DNS, HTTP, AWS keys, Word docs, SQL queries)\n- **Attivo Networks (SentinelOne)**: Enterprise deception platform with AD decoys and endpoint breadcrumbs\n- **HoneyDB**: Community honeypot data aggregation platform for threat intelligence sharing\n- **T-Pot**: Open-source multi-honeypot platform combining 20+ honeypot types in a Docker deployment\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Lateral Movement Detection**: Attacker enumerates SMB shares and accesses honeypot file server — immediate high-fidelity alert\n- **Credential Theft Discovery**: Mimikatz dumps honeytoken cached credentials — usage of fake account triggers alert\n- **Cloud Key Compromise**: Stolen AWS canary token used from external IP — detects supply chain or insider compromise\n- **Ransomware Early Warning**: Ransomware encrypts canary files on honeypot shares — early detection before production systems affected\n- **Insider Threat Signal**: Employee accesses honeypot \"salary database\" — indicates unauthorized data exploration\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nDECEPTION ALERT — CRITICAL\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nTime:         2024-03-15 14:23:07 UTC\nCanary:       FILESERVER-BK04 (10.0.5.200)\nService:      SMB — File share \"Finance_Backup\" accessed\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)\nUser:         company\\jsmith\nFile Accessed: Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx (canary document)\n\nAlert Confidence: HIGH — No legitimate reason to access deception asset\nFalse Positive Likelihood: \u003C1%\n\nAutomated Response:\n  [DONE] WORKSTATION-042 isolated via CrowdStrike\n  [DONE] 192.168.1.105 blocked at firewall (bidirectional)\n  [DONE] Incident INC0012567 created (P1 — Critical)\n  [PENDING] Tier 2 investigation — determine if workstation compromised or insider threat\n```\n","# Performing Deception Technology Deployment\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC teams need high-fidelity detection of post-compromise lateral movement with near-zero false positives\n- Existing detection tools miss advanced attackers who avoid triggering threshold-based alerts\n- The organization wants to detect credential abuse by planting fake credentials as honeytokens\n- Network segmentation gaps need compensating detection controls\n\n**Do not use** as a replacement for fundamental security controls (patching, EDR, network segmentation) — deception is a detection layer, not a prevention mechanism.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Network segments identified for honeypot\u002Fdecoy deployment (server VLANs, DMZ, OT networks)\n- Deception platform (Thinkst Canary, Attivo\u002FSentinelOne Hologram, or open-source alternatives)\n- SIEM integration for deception alerts (any interaction with deception assets is suspicious)\n- Active Directory access for honeytoken account and credential creation\n- Network team coordination for IP allocation and traffic routing\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map Attack Surface for Deception Placement\n\nIdentify high-value network segments where attackers would traverse:\n\n```\nDECEPTION DEPLOYMENT MAP\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nSegment              Decoy Type          Rationale\nServer VLAN          Fake file server    Attackers enumerate SMB shares during recon\nDatabase VLAN        Fake DB server      SQL scanning detected in past incidents\nAD\u002FDC Segment        Honeytoken account  Credential theft detection\nExecutive Subnet     Fake workstation    Targeted attacks pivot through exec systems\nDMZ                  Honeypot web app    External attacker detection\nOT Network           Fake PLC\u002FHMI        Industrial threat detection\nCloud (AWS VPC)      Canary EC2 + S3     Cloud lateral movement detection\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Thinkst Canary Devices\n\nConfigure Canary devices mimicking real infrastructure:\n\n**Windows File Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n  \"personality\": \"windows-server-2019\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"smb\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"shares\": [\"Finance_Backup\", \"HR_Archive\", \"IT_Docs\"],\n      \"files\": [\n        {\"name\": \"Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"employee_ssn_export.csv\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"admin_passwords.kdbx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"}\n      ]\n    },\n    \"rdp\": {\"enabled\": true},\n    \"http\": {\"enabled\": false}\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.5.200\",\n    \"hostname\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n    \"domain\": \"company.local\"\n  },\n  \"alert_webhook\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fsoar.company.com\u002Fapi\u002Fwebhook\u002Fcanary\"\n}\n```\n\n**Database Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"DB-ARCHIVE-02\",\n  \"personality\": \"linux-mysql\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"mysql\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 3306,\n      \"databases\": [\"customer_pii\", \"payment_archive\"],\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    },\n    \"ssh\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 22,\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    }\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.10.50\",\n    \"hostname\": \"db-archive-02\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy Honeytokens in Active Directory\n\nCreate fake privileged accounts that should never be used:\n\n```powershell\n# Create honeytoken service account\nNew-ADUser -Name \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -UserPrincipalName \"svc_sql_backup@company.local\" `\n    -Description \"SQL Backup Service Account - DO NOT DELETE\" `\n    -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString \"FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\" -AsPlainText -Force) `\n    -Enabled $true `\n    -PasswordNeverExpires $true `\n    -CannotChangePassword $true\n\n# Add to a group that looks attractive (but monitor for any use)\nAdd-ADGroupMember -Identity \"Domain Admins\" -Members \"svc_sql_backup\"\n\n# Place cached credentials on decoy workstation\n# (Mimikatz\u002Fcredential dumping will find these)\ncmdkey \u002Fadd:fileserver-bk04.company.local \u002Fuser:company\\svc_sql_backup \u002Fpass:FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\n```\n\n**Monitor honeytoken usage in Splunk:**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\"\n(EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4648 OR EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\nTargetUserName=\"svc_sql_backup\"\n| eval alert_severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval alert_message = \"HONEYTOKEN ACCOUNT USED — Likely credential theft detected\"\n| table _time, EventCode, src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName, Logon_Type, alert_message\n```\n\n### Step 4: Deploy Canary Files and Documents\n\nPlant tracked documents that beacon when opened:\n\n**Canary Document (Word doc with tracking):**\n```python\n# Using Thinkst Canary API to create a canary token document\nimport requests\n\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"doc-msword\",\n        \"memo\": \"Finance backup folder canary document\",\n        \"flock_id\": \"flock:default\"\n    }\n)\ntoken = response.json()\ndownload_url = token[\"canarytoken\"][\"canarytoken_url\"]\nprint(f\"Download canary doc: {download_url}\")\n# Place this document in honeypot SMB shares and sensitive directories\n```\n\n**AWS Canary Token (S3 access key):**\n```python\n# Create AWS canary token — alerts when access key is used\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"aws-id\",\n        \"memo\": \"Canary AWS key in developer laptop .aws\u002Fcredentials\"\n    }\n)\naws_keys = response.json()\nprint(f\"Access Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['access_key_id']}\")\nprint(f\"Secret Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['secret_access_key']}\")\n# Plant in .aws\u002Fcredentials on developer workstations\n```\n\n### Step 5: Integrate Deception Alerts with SIEM\u002FSOAR\n\nAll deception alerts are high-fidelity — any interaction is suspicious:\n\n**Splunk Alert for Canary Triggers:**\n```spl\nindex=canary sourcetype=\"canary:alerts\"\n| eval severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval confidence = \"HIGH — Deception asset triggered, zero false positive expected\"\n| table _time, canary_name, alert_type, source_ip, service, details\n| sendalert create_notable param.rule_title=\"Deception Alert — Canary Triggered\"\n  param.severity=\"critical\" param.drilldown_search=\"index=canary source_ip=$source_ip$\"\n```\n\n**SOAR Automated Response:**\n```python\ndef canary_triggered(container):\n    \"\"\"Auto-response for deception alerts — high confidence, no approval needed\"\"\"\n    source_ip = container[\"artifacts\"][0][\"cef\"][\"sourceAddress\"]\n\n    # Immediately isolate the source\n    phantom.act(\"quarantine device\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip_hostname\": source_ip}],\n                assets=[\"crowdstrike_prod\"],\n                name=\"isolate_attacker_host\")\n\n    # Block at firewall\n    phantom.act(\"block ip\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip\": source_ip, \"direction\": \"both\"}],\n                assets=[\"palo_alto_prod\"],\n                name=\"block_attacker_ip\")\n\n    # Create high-priority incident\n    phantom.act(\"create ticket\",\n                parameters=[{\n                    \"short_description\": f\"DECEPTION ALERT: Canary triggered from {source_ip}\",\n                    \"urgency\": \"1\",\n                    \"impact\": \"1\"\n                }],\n                assets=[\"servicenow_prod\"])\n\n    phantom.set_severity(container, \"critical\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Maintain Deception Realism\n\nRegularly update decoys to maintain believability:\n\n- Rotate honeytoken passwords quarterly (update cached credentials on decoy workstations)\n- Update canary file modification dates to appear recently accessed\n- Add realistic network traffic to honeypots (scheduled SMB enumeration, DNS lookups)\n- Register honeypot hostnames in DNS and Active Directory to appear in network scans\n- Update canary document contents to match current business context\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Honeypot** | Decoy system mimicking real infrastructure to attract and detect attackers in the network |\n| **Honeytoken** | Fake credential, file, or data record that triggers an alert when accessed or used |\n| **Canary** | Lightweight deception device or token that alerts on any interaction (Thinkst Canary platform) |\n| **Breadcrumb** | Planted artifact (cached credential, bookmark, config file) leading attackers to deception assets |\n| **High-Fidelity Alert** | Detection signal with near-zero false positive rate because no legitimate user should interact with deception assets |\n| **Decoy Network** | Set of interconnected honeypots simulating a realistic network segment to observe attacker TTPs |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Thinkst Canary**: Commercial deception platform offering hardware\u002Fvirtual canaries and canary tokens\n- **Canarytokens.org**: Free honeytoken generation service (DNS, HTTP, AWS keys, Word docs, SQL queries)\n- **Attivo Networks (SentinelOne)**: Enterprise deception platform with AD decoys and endpoint breadcrumbs\n- **HoneyDB**: Community honeypot data aggregation platform for threat intelligence sharing\n- **T-Pot**: Open-source multi-honeypot platform combining 20+ honeypot types in a Docker deployment\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Lateral Movement Detection**: Attacker enumerates SMB shares and accesses honeypot file server — immediate high-fidelity alert\n- **Credential Theft Discovery**: Mimikatz dumps honeytoken cached credentials — usage of fake account triggers alert\n- **Cloud Key Compromise**: Stolen AWS canary token used from external IP — detects supply chain or insider compromise\n- **Ransomware Early Warning**: Ransomware encrypts canary files on honeypot shares — early detection before production systems affected\n- **Insider Threat Signal**: Employee accesses honeypot \"salary database\" — indicates unauthorized data exploration\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nDECEPTION ALERT — CRITICAL\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nTime:         2024-03-15 14:23:07 UTC\nCanary:       FILESERVER-BK04 (10.0.5.200)\nService:      SMB — File share \"Finance_Backup\" accessed\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)\nUser:         company\\jsmith\nFile Accessed: Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx (canary document)\n\nAlert Confidence: HIGH — No legitimate reason to access deception asset\nFalse Positive Likelihood: \u003C1%\n\nAutomated Response:\n  [DONE] WORKSTATION-042 isolated via CrowdStrike\n  [DONE] 192.168.1.105 blocked at firewall (bidirectional)\n  [DONE] Incident INC0012567 created (P1 — Critical)\n  [PENDING] Tier 2 investigation — determine if workstation compromised or insider threat\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":41,"description":42,"mitre_attack":43},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"soc","deception","honeypot","honeytoken","canary","lateral-movement","detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01","DE.AE-06","soc-operations","Deploys deception technology including honeypots, honeytokens, and decoy systems to detect attackers who have bypassed perimeter defenses, providing high-fidelity alerts with near-zero false positive rates. Use when SOC teams need early warning of lateral movement, credential abuse, or internal reconnaissance by deploying convincing traps across the network.\n",[44,45,46,47,48],"T1078","T1685.002","T1685.005","T1566","T1021","main","7540bbccf0c1ded6156a467b02c95b61ad62413f",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena","Currently exploring the intersection of tech","2026-09-11 03:02:31",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":57,"prompt":67,"zipAvailable":68},[58,61,64],{"tool":59,"command":60},"npx","npx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill performing-deception-technology-deployment",{"tool":62,"command":63},"bunx","bunx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill performing-deception-technology-deployment",{"tool":65,"command":66},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill performing-deception-technology-deployment","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002FSKILL.md",true,[70,74,80],{"path":71,"resourceType":71,"resourceTypeDesc":72,"sizeBytes":73,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":75,"resourceType":76,"resourceTypeDesc":77,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2160,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":82,"resourceTypeDesc":83,"sizeBytes":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7774,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[87,94,101,108,115,122],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACCCVNCFKMA9X6D15X6G98","runpodctl","Runpod CLI for managing GPU\u002FCPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send\u002Freceive). Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":102,"name":103,"nameZh":6,"description":104,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). Use to answer \"how does X work\", \"which GPU\", \"how do I build a container\", or \"how do I stand up a workload on a pod\". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-usage\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBRPE345GF5GM5B8P8RRC","runpod-templates","Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says \"run \u003CX> on a pod\" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-templates\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBJATHKVX1TWES2F44GY8","runpod-migrate","Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-migrate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":123,"name":124,"nameZh":6,"description":125,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":126,"categories":127,"keywords":128,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBC7GHVH6T9YEAPCG2AP8","runpod-mcp","Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU\u002FCPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-mcp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]