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Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when creating a new KMS key, deploying a customer-managed CMK, validating a key policy, enabling rotation, or configuring multi-Region keys. Triggers: create KMS key, customer managed key, CMK, key policy, key administrators, key users, KMS grants, automatic rotation, multi-Region keys, CloudHSM custom key store, envelope encryption, cross-account KMS.","jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","jhkchan","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F1083902?v=4","01M7A2SVQYP9GQTPTDXP5JKYQ4","Jacky Chan","01M7A2SVS117YWCTZABB75HZR1",4,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fkms-key-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: kms-key-deployer\ndescription: 'Provisions AWS KMS keys correctly: key type selection (symmetric AES-256, asymmetric RSA\u002FECDSA, HMAC), key spec, key policy with separated key administrators vs key users, grants vs key policy, aliases, automatic rotation (symmetric only, annually), multi-Region keys (primary + replicas), custom key store (CloudHSM), deletion window (7-30 days, irreversible), tagging, cross-account access (key policy + caller IAM), and envelope encryption pattern. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when creating a new KMS key, deploying a customer-managed CMK, validating a key policy, enabling rotation, or configuring multi-Region keys. Triggers: create KMS key, customer managed key, CMK, key policy, key administrators, key users, KMS grants, automatic rotation, multi-Region keys, CloudHSM custom key store, envelope encryption, cross-account KMS.'\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: 'Requires an LLM agent runtime (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). For live deployment: AWS CLI v2 with kms, iam, cloudhsm, ram, and sts access. Works with Terraform aws_kms_key \u002F aws_kms_alias \u002F aws_kms_grant resources, CloudFormation AWS::KMS::Key \u002F AWS::KMS::Alias, and SAM templates.'\nmetadata:\n  domain: aws-cloudops\n  complexity: high\n  requires_llm: 'true'\n  phase: '1'\n  supports_pipeline: 'true'\n  entry_point: 'false'\n  family: Security\n  task_type: deploy\n  skill_class: capability\n  lifecycle_status: active\n  verdict_shape: READY_TO_DEPLOY | PREREQUISITES_MISSING\n  version: 0.1.0\n  author: Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder\n  tags: aws, kms, security, cloudops, deploy, encryption, key-policy, multi-region\n  dependencies: aws-orchestrator\n  keywords: aws, kms, security, cloudops, deploy, provisioning, encryption, key-policy, cmk, envelope-encryption, multi-region, cloudhsm, key-rotation, asymmetric, grants\n  when_to_use: Invoke when the user wants to create a new KMS customer-managed key (CMK), provision a multi-Region key, configure a CloudHSM custom key store key, validate a key policy for least-privilege, enable automatic rotation, set up cross-account access, or generate deployment CLI \u002F IaC templates. Do NOT invoke for AWS-managed default keys (S3, EBS, DynamoDB defaults — these are not customer-controllable), or for TLS certificate key material (use ACM).\n---\n\n# KMS Key Deployer\n\nAn AWS CloudOps agent skill that provisions AWS KMS customer-managed keys\n(CMKs) with correct production defaults. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist\nverifying every configuration item.\n\n## Quick navigation\n\n| Need | Section |\n|---|---|\n| What MUST be in the response | \"STRICT output contract\" |\n| Why the provisioning order matters | \"Reasoning framework\" |\n| What to verify before provisioning | \"Prerequisites\" |\n| The ordered provisioning steps | \"Deployment procedure\" |\n| Common silent-failure pitfalls | \"NEVER\" |\n| Key policy, grants, multi-Region, CloudHSM | \"Deployment procedure\" Steps 2-8 |\n| Workload-specific defaults | \"Workload matrix\" |\n| 2024-2026 feature changes | \"Recent AWS features\" |\n| Deep CLI sequences | `references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md` |\n| Key policy, grants, multi-Region, CloudHSM, cross-account, envelope | `references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md` |\n\n## STRICT output contract\n\nWhen this skill is invoked with a KMS key provisioning request (key\nalias, usage, key type, or a partial existing configuration), the agent\nMUST respond with the READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist defined in \"Output\nformat\" using the literal all-caps labels `KEY:`, `VERDICT:`,\n`CHECKLIST:`, and `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:`. Do NOT preface the\nchecklist with prose, headings, or disclaimers — emit the block as the\nfirst lines of the response.\n\n### Required output structure\n\n1. `KEY: \u003Calias-or-key-id>` — the KMS key being provisioned.\n2. `VERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY` OR `VERDICT: PREREQUISITES_MISSING`.\n3. `CHECKLIST:` followed by indented lines with status markers\n   (`[✓]`, `[✗]`, `[OPTIONAL]`, `[INPUT NEEDED]`).\n4. `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:` followed by indented `aws kms ...` commands.\n\n### FORBIDDEN output patterns\n\n- **No prose preamble before `KEY:`** — the first non-empty line MUST be `KEY:`.\n- **No markdown variants of labels** — write `VERDICT:`, not `**VERDICT:**`,\n  `### Verdict`, `Verdict =`, or `` `VERDICT` ``.\n- **No swapping verdict tokens** — exactly `READY_TO_DEPLOY` or\n  `PREREQUISITES_MISSING`. Not \"ready\", \"missing\", \"BLOCKED\", \"OK\".\n- **No omitting `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:`** — include even when\n  PREREQUISITES_MISSING; the operator needs commands to verify gaps.\n- **No extra sections after `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:`** — the checklist\n  block is the entire response. Put deeper explanation in `references\u002F`.\n- **No status marker drift** — use only `[✓]`, `[✗]`, `[OPTIONAL]`,\n  `[INPUT NEEDED]`. Do not invent `[?]`, `[!]`, `[WARN]`, or emoji.\n\n### Perfect example (copy the shape exactly)\n\n```text\nKEY: alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\nVERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY\nCHECKLIST:\n  [✓]      Key spec — SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT (AES-256-GCM)\n  [✓]      Key usage — ENCRYPT_DECRYPT\n  [✓]      Origin — AWS_KMS\n  [✓]      Key administrators — arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fkms-admin (kms:Create*, kms:Put*, kms:Enable*, ScheduleKeyDeletion)\n  [✓]      Key users — arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fpayments-svc (kms:Encrypt, kms:Decrypt, kms:GenerateDataKey, kms:DescribeKey)\n  [✓]      Root account break-glass — arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root (kms:*)\n  [✓]      Automatic rotation — enabled (annual, symmetric only)\n  [✓]      Alias — alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n  [✓]      Deletion window — 30 days\n  [✓]      Tags — Environment=production, Application=payments\n  [OPTIONAL] Multi-Region — single-Region (us-east-1) primary only\n  [OPTIONAL] Grants — none (key policy covers all callers)\nVERIFICATION_COMMANDS:\n  aws kms describe-key --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n  aws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n  aws kms list-aliases --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-resource-tags --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-grants --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws iam get-role-policy --role-name kms-admin --policy-name kms-admin-policy\n```\n\n## Reasoning framework (why the provisioning order matters)\n\nKMS key provisioning has **dependency and ordering constraints** that make\nthe procedure non-trivial. Applying configurations in the wrong order causes\nlocked-out keys, un-decryptable data, or compliance violations:\n\n1. **Key spec + key usage FIRST** — the `KeySpec` and `KeyUsage` determine\n   what crypto operations the key supports. A `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` key cannot\n   sign; an `RSA_4096` `SIGN_VERIFY` key cannot encrypt. Changing spec after\n   creation requires a new key and re-encrypting all data.\n2. **Key policy separates administrators from users** — the ONLY way to\n   grant CMK access (IAM alone is not enough). Conflating admin and user\n   produces lockouts (users disable the key) or over-permission (admins\n   decrypt production data).\n3. **Root account break-glass** — every CMK key policy MUST include account\n   root with `kms:*`. Without this, an accidental policy lockout is\n   unrecoverable — AWS support cannot restore access.\n4. **Aliases after key creation** — human-readable names (`alias\u002F\u003Cname>`)\n   that decouple the application reference from the underlying key material\n   (useful for rotation cutover).\n5. **Automatic rotation** — symmetric CMKs support annual rotation (key\n   material only, ARN\u002FID unchanged). Asymmetric, HMAC, and multi-Region\n   primaries do NOT support auto-rotation.\n6. **Multi-Region keys** — primary + replicas share key material but have\n   independent key policies. Create primary first, then replicate. Cannot\n   auto-rotate.\n7. **Deletion window** — 7-30 day mandatory waiting period before irreversible\n   deletion. Set to 30 days for production to allow recovery from accidents.\n\n## Prerequisites (verify before deployment)\n\n| Prerequisite | Why it matters | How to verify |\n|---|---|---|\n| **AWS account root access or break-glass** | Every CMK policy MUST include root. | `aws sts get-caller-identity` |\n| **Key administrator principal** | IAM role\u002Fuser that can administer the key. | `aws iam get-role --role-name \u003Cadmin-role>` |\n| **Key user principals** | Application roles needing Encrypt\u002FDecrypt\u002FGenerateDataKey. | `aws iam get-role --role-name \u003Capp-role>` |\n| **CloudHSM cluster** (if custom key store) | Must be ACTIVE with >= 2 HSMs across AZs. | `aws cloudhsmv2 describe-clusters` |\n| **Cross-account caller IAM** (if cross-account) | Caller IAM must ALSO grant KMS actions. | `aws iam get-role` in caller account |\n| **Alias name uniqueness** | Unique within account\u002FRegion. `alias\u002Faws\u002F*` reserved. | `aws kms list-aliases` |\n| **IAM permissions** | Caller needs `kms:CreateKey`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, `kms:CreateAlias`. | `aws sts get-caller-identity` |\n\n## Deployment procedure (apply in order)\n\n### Step 1: Key spec + key usage selection\n\n**Symmetric (the common case):**\n\n| KeySpec | KeyUsage | What it does |\n|---|---|---|\n| `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | `ENCRYPT_DECRYPT` | AES-256-GCM. Default for 95% of workloads (EBS, S3, RDS, Lambda, Secrets Manager). |\n\n**Asymmetric \u002F HMAC:**\n\n| KeySpec | KeyUsage | What it does |\n|---|---|---|\n| `RSA_2048` \u002F `RSA_3072` \u002F `RSA_4096` | `ENCRYPT_DECRYPT` | RSA encryption (public key downloadable) |\n| `RSA_2048` \u002F `RSA_3072` \u002F `RSA_4096` | `SIGN_VERIFY` | RSA signing (code\u002Fdocument signing) |\n| `ECC_NIST_P256` \u002F `P384` \u002F `P521` | `SIGN_VERIFY` | ECDSA signing (lower latency) |\n| `ECC_NIST_P256` \u002F `P384` | `KEY_AGREEMENT` | ECDH key agreement (mTLS) |\n| `HMAC_256` | `GENERATE_VERIFY_MAC` | HMAC-SHA-256 (JWT, API tokens) |\n\n**Choose `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` unless you have a specific reason not to.**\nIt is the only spec supporting automatic rotation, AWS service integration,\nand the cheapest.\n\n### Step 2: Key policy (separate administrators from users)\n\nThe key policy is the ONLY way to grant CMK access — IAM cannot override a\nkey policy denial. A production key policy contains four statements:\n\n1. **Break-glass (root)** — `kms:*` on account root. Mandatory recovery path.\n2. **Key administrators** — lifecycle actions only (`Create*`, `Put*`,\n   `Disable*`, `ScheduleKeyDeletion`). NO Encrypt\u002FDecrypt.\n3. **Key users** — `Encrypt`, `Decrypt`, `ReEncrypt*`, `GenerateDataKey*`,\n   `DescribeKey`.\n4. **Grant creation** — allows AWS service integrations to create grants\n   when `kms:GrantIsForAWSResource=true`.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Enable IAM User Permissions (break-glass)\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root\" },\n      \"Action\": \"kms:*\", \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Allow access for Key Administrators\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fkms-admin\" },\n      \"Action\": [\"kms:Create*\",\"kms:Describe*\",\"kms:Enable*\",\"kms:List*\",\n        \"kms:Put*\",\"kms:Update*\",\"kms:Revoke*\",\"kms:Disable*\",\"kms:Get*\",\n        \"kms:Delete*\",\"kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion\",\"kms:CancelKeyDeletion\",\n        \"kms:RotateKeyOnDemand\"],\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Allow use of the key\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fpayments-svc\" },\n      \"Action\": [\"kms:Encrypt\",\"kms:Decrypt\",\"kms:ReEncrypt*\",\n        \"kms:GenerateDataKey*\",\"kms:DescribeKey\"],\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Allow attachment of persistent resources\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fpayments-svc\" },\n      \"Action\": [\"kms:CreateGrant\",\"kms:ListGrants\",\"kms:RevokeGrant\"],\n      \"Resource\": \"*\",\n      \"Condition\": { \"Bool\": { \"kms:GrantIsForAWSResource\": \"true\" } }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**NEVER grant `kms:*` to anyone but root.**\n\n### Step 3: Key administrators vs. key users (separation principle)\n\n| Capability | Key administrators | Key users |\n|---|---|---|\n| `kms:Create*`, `kms:Put*`, `kms:Update*` | YES | NO |\n| `kms:Enable*`, `kms:Disable*` | YES | NO |\n| `kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion`, `kms:CancelKeyDeletion` | YES | NO |\n| `kms:Encrypt`, `kms:Decrypt`, `kms:GenerateDataKey*` | NO | YES |\n| `kms:Describe*`, `kms:List*` | YES | YES (read-only) |\n| `kms:CreateGrant` | NO | YES (with condition) |\n\n### Step 4: Grants vs. key policy\n\n- **Key policy** — persistent JSON on the key. Use for stable, long-term\n  access (app roles, break-glass root, key admin role).\n- **Grants** — temporary, programmatic permissions with constraints. Use\n  for AWS service integrations (Lambda, EBS), temporary access (migration),\n  tighter scoping (Encrypt only on specific encryption context).\n\nGrants are subject to the key policy and eventually consistent (~5s\npropagation). Prefer key policy for human\u002Flong-term roles; grants for\nservice integrations and temporary access.\n\n```bash\naws kms create-grant \\\n  --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk \\\n  --grantee-principal arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fmigration-tool \\\n  --operations Decrypt \\\n  --constraints '{\"EncryptionContextSubset\": {\"department\": \"finance\"}}' \\\n  --retiring-principal arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fkms-admin\n```\n\n### Step 5: Aliases\n\n```bash\naws kms create-alias --alias-name alias\u002Fpayments-cmk --target-key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n```\n\n- Prefix `alias\u002F` mandatory. `alias\u002Faws\u002F*` reserved for AWS-managed keys.\n- Can be updated to point at a different key (rotation cutover).\n- Name after the workload (`alias\u002Fpayments-cmk`), not generic (`alias\u002Fmy-key`).\n\n### Step 6: Automatic rotation\n\n```bash\naws kms enable-key-rotation --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n```\n\n- **Symmetric CMKs**: annual auto-rotation. ARN, ID, policy unchanged.\n  Existing ciphertext remains decryptable.\n- **Asymmetric \u002F HMAC**: do NOT support auto-rotation. Manual rotation\n  required (create new key, update alias, re-encrypt).\n- **Multi-Region primaries**: cannot auto-rotate (would desync replicas).\n- **Custom key store (CloudHSM)**: supports auto-rotation since 2023.\n- **On-demand rotation (2024-2025)**: `kms:RotateKeyOnDemand` triggers\n  immediate rotation for eligible symmetric keys.\n\n### Step 7: Multi-Region keys (primary + replicas)\n\n```bash\n# Primary (multi-Region)\naws kms create-key --description \"Payments CMK (primary)\" \\\n  --origin AWS_KMS --multi-region --policy file:\u002F\u002Fpolicy.json\n\n# Replica in us-west-2\naws kms replicate-key \\\n  --key-id arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key\u002F\u003Cprimary-key-id> \\\n  --replica-region us-west-2 --policy file:\u002F\u002Freplica-policy.json\n```\n\nEach replica shares key material with the primary but has an INDEPENDENT\nkey policy. Multi-Region keys CANNOT auto-rotate. Use for cross-Region DR,\nglobal DynamoDB table encryption, cross-Region EBS snapshot restore.\n\n### Step 8: Custom key store (CloudHSM)\n\nFor FIPS 140-2 Level 3 compliance or regulatory key custody:\n\n```bash\n# 1. CloudHSM cluster must be ACTIVE with >= 2 HSMs\naws cloudhsmv2 describe-clusters\n\n# 2. Create custom key store linked to the CloudHSM cluster\naws kms create-custom-key-store \\\n  --custom-key-store-name payments-hsm-keystore \\\n  --cloud-hsm-cluster-id cluster-xxx \\\n  --trust-anchor certificate.pem \\\n  --key-store-admin-credentials \u003Ckmsuser-password> \\\n  --hsm-credentials \u003Chsm-password>\n\n# 3. Connect the key store\naws kms connect-custom-key-store --custom-key-store-id cks-xxx\n\n# 4. Create key in the custom key store\naws kms create-key --custom-key-store-id cks-xxx \\\n  --description \"Payments CMK (CloudHSM)\" --policy file:\u002F\u002Fpolicy.json\n```\n\nRules:\n- `kmsuser` CU must be logged out before KMS connects.\n- Cluster must have >= 2 active HSMs across different AZs.\n- Supports `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`, `RSA_*`, `ECC_*`, `HMAC_256`.\n- A disconnected key store blocks all Encrypt\u002FDecrypt on its keys.\n\n### Step 9: Deletion window\n\n```bash\naws kms schedule-key-deletion --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk --pending-window-in-days 30\n```\n\n- Window: 7-30 days. Default is 30 days. For production, ALWAYS set 30 days.\n- Deletion is IRREVERSIBLE — once the window expires, the key material is\n  destroyed and all ciphertext encrypted under the key becomes permanently\n  unrecoverable.\n- The key is in `PendingDeletion` state during the window. It can be\n  cancelled with `CancelKeyDeletion`.\n- During `PendingDeletion`, the key CANNOT be used for Encrypt or\n  GenerateDataKey, but CAN be used for Decrypt (so existing data can be\n  migrated to a new key).\n\n### Step 10: Tagging + verification\n\n```bash\naws kms tag-resource --key-id \u003Ckey-id> \\\n  --tags '[{\"TagKey\":\"Environment\",\"TagValue\":\"production\"}]'\naws kms describe-key --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\naws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\naws kms get-key-policy --key-id \u003Ckey-id> --policy-name default\n```\n\n## Envelope encryption and cross-account access\n\n**Envelope encryption:** KMS has a 4 KB payload limit. Use\n`GenerateDataKey` to get a plaintext data key + encrypted data key, encrypt\npayloads client-side (AWS Encryption SDK), store ciphertext + encrypted key.\nDecrypt by calling `Decrypt` on the encrypted data key.\n\n```bash\naws kms generate-data-key --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk \\\n  --key-spec AES_256 \\\n  --encryption-context '{\"department\":\"finance\",\"app\":\"payments\"}'\n\naws kms decrypt --ciphertext-blob fileb:\u002F\u002Fencrypted-data-key.bin \\\n  --encryption-context '{\"department\":\"finance\",\"app\":\"payments\"}'\n```\n\nThe encryption context is authenticated AAD — MUST be identical on Encrypt\nand Decrypt. Full reference in `references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md`.\n\n**Cross-account access:** KMS is a \"both-must-allow\" service. Account A's\nkey policy must grant account B, AND account B's IAM must grant the KMS\nactions. A missing key policy statement fails silently with\n`AccessDeniedException`. Full reference in\n`references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md`.\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge-case quick list moved verbatim to\n`references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md` (load on demand).\n\n## Workload matrix\n\n| Workload | KeySpec | Rotation | Multi-Region | Origin | Notes |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| EBS \u002F S3 \u002F RDS \u002F Lambda env vars | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Default for AWS service integration |\n| DynamoDB \u002F Aurora \u002F SQS \u002F SNS | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Use CMK for full control |\n| Secrets Manager | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | No | AWS_KMS | One CMK per secret-class |\n| Code signing (Signer) | `RSA_4096` SIGN_VERIFY | Manual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Cannot auto-rotate |\n| JWT \u002F API tokens | `HMAC_256` | Manual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Cannot auto-rotate |\n| Cross-Region DR | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Manual | YES | AWS_KMS | Replica per Region |\n| FIPS \u002F regulatory | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | No | CloudHSM | Custom key store |\n| Document signing | `ECC_NIST_P384` SIGN_VERIFY | Manual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Lower latency than RSA |\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\n2024-2026 feature details moved verbatim to\n`references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md` (load on demand).\n\n## NEVER (top 5 — full list of 13 anti-patterns in references)\n\n- NEVER create a CMK without the account root as break-glass\n  (`{\"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::\u003Caccount>:root\"}` with `kms:*`). Without root,\n  an accidental lockout is unrecoverable — AWS support cannot help.\n- NEVER grant `kms:*` to any non-root principal. Use scoped statements for\n  users (Encrypt\u002FDecrypt\u002FGenerateDataKey) vs administrators (Create*\u002FDisable*).\n- NEVER combine key administrator and key user into one role. Separation of\n  duties: admins manage lifecycle, users access data — never both.\n- NEVER skip automatic rotation on a `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` CMK. Annual rotation\n  is free, invisible to callers, and limits blast radius of compromise.\n- NEVER delete a CMK without confirming no ciphertext is encrypted under it.\n  Audit CloudTrail for recent Encrypt\u002FGenerateDataKey usage.\n\n## Expert heuristic — choosing key spec, administrators, and users\n\n- **Key spec** — default to `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`. Choose asymmetric only for\n  public-key encryption, digital signatures verifiable outside AWS, or HMAC.\n- **Administrators** — one `kms-admin` role per security team. Lifecycle\n  actions only, NO `kms:Decrypt`.\n- **Users** — one role per application. Never grant to broad groups like\n  \"Developers\" — that lets engineers read production ciphertext.\n- **Break-glass** — root always in the policy with `kms:*`. Not a violation\n  of least privilege — it is the recovery path.\n- **Rotation** — symmetric: on; asymmetric\u002FHMAC: document manual procedure.\n- **Multi-Region** — only when needed (cross-Region DR, global tables).\n  Single-Region is the right default.\n- **Encryption context** — always include identifying fields like\n  `{\"app\":\"payments\",\"env\":\"prod\"}`. Scopes grants, provides audit trail.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any provisioning CLI)\n\nPre-flight command listing moved verbatim to\n`references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md` (load on demand).\n\n## Output format — MANDATORY literal labels\n\nWhen invoked with a key provisioning request, your ENTIRE response MUST\nbe the checklist block below. The labels are **case-sensitive all-caps\nkeywords** — write them EXACTLY as shown. Do NOT write a preamble. Start\nwith `KEY:` and stop after the `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:` block.\n\n```text\nKEY: \u003Calias-or-key-id>\nVERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY | PREREQUISITES_MISSING\nCHECKLIST:\n  [✓]      Key spec — \u003CSYMMETRIC_DEFAULT | RSA_4096 | HMAC_256 | ...>\n  [✓]      Key usage — \u003CENCRYPT_DECRYPT | SIGN_VERIFY | GENERATE_VERIFY_MAC | KEY_AGREEMENT>\n  [✓]      Origin — \u003CAWS_KMS | AWS_CLOUDHSM | EXTERNAL_KEY_STORE>\n  [✓]      Key administrators — \u003Cadmin-role-arn> (lifecycle actions only, no Encrypt\u002FDecrypt)\n  [✓]      Key users — \u003Capp-role-arns> (Encrypt, Decrypt, GenerateDataKey)\n  [✓]      Root account break-glass — arn:aws:iam::\u003Caccount>:root (kms:*)\n  [✓]      Automatic rotation — \u003Cenabled annual | not supported for this spec>\n  [✓]      Alias — alias\u002F\u003Cname>\n  [✓]      Deletion window — \u003C7-30 days>\n  [✓]      Tags — \u003Ckey=value pairs>\n  [OPTIONAL] Multi-Region — \u003Cprimary only | primary + replicas in \u003Cregions>>\n  [OPTIONAL] Grants — \u003Cnone | service integrations>\nVERIFICATION_COMMANDS:\n  aws kms describe-key --key-id alias\u002F\u003Cname>\n  aws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id alias\u002F\u003Cname>\n  aws kms get-key-policy --key-id \u003Ckey-id> --policy-name default\n  aws kms list-aliases --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-resource-tags --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-grants --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n```\n\n**Status marker semantics:**\n- `[✓]` — applied and verified.\n- `[✗]` — NOT applied or misconfigured. Cite the gap.\n- `[OPTIONAL]` — recommended but not required for the workload type.\n- `[INPUT NEEDED]` — prerequisite value missing; operator must provide.\n\n**PREREQUISITES_MISSING verdict:** if any REQUIRED prerequisite is missing\n(administrator role ARN, application role ARN, CloudHSM cluster), the\nverdict is `PREREQUISITES_MISSING` with each gap listed.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [`references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md`](references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md) — full copy-pasteable CLI sequence for all 10 provisioning steps, Terraform\u002FCloudFormation equivalents, pre-flight safety checks.\n- [`references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md`](references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md) — key policy structure, grants, multi-Region, CloudHSM, envelope encryption, cross-account, edge-case handling.\n- [`references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md`](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — recent AWS features 2024-2026 (on-demand rotation, HMAC GA, ECDH, XKS, VPC endpoint policies).\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F KMS Cryptographic Key Provisioning.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS KMS Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Foverview.html\n- **KMS Key Policies** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fkey-policies.html\n- **KMS Key Spec** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fkms-developer-guide.html#concepts\n- **KMS Rotating Keys** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Frotate-keys.html\n- **KMS Multi-Region Keys** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fmulti-region-keys-overview.html\n- **KMS Custom Key Store** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fcustom-key-store-overview.html\n- **KMS Grants** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fgrants.html\n- **Envelope Encryption** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fconcepts.html#enveloping\n- **KMS CLI Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fkms\u002F\n\n## References\n\n- `references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md` — full copy-pasteable CLI command\n  sequence for all 10 provisioning steps, including Terraform equivalents.\n\n- `references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md` — deep reference on key\n  policy structure, multi-Region internals, CloudHSM lifecycle, envelope\n  encryption, cross-account access, full NEVER list, and edge-case handling.\n","# KMS Key Deployer\n\nAn AWS CloudOps agent skill that provisions AWS KMS customer-managed keys\n(CMKs) with correct production defaults. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist\nverifying every configuration item.\n\n## Quick navigation\n\n| Need | Section |\n|---|---|\n| What MUST be in the response | \"STRICT output contract\" |\n| Why the provisioning order matters | \"Reasoning framework\" |\n| What to verify before provisioning | \"Prerequisites\" |\n| The ordered provisioning steps | \"Deployment procedure\" |\n| Common silent-failure pitfalls | \"NEVER\" |\n| Key policy, grants, multi-Region, CloudHSM | \"Deployment procedure\" Steps 2-8 |\n| Workload-specific defaults | \"Workload matrix\" |\n| 2024-2026 feature changes | \"Recent AWS features\" |\n| Deep CLI sequences | `references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md` |\n| Key policy, grants, multi-Region, CloudHSM, cross-account, envelope | `references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md` |\n\n## STRICT output contract\n\nWhen this skill is invoked with a KMS key provisioning request (key\nalias, usage, key type, or a partial existing configuration), the agent\nMUST respond with the READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist defined in \"Output\nformat\" using the literal all-caps labels `KEY:`, `VERDICT:`,\n`CHECKLIST:`, and `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:`. Do NOT preface the\nchecklist with prose, headings, or disclaimers — emit the block as the\nfirst lines of the response.\n\n### Required output structure\n\n1. `KEY: \u003Calias-or-key-id>` — the KMS key being provisioned.\n2. `VERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY` OR `VERDICT: PREREQUISITES_MISSING`.\n3. `CHECKLIST:` followed by indented lines with status markers\n   (`[✓]`, `[✗]`, `[OPTIONAL]`, `[INPUT NEEDED]`).\n4. `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:` followed by indented `aws kms ...` commands.\n\n### FORBIDDEN output patterns\n\n- **No prose preamble before `KEY:`** — the first non-empty line MUST be `KEY:`.\n- **No markdown variants of labels** — write `VERDICT:`, not `**VERDICT:**`,\n  `### Verdict`, `Verdict =`, or `` `VERDICT` ``.\n- **No swapping verdict tokens** — exactly `READY_TO_DEPLOY` or\n  `PREREQUISITES_MISSING`. Not \"ready\", \"missing\", \"BLOCKED\", \"OK\".\n- **No omitting `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:`** — include even when\n  PREREQUISITES_MISSING; the operator needs commands to verify gaps.\n- **No extra sections after `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:`** — the checklist\n  block is the entire response. Put deeper explanation in `references\u002F`.\n- **No status marker drift** — use only `[✓]`, `[✗]`, `[OPTIONAL]`,\n  `[INPUT NEEDED]`. Do not invent `[?]`, `[!]`, `[WARN]`, or emoji.\n\n### Perfect example (copy the shape exactly)\n\n```text\nKEY: alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\nVERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY\nCHECKLIST:\n  [✓]      Key spec — SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT (AES-256-GCM)\n  [✓]      Key usage — ENCRYPT_DECRYPT\n  [✓]      Origin — AWS_KMS\n  [✓]      Key administrators — arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fkms-admin (kms:Create*, kms:Put*, kms:Enable*, ScheduleKeyDeletion)\n  [✓]      Key users — arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fpayments-svc (kms:Encrypt, kms:Decrypt, kms:GenerateDataKey, kms:DescribeKey)\n  [✓]      Root account break-glass — arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root (kms:*)\n  [✓]      Automatic rotation — enabled (annual, symmetric only)\n  [✓]      Alias — alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n  [✓]      Deletion window — 30 days\n  [✓]      Tags — Environment=production, Application=payments\n  [OPTIONAL] Multi-Region — single-Region (us-east-1) primary only\n  [OPTIONAL] Grants — none (key policy covers all callers)\nVERIFICATION_COMMANDS:\n  aws kms describe-key --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n  aws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n  aws kms list-aliases --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-resource-tags --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-grants --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws iam get-role-policy --role-name kms-admin --policy-name kms-admin-policy\n```\n\n## Reasoning framework (why the provisioning order matters)\n\nKMS key provisioning has **dependency and ordering constraints** that make\nthe procedure non-trivial. Applying configurations in the wrong order causes\nlocked-out keys, un-decryptable data, or compliance violations:\n\n1. **Key spec + key usage FIRST** — the `KeySpec` and `KeyUsage` determine\n   what crypto operations the key supports. A `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` key cannot\n   sign; an `RSA_4096` `SIGN_VERIFY` key cannot encrypt. Changing spec after\n   creation requires a new key and re-encrypting all data.\n2. **Key policy separates administrators from users** — the ONLY way to\n   grant CMK access (IAM alone is not enough). Conflating admin and user\n   produces lockouts (users disable the key) or over-permission (admins\n   decrypt production data).\n3. **Root account break-glass** — every CMK key policy MUST include account\n   root with `kms:*`. Without this, an accidental policy lockout is\n   unrecoverable — AWS support cannot restore access.\n4. **Aliases after key creation** — human-readable names (`alias\u002F\u003Cname>`)\n   that decouple the application reference from the underlying key material\n   (useful for rotation cutover).\n5. **Automatic rotation** — symmetric CMKs support annual rotation (key\n   material only, ARN\u002FID unchanged). Asymmetric, HMAC, and multi-Region\n   primaries do NOT support auto-rotation.\n6. **Multi-Region keys** — primary + replicas share key material but have\n   independent key policies. Create primary first, then replicate. Cannot\n   auto-rotate.\n7. **Deletion window** — 7-30 day mandatory waiting period before irreversible\n   deletion. Set to 30 days for production to allow recovery from accidents.\n\n## Prerequisites (verify before deployment)\n\n| Prerequisite | Why it matters | How to verify |\n|---|---|---|\n| **AWS account root access or break-glass** | Every CMK policy MUST include root. | `aws sts get-caller-identity` |\n| **Key administrator principal** | IAM role\u002Fuser that can administer the key. | `aws iam get-role --role-name \u003Cadmin-role>` |\n| **Key user principals** | Application roles needing Encrypt\u002FDecrypt\u002FGenerateDataKey. | `aws iam get-role --role-name \u003Capp-role>` |\n| **CloudHSM cluster** (if custom key store) | Must be ACTIVE with >= 2 HSMs across AZs. | `aws cloudhsmv2 describe-clusters` |\n| **Cross-account caller IAM** (if cross-account) | Caller IAM must ALSO grant KMS actions. | `aws iam get-role` in caller account |\n| **Alias name uniqueness** | Unique within account\u002FRegion. `alias\u002Faws\u002F*` reserved. | `aws kms list-aliases` |\n| **IAM permissions** | Caller needs `kms:CreateKey`, `iam:PutRolePolicy`, `kms:CreateAlias`. | `aws sts get-caller-identity` |\n\n## Deployment procedure (apply in order)\n\n### Step 1: Key spec + key usage selection\n\n**Symmetric (the common case):**\n\n| KeySpec | KeyUsage | What it does |\n|---|---|---|\n| `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | `ENCRYPT_DECRYPT` | AES-256-GCM. Default for 95% of workloads (EBS, S3, RDS, Lambda, Secrets Manager). |\n\n**Asymmetric \u002F HMAC:**\n\n| KeySpec | KeyUsage | What it does |\n|---|---|---|\n| `RSA_2048` \u002F `RSA_3072` \u002F `RSA_4096` | `ENCRYPT_DECRYPT` | RSA encryption (public key downloadable) |\n| `RSA_2048` \u002F `RSA_3072` \u002F `RSA_4096` | `SIGN_VERIFY` | RSA signing (code\u002Fdocument signing) |\n| `ECC_NIST_P256` \u002F `P384` \u002F `P521` | `SIGN_VERIFY` | ECDSA signing (lower latency) |\n| `ECC_NIST_P256` \u002F `P384` | `KEY_AGREEMENT` | ECDH key agreement (mTLS) |\n| `HMAC_256` | `GENERATE_VERIFY_MAC` | HMAC-SHA-256 (JWT, API tokens) |\n\n**Choose `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` unless you have a specific reason not to.**\nIt is the only spec supporting automatic rotation, AWS service integration,\nand the cheapest.\n\n### Step 2: Key policy (separate administrators from users)\n\nThe key policy is the ONLY way to grant CMK access — IAM cannot override a\nkey policy denial. A production key policy contains four statements:\n\n1. **Break-glass (root)** — `kms:*` on account root. Mandatory recovery path.\n2. **Key administrators** — lifecycle actions only (`Create*`, `Put*`,\n   `Disable*`, `ScheduleKeyDeletion`). NO Encrypt\u002FDecrypt.\n3. **Key users** — `Encrypt`, `Decrypt`, `ReEncrypt*`, `GenerateDataKey*`,\n   `DescribeKey`.\n4. **Grant creation** — allows AWS service integrations to create grants\n   when `kms:GrantIsForAWSResource=true`.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Enable IAM User Permissions (break-glass)\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root\" },\n      \"Action\": \"kms:*\", \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Allow access for Key Administrators\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fkms-admin\" },\n      \"Action\": [\"kms:Create*\",\"kms:Describe*\",\"kms:Enable*\",\"kms:List*\",\n        \"kms:Put*\",\"kms:Update*\",\"kms:Revoke*\",\"kms:Disable*\",\"kms:Get*\",\n        \"kms:Delete*\",\"kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion\",\"kms:CancelKeyDeletion\",\n        \"kms:RotateKeyOnDemand\"],\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Allow use of the key\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fpayments-svc\" },\n      \"Action\": [\"kms:Encrypt\",\"kms:Decrypt\",\"kms:ReEncrypt*\",\n        \"kms:GenerateDataKey*\",\"kms:DescribeKey\"],\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"Allow attachment of persistent resources\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fpayments-svc\" },\n      \"Action\": [\"kms:CreateGrant\",\"kms:ListGrants\",\"kms:RevokeGrant\"],\n      \"Resource\": \"*\",\n      \"Condition\": { \"Bool\": { \"kms:GrantIsForAWSResource\": \"true\" } }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**NEVER grant `kms:*` to anyone but root.**\n\n### Step 3: Key administrators vs. key users (separation principle)\n\n| Capability | Key administrators | Key users |\n|---|---|---|\n| `kms:Create*`, `kms:Put*`, `kms:Update*` | YES | NO |\n| `kms:Enable*`, `kms:Disable*` | YES | NO |\n| `kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion`, `kms:CancelKeyDeletion` | YES | NO |\n| `kms:Encrypt`, `kms:Decrypt`, `kms:GenerateDataKey*` | NO | YES |\n| `kms:Describe*`, `kms:List*` | YES | YES (read-only) |\n| `kms:CreateGrant` | NO | YES (with condition) |\n\n### Step 4: Grants vs. key policy\n\n- **Key policy** — persistent JSON on the key. Use for stable, long-term\n  access (app roles, break-glass root, key admin role).\n- **Grants** — temporary, programmatic permissions with constraints. Use\n  for AWS service integrations (Lambda, EBS), temporary access (migration),\n  tighter scoping (Encrypt only on specific encryption context).\n\nGrants are subject to the key policy and eventually consistent (~5s\npropagation). Prefer key policy for human\u002Flong-term roles; grants for\nservice integrations and temporary access.\n\n```bash\naws kms create-grant \\\n  --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk \\\n  --grantee-principal arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fmigration-tool \\\n  --operations Decrypt \\\n  --constraints '{\"EncryptionContextSubset\": {\"department\": \"finance\"}}' \\\n  --retiring-principal arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role\u002Fkms-admin\n```\n\n### Step 5: Aliases\n\n```bash\naws kms create-alias --alias-name alias\u002Fpayments-cmk --target-key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n```\n\n- Prefix `alias\u002F` mandatory. `alias\u002Faws\u002F*` reserved for AWS-managed keys.\n- Can be updated to point at a different key (rotation cutover).\n- Name after the workload (`alias\u002Fpayments-cmk`), not generic (`alias\u002Fmy-key`).\n\n### Step 6: Automatic rotation\n\n```bash\naws kms enable-key-rotation --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\n```\n\n- **Symmetric CMKs**: annual auto-rotation. ARN, ID, policy unchanged.\n  Existing ciphertext remains decryptable.\n- **Asymmetric \u002F HMAC**: do NOT support auto-rotation. Manual rotation\n  required (create new key, update alias, re-encrypt).\n- **Multi-Region primaries**: cannot auto-rotate (would desync replicas).\n- **Custom key store (CloudHSM)**: supports auto-rotation since 2023.\n- **On-demand rotation (2024-2025)**: `kms:RotateKeyOnDemand` triggers\n  immediate rotation for eligible symmetric keys.\n\n### Step 7: Multi-Region keys (primary + replicas)\n\n```bash\n# Primary (multi-Region)\naws kms create-key --description \"Payments CMK (primary)\" \\\n  --origin AWS_KMS --multi-region --policy file:\u002F\u002Fpolicy.json\n\n# Replica in us-west-2\naws kms replicate-key \\\n  --key-id arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key\u002F\u003Cprimary-key-id> \\\n  --replica-region us-west-2 --policy file:\u002F\u002Freplica-policy.json\n```\n\nEach replica shares key material with the primary but has an INDEPENDENT\nkey policy. Multi-Region keys CANNOT auto-rotate. Use for cross-Region DR,\nglobal DynamoDB table encryption, cross-Region EBS snapshot restore.\n\n### Step 8: Custom key store (CloudHSM)\n\nFor FIPS 140-2 Level 3 compliance or regulatory key custody:\n\n```bash\n# 1. CloudHSM cluster must be ACTIVE with >= 2 HSMs\naws cloudhsmv2 describe-clusters\n\n# 2. Create custom key store linked to the CloudHSM cluster\naws kms create-custom-key-store \\\n  --custom-key-store-name payments-hsm-keystore \\\n  --cloud-hsm-cluster-id cluster-xxx \\\n  --trust-anchor certificate.pem \\\n  --key-store-admin-credentials \u003Ckmsuser-password> \\\n  --hsm-credentials \u003Chsm-password>\n\n# 3. Connect the key store\naws kms connect-custom-key-store --custom-key-store-id cks-xxx\n\n# 4. Create key in the custom key store\naws kms create-key --custom-key-store-id cks-xxx \\\n  --description \"Payments CMK (CloudHSM)\" --policy file:\u002F\u002Fpolicy.json\n```\n\nRules:\n- `kmsuser` CU must be logged out before KMS connects.\n- Cluster must have >= 2 active HSMs across different AZs.\n- Supports `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`, `RSA_*`, `ECC_*`, `HMAC_256`.\n- A disconnected key store blocks all Encrypt\u002FDecrypt on its keys.\n\n### Step 9: Deletion window\n\n```bash\naws kms schedule-key-deletion --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk --pending-window-in-days 30\n```\n\n- Window: 7-30 days. Default is 30 days. For production, ALWAYS set 30 days.\n- Deletion is IRREVERSIBLE — once the window expires, the key material is\n  destroyed and all ciphertext encrypted under the key becomes permanently\n  unrecoverable.\n- The key is in `PendingDeletion` state during the window. It can be\n  cancelled with `CancelKeyDeletion`.\n- During `PendingDeletion`, the key CANNOT be used for Encrypt or\n  GenerateDataKey, but CAN be used for Decrypt (so existing data can be\n  migrated to a new key).\n\n### Step 10: Tagging + verification\n\n```bash\naws kms tag-resource --key-id \u003Ckey-id> \\\n  --tags '[{\"TagKey\":\"Environment\",\"TagValue\":\"production\"}]'\naws kms describe-key --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\naws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk\naws kms get-key-policy --key-id \u003Ckey-id> --policy-name default\n```\n\n## Envelope encryption and cross-account access\n\n**Envelope encryption:** KMS has a 4 KB payload limit. Use\n`GenerateDataKey` to get a plaintext data key + encrypted data key, encrypt\npayloads client-side (AWS Encryption SDK), store ciphertext + encrypted key.\nDecrypt by calling `Decrypt` on the encrypted data key.\n\n```bash\naws kms generate-data-key --key-id alias\u002Fpayments-cmk \\\n  --key-spec AES_256 \\\n  --encryption-context '{\"department\":\"finance\",\"app\":\"payments\"}'\n\naws kms decrypt --ciphertext-blob fileb:\u002F\u002Fencrypted-data-key.bin \\\n  --encryption-context '{\"department\":\"finance\",\"app\":\"payments\"}'\n```\n\nThe encryption context is authenticated AAD — MUST be identical on Encrypt\nand Decrypt. Full reference in `references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md`.\n\n**Cross-account access:** KMS is a \"both-must-allow\" service. Account A's\nkey policy must grant account B, AND account B's IAM must grant the KMS\nactions. A missing key policy statement fails silently with\n`AccessDeniedException`. Full reference in\n`references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md`.\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge-case quick list moved verbatim to\n`references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md` (load on demand).\n\n## Workload matrix\n\n| Workload | KeySpec | Rotation | Multi-Region | Origin | Notes |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| EBS \u002F S3 \u002F RDS \u002F Lambda env vars | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Default for AWS service integration |\n| DynamoDB \u002F Aurora \u002F SQS \u002F SNS | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Use CMK for full control |\n| Secrets Manager | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | No | AWS_KMS | One CMK per secret-class |\n| Code signing (Signer) | `RSA_4096` SIGN_VERIFY | Manual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Cannot auto-rotate |\n| JWT \u002F API tokens | `HMAC_256` | Manual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Cannot auto-rotate |\n| Cross-Region DR | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Manual | YES | AWS_KMS | Replica per Region |\n| FIPS \u002F regulatory | `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` | Annual | No | CloudHSM | Custom key store |\n| Document signing | `ECC_NIST_P384` SIGN_VERIFY | Manual | Optional | AWS_KMS | Lower latency than RSA |\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\n2024-2026 feature details moved verbatim to\n`references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md` (load on demand).\n\n## NEVER (top 5 — full list of 13 anti-patterns in references)\n\n- NEVER create a CMK without the account root as break-glass\n  (`{\"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::\u003Caccount>:root\"}` with `kms:*`). Without root,\n  an accidental lockout is unrecoverable — AWS support cannot help.\n- NEVER grant `kms:*` to any non-root principal. Use scoped statements for\n  users (Encrypt\u002FDecrypt\u002FGenerateDataKey) vs administrators (Create*\u002FDisable*).\n- NEVER combine key administrator and key user into one role. Separation of\n  duties: admins manage lifecycle, users access data — never both.\n- NEVER skip automatic rotation on a `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT` CMK. Annual rotation\n  is free, invisible to callers, and limits blast radius of compromise.\n- NEVER delete a CMK without confirming no ciphertext is encrypted under it.\n  Audit CloudTrail for recent Encrypt\u002FGenerateDataKey usage.\n\n## Expert heuristic — choosing key spec, administrators, and users\n\n- **Key spec** — default to `SYMMETRIC_DEFAULT`. Choose asymmetric only for\n  public-key encryption, digital signatures verifiable outside AWS, or HMAC.\n- **Administrators** — one `kms-admin` role per security team. Lifecycle\n  actions only, NO `kms:Decrypt`.\n- **Users** — one role per application. Never grant to broad groups like\n  \"Developers\" — that lets engineers read production ciphertext.\n- **Break-glass** — root always in the policy with `kms:*`. Not a violation\n  of least privilege — it is the recovery path.\n- **Rotation** — symmetric: on; asymmetric\u002FHMAC: document manual procedure.\n- **Multi-Region** — only when needed (cross-Region DR, global tables).\n  Single-Region is the right default.\n- **Encryption context** — always include identifying fields like\n  `{\"app\":\"payments\",\"env\":\"prod\"}`. Scopes grants, provides audit trail.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any provisioning CLI)\n\nPre-flight command listing moved verbatim to\n`references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md` (load on demand).\n\n## Output format — MANDATORY literal labels\n\nWhen invoked with a key provisioning request, your ENTIRE response MUST\nbe the checklist block below. The labels are **case-sensitive all-caps\nkeywords** — write them EXACTLY as shown. Do NOT write a preamble. Start\nwith `KEY:` and stop after the `VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:` block.\n\n```text\nKEY: \u003Calias-or-key-id>\nVERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY | PREREQUISITES_MISSING\nCHECKLIST:\n  [✓]      Key spec — \u003CSYMMETRIC_DEFAULT | RSA_4096 | HMAC_256 | ...>\n  [✓]      Key usage — \u003CENCRYPT_DECRYPT | SIGN_VERIFY | GENERATE_VERIFY_MAC | KEY_AGREEMENT>\n  [✓]      Origin — \u003CAWS_KMS | AWS_CLOUDHSM | EXTERNAL_KEY_STORE>\n  [✓]      Key administrators — \u003Cadmin-role-arn> (lifecycle actions only, no Encrypt\u002FDecrypt)\n  [✓]      Key users — \u003Capp-role-arns> (Encrypt, Decrypt, GenerateDataKey)\n  [✓]      Root account break-glass — arn:aws:iam::\u003Caccount>:root (kms:*)\n  [✓]      Automatic rotation — \u003Cenabled annual | not supported for this spec>\n  [✓]      Alias — alias\u002F\u003Cname>\n  [✓]      Deletion window — \u003C7-30 days>\n  [✓]      Tags — \u003Ckey=value pairs>\n  [OPTIONAL] Multi-Region — \u003Cprimary only | primary + replicas in \u003Cregions>>\n  [OPTIONAL] Grants — \u003Cnone | service integrations>\nVERIFICATION_COMMANDS:\n  aws kms describe-key --key-id alias\u002F\u003Cname>\n  aws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id alias\u002F\u003Cname>\n  aws kms get-key-policy --key-id \u003Ckey-id> --policy-name default\n  aws kms list-aliases --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-resource-tags --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n  aws kms list-grants --key-id \u003Ckey-id>\n```\n\n**Status marker semantics:**\n- `[✓]` — applied and verified.\n- `[✗]` — NOT applied or misconfigured. Cite the gap.\n- `[OPTIONAL]` — recommended but not required for the workload type.\n- `[INPUT NEEDED]` — prerequisite value missing; operator must provide.\n\n**PREREQUISITES_MISSING verdict:** if any REQUIRED prerequisite is missing\n(administrator role ARN, application role ARN, CloudHSM cluster), the\nverdict is `PREREQUISITES_MISSING` with each gap listed.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [`references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md`](references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md) — full copy-pasteable CLI sequence for all 10 provisioning steps, Terraform\u002FCloudFormation equivalents, pre-flight safety checks.\n- [`references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md`](references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md) — key policy structure, grants, multi-Region, CloudHSM, envelope encryption, cross-account, edge-case handling.\n- [`references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md`](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — recent AWS features 2024-2026 (on-demand rotation, HMAC GA, ECDH, XKS, VPC endpoint policies).\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F KMS Cryptographic Key Provisioning.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS KMS Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Foverview.html\n- **KMS Key Policies** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fkey-policies.html\n- **KMS Key Spec** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fkms-developer-guide.html#concepts\n- **KMS Rotating Keys** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Frotate-keys.html\n- **KMS Multi-Region Keys** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fmulti-region-keys-overview.html\n- **KMS Custom Key Store** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fcustom-key-store-overview.html\n- **KMS Grants** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fgrants.html\n- **Envelope Encryption** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fkms\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fconcepts.html#enveloping\n- **KMS CLI Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fkms\u002F\n\n## References\n\n- `references\u002Fdeployment-cli-commands.md` — full copy-pasteable CLI command\n  sequence for all 10 provisioning steps, including Terraform equivalents.\n\n- `references\u002Fkey-policy-and-multiregion-guide.md` — deep reference on key\n  policy structure, multi-Region internals, CloudHSM lifecycle, envelope\n  encryption, cross-account access, full NEVER list, and edge-case handling.\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":41},{"tags":25,"phase":26,"author":27,"domain":28,"family":29,"version":30,"keywords":31,"task_type":32,"complexity":33,"entry_point":34,"skill_class":35,"when_to_use":36,"dependencies":37,"requires_llm":38,"verdict_shape":39,"lifecycle_status":40,"supports_pipeline":38},"aws, kms, security, cloudops, deploy, encryption, key-policy, multi-region","1","Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder","aws-cloudops","Security","0.1.0","aws, kms, security, cloudops, deploy, provisioning, encryption, key-policy, cmk, envelope-encryption, multi-region, cloudhsm, key-rotation, asymmetric, grants","deploy","high","false","capability","Invoke when the user wants to create a new KMS customer-managed key (CMK), provision a multi-Region key, configure a CloudHSM custom key store key, validate a key policy for least-privilege, enable automatic rotation, set up cross-account access, or generate deployment CLI \u002F IaC templates. Do NOT invoke for AWS-managed default keys (S3, EBS, DynamoDB defaults — these are not customer-controllable), or for TLS certificate key material (use ACM).","aws-orchestrator","true","READY_TO_DEPLOY | PREREQUISITES_MISSING","active","Requires an LLM agent runtime (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). For live deployment: AWS CLI v2 with kms, iam, cloudhsm, ram, and sts access. Works with Terraform aws_kms_key \u002F aws_kms_alias \u002F aws_kms_grant resources, CloudFormation AWS::KMS::Key \u002F AWS::KMS::Alias, and SAM templates.","main","eeace51bd5dd1db2030729d83eeab988861553aa","skills\u002Fkms-key-deployer",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan","CTO & Co-Founder @Beever-AI  & @votee. CAISP. AWS Community Builder. Organizer@GDGCloudHK. MongoDB Champion. 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AWS X-Ray distributed tracing with production-grade configuration: X-Ray daemon deployment (EC2 systemd, ECS sidecar, EKS DaemonSet, Lambda built-in), SDK instrumentation (Java, Python, Node.js, Go, .NET) with annotations and metadata, sampling rules (default reservoir + rate vs custom rules with URL \u002F method \u002F service-name predicates), service map generation, trace query and retrieval, groups and insights, CloudWatch ServiceLens integration, IAM permissions (PutTraceSegments, GetSamplingRules), and latest features (Lambda Powertools tracing, OpenTelemetry \u002F ADOT Collector support, W3C trace context). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when enabling X-Ray on a new application, adding tracing to ECS \u002F EKS \u002F Lambda, validating a sampling configuration, or generating daemon deployment CLI and IaC templates. Triggers: X-Ray, distributed tracing, X-Ray daemon, sampling rules, service map, X-Ray SDK, OpenTelemetry, ADOT, Lambda Powertools, CloudWatch ServiceLens.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxray-tracing-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":147,"name":148,"nameZh":6,"description":149,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":150,"categories":151,"keywords":152,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADTVJ7DCBM9CB1FY51GH7J","wellarchitected-workload-auditor","Audits AWS Well-Architected Tool workloads for review staleness, per-pillar high-risk issue counts, milestone tracking gaps, and remediation plan completeness. Emits a deterministic verdict (STALE_REVIEW | HIGH_RISK | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per workload with per-pillar risk breakdown, milestone trend analysis, and specific remediation. Use when reviewing Well-Architected workloads, checking WA review freshness, auditing high-risk issues per pillar, validating milestone coverage, or tracking remediation plans.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-workload-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":154,"name":155,"nameZh":6,"description":156,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":157,"categories":158,"keywords":159,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADT59G6FTTNZYHT2QRPNNP","wellarchitected-review-operator","Operates AWS Well-Architected Tool reviews end-to-end — creates workloads, runs pillar reviews (operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, Prosperity), answers questions with risk-tier rationale, generates reports and improvement plans, creates milestones, and integrates with Trusted Advisor and Well-Architected Labs. Runs deterministic pre-checks (workload existence, lens availability, pillar coverage), emits the exact update-answer \u002F get-consolidated-report CLI behind a CONFIRM gate, and verifies risk-tier transitions. Emits READY | BLOCKED | COMPLETED. Use when creating a workload, answering pillar questions, generating an improvement plan, creating a milestone, or integrating with Trusted Advisor. Triggers: well-architected tool, well architected review, workload review, pillar, operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, prosperity, improvement plan, milestone, trusted advisor.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-review-operator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":161,"name":162,"nameZh":6,"description":163,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":164,"categories":165,"keywords":166,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADSH5JA9QHNPPHQCD7EVA7","wafv2-web-acl-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 Web ACLs with correct production defaults: scope selection (CLOUDFRONT vs REGIONAL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, SQLiRuleSet, LinuxRuleSet, WindowsRuleSet, IPReputationList, BotControlRuleSet, AmazonIpReputationList, ATP), custom rules (byte match, IP set, regex pattern, geo match, size constraint, rate-based), rule priority ordering, logging destinations (Kinesis Firehose, CloudWatch Logs, S3), resource association (ALB, API Gateway, CloudFront), rate-based rules with aggregate keys (IP, forwarded IP), Challenge and CAPTCHA actions, and account takeover prevention. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist. Use when creating a Web ACL, attaching managed rules, configuring rate limiting, enabling WAF logging, associating a Web ACL with an ALB\u002FAPI Gateway\u002FCloudFront, or configuring CAPTCHA\u002FChallenge actions. Triggers: create WAF Web ACL, WAFv2, managed rule groups, WAF rate limiting, WAF logging, WAF CAPTCHA, WAF Challenge action, bot control, ATP managed rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":168,"name":169,"nameZh":6,"description":170,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":171,"categories":172,"keywords":173,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X","wafv2-web-acl-auditor","Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":175,"name":176,"nameZh":6,"description":177,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":178,"categories":179,"keywords":180,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADR8W7G72JX4KFGN03QK8Q","waf-rule-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwaf-rule-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]